A genealogy of the balance of power by Andersen, Morten Skumsrud
 
 
 
 
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
A Genealogy of the Balance of Power 
 
 
 
Morten Skumsrud Andersen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the 
London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 
London, January 2016. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Declaration    
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London 
School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly 
indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by 
me and any other person is clearly identified in it).   
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full 
acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.   
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third 
party.    
I declare that my thesis consists of 104,177 words.   
 
Statement of use of third party for editorial help  
I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar 
by Susan Høivik. 
  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The Balance of Power is one of the foundational concepts for the academic 
discipline of International Relations. Most treat it as a theoretical or analytical 
concept – a tool that scholars use to investigate the workings of world politics. 
However, there is a gap in the literature on the balance of power; it is also a 
concept used by political practitioners and diplomats in concrete debates and 
disputes throughout centuries. No one has systematically investigated the concept 
as a ‘category of practice’, and I seek to redress this omission. I ask, how, why, 
and with what effects has the balance of power concept been deployed across 
different contexts? This is important, because the discipline needs to investigate 
the histories of its dominant concepts – the balance of power deserves attention as 
an object of analysis in its own right. I combine a genealogical reading (by what 
accidents of history did we end up here?) with conceptual history (how was the 
balance used then as a rhetorical resource in making arguments?). The result is a 
history of practical international thought. I trace the trajectory of the balance of 
power concept empirically and concretely – from its emergence in England based 
on a domestic republican tradition, to its elaboration at the British-founded 
University of Göttingen in Hanover, on to Prussia and Germany, before finally 
ending up in the USA with the emergence of IR as a discipline. Throughout this 
trajectory, the concept of the balance of power has been centrally linked to what 
historical actors took to be European polities and their relations. In this trajectory, 
‘shifts’ in the balance of power, is governed more by how the concept itself is 
deployed, than any material or territorial assessment of power alone, or by any 
deliberate refinement of the concept. It has affected and constituted international 
politics and foreign policies across time, as well as our own discipline of IR.  
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Preface 
 
Once the scaffolding has been dismantled, it can be difficult to fathom certain processes 
important for understanding the construction of a project – also with an academic 
dissertation. The Preface is conventionally the place to mention them. 
Over the course of the past three years, this project has changed in two important ways. 
Firstly, I decided to start the genealogy in the mid-1600s – later than originally intended, 
given what seemed to be the almost routine invocation of the ‘ancient roots’ of the 
concept. In fact, as I came to realise, the balance of power became a concept public 
enough to be used in political controversies only in the mid-17th century. This proved 
fortunate, as the amount of historical, empirical work invested has in any case proven 
quite substantial and at times exhausting – again more than initially expected.  
The second major change concerns the problem or puzzle in focus. Because I have 
wanted to examine the balance of power as a concept used in historical practice, as 
distinct from a theoretical tool used in modern-day analytical practice within the field of 
International Relations, I begin by framing the research puzzle as an opposition between 
the balance of power as analytical statement, and the balance of power as participant 
practice. However, it emerged, distinguishing between these two ways of approaching the 
balance of power is itself an effect of the historical trajectory of the concept in use. As a 
result, this project also claims to have established the conditions of possibility for my 
framing of this puzzle in the first place. That does not invalidate the research question, 
but it adds a reflexive layer to the project: the discipline of IR, with the debate between 
‘practice’ and ‘theory’, should be seen as yet another effect of the historical trajectory of 
balance-of-power rhetoric. Reflecting on my own research question and this project as I 
go along, as part of the discipline which is also an effect of balance-of-power rhetoric, I 
therefore critique myself in real time, as Daniel Levine has succinctly put it.1  
                                                          
1 Levine, Daniel J. 2012. Recovering International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 18. 
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That is, by exploring the practical usage of the concept, I have also explained the initial 
situation. At least it is my hope that T.S. Eliot’s words from Four Quartets might ring 
true: “We shall not cease from exploration / And the end of all our exploring / Will be to 
arrive where we started / And know the place for the first time.” 
 
 
Oslo, December 2015 
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Introduction 
 
International Relations (IR) has generally treated the balance of power as an analytical 
theory moulded by scholars – but in the empirics of how this concept has actually been 
applied by diplomats and politicians for over 350 years there lies a hidden world of power 
politics that concerns far more than a stable distribution of capabilities. Taken seriously as 
an empirical phenomenon, the balance of power is not solely about the balance of power 
at all. 
The analytical concept has been criticised, among other things, for not providing an 
efficient tool for explaining international phenomena. Still, its prevalence within the 
discipline of IR endures. Balance of power theory as we know it has become one of the 
foundational, analytical theories in the discipline – not because it depicts international 
reality efficiently but because it, for an array of other reasons, became a central concept 
of political practice during the historical evolution of European international politics. 
Modern academics have adopted this politically and rhetorically strategic concept, 
without reflecting on its varied and distinct uses in the world of policy, as against the 
world of academic knowledge.  
The first goal of this project is to investigate systematically how, why, and with what 
effects the balance of power has been used in practice by diplomatic and political actors 
in their political and intellectual projects in various contexts since the mid-1600s. When 
concepts are treated as ‘analytical categories’, the goal is often to make the concepts as 
context-independent as possible. Context is however crucial in studying a concept as 
‘practical category’.  
On another level of analysis, categories such as ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’, and any 
transitions from one to the other, can be studied in their own right as empirical 
phenomena of the social world. Because of the important connexions between practical 
and analytical categories in IR, a second, more reflexive, goal here is to explain the 
processes whereby the balance of power as an object named in the terms of practical 
everyday language transited into an ‘object named by the terms of a discipline-specific 
terminological repertoire’, itself ‘defined and differentiated in the process of being 
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associated with the terms of such a repertoire’.1 An investigation of the balance of power 
as deployed in practical use will also shed light on how the analytical concept emerged 
and developed in the scholarly discipline of IR. As a ‘genealogy’ of the concept – a term 
which I clarify in Chapter 1 – this will be ‘an attempt to read the present in terms of the 
past by writing the past in terms of the present’.2 Indeed, our present-day condition is in 
important ways the reason why ‘the balance of power’ can be seen as meriting historical 
attention in the first place.  
Therefore, these two goals are interrelated. In this project, the analytical, often structural, 
theory of the balance of power in IR is of interest less for the substantive explanations it 
offers about international politics, and more as a result of the contingent historical 
trajectories under investigation. When I choose to confront the analytical category of the 
balance of power empirically, this means that the IR discipline is both analytical 
standpoint and historical effect.3 This interrelation, as argued in Chapter 1, can be best 
captured by combining a genealogical reading with a more ‘nitty-gritty’ exploration of 
controversies and debates, showing the uses and effects of the concept in and across 
contexts.  
This is both a highly empirical and theoretical project, but I assume no definition of the 
‘international’, or what international politics really is. With some minimalist starting 
assumptions, I set out to look for instances where the balance of power has been used in 
controversies, to see the picture of international politics that emerges. I treat the balance 
of power as a concept, and concepts as relational: concepts exist solely by virtue of their 
relation to other concepts and concerns; and concepts cannot be studied apart from their 
use, where processes of contingently linking concepts to other issues are crucial.  
Such links have been recurrently made between the balance of power and the nature of 
polities or states, their relations, and a purported system or structure. This history of how 
the concept has been used, and of the ways historical actors have linked it to other 
concerns, is thus by implication also the history of how actors have differentiated between 
                                                          
1 Scholz, Bernhard F. 1998. ‘Conceptual History in Context: Reconstructing the Terminology of an 
Academic Discipline’, pp. 87–101 in Iain Hampsher-Monk et al. (eds) History of Concepts: Comparative 
Perspectives. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, p. 87.  
2 Lindstrom, Lamont. 1982. ‘Leftamap Kastom: the Political History of Tradition on Tanna, Vanuatu’, 
Mankind 13(4):316–329, p. 317.  
3 Walker, Rob B.J. 1993. Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 5–8. 
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polities, how they have considered the relations between these polities, and their relation 
to an international system, seen through the lens of the concept of the balance of power.  
However, I do this by treating the balance of power as a ‘category of practice’,4 focusing 
on the participants in balance-of-power politics. This is a history of practical international 
thought. 
Starting with few assumptions about either international politics or the study thereof, I 
find that when approached as practical international thought, the balance of power is not 
really about the balance of power as we know it at all. The stability or instability of the 
international system or the international order has less to do with the phenomenon of the 
balance of power as such, and more to do with how that concept has been applied in 
practice. Put differently, even though it concerns a concept, this is a study of the 
signifiers, not of the signified. It is the contingent linking of the balance of power concept 
to other concerns that has effects.  
I trace the trajectory of the balance of power concept empirically and concretely – from 
its emergence in England based on a domestic republican tradition, to its elaboration at 
the British-founded University of Göttingen in Hanover, on to Prussia and Germany, 
before finally ending up in the USA with the emergence of IR as a discipline. Throughout 
this trajectory, the concept of the balance of power has been centrally linked to what 
historical actors took to be European polities and their relations. As we shall see, this 
changed dramatically during the timespan under study here.  
This has profound implications for how we think about the balance-of-power concept in 
the discipline: by systematically analysing and documenting its use in practice, I show 
how the deployment of the concept itself has had consequences, and has in fact been a 
crucially important concept – but in other, more concrete, ways than normally imagined. 
It has affected and constituted international politics and foreign policies across time. I 
investigate how the concept became central in IR, and how it is the result of the lack of a 
distinct Weberian moment of abstract reflection, which has made the discipline different 
from other social sciences.  
Knowing the practical history of the balance of power implies knowing how to use the 
concept in correct ways. Isolating the concept as exclusively an analytical tool, or 
                                                          
4 Brubaker, Rogers and Frederick Cooper. 2000. ‘Beyond “identity”’, Theory and Society 29(1):1–47, p. 4. 
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confusing analytical and empirical statements, means overlooking important phenomena 
in world politics, and leads to inconsistent and erroneous uses of the concept. The balance 
of power is not a realist concept, it does not exist ‘out there’, and it is not solely an 
analytical model: it has had concrete effects on politics and social configurations, and not 
least, on the trajectory of the international system, and the polities comprising it, at 
critical junctures and inflection points in the course of the past 350 years.  
 
The context: The balance of power as a master concept in IR  
From the international lawyers and historians preceding the formation of the IR 
discipline, throughout the interwar years, to Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International 
Politics, Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, and contemporary theories 
of US hegemony or retrenchment, the balance of power has been at the centre of debate in 
academic International Relations. It is frequently asserted that the idea of the balance of 
power has been a constant feature of international politics ever since the ancient Greeks, 
and is therefore well-suited as a scholarly tool for analysing historical empires and 
ancient political systems.  
‘No other single proposition about international politics’, Brooks and Wohlforth write, 
‘has attracted more scholarly effort than the balance of power. It is perhaps as central in 
today’s thinking as it has been at any time since the Enlightenment’.5 Sheehan labels it 
‘one of the most important concepts in history’.6  
Three of the most central IR publications on the modern concept of the balance of power 
– by Hans Morgenthau, Hedley Bull and Kenneth Waltz7  – are flanked by an array of 
writings on the concept, debating such issues as whether it promotes peace or war, 
whether it is European or also extra-European, if there is one balance or also various sub-
balances; also, the connexions between balancing and deterrence, the balance of power as 
a mechanical-structural system or as intentional foreign policy prescription, whether it 
                                                          
5 Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. 2008. World Out of Balance: International Relations and 
the Challenge of American Primacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p 7. 
6 Sheehan, Michael J. 1996. The Balance of Power: History and Theory. London: Routledge, p. 1. 
7 Morgenthau, Hans. 1948. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf; Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: 
Columbia University Press; Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
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guarantees the independence of all states or only of the ‘great powers’, to mention only 
some.8  
Although primarily associated with realism in IR, the concept is discussed in other 
approaches as well. For instance, Richard Little investigates the balance of power  as 
‘metaphor, myth and model’ from an English School perspective,9 Stacie Goddard 
connects the scholarly defined balance-of-power concept to a constructivist theory of 
legitimation and rhetorical coercion,10 and other authors to be mentioned in the coming 
chapters, like Ian Clark and Andreas Osiander, hold similar perspectives.11 Also 
international historians of various leanings have discussed the concept. However, as I will 
show, most of this literature confuses analytical and empirical claims, and the concept as 
category of practice and as a tool of scholarly analysis.  
However, others have lamented the state of balance-of-power theory. One problem 
frequently stressed is that the concept ‘has too many meanings’12 and is ‘vague’.13 The 
early writings on the balance of power had ‘considerable defects’, since they failed to 
distinguish between the different meanings of the concept. There was little ‘logical 
coherence’ or ‘analytical acuteness’;14 ‘very often it was no more than a phrase used to 
inhibit thought. Frequently appealed to, it was seldom analysed in real depth or 
                                                          
8 See inter alia Nelson, Ernest W. 1943. ‘The Origins of Modern Balance of Power Politics’, Mediavalia et 
Humanistica 1:124–142; Vagts, Alfred. 1948. ‘The Balance of Power: Growth of an Idea’, World Politics 
1(1):82–101; Haas, Ernst B. 1953. ‘The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?’, World 
Politics 5(4):442–477; Gulick, Edward Vose. 1955. Europe’s Classical Balance of Power: A Case History 
of the Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft. Ithaca: Greenwood Press; 
Claude, Inis L. 1962. Power and International Relations. New York: Random House; Snyder, Glenn 
Herald. 1965. The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror. San Francisco: Chandler; Seabury, Paul 
(ed.). 1965. Balance of Power. San Francisco: Chandler; Wright, Moorhead (ed.). 1975. Theory and 
Practice of the Balance of Power, 1486–1914: Selected European Writings. London: Dent; Lider, Julian. 
1986. Correlation of Forces. Aldershot: Gower; Little, Richard. 1989. ‘Deconstructing the Balance of 
Power: Two Traditions of Thought’, Review of International Studies 15(2):87–100; Schroeder, Paul. W. 
1989. ‘The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?’, Review of 
International Studies 15(2):135–153. 
9 Little, Richard. 2007. The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
10 Goddard, Stacie E. 2009. ‘When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of 
Power’, International Security 33(3): 110–142. 
11 Clark, Ian. 2005. Legitimacy in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Osiander, 
Andreas. 1994. The States System of Europe 1640–1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International 
Stability. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
12 Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory, p 2. 
13 Claude, Inis L. 1989. ‘The balance of power revisited’, Review of International Studies 15(02): 77–85. 
14 Anderson. Matthew Smith. 1993. The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450–1919. London: Longman, p. 150. 
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formulated with genuine rigour’.15 Paul Schroeder laments ‘the ambiguous nature of the 
concept and the numerous ways it has been defined, the various distinct and partly 
contradictory meanings given to it in practice and the divergent purposes it serves […] 
and the apparent failure of attempts to define balance of power as a system and specify its 
operating rules’.16 Sheehan, in consequence, emphasises all the ‘incorrect usages’ of the 
term: ‘an incorrect usage remains that even if it is used frequently’, he argues,17 and such 
wrong usage comes ‘at the expense of clear comprehension’.18 Still, the typical analytical 
move in the literature is to acknowledge the various meanings and uses, while trying to 
identify a ‘core meaning’, or a ‘central proposition’ of the concept. Sheehan proposes its 
meaning can be ‘discovered’, even if the concept has too many meanings.19 As shown 
below, I hold a rather different view on the heterogeneity and correctness of its use. 
Contemporary debates over the balance of power as a concept range from denials that a 
balance-of-power system is or ever has been operating – more frequently, the assertion of 
the same – to sophisticated attempts at improving or amending the concept by introducing 
notions of ‘soft balancing’, or associated explanations like ‘bandwagoning’, ‘buck-
passing’ or ‘hegemonic transition’.20 But despite criticisms, with some arguing that 
classical balance-of-power theories no longer apply to international politics, and despite 
the fact that social scientists outside of the IR discipline have shown scant interest in the 
concept,21 the balance of power has been and remains a particularly important concept in 
international politics and for the academic discipline of IR. Abandoning the concept 
altogether is therefore not desirable, as that would mean ignoring all the uses, 
experiences, and utterances of actual actors who have been using this term massively, 
albeit variably, throughout history.  
                                                          
15 Matthew Smith Anderson, quoted in Black, Jeremy. 1983. ‘The Theory of the Balance of Power in the 
First Half of the Eighteenth Century: a Note on Sources’, Review of International Studies 9(01):55–61, p. 
55. 
16 Schroeder, ‘The Nineteenth Century System’, p. 135. See e.g. Haas, ‘The Balance of Power’ for a list of 
multiple definitions. See also Butterfield, Herbert and Martin Wight (eds) 1966. Diplomatic Investigations. 
London: George Allen & Unwin, p. 151. 
17 Sheehan. The Balance of Power: History and Theory , p.15. 
18 Ibid., p. 23. 
19 Ibid., p. 1. 
20 Wright, Quincy. 1983[1942]. A Study of War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Organski, Abramo 
F. K. 1968. World Politics. New York: Knopf.; Walt, Stephen M. 1987. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press; Christensen, Thomas J. and Jack Snyder. 1990. ‘Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: 
Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity’, International Organization 44(2):137–168; Wohlforth, 
William C., Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur 
Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and William L. Brenner. 2007. ‘Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World 
History’, European Journal of International Relations 13(2):155–185. 
21 Little, The Balance of Power, p. 49. 
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Simply eliminating the concept would leave us with a ‘surplus’ of very central historical 
empirical material that cannot be accounted for. We would find ourselves concentrating 
on some alternative analytical concept to that of the balance of power, imposing it on 
historical actors without taking into account what they were actually saying, meaning, and 
knowing when they referred to ‘the balance of power’. To ignore the ways in which the 
concept has been used across different contexts as a ‘category of practice’ and not only as 
scholarly analytical tool would be to cut short an array of historical empirics of use which 
has also had effects on foreign policy and international politics – and on how the present-
day concept of the balance of power concept has become so central to IR. 
Therefore, my purpose is not to criticise or demolish the concept of the balance of power 
or the actors using it. This would be to deny its long genealogy, and to ignore the crucial 
ways in which it has shaped historical trajectories, the IR discipline included. Rather, I 
will criticise the stories that are typically told about it.22 
 
The problem: Why a genealogy of the balance of power matters  
The balance of power has been thoroughly explored in almost all strands of IR theory, so 
it would seem that little new can be said about the concept, other than applying it to new 
cases to corroborate or refute its analytical usefulness. Do we really need yet another 
study of the balance of power – which is already one of the most meticulously 
investigated analytical concepts in IR? 
Being a part of this discipline has obvious advantages for trying to understand what is 
going on within it. However, unreflective membership can have its disadvantages, not 
least since presuppositions and routine practices in the discipline may themselves be 
potentially problematic and in need of explanation.23 In IR, the self-evident way to go 
about investigating the concept, it seems, is to treat the success of balance-of-power 
theory as its own explanation. 
                                                          
22 Shapin, Steven. 1996. The Scientific Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 165. 
23 Shapin, Steven and Simon Schaffer. 1985. Leviathan and the Air-Pump. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, p. 5. 
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Against how the balance of power is normally treated, I argue that the balance of power is 
not really about the Balance of Power as we know it at all, but about an array of other 
concerns. The reason for this – which is a central observation in this project – is that the 
balance of power as a concept is not only an analytical and observational category of 
present-day analysis, a theoretical tool for scholars to make sense of international politics, 
but has also been central to how practitioners have made sense of their surroundings and 
have promoted their political projects for more than 350 years, denominating the practical 
knowledge of historical actors.24 In controversies and policy debates, the balance-of-
power concept has emerged, been deployed, and changed through contingently linking it 
to other concerns. The ‘balance of power’ was historically a concept of participants in 
diplomatic practices, only later put to systematic, analytical use – first by the realist 
tradition. An ‘experience-distant’ analytical category is based on the balance of power as 
developed and deployed by historically situated social actors.25 The problem is that there 
is no reason to believe that historical categories of practice match current analytical 
categories, so the contextual uses and deployments of the balance of power need not be 
investigated through the analytical tool of balance of power theory. There are, in fact, no 
logical connexions between the two categories. One can investigate how the balance of 
power became a socially powerful concept – but by conflating analytical and practical 
categories, one reifies and reproduces a political concept within academia. In a way, 
theoretical analysis inadvertently becomes part of practical politics. And this is precisely 
the tension that IR theory has had to grapple with.26  
To my knowledge, no publication in IR on the balance of power has systematically 
separated the concept as theory from the concept in practical use as basis for analysis. 
Consequently, there has been no systematic analysis of how, why, and with what effects 
the balance of power and associated concepts have been used in practice across different 
contexts. Knowing this will mean knowing the history of a key concept of the IR 
discipline, and how that concept became central. The discipline needs to investigate the 
histories of its dominant concepts. This lack of attention is significant, because knowing 
the practical history of the balance of power means knowing how to use the concept in 
correct ways. Secondly, not knowing this would incur costs: it would mean not knowing 
                                                          
24 Brubaker and Cooper, ‘Beyond “identity”’, p. 4. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Guzzini, Stefano. 2004. ‘The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations’, European 
Journal of International Relations 10(4): 533–568. 
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the central importance of the balance of power as something that has concretely affected 
and constituted international politics and foreign policies across time. I find that it is 
indeed a crucial concept – but in other ways than normally imagined. Isolating the 
concept as analytical tool overlooks important phenomena in world politics. Only half of 
the concept’s potential is currently being realised, so to speak, and with the danger of 
realising it in inconsistent and wrong ways.  Also, there is value in decoupling the study 
of the balance of power from IR theories, realism in particular. The balance of power 
merits attention as an object of analysis in its own right.27 
 
What I will (and will not) do 
I will not use academic theories of the balance of power to detail and explain its 
workings. What I want to understand is the historically varying status of the ‘balance of 
power’ and associated concepts. Instead of relying on the balance of power as an 
analytical tool in searching for explanations and understanding of present and historical 
phenomena in international politics, I want to let the participants in balance-of-power 
politics specify what it means and consists of. I treat the balance of power as a concept: a 
resource that historical actors can seize on and use to make sense of relevant occurrences 
and events in their historical context.28 This is not a focus on ‘ideas’; neither do I consider 
the balance-of-power concept as existing ‘out there’ in the world. Given my assumptions 
in this study, the balance of power as a concept cannot be studied apart from its use in 
concrete controversies and debates, where it has been linked to other concerns, and has 
influenced the differentiation of polities and their relations to a perceived system. 
The balance of power is not explicitly mentioned by Thucydides or Machiavelli, although 
their writings are seen to represent the balance of power idea, as David Hume argued.29 
As I will show below, during the mid-1700s, the concept came under attack. In 1742, one 
rescue mission was undertaken by Hume, who sought to establish firmly that the balance 
of power had been a commonsensical idea, reconstructing a historical tradition from the 
                                                          
27 Nexon, Dan. 2009. ‘The Balance of Power in the Balance’, World Politics 61(2):330–359, p. 332. 
28 Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2006. ‘The Present as History’, pp. 490–500 in Robert E. Goodin and Charles 
Tilly (eds) The Oxford Handbook on Contextual Political Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 
497. 
29 Hume, David. 1987[1742]. ‘Of the Balance of Power’, pp. 332–341 in David Hume, Essays Moral 
Political and Literary. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
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ancient Greeks and up until his own time. Even if not expressed, the principle, he held, ‘is 
founded so much on common sense and obvious reasoning, that it is impossible it could 
altogether have escaped antiquity’;30 it had ‘naturally discovered itself in foreign 
politics’.31 Being the first to draw the line so far back in time, he constructed an age-old 
tradition of the balance of power against those seeking to question its very existence. And 
indeed, the balance of power had been occasionally mentioned throughout the 15th, 16th, 
and 17th centuries as a metaphor to describe a political situation. For instance, 
Machiavelli’s friend Francesco Guicciardini, in his Storia d’Italia, describes Italy as 
being in a ‘state of balance’ between the different city states. The English translation of 
this work from 1579 was dedicated to Elizabeth I, styled as the holder of the balance of 
power amongst Christian monarchs.32 Richard Little has established exactly this – how 
the balance of power has been invoked as metaphor and myth ever since Guicciardini.33 
However, despite brilliant analyses of modern IR scholars, Little’s book is not really an 
historical investigation of how this ‘metaphor’ has been used across time: what he does is 
to sensibly categorise it as having had both ‘adversarial’ and ‘associational’ aspects.  
I will not search for the ‘origin’ of the balance of power, in the sense of when it was first 
mentioned, or the like. Neither is it my goal to investigate how the balance developed 
teleologically until today – as Michael Sheehan could be taken to imply when he writes 
that the balance in Renaissance Italy was not ‘a fully developed form’, and that 
‘important elements of the theory were missing’, and had to ‘await the evolution of the 
interstate system’.34 Instead of starting with Renaissance Italy, I begin in the mid-17th 
century. That is because I am investigating the balance of power as a concept. Unlike 
Little, I do not take up the instances when the balance of power has been mentioned as a 
metaphor, as a description by analogy. Rather, by treating it as a concept, I start the 
investigation when, as I show, the balance of power became so public that it could be use 
in political debates, contentions, and controversies, as a rhetorical ‘weapon’, linked to 
other concerns. This requires something more than status as merely an infrequently 
invoked descriptive metaphor, similar to ‘soft power’ or ‘broken heart’. It requires a 
certain stability, which came about at a particular moment in time, in this case linked to 
                                                          
30 Ibid., p. 337. 
31 Ibid., p. 334. 
32 Sheehan, The Balance of Power, p. 35. 
33 Little, The Balance of Power. 
34 Sheehan, The Balance of Power, p. 32. 
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domestic republican arguments. In Chapter 2, I analyse exactly how this stability came 
about – when the balance of power emerged as a concept.  
My focus is therefore on how relations are made in practice; on shifting social processes 
and constellations, and how this in turn produces boundaries and concepts. Taking for 
granted that there is a dichotomy between IR theories and other forms of social analysis is 
therefore not a good starting point. As mentioned, I make few assumptions about what the 
international is, or what international politics is. I begin the empirical investigation with a 
few assumptions, to see where they can take me and with what results. 
What I mean by treating the balance of power as a concept is further detailed in Chapter 
1. For now, let me simply point out that the temporal limitations of this study are due to 
this analytical choice – to investigate the balance of power as a relative stable, publically 
available rhetorical resource to be used in both constructing and unravelling arguments 
and positions, and with tangible effects.  
Since I will not study the balance-of-power concept apart from its use, and since its use 
implies processes of linking the concept to other concerns, a genealogy of the balance of 
power will also by implication be a practical history of the international system. What I 
have seen emerge is also a history of how historical actors have linked the concept to 
other concerns, conceived of their polity or state, others’ polities, and how they stand in 
relation to each other and to the international ‘system’, whose definition is also part of the 
participant practices I investigate. Actors have held varying conceptions of what the 
polities were, and what the international system was. The balance-of-power concept 
provided the link between the two in varying ways across time and space – the balance of 
power could ‘fill in the gaps’, so to speak, between polities and the international system. 
It has been the central concept for arguing about system and stability – but has also, 
through its deployment, concretely affected that system. Arguing about stability may lead 
to instability, and vice versa.  
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How I will do it 
This way of treating the balance of power has consequences for how I have conducted my 
investigation and research. To substantiate the above claims, the following are what I 
have been looking for, and the data I have used in the search: 
 
Looking for controversies 
I have looked for controversies involving the balance-of-power concept. My methodical 
tool is to search for and examine episodes of controversy and conflict where the balance 
of power concept has been centrally involved. The advantage of this is that these 
controversies involve disagreements over the reality, properties, meanings, and 
implications of the concept of the balance of power, ‘whose existence and value are 
subsequently taken to be unproblematic or settled’.35 Furthermore, in such controversies, 
historical actors have attempted ‘to deconstruct the taken-for-granted quality of their 
antagonists’ preferred beliefs and practices’,36 precisely by drawing attention to their 
conventional status and, for instance, challenging either the artificiality of assumptions or 
the inexactness of their implications. Studying concepts in controversies is like studying a 
ship in a bottle. After the complicated process of inserting the parts, cutting the strings, 
applying the glue and letting it dry, the result seems almost magical. How the little vessel 
came to be made is difficult to fathom. The advantage, then, of looking at controversies is 
that these are unstable situations, allowing us to ‘catch a glimpse of the glue being 
inserted and the strings being pulled’.37  
The point is not to determine who was right in these disputes. At times, some version of 
the argument that historical actors were ‘misunderstanding’ the real meaning of the 
balance of power appears. Michael Sheehan, for example, revisits British debates over 
whether or not to go to war between 1733 and 1756, but with the aim of establishing 
whether these wars were really ‘balancing wars’ or not.38 His emphasis is on British 
                                                          
35 Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan, p. 7, emphasis added. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Potter, Jonathan. 1996. Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction. London: 
Sage, p. 26. 
38 Sheehan, Michael. 1996. ‘Balance of Power Intervention: Britain’s Decisions For or Against War, 1733–
56’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 7(2): 271–289. 
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motivations, and ‘only the War of the Austrian Succession can be readily identified as a 
war in defence of the Balance of Power’.39 Furthermore, the uses of the concept are still 
compared with an analytically fashioned Balance of Power.40 The focus is on the balance 
of power as a potential explanation for war, and for Britain as objective ‘balancer’. What 
is not relevant to Sheehan’s account is the historical actors’ own understanding of their 
situation, and the reasons and effects of this ‘exaggerated’ use of balancing rhetoric or 
self-conception as balancer. In the end, the goal is to prove or disprove the theory of the 
balance of power, in this instance whether Britain was ‘right’ or not in invoking the 
balance. I am not evaluating the correctness of the concept: the category of 
‘misunderstanding’ has no place in this project.41 A controversy is rather a window of 
opportunity for seeing how the balance of power has been used in practical 
argumentation, and with what effects.  
As I take my starting point in relations rather than ready-made analytical entities, 
controversies are seen not as clashes between established groups, but as dialogical and 
productive processes of forming positions on issues, with consequences and effects. Now 
that I have gone through centuries of source material, some episodes stand out in the 
above sense, thus being an analytical limitation. 
However, this is not a history project. What I am doing is firmly rooted in International 
Relations as a social science; and, in terms of ontology, theory, methodology, methods, or 
data collection, this statement is not altered by the fact that my empirical material is 
mainly taken from ‘the past’. However, this does affect the availability of data – which is 
a purely practical issue, no different from any other problem of access.  
As explained in Chapter 1, a genealogy is an exemplary and episodic history, not a 
covering history of the linear evolution of the concept. My limitations are therefore not so 
much temporal as substantial: balance-of-power rhetoric at elite levels has not been so 
frequent that reading to empirical exhaustion is impossible.  
Still, this requires a great deal in terms of narrowing down the range of data, the sites of 
debate, and actors. Some data and sources are more important than others – but how to 
decide? 
                                                          
39 Ibid., p. 287 
40 Ibid., p. 288. 
41 Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan, p. 12. 
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Coming to grips with England 
First, I do not use countries as ‘cases’. Country-units are less relevant than the 
relational/social processes associated with the concept of the balance of power – and 
these are transnational, even if they emerge from a country or a domestic setting.  
Even if the focus in many of the chapters is tilted towards England and Britain, Britain is 
not a ‘case study’, but a focal point for studying the emergence of and debates concerning 
the balance of power. This is, as I will show empirically, because the English debates 
prove to have contributed to making the balance of power a concept in important ways. 
England thereby came to be seen as crucial to the balance of power in Europe by 
historical actors themselves. During at least the 17th and 18th centuries, for most other 
countries, invoking the balance of power was a reaction, whereas in England it was seen 
as the continuation of a longstanding tradition.42 From the late 1600s, England considered 
itself, and was also appealed to by other nations, as the ‘holder of the balance of Europe’. 
Britain could argue from an almost institutionalised position as the ‘balancer’, for 
instance using this position to discredit the Austrians during the Utrecht negotiations in 
1712, as shown in Chapter 3. 
Furthermore, and pertaining to the genealogical precepts of this project, England is a case 
often raised in the historical and analytical literature on balance-of-power theory. For that 
reason alone, it makes sense to examine it from a different methodological perspective.  
That I focus on English texts is also the result of a more practical limitation: my own 
language abilities. I have consulted German and French sources where relevant, also 
secondary sources, but closer readings of a broader selection of primary documents in 
these languages would have been too time-consuming, given that I cannot read them with 
the same ease as I do English sources. That being said, the above-mentioned analytical 
arguments for focusing on English sources would in any case override this practical 
concern. 
 
 
                                                          
42 See Holbraad, Carsten. 1970. The Concert of Europe: A Study of German and British International 
Theory. London: Longman, p. 136. 
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A note on eurocentrism 
The balance of power as a concept emerged in Europe, and served to define what Europe 
was and what its interest was. In this sense, the concept is, empirically speaking, euro-
centric. Most historical actors saw events occurring outside of Europe as a mere sideshow 
for the really important thing: the balance of power in Europe.43 It is difficult to find 
central controversies involving the balance of power regarding overseas possessions or 
colonialism.  
That as such is not a problem. What may be problematic is how the concept has become 
an unreflective expression of the nature of international politics writ large. The problem 
here would be that it did not remain euro-centric in the transition from political practice 
to academic analysis: empirically speaking, it was applied exclusively to Europe, and at 
times explicitly to rule out other parts of the world as being Oriental Despotisms, 
uncivilized, and unable to practice the balance of power, lacking reason or modern state 
capabilities.  
Important work remains to be done on how subaltern actors in ‘peripheries’, including the 
early USA, have considered and argued about the structures of international politics. 
However, that is not my job here, as I focus on the actual deployment of the concept, 
which took place almost exclusively amongst European political and diplomatic elites. 
 
What I look at 
It is within these elites that I have identified the major controversies involving the balance 
of power as a concept. Since controversies, debates and contentions are important in this 
study, and the elite-level is the most prevalent site for debates on the balance, I examined 
parliamentary records of debates, speeches, and statements, combined with debates in the 
broader ‘public sphere’ as expressed in pamphlets, political literature, and opinion 
writing, to show the room and limits for rhetorical manoeuvre. Parliamentary debates are 
particularly well-suited, as they include lengthy statements, are public, and are publically 
                                                          
43 Simms, Brendan. 2007. Three Victories and a Defeat. London: Penguin. 
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contested.44 Further, in controversies, as in argumentation in general, giving reasons is 
essential. Diplomats are ‘trained to find reasons’,45 making it particularly instructive to 
study them and how they make use of the available rhetorical repertoire. I have used 
(mainly British) parliamentary archives, pamphlets and other published primary sources, 
as well as secondary accounts.  
I give no automatic priority to primary sources, but they are important, given my purpose. 
Primary sources have been crucial for identifying concrete controversies, debates, and 
processes of linking that have actually taken place. They have also been useful for 
challenging or corroborating more analytical, broad claims in the secondary sources, 
which I use mainly to establish the broader historical picture and context. 
It has been important to keep spaces open. For example, as the empirical investigation 
proceeded, I found it necessary to include the analysis and rhetoric of what came to be 
self-identified academic communities at an earlier point than I had expected, in the 18th 
century (see Chapter 4). 
 
… and how I look at it 
The context within a text also matters. Most of the time, there is something routine about 
mentions of the balance: the term is included without much elaboration. I have discarded 
hundreds of documents that mention the balance, but that provide little empirical leverage 
for making my points. That is in itself a finding – the routine aspects of the balance of 
power. But also, even if mentioned only once in a text, it might be mentioned in the 
preamble. And looking at other texts, I might find that it is repeatedly used in preambles. 
That says something about its status. Also, the term might be invoked at a particularly 
tense moment in a parliamentary debate, and/or totally change the debate by being 
introduced. Or it may be used ritually in a variety of other ways, thus making a change in 
such ritual use all the more evident. These things – uses in a context – make a difference, 
as I will show.  
                                                          
44 See Hansen, Lene. 2006. Security as Practice. London: Routledge, p. 82 et passim. 
45 Kiernan, Victor G. 1970. ‘Diplomats in Exile’, pp. 301–321 in Matthew Smith Anderson and Ragnhild 
Hatton (eds), Studies in Diplomatic History. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, p. 306. 
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Consequently, other tools than the mere enumeration and quantifying of the appearance 
of the string of words that is ‘the balance of power’ must be used. Some kinds of data are 
for me more important than others, but more important does not mean more frequent. The 
quantity or frequency of the mentions of the balance of power is not the point.  
The genealogy of the concept thus includes both long-term developments, and specific 
moments. As opposed to viewing the concept as somehow ‘timeless’ and unchanging, I 
organise the story of this around four inflection points in the trajectory of the concept, and 
one broader episteme shift. 
 
Structure and contents: Two epistemes, four inflection points  
I have looked for controversies, and have identified four inflection points in the uses of 
the concept, which for me are what connects balance-of-power rhetoric to concrete 
effects. Inflection points are rhetorically indeterminate situations, so I include these 
inflection points not in order to determine a match between perceptions and reality, but to 
detail a practical situation where one or more communities act to resolve a problem (see 
Chapter 1). 
What actors say and do is not about one-off choice situations, but about investigating the 
historical processes that have affected social configurations. The social, cultural, and 
historical context is a ‘structural’ constrain, because what counts are the relations and 
actual interactions between actors and positions, and not inherent dispositions of actors 
and positions. This goes beyond an argument ranking preferences, or based on individual 
interests.  
For me, an inflection point is therefore not a ‘choice situation’, but something that occurs 
when concepts suddenly expand or restrict the space for action. Inflection points are 
therefore important in causally explaining action.46 Treating the balance of power as a 
concept allows me to identify such inflection points empirically, not only in logical or 
abstract space, and thereby to move away from stable ideas, mental properties and the 
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Jordheim’. Nytt norsk tidsskrift 29(1): 59–66, p. 61. 
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philosophical, into the concretely political and rhetorical.47 Inflection points redirect a 
process, and are rhetorical and narrative because an inflection point, or a turning point, 
cannot exist without also establishing a new direction or new place to turn to – ‘not all 
sudden changes are turning points, but only those which are succeeded by a period 
evincing a new regime’.48 The historical events ‘themselves’, and when they happened, 
are less important than their potentially becoming inflection points in the history of the 
balance of power as a concept, marking shifts from one condition of possibility to 
another.  
To identify the four inflection points in the historical trajectory of the balance-of-power 
concept, I have looked for controversies where the balance of power has been invoked – 
and they seem to appear in the wake of wars and calamity. Concepts, as part of an 
available rhetorical repertoire, are crucial meaning-making tools after major crises, when 
order needs to be restored somehow. New questions and answers are posed about 
international politics, international order, the nature of political units, and the political 
‘system’. These inflection points are therefore also part of the relational history of how 
differentiation between polities and the conception of an international structure come 
about, are made sense of, and change by means of the balance-of-power concept.  
I have divided the structure of this project into four sections, each consisting of two 
chapters. Thus I address one inflection point in sets of two chapters. The balance of 
power is and has been a socially powerful rhetorical tool, and this must be explained. 
Therefore, the first chapters in each of the four sections – Chapters 2, 4, 6, and 8 – trace 
the preconditions for the deployment of the balance of power in a given historical context. 
I broaden the investigation to wider society by situating balance-of-power rhetoric in a 
social context. In these first chapters I survey what the landscape of debates looked like – 
these chapters map when, where, and how the concept was produced and disseminated.49 
The second chapters in each pair – Chapters 3, 5, 7, and 9 – examine how the balance-of-
power concept, already part of the rhetorical repertoire, has been applied in specific 
                                                          
47 Crick, Nathan. 2014. ‘Rhetoric and Events’, Philosophy and Rhetoric 47(3):251–272, p. 265. 
48 Abbott, Andrew. 2001. Time Matters: On Theory and Method. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 
258. 
49 See Jackson, Patrick T. 2006. Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the 
West. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
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controversies, how it was linked or delinked to particular political concerns and policies, 
legitimating or delegitimising them, and the effects on subsequent developments.50 
In addition, the project has two parts, I and II. This is because I also identify a broader 
shift between two epistemes, occurring from the late 18th century. 
Epistemes concern knowledge – or rather, what makes possible particular configurations 
of knowledge. It is a more basic condition, or a limitation, for making claims that can be 
evaluated as true or untrue, as scientific or unscientific. It is not the condition for making 
true statements as such, but the condition by which one can have a discussion about 
whether something is true or false at all, without rejecting it out of hand. Contra Michel 
Foucault’s ‘regimes of truth’, I consider an episteme not as ‘the mechanisms and 
instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements’,51 but what allows 
something to be the subject of such a discussion, and such a potential distinction at all, in 
the first place.  
This is a broad analytical category, including certain assumptions, often implicit, behind a 
certain configuration of knowledge in practice. Separating between two epistemes, I try to 
make these assumptions explicit. This concerns precisely the participants’ views of what 
kind of polities exist, and their relations to the international structure. 
I hold that the balance of power shifted, from being a republican concern with protecting 
something – the public interest – to being seen as a liberal expression of free-flowing 
private interests; the independence of atomistic nation-states and national positions. It was 
less about protecting the freedom to act from the dominance of a ‘Universal Monarchy’ 
(or similar), and more about freedom from interference and interventions. This 
corresponds to the emerging distinction between abstraction and reality that centrally 
affected how the balance of power could be criticised, and then how it developed in 
Prussia, later Germany (see Chapter 8). 
Table 1 shows the change in episteme, from Part I to Part II, to be demonstrated in the 
ensuing chapters: 
                                                          
50 Ibid., p. 28. 
51 Foucault, Michel. 1984. ‘Truth and Power’, pp. 51–75 in Paul Rabinow (ed) The Foucault Reader. New 
York: Pantheon, pp. 72–73. 
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Time 
Style of 
argumentation 
Interest 
Abstract-
theoretical 
knowledge 
Practical-
applied 
knowledge 
18th century Republican 
Public 
(common 
good) 
 
European order and 
commonwealth; opposition to 
Universal Monarchy, dominance, 
and arbitrary rule. 
19th century Liberal 
Private 
(freedom and 
passions) 
Autonomy, 
independence, 
anti-
intervention 
Statistics, 
measuring 
dispositions, 
capacity, 
influence, 
trajectories 
 
Table 1: The episteme shift 
This highly stylized and ideal-typical table shows the shifts in episteme as context for 
balance of power rhetoric. It is episteme, so, empirically speaking, it is the domain of 
knowledge that most concerns me, and the arrows show the temporal development.52 The 
public interest of Europe is something different from national capabilities, and national 
positions, which, in turn, are different from the criticisms of the Congress of Vienna 
(Chapters 6, 7) which emphasised the independence of states. However, this liberal focus 
on state independence and anti-intervention, by unintended effects, affected the German 
view of making the state the first principle of international politics.  
 
Chapter overview 
In Chapter 1, I argue that applying a different methodological perspective and 
conceptualising what we study in new ways can offer a new empirical perspective on the 
                                                          
52 Inspired by a figure in Guzzini, Stefano. 2013. Power, Realism and Constructivism. London: Routledge, 
p.10,  there used for a different purpose. 
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much-written-about concept of the balance of power. One immediate concern in drawing 
attention to methodological issues in the first chapter is to justify the research questions 
and topic in light of existing research and approaches. That is, I dwell on general issues of 
methodology at the outset also because this project differs considerably from 
conventional takes on the balance of power on precisely this point: methodology. I then 
explain my central assumptions concerning genealogy and concepts, and how they differ 
from competing accounts. 
The main inflection point in the first section is how the very deployment of the balance of 
power concept was the fundamental element for the construction of an order, leading to 
the view that there existed a European system in which every and any polity might have to 
be constrained to avoid hegemonic dominance and arbitrary rule – or ‘Universal 
Monarchy’.  
The first chapter in the section, Chapter 2, addresses the emergence of the balance of 
power as a concept from about the 1660s. This does not mean that the term ‘balance of 
power’ did not figure before then, but this was the period in which it became public and 
commonplace, and started influencing and being used as a ‘weapon’ in policy debates. 
The balance of power was not a stock-in trade ‘realist’ concept from the beginning: it was 
heavily influenced by classical republicanism, focusing on virtue, mixed constitutions, 
checks and balances in a domestic setting. The concept emerged through links made 
between resistance to Universal Monarchy, the concept of interest, and the protection of 
the public, or the commonwealth, as opposed to the private. From the 1670s, the balance 
of power emerged as a way to counter France in particular, seen to be threatening Europe 
with establishing a Universal Monarchy. However, once the balance of power had 
become firmly established after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, it appears that the 
concept was not so much needed as a justification for English foreign policy: it was now 
used more for domestic legitimation purposes and in internal party struggles, precisely 
because it had become so commonplace. This had important effects at the Peace of 
Utrecht in 1713, where domestic developments in England would affect the deployment 
of the concept, and European politics as a whole. 
In Chapter 3, I focus on the controversies and debates surrounding the case of the 
Treaties of Utrecht of 1713. The uses of the balance-of-power concept led to a revised 
view of the international system. The focus was less on the single threat of France, 
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because any state might be seen as a potential threat. The public interest of Europe was 
what had to be protected – and the balance of power was an expression of this, rather than 
of dynastic politics. This was connected with domestic developments in Britain. I show 
concretely these domestic, republican influences from Britain, how they conditioned the 
deployment of the balance of power, and the conception of how and what kinds of polities 
existed in the system.  
In the Utrecht negotiations themselves, the once-pivotal Austria was relegated to the 
sidelines. Austria, while at least tacitly accepting the principle of the balance of power, 
sought to question its implications, by linking the concept to inherent rights of succession 
and the integral stability of coalitions – but failed. Austria’s range of policy options at 
Utrecht was narrowed because of its previous investment in the balance-of-power 
concept. With a shift in Britain, Austria found itself stuck in a now outdated conception 
of the balance of power. Due to contingent developments in British politics, the concept 
and the implications connected to it had been reassembled, and that prevented Austria 
from using the balance in ways consistent with earlier registries. The Austrians were left 
rhetorically exposed.  
The inflection point in Section 2 is an all-out attack on the very concept of the balance of 
power itself – not only on its implications, as had been debated at Utrecht.  
This section begins with Chapter 4, empirically charting the emergence of what was to 
become the crucially important distinction between reality and abstractions, between 
practical and ‘useless’ knowledge. In the mid-18th century, a distinction between abstract 
and practical knowledge became salient in political argumentation. Importantly, however, 
such a position on knowledge could not be used against the balance of power until that 
concept had become connected to international law, where such discussions about the 
abstract versus the practical were already ongoing. This happened at the British 
University of Göttingen in Hanover. That distinction itself became a new resource to be 
exploited in political arguments and legitimating tactics. The possible epistemic backing 
for central political claims changed, and that affected the balance of power as well. 
The charge was levelled against the balance that it was a ‘chimera’ – a vague theoretical 
invention of jurists and theorists; further, that it was not concerned with practical realities 
and was therefore not properly scientific, but political and moral. The Göttingen scholar 
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Johan Heinrich Gottlob von Justi turned the concept of ‘interest’ against the balance-of-
power concept, by advocating for self-interests and passions as the true basis of 
international politics, rather than any European ‘public interest’ embedded in the balance. 
The domestic aspects of polities became important as the expression of the real nature of 
the international, rather than the ‘abstract’ public interest or Commonwealth of Europe. 
This is an important inflection point in the trajectory from an English republican tradition 
to a Prussian and German conception of the balance of power, eventually, much later, to 
have influence on the formation of IR theory in the USA. This also marks the beginning 
of the episteme shift, from a republican protection of the European public interest, to the 
steady atomisation and individuation of states and polities. 
In Chapter 5, this distinction unfolds in practice in the British debates concerning the 
Russian occupation of the Ottoman-held coastal town Ochakov (Özi in Turkish), on the 
northern coast of the Black Sea. This central distinction between abstraction and practice 
allowed for attacks on the balance of power in concrete policy debates. Precisely these 
rhetorical resources were deployed in the Ochakov controversy in 1791–92. I show how a 
group of British politicians were attacking the balance of power by distinguishing 
between abstraction and practice, while others countered such attacks with arguments 
from tradition. British Prime Minister Pitt was attacked and suffered his first foreign 
policy defeat when his use of the balance of power was denounced as an abstraction, and 
his opponents shifted to liberal arguments concerning the independence and individuality 
of states. This heralded a new problem in the international: that of interventions. This was 
also a central preoccupation of Edmund Burke who, inspired by the Ochakov debate, 
would define central parameters for the debates in the early 19th century – which is the 
topic of the next section.  
The third section is the first section in Part II. The Göttingen University attack on the 
balance inadvertently led to a more liberal focus on individual states and their interaction. 
Here we see the change in episteme that defines Part II: this is not only a new inflection 
point, but illustrates the shift of an entire episteme. The balance of power was now less 
about the protection of the republican public interests against structures of dominance like 
Universal Monarchy, and more about the independence of relatively isolated states and a 
liberal focus on freedom from interference. From protecting something, the balance was 
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increasingly seen to be about calculating the capabilities of atomistic nation-states, and 
predicting trajectories.  
In the general Chapter 6, I argue that the Congress of Vienna is significant in the 
genealogy of the balance of power. However, it is not important because the balance-of-
power concept was frequently used. Rather, the 1814–1815 Congress of Vienna was 
important for the balance of power not so much because of what happened in the 
negotiations or at the Congress itself, but in what was going on ‘around’ it: shifting, 
contextual rhetorical coordinates that would impact the balance-of-power concept on its 
‘return’ when the Congress broke down. Contrary to common assumptions, the balance of 
power was not in fact used during the Congress of Vienna: a different concept, 
‘equilibrium’, appeared on the scene. This is not a trivial semantic point, as too often 
assumed in the literature on the balance of power. The public interest of Europe was now 
seen as being the equilibrium of Europe, to be managed by an exclusive group of ‘great 
powers’. The problem was now not whether powers deemed too strong should be allowed 
to exist, as had been the case, but whether powers deemed to be too weak should. In an 
important reversal, the main problem was not the opposition to Universal Monarchy, but 
how to get rid of the small states now seen as useless, destabilising and lacking proper 
internal governance. 
In an equilibrium there was no place for a ‘balancer’, which had been the traditional role 
of Britain. So, in a turn from the previous century, British politicians brought the classical 
concept of the balance of power back and used it to oppose the European Congress 
‘equilibrium’, and to defend national independence and the small states in the system. 
The inflection point here is therefore how the balance of power came to be associated 
with the independence of states, increasingly moving away from ‘protecting the public 
interest’, as that was now associated with the hierarchical Congress equilibrium which 
ignored the independence of states. The balance of power was now less about protecting 
something like the public interest, and more about dampening the disruptive dynamics 
between nations in the European body. Balance-of-power arguments now worked when 
they could mediate between conflicting national passions and national positions. Thus, 
the balance of power no longer expressed a common European interest: it participated in 
its demise.    
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In the second chapter in this section, Chapter 7, I show concretely how the balance of 
power was used to oppose the Congress system by emphasising the independence of 
states, and against interventions. Debates concerned the incorporation and erasure of the 
small state of Genoa in 1815, and the controversies in the 1822 Congress of Verona, 
when the Congress of Europe faltered. I explore what happened when the balance of 
power was ‘brought back’, but now in a very different way: not to defend the public 
interest, but to protect individual state independence and a multiplicity of states. Actors 
picked up the classical concept of the balance of power to argue against interventions 
conducted in the name of the Congress equilibrium. These were steps in the trajectory 
towards emphasising national position, which is the topic of the next, final section. 
In Section 4, I start by looking at developments in Germany throughout the 19th century in 
Chapter 8, where the triumph of the state pushed the European public interest out of the 
way. This is the second inflection point in the 19th century, whereby the whole notion of a 
European public interest itself was questioned. In Prussia, Hegel used the balance of 
power to sharpen the contrast between the state as idea, and the practical realm of politics. 
The balance of power was political, as opposed to the natural idea of the state. The main 
development in this was how the impersonal state replaced the balance of power as a first 
principle of international politics. This state-centrism implies that the balance of power is 
not a first principle of international politics, but rather a management principle in the 
context of the progressive self-awareness of nation-states. The state as a first principle led 
to a focus on national positions in balance-of-power rhetoric rather than on protecting the 
public interest. The nation-state came before the balance of power, as a natural unit that 
could be known both on a transcendental and on a practical level, particularly through the 
use of statistics. Balance-of-power rhetoric shifted, from emphasising the protection of 
the ‘public interest’ of Europe, to emphasising national positions and national interests in 
power-political competition. The balance of power was no longer about a European 
public interest: it now concerned a multitude of independent, atomistic nation-states 
competing, as in a market, in power-political struggles. 
In Chapter 9, I first show how international lawyers rejected the balance-of-power 
concept as being too close to engaged politics. For liberal lawyers, what was to be fought 
was no longer any Universal Monarchy, but international anarchy. In this sense, it is 
what one is arguing against that turns and changes. However, international anarchy was 
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in turn appropriated by scholars focusing on the state, as an analytical description of the 
condition and system in which nation-states found themselves. Political science took up 
the concept of the balance of power, and embraced it as an expression of political 
practice. 
Making the state the a priori, and rejecting the public interest of Europe, were elements in 
the Prussian and German views of the balance of power. These had a central influence on 
the gradual establishment of the academic discipline of IR, particularly the development 
of a theory of international politics in the 1950s and 60s.  
What I show throughout these chapters is how formerly separate elements of political 
practice have come together, in different ways in different times, to produce the concept 
of ‘the balance of power’. In Chapter 9, in an interesting reversal, we see how the balance 
of power has been appropriated in IR to account for the practices that are grouped 
together to form the concept itself.53 The emphasis on the ‘public interest’ of Europe, or a 
European international society, had disappeared. 
Balance-of-power rhetoric had an important role in creating a disciplinary jurisdiction for 
IR. Indeed, the balance of power made IR possible in the first place. The concept changed 
hands, in a manner of speaking: whereas politicians might refer to it occasionally, the 
disputes, contentions, and debates involving the balance of power moved into the 
emergent academic field of IR, which sustained and reproduced the concept. The balance-
of-power concept, imported from Germany, made the discipline of International Relations 
a possibility. The identification of the balance of power with practice met resistance in the 
USA, because ‘scientific legitimacy’ was needed. And so, practice became its own 
theory.  
It is here that I close the circle. We can already see what has become the fate of IR – a 
confusion between practice and theory. That was also my rationale for embarking upon 
this research project.  
  
                                                          
53 Culler, Jonathan.1997. Literary Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 5. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Methodologies, Ontologies, and a Genealogy of the Balance of 
Power Concept 
 
Criticism of Balance of Power theory often singles out the failure of theorists to predict 
when balances will emerge, the difficulty of measuring power and other intangible 
factors, and simply the lack of evidence for balancing, especially in today’s world.1 The 
response frequently involves attempts at broadening the concept, to include notions of 
‘soft balancing’ and the like, so as to fit a larger or different universe of cases. This, the 
rebuttal goes, is a prime case of conceptual stretching.2 Still, whatever the quandaries 
over concepts, definitions, and their fit to reality, the fact remains that any new empirical 
input or new cases of balancing will be selected on the basis of the analytical definition 
used. What is to count as balancing is always decided in advance, given the properties of 
the balance of power as defined by the scholar in question. Kaufman, Little and 
Wohlforth, for example, aim to ‘test the logic and universality of balance-of-power theory 
against pre-modern evidence’.3 Their pre-modern case studies are all interstate systems, 
they claim, and as such relevant for testing balance-of-power theory based on a range of 
theoretical propositions.4 The justification for testing balance-of-power theory in the first 
place is that it is ‘one of the most influential ideas in IR’, that it is central to the debates of 
scholars as well as practitioners, its broad scope, and its foundational role in the evolution 
                                                          
1 Paul, Thazha Varkey. 2004. ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-25 in  T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann 
(eds.), Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
p. 3, 9. 
2 Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’, American Political Science 
Review 64 (4): 1033–1053. 
3 Kaufman, Stuart J., Richard Little and William C. Wohlforth . 2007. ‘Introduction: Balance and Hierarchy 
in International Systems’, pp. 1–21 in Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little and William C. Wohlforth .eds. The 
Balance of Power in World History. London: Routledge, p. 4.  
4 Ibid, p. 18 ̶ 19. 
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of the academic study of IR.5 The dilemma is that Kaufman, Little and Wohlforth, as 
indeed many others, find that the balance of power is in fact not very efficient for 
explaining international politics.  
If that is the case, we have an array of historical documentation on how balance of power 
has figured centrally amongst political practitioners, especially in Europe, that cannot be 
accounted for. We have ‘left-over’ historical empirics, or a ‘surplus of meaning’,6 
concerning the balance of power – on how people have been constantly talking of, writing 
on, and referring to it. What can we do with this, and how?  
As explained in the introduction, my alternative is to examine precisely such rhetorical 
aspects of the balance of power rather than starting from a standard, analytical definition. 
How has this term framed situations in particular ways, legitimating certain courses of 
action, and with what effects? The focus shifts from academic definitions, to definitions 
employed by historical actors in their context. One goal, then, is simply to look at new 
‘things’ by moving away from confirming, disconfirming or amending contemporary 
theories, and instead taking seriously the statements and uses of the concept amongst 
historical actors.  
Still, introducing new things to study does not tell us much about how and why to study 
them. These ‘new things’ might easily be accommodated into existing analytical 
approaches, say by comparing historical statements to contemporary definitions. 
Alternatively, other kinds of historical data on the balance can be seen to ‘speak for 
themselves’. In Chapter 9, for example, I examine how Morgenthau focused on the 
‘practice’ of diplomats as in itself being a theory of the balance of power and in 
international politics.  
Therefore, to make the most out of this historical material on the uses of the concept, we 
need a different methodological approach. Despite the increasing variance in the 
substantial things to prioritise for study, different kinds of methodologies – specifying the 
                                                          
5 Ibid., p. 13. 
6 Ricoeur, Paul. 1976. Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning. Fort Worth, TX: TCU 
Press. 
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purposes and goals of research – have not been much discussed in IR in general and in the 
literature on the Balance of Power in particular. And this, I will argue, is one reason why 
there have been so few real challenges to the dominant ways of studying the balance of 
power.  
Applying a different methodological perspective and conceptualising what we study in 
new ways can explain new things about international politics and provide new empirical 
facts and perspectives on the much-discussed concept of the balance of power. Another, 
immediate concern in drawing attention to issues of methodology in this first chapter is 
therefore to justify the research questions and topic in light of existing research and 
approaches. How does my approach differ from how others have treated the balance of 
power? The reason for spending some time on general issues of methodology at the outset 
is also that this project will differ considerably from conventional takes on the balance of 
power on precisely this account: on methodology. I wish to make my presuppositions 
clear (particularly since some of my objects of study are indeed the presuppositions of 
others) to enable readers to judge the project on its own merits and to avoid 
misunderstandings.  
To keep a steady methodological hand on the tiller, it is important to negotiate the 
differences between a community of researchers and their procedures, on the one hand, 
and any (historical) community as an object of research on the other. The methodological 
question to be asked is how to make such a separation in practice, given one’s particular 
outlook on the world (one’s ‘postulates’). If this is not clear, one might find oneself 
jumping freely and unreflectively between analytical categories and categories of 
practical and historical use, all within the same research project.  
This first part on methodology has another function, because these methodological 
musing are not only of a meta-methodological relevance – they also address the 
production of limits of academic communities. This is also relevant for my concrete, 
empirical investigation, particularly from Chapter 4 on, as I identify a shift in episteme. It 
concerns different standards for evaluating knowledge claims, which are of crucial 
importance for this project, but which have also been crucial for the historical actors I 
investigate. That is, this section on methodologies, and the interaction of different 
communities, is also important empirically for this project, and not only as abstract 
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methodological and theoretical problems. In short, different communities have different 
communal ways to go about solving practical problems.   
After this methodological prelude, I go on to flesh out my assumptions as concerns 
genealogy, concepts, and how to study them. 
 
You, me, and science 
What separates an academic community from other communities? Is it some kind of 
privileged access to the world that is not granted others? No, surely the scholar’s or 
scientist’s way of making sense of the world cannot be so radically different from that of 
other people. The separation rather concerns the practices of a scientific community: to 
count as competent and professional scholars, we must be orderly and systematic in what 
we do, in specific ways, acknowledged by our peers,7 based on a scholarly ‘vocation’,8 
‘carried on for the sake of advancing the system of knowings and knowns’.9 We always 
stand within a community, looking out. And when doing research, one of the 
communities in question is the professional, scientific one, where there are certain 
expectations as to consistency. 
The problem is that social life in general is not particularly consistent, orderly or 
systematic, so the categories we as social scientists use, the delimitations we must make, 
and the way of going about this, are not already given.10 They must, in some sense of the 
word, be imposed. Being immersed in the same social world as everyone else, social 
scientists manage to pull off such ‘imposing’ in a consistent way through tools such as 
methods and methodology. 
When doing such imposing, subjective ideas and presuppositions, from within the context 
in which one finds oneself, play a role here, as in any other social practice. When 
researching a historical phenomenon, for example, ‘one cannot verbalize a practice 
                                                          
7 Shotter, John. 1993. Conversational Realities; Constructing Life through Language. London: Sage, p. 25.  
8 Weber, Max. 2004. ‘Science as a Vocation’, pp. 1–31 in Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures. 
Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing.  
9 Dewey, John and Arthur F. Bentley. 1960. Knowing and the Known. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, p. 281. 
10 Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2006. ‘The Present as History’, pp. 490–500 in Robert E. Goodin and Charles 
Tilly (eds.) The Oxford Handbook on Contextual Political Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 
495. 
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without offering a theory’,11 and that theory will inevitably be a view from the present. 
The question then becomes: when doing academic research as the particular kind of 
practical activity that it is, what do we do with this inherent positionality? That is a pre-
eminently methodological issue. 
It is also a question at the core of this project, given its focus on the local, contextualised 
rhetoric of those involved in historical phenomena. In discussing the character of such 
necessary ‘imposing’, therefore, it is important to focus not only on how to delimit what 
to study (deciding on ontological categories), but also how to study it (methodology). The 
former tells a story of the researched; the latter in addition tells the story of the researcher.  
Methodology, then, also concerns how the researcher goes about interpreting and ‘making 
meaning’. In the present project, these issues of interpretation and meaning assume extra 
importance since what is to be interpreted are the interpretations of others. This is a 
special case of a ‘double hermeneutic’– interpreting an already interpreted world.12 To 
rephrase my aim here, it is a clarification of how two different interpretative communities 
relate to each other – a given historical community under investigation on the one hand, 
and a contemporary community of researchers or scientists on the other. In both 
communities, ‘traditional categories are the gospel of everyday thinking […] and of 
everyday practice’,13 but the categories and their purpose are not the same in each 
community.  
 
Postulates 
To understand what methodologies are, where they come from, and how they are 
selected, let me take a quick look at ‘philosophical ontology’, or what I will call 
‘postulates’.  
The Stanford Encyclopedia defines ontology as ‘a philosophical discipline that 
encompasses besides the study of what there is and the study of the general features of 
                                                          
11 Pocock, John Greville Agard. 2009. Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 87. 
12 Giddens, Anthony. 1976. New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative 
Sociologies. London: Polity, pp. 158–159. 
13 Feyerabend, Paul. 2010[1975]. Against Method. London: Verso, p. 11; Marcuse, Herbert. 1977[1941]. 
Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. London: Routledge.  
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what there is also the study of what is involved in settling questions about what there is in 
general’.14 Ontology can therefore mean both the study of what it is to be or exist, what 
existence in general would mean, how something can be said to exist, and the study of 
something that exists; a thing or an entity.15 These are both taxonomic categories. To 
separate these two meanings of ontology, they have been called philosophical and 
scientific ontology, respectively.16 Whilst the former involves basically everything and 
anything (what all things that exist are said to have in common), the latter is a particular 
focus of study: limiting a scientific ontology is an a priori or pragmatic preference for not 
granting existence to too many things in theory.17 
For the state of the art in IR on questions of philosophy of science and methodology I 
may note Patrick T. Jackson’s The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations.18 
Linking philosophy to methodology, he argues, can foreground methodological concerns, 
making the discipline aware of the different methodologies existing, to be able to move 
on to discussing empirical problems in light of such a methodological pluralism. The 
basic point is that the ontological presuppositions behind methodologies are 
‘philosophical ontologies’. Offhand, most would probably associate ontology with 
scientific, not philosophical, ontology. Therefore, to clearly distinguish philosophical 
from scientific ontologies I will refer to philosophical ontologies as ‘postulates’.19 This 
seems apt, since to ‘postulate’ is to assume or assert something, and postulates are the 
elaboration of ‘conditions of existence’.20 
Data cannot speak for itself. Knowings and known are difficult to separate. Still, the 
researcher, like anyone else, has to start from somewhere – and that somewhere is such a 
postulate. Importantly, there are no particular logical or scientific reasons for selecting 
postulates – they are more like subjective choices, or the value commitments and 
                                                          
14 Stanford Encyclopedia. 2011. ‘Logic and Ontology’. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-
ontology/ [21.05.2013]. 
15 Lawson, Tony. 2004. ‘A Conception of Ontology’, Cambridge mimeo, Cambridge Social Ontology 
Group (CSOG). Available at: www.csog.group.cam.ac.uk/A_Conception_of_Ontology.pdf  [07.05.2013], 
p. 1. 
16 Patomäki, Heikki and Colin Wight. 2000. ‘After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism’, 
International Studies Quarterly 44 (2): 213–237, p. 215; Lawson, ‘A Conception’, p. 2; Jackson, Patrick 
Thaddeus. 2011. The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations. London: Routledge.  
17 Lawson, ‘A Conception’, p. 8. 
18 Jackson, Conduct. 
19 Dewey and Bentley, Knowing. 
20 Lawson, ‘A Conception’, p. 3. 
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presuppositions of a researcher.21 As P.T. Jackson also points out, such postulates can 
never be verified or settled, but ‘depend – in the final analysis – on a measure of faith 
[…] because they cannot be revolved (sic) empirically or rationally’.22  
A postulate is all-embracing, including ‘all of us’ – researchers and our objects of 
research alike. It is the social writ large. And the standing of this postulate is contingent, 
subjective, and ‘unscientific’. A postulate would be difficult to ‘prove’ empirically. 
Instead, postulates enable us as researchers to ‘proceed to cultivate the garden of our 
choice’.23  
How to justify a postulate? If my postulate is – as it in fact is – that ‘language and 
utterances do not correspond to an externally existing referent in the world, but are 
performative of the world’, then must not that utterance be subject to the same systematic, 
evaluative standards entailed by my postulate on performativity? Does the very act of 
writing suppose the argument’s opposite?24 The position seems to implode in a cloud of 
inconsistency. Could there be a consistent response if someone disagrees with my 
postulate? 
There is no need to break philosophical eggs to make an explanatory omelette: The point 
is that a postulate does not involve disagreements with scientific, factual claims, but is 
based on something different from science – it doesn’t ‘stay within the scientific family’.25 
As Richard Creath has noted:  
the central philosophical issue is not over the factual claims that the speaker adopts or that 
most speakers adopt such conventions […] Rather, what ought to be said is: ‘ I propose 
that we adopt such and such convention.’ This is not a factual claim, and the sort of 
argument that would be appropriate on behalf of such a proposal would be [a] pragmatic 
argument, i.e., one which tries to show that such conventions would be useful.26 
                                                          
21 Weber, Science. 
22 Jackson, Conduct, p. 34. 
23 Dewey and Bentley, Knowing, p. 60. 
24 Abbott, Andrew. 2001. Chaos of Disciplines. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, p. 81. 
25 van Fraasen, Bas C. 2002. The Empirical Stance. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 48; Abbott, 
Chaos, p. 83. 
26 Creath, Richard.1987. ‘The Initial Reception of Carnap's Doctrine of Analyticity’, Noûs 21(4): 477–499, 
p. 490, first italics added. 
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Postulates are not scientific truth-claims about what the world is really like – they are 
more like a collection of views, opinions, values, stances that need not imply any kind of 
dogmatism. What distinguishes science, on the other hand, is what is done once a certain 
viewpoint or postulate is adopted.27 This, again, means that scientific inquiry is defined 
by its communal, practical processes. Thereby the importance of introducing this abstract 
category of ‘postulates’ becomes clear, as we can conceive of methodologies as the 
‘operationalisation’ of postulates.  
 
Methodology  
As seen, there is a difference between postulates, a philosophical outlook on how the 
world hangs together, and (scientific) ontology, which is the substantive assumptions 
about concrete bits and pieces of reality. And it is such postulates, and not scientific 
ontologies, that are connected to methodology. In producing scientific facts, 
methodologies are the standards of significance and the standard of ‘objectivity’. What is 
significant can be found only ‘in relevance to the end in view’28 – and methodology is 
what specifies that end or the goal of research. Methodology translates general and 
subjective postulates about the world into scientific research procedures and goals for 
inquiry. 
Thus, the main reason for focusing on methodology is that all research involves 
methodological assumptions, because we are all enmeshed in the same social world – 
social scientists included. Having a methodology is unavoidable. The real choice we face 
is whether to make such methodological presuppositions explicit or implicit in our 
research. By leaving them implicit, we may be unable to expose and deal with 
inconsistencies and limitations.  
What is meant by ‘methodology’ is often unclear. It may sometimes refer to the study of 
the purely technical application of specific methods. However, the more normal usage, 
which is consistent with the above, is to speak of methodologies as the principles, 
practices, and goals that are followed in order to be systematic in one’s research. 
                                                          
27 van Fraasen, The Empirical Stance, p. 48; Feyerabend, Against Method, p. 199. 
28 Carr, Edward Hallett. 1990[1961]. What is History? London: Penguin, pp. 120–121. 
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Methodology is a way of exposing and communicating one’s choices and strategies, for 
‘better understanding how analyses might compete or complement each other, and for 
stronger theoretical accounts’.29 This is the sense in which I will continue to speak of 
methodology. To clarify by comparison; methodology is not the same thing as methods, 
even if it is often held to be.30 Confusing the two ‘obscures an important conceptual 
distinction between the tools of scientific investigation (properly methods) and the 
principles that determine how such tools are deployed and interpreted’,31 which is 
methodology. 
Also in IR, methods and methodologies are often confounded. However, when IR 
scholars do write about methodology proper, it has traditionally taken one of two forms. 
First, some discuss methodology in order to justify that the predominant practices in the 
discipline are basically fine and ‘scientific’ enough. This serves to rationalise mainstream 
methodological practices, effectively disconnecting methodology from different 
postulates, and rather moving it in the direction of a universal, scientific rationality. King, 
Keohane and Verba correctly point out that ‘authors who understand and explicate the 
logic of their analyses will produce more valuable research’, but this is their imperial 
moment: ‘The appropriate methodological issues for qualitative researchers to understand 
are precisely the ones that all other scientific researchers need to follow’, which is ‘the 
methodology of inference’.32 Their focus on this particular methodology, write King et 
al.,  
is not intended to denigrate the significance of the process by which fruitful questions are 
formulated. On the contrary, we agree with the interpretivists that it is crucial to 
understand a culture deeply before formulating hypothesis or designing systematic 
research projects to find an answer.33 
The role of those methodologies derived from postulates that assert the necessity of 
interpretation, then, is merely to prepare the ground for the ‘real’ scientific effort – and 
that is to formulate hypothesis, eventually to be able to verify the veracity of claims, 
                                                          
29 Hansen, Lene. 2006. Security as Practice. London: Routledge, p. xix. 
30 Sartori, ‘Concept Misformation’, p. 1033. 
31 American Heritage Dictionary. 2000. ‘Methodology’. Available at: 
www.thefreedictionary.com/methodology  [21.05.2013]. 
32 King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference 
in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 230–232.  
33 Ibid., p. 37. 
40 
 
which ‘can only be accomplished through the logic of scientific inference, which we 
describe’.34 Common methodological practice in IR – resting on inferential logic, 
deductivist modelling, hypothesis testing, and strict cross-case comparison – is 
systematised and taken as the standard against which to measure alternative approaches. 
In such cases, a focus on methodology will not change much, but serves mainly a 
conservative purpose.35  
Others may venture outside of the discipline, importing methodological and theoretical 
‘gurus’,36 and then insist on the new correct criteria and methodologies for the discipline. 
The argument would then be that methodologies based on positivist logics, such as the 
above, are wrong and damaging for the discipline: what we all should do, is to use 
Bourdieu, Foucault, or methodologist X or, alternatively, become more ‘historical’, more 
‘anthropological’ etc. Unfortunately, such claims often take the form of mere assertions 
of what should be done, often without showing it in practice.37 Methodological debate is 
reduced to the formula ‘you should not be doing your job; you should be doing mine’.38 
The problem is not the particular methodology X per se: it is rather ‘the dogma that 
nothing (or almost nothing) else counts’.39 Both these slants, then, reject methodological 
pluralism, and insist on certain methodologies as being universally applicable and 
desirable.40  
But there can be no universal methodology. Different research goals or aims correspond 
to different methodologies. Such goals are not obvious or given, but must be selected on 
the basis of the researcher’s postulates and values. Talking about methodology as a way 
of attaining objectivity is only an ideal – an ideal which may perhaps never be fulfilled.41 
The goal and purpose of a social science project, embedded in its methodology, stem 
from the scientist’s subjective postulates on the nature of the social, distinct from the 
scientific process itself. 
                                                          
34 Ibid., p. 37–38. 
35 Lawson, Tony. 1994. ‘Why Methodology?’, mimeo, Association for Heterodox Economics. Available at: 
www.hetecon.net/documents/Post-GraduateWorkshop/AHE-MW-2012-25.pdf [07.05.2013], p. 3. 
36 Hollis, Martin and Steve Smith. 1991. ‘Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International 
Relations’, Review of International Studies 17(4): 393–410.  
37 Lawson, ‘Why Methodology?’, p. 3. 
38 Pocock, John Greville Agard . 2009. Political Thought and History. Essays on Theory and Method. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 51. 
39 Lawson, ‘Why Methodology?’, p. 8. 
40 Ibid.; Jackson, Conduct. 
41 Weber, Vocation. 
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Consequently, selecting which methodology to use is not a scientific activity, but is based 
on ones’ general postulates. Discussing methodologies is not the same thing as doing 
science. Neither is the task of methodology to issue prescripts, rules, or standards for 
others to follow. It is rather about clarifying for oneself and others what the goal of 
research is, and on what criteria it should be judged. Methodology should be discussed 
not because it will decide how to do research, but because it can indicate possibilities. 
Neither is methodology a question of specific substantial issues – methodologies rest on 
postulates, and postulates cannot deliver substantive theorising about international 
politics. The point is to encourage explanatory efficiency. Substantial claims are rather 
associated with ontology. 
 
Methodology vs. (scientific) ontology 
The point of focusing on methodologies, then, is firstly to make it clear that there are no 
methods or specific orientations indispensable to doing research. Differently put: an 
alternative methodology can make a difference. Secondly, methodology is different from 
(scientific) ontologies – there is no given way to treat a catalogue of things said to exist, 
just as there is no given way to study a state, a society, or war.42 Methodology and 
ontology are often confounded, and this is particularly pronounced when it comes to the 
study of knowledge.  
In fact, knowledge is often not studied empirically at all. General claims and postulates 
about knowledge are often found at the beginning of texts, serving only as a ‘confession 
of faith’ before going on to the actual study of something else. Too often, the concern 
stops at the level of postulates. Historical knowledge on knowledge is lacking. If 
knowledge is such a fundamental thing, however, it would be reasonable to expect it to be 
studied empirically. Perhaps reflections on how to study knowledge may be lacking 
because knowledge is somehow seen to be a ‘special case’, not like studying any other 
entity or practice. This, again, results from the methodological puzzle introduced above: 
On the one hand, knowledge is a problem that researchers must deal with because, in our 
own practice, we are in the business of knowledge production. On the other, we have the 
logically unrelated problem of conceptualising knowledge ‘out there’ ̶ the ‘folk models’. 
                                                          
42 Jackson, Conduct, p. 205. 
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One is of methodology, another of knowledge as a concrete phenomenon to be studied in 
particular sites. In other words, there are postulates on the overall nature of knowledge 
and there are specific claims on (the context dependence of) knowledge itself (sociology 
of knowledge). The latter pertains to ontology.  
For example, a familiar ‘constructivist’ position is that the construction of knowledge and 
the construction of reality are interlinked; and that it makes no sense to separate theory 
categorically from empirical reality, as knowledge always has a practical and 
conventional baseline. My wish with this project, to focus ontologically on how historical 
actors make sense of their own circumstances rather than on scholarly categories, might 
seem to resonate with this, indicating some sort of constructivist analysis. Would not this 
be the focus of sociologically or anthropologically inspired studies of international 
politics, focusing on how actors go about constructing their own worlds, and ‘things’ such 
as the ‘balance of power’, through their use of language? This ‘instinctive’ reaction would 
be the result of the widespread confusion between methodology and ontology. Deciding 
to study the accounts of participants rather than studying a scholarly fashioned entity is a 
matter of according priority to what to study, and bears no necessary relationship to the 
question of how or why to study it.  
Saying that the world is socially constructed could be a postulate, without any 
connections whatsoever to a particular scientific ontology. In IR, however, the converse is 
most often the case: constructivism denotes a set of ontological entities – such as norms, 
values, identities – rather than a distinct approach and goal for social research. Such a 
scientific ontology, in turn, would tell us nothing about how to study it. A case in point is 
how Alexander Wendt can consistently pair a constructivist or ‘idealist’ ontology with a 
positivist methodology.43  
What words and concepts actors use need not be connected to one particular postulate on 
the nature of the social world, and need not involve assumptions about social 
constructions at all. Sayings, doings, and uses of concepts can equally well be 
quantitatively plotted into diagrams, subjected to regression analyses, attributed to 
psychological or other structural dispositions, or form part of a rational choice 
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explanation. As Abbott observes, constructionist work is often associated with 
‘interpretative’ as opposed to ‘positivist’ methodologies, but ‘this methodological reliance 
is not necessary in principle’.44 
To put it in different terms, postulates and ontologies are not really competing. However, 
we cannot engage in both at the same time. This is precisely the difference between 
postulating a social condition tout court, concerning ‘all of us humans’ – of which 
methodologies are the operationalization – as against the specific, scientific ontologies we 
operate with when studying or analysing empirically concrete material in the world. 
Unnecessary conflicts arise when philosophical claims encounter specific analytical 
claims.45  
This distinction is important because the problems emanating from not taking 
participants’ accounts into consideration, as noted above, can be dealt with in numerous 
ways. There is no self-evident methodology to apply to a scientific ontology of participant 
rhetoric. The problem is that such an ontology is often seen as ‘constructivism’ by 
definition, without much attention to methodological choices.  Focusing on the balance of 
power as a ‘category of practice’ as opposed to analytical ways of studying the balance of 
power is not a given: it must be connected to methodology – the goal of doing this in the 
first place. 
How/what knowledge is possible and what the world under investigation is made of are 
two different questions, on two different levels. These are often conflated, particularly 
when studying knowledge, as it is assumed that one can be reduced to the other. Adding 
these levels together can serve the function of protecting against ‘anything goes’ attitudes. 
If, for example, a postulate on ‘everyday knowledge’ also automatically defines objects of 
research, there can be ‘discoverable’ or indisputable standards for truth claims. The 
proving and the proven are added together. When constructivism invokes ‘common 
sense’, or ‘everyday knowledge’, this is often treated as both a philosophical postulate 
and as the given object for research into concrete varieties in empirical phenomena. But, 
as seen, there is no a priori given way to ‘operationalise’ philosophical postulates.  
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However, if we separate clearly between these levels, the key to resolving the dilemma of 
a ‘constructivist’ postulate on knowledge and the fear that ‘anything goes’ is to situate it 
within a (scientific) community. The formal or logical rigour aspired to in methodological 
application is not a question of some foundational notion of a parallel rationality between 
scholar and object of study,46 but – bluntly put – of being taken seriously within your 
community. We are all part of the social world, and of different practical domains, but 
through methodology, science is distinguished by ‘the passage from conversational and 
other “practical” namings to namings that are likewise practical – indeed, very much 
more practical – for research’.47 
One can be part of a rule-dependent practical activity, or one can stand outside of it, but 
then inevitably analysing it from another rule-dependent practical activity – in this case, 
academic research. An overall account of the nature of knowledge does therefore not 
imply that how participants in a social phenomenon explain and understand their activity 
is the same as how scientists explain and understand that same activity. The situation of 
scientists, or researchers, differs from the situation of the participants under investigation 
only because they partake in different practical domains of activity. Accordingly, ‘there is 
no reason that we should assume symmetry between our own situation and the situation 
of the people we study’.48 The difference in the concerns of participants and scientists 
regarding what is done and known and why it is done and known,  
renders the subject matters that are proper, necessary, in the doings and knowings of the 
two concerns as different as is H2O from the water we drink and wash with […] Scientific 
knowing is that particular form of practical human activity which is concerned with the 
advancement of knowing apart from concern with other practical affairs.49  
What we do with the subject matter, however, can never be seen as detached from either 
postulates or methodologies. Bearing this in mind makes it easier to see how the choice of 
focus on scholarly definitions of the balance of power versus that of the participants is 
really a choice of ontology, and does not entail logical connexions to methodology. I 
therefore argue for the efficiency of focusing on participant accounts instead of scholarly 
theories of the Balance of Power in a specific way, given my methodology. My 
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methodology is genealogy. This is a methodological precept, because it specifies the goal 
of investigation, also by situating the scholar, as I will detail below.  
Focusing on the rhetorical practices and conceptual uses of those we study, then, will not 
matter much unless it is accompanied by methodological reflection on the position of the 
scholar and the very aim of studying participant rhetoric and not something else.  
Consider this: Even if I use exactly the same historical empirics, the same quotes and 
source material as authors elaborating a scholarly definition of the balance of power, my 
goal in using these quotes is different. I have a different methodology, a different aim: I 
am looking for the historical constitution of the balance of power in arguments, and the 
effects of using the balance-of-power concept in a given historical situation. I am not 
summoning these actors as historical witnesses to the correctness of my own analytical 
view of what the balance of power really is.  
The above has been abstract, and may seem overly detached. However, in addition to 
being a methodological point framing this project, it is also an assumption relevant to the 
empirical material: the distinctions between such communities emerge at certain points in 
time, and my argument below is that how knowledge claims and theories are assessed and 
used within different communities makes a difference regarding the balance of power: a 
central development was the increasing distinction between abstractions and reality or 
political practice – a distinction which was itself used to make political points, eventually 
impacting the constitution of the IR discipline. In other words, the above concerns not 
only me and us, but has also been a consequential division in historical practice – be it 
scientific communities, or communities who otherwise operate with different standards of 
validity.  
 
My assumptions and methodology 
This project is an empirically, not conceptually, driven analysis. The subject is the 
balance of power, and my data are published utterances. Therefore, at one level, this 
project is a documentation of balance-of-power rhetoric across time and space. It 
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documents how political elites have used the concept of balance of power. This is 
necessary work and is of value for the discipline of IR since it fills a gap in scholarship.  
However, it is also a profoundly theoretical analysis. As made clear above, it is not 
enough to say that I will examine ‘participant rhetoric’ or the balance of power ‘in 
practice’, because it is not self-evident what that might entail, or what the purpose of this 
might be. The goal of this project is not to reconstruct a theory of the balance of power 
based on historical empirical evidence of use. My goal is to write a genealogy of the 
balance of power as a concept. 
A genealogy aims to show historical trajectories whereby elements that in their immediate 
context would seem unrelated, at later points accidently come together to shift conditions 
of possibility and eventually produce our present condition. A genealogy therefore most 
often deals with large historical shifts, often spanning hundreds of years. However, I also 
want to paint a more fine-grained picture of how the balance of power has been deployed 
in concrete policy debates and controversies, being contingently linked to other concerns, 
and thereby produced effects. Therefore, I specify the genealogy by also employing a 
specific form of conceptual analysis, whereby concepts cannot be studied apart from their 
use. By doing this, I also achieve a contrast to how conceptual analysis is normally 
conducted in the discipline as a way to sharpen tools for investigation.  
Traditionally, a conceptual history often concerns the personal and historical 
circumstances of given authors.50 This, however, plays down the possible future roles that 
a text or utterance may play – the concern is with the time and place in which the text or 
utterance was produced, and is only incidentally relevant to later developments.51 What I 
do is to combine and use a particular form of conceptual analysis for the purposes of a 
genealogical analysis.  
To combine historical analyses of concepts with a genealogy, I emphasise how a 
genealogy negotiates between the agency of the present-day scholar and the historical 
actors. Such a genealogical analysis is therefore also a methodological precept, where the 
present is an inevitable analytical standpoint. Writing a genealogy is doubly 
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hermeneutical, because it includes both the agency of the present-day interpreter (myself), 
and the interpretations of historical actors.  
Such a change in theoretical and methodological focus enables me to investigate the 
contingent linking of the balance of power to other concerns. The key mechanisms in 
explaining change over time are the concrete processes of linking the balance-of-power 
concept to other concerns, producing historical breaks or inflection points. That means I 
can make use of historical material that is not usually considered relevant for the balance 
of power. In so doing, I also historically and empirically amend common balance-of-
power arguments and examples in IR. 
The almost self-evident status of the balance of power as an analytical and experience-
distant concept in IR means that, throughout the project, I face a fight on three fronts: 
- On an ontological level, against the notion that the balance of power is somehow 
objectively existing ‘out there’ in the real world. My assertion is however that the 
balance of power is relationally constituted in historical practice.  
- On the empirical level, against alternative timings, datings, and concrete historical 
accounts of the balance of power.  
- As regards causality and effects, against those who hold that the balance of power 
is epiphenomenal  ̶  an ‘idea’ that serves to legitimise the interests and policies 
that the actors would have followed in any case. My claim is rather that the 
concept of the balance of power has discursive and constitutive effects on policy 
in the first place.  
These points recur throughout the chapters. To be able to make them convincingly, I will 
present the assumptions which have affected how I identify and use data and sources as 
presented in the introduction.  
What is it about my assumptions that make this a different kind of study of the balance of 
power? 
In Chapter 7 of this project, a centrally placed actor, British Prime Minister Canning, will 
ask: ‘is the balance of power a fixed and unalterable standard? Or is it not a standard 
perpetually varying, as civilization advances, and as new nations spring up, and take their 
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place among established political communities?’ He declares that ‘to look to the policy of 
Europe, in the times of William and Anne, for the purpose of regulating the balance of 
power in Europe at the present day, is to disregard the progress of events, and to confuse 
dates and facts which throw a reciprocal light upon each other’.52 In Chapter 9, we will 
see how British Foreign Minister Austen Chamberlain argued that practising politicians 
like himself ‘decide the practical questions of daily life by instinct rather than by any 
careful process of reasoning, by rule of thumb rather than by systematic logic’.53   
Unlike some present-day analysts who use history as their justification, centrally placed 
historical actors themselves, in the midst of political turbulence, did not consider the 
balance of power as a ‘timeless principle’, and did not have a coherent theory about what 
it was.  
So what is the balance of power? Just as there is no reason to believe that today’s scholars 
have captured the essence of the balance of power, neither is there any reason to believe 
that any of the politicians, authors, philosophers, or pamphleteers to be encountered in the 
ensuing pages should have a coherent theory about the balance of power that could 
answer this question.54 Politicians and diplomats seize on the available, dominant 
concepts and use them for their purposes, not knowing whether that will be a successful 
exercise until after the fact. They do not know any better than us what the concept really 
‘is’.  
This in turn also means that there is little reason to think that the balance-of-power 
concept as used in the IR discipline corresponds to the balance of power as it has been 
used across time and space by historical actors ‘thrown’ into the world, facing practical 
problems. However, this is an assumption often implicitly made in much of the literature. 
For instance, Paul Schroeder claims (as I also claim in Chapter 6 regarding the Congress 
of Vienna), that there is a difference between the language of ‘balance of power’ and 
‘equilibrium’. I agree, but Schroeder goes on to say, ‘the language of the Vienna era 
certainly demonstrates that the international system required and rested on political 
                                                          
52 Commons Sitting, December 12, 1826. Walsh, Robert. 1835. Select Speeches of the Right Honourable 
George Canning, Philadelphia: Key and Biddle, p. 466, emphasis added. 
53 Chamberlain, Austen. 1930. ‘Great Britain as a European Power’, Journal of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 9(2):180–188, p. 180. 
54 Jordheim, Helge. 2012. ‘Staten, genealogien og historien. Quentin Skinner i samtale med Helge 
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equilibrium – but not that there was a balance of power’.55 His point is that a ‘balance’ 
and an ‘equilibrium’ are different animals in his, and presumably our, analytical 
language. In cases where historical actors did use the balance-of-power concept, 
Schroeder is in effect saying that, yes, they talked about a ‘balance of power’, but they 
were wrong in doing so, and this did not make sense, because there really was no Balance 
of Power. Not only is there a parallel between their uses and ours, but on top of it, they 
mistook one concept for the other. Schroeder’s argument would imply that the historical 
actors’ use of the concept ‘balance of power’ two centuries ago is parallel to ‘our’ 
analytical concept. In addition, Schroeder compares ‘equilibrium’ as participant rhetoric, 
with ‘balance of power’ as theoretical, analytical category – ‘apples with oranges’, as the 
saying goes. Then, in the end, he asks, ‘if the case against the balance of power 
interpretation is so clear, why have many excellent scholars adopted it?’56 He answers 
that the reasons are the flexibility of the concept, the weight of tradition and convention, 
realism in IR, and Vienna as a customary ‘data point’. This is probably all true. However, 
it remains to be asked: what do we do with the historical material detailing the uses of the 
concept amongst central practitioners in those times? The answer probably should not be 
that everyone was wrong in using it. That, in fact, would be validating the status of the 
contemporary concept Schroeder sets out to question in the first place. 
If we assume that the balance of power is an entity, a ‘thing’, and we then search through 
history to identify what different politicians and authors had to say about this ‘thing’, we 
are making the mistake of trying to identify or reconstruct a theory that was not there and 
that has never existed.57 If a concept is seen as somehow moving through time, ‘the 
balance of power’ in Canning’s time and ‘the balance of power’ in Chamberlain’s time 
may be mistaken as the ‘same thing’. 
The balance of power can mean many different things to many different people. This in 
turn implies that not one but many different valid stories can be told about the concept. So 
even if we should aim to ‘tell it like it really was’, selection is involved.58 The theory 
behind the choices one makes in this respect is the methodology: where, who, and what to 
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study, and not to study, within which research tradition, and what counts as valid and 
relevant data and knowledge.  
My genealogy of the balance of power will emphasise how this concept was contingent, 
diverse, and problematic, used by a range of historically, politically, and morally situated 
historical actors. It will also question the ways in which the balance of power has been 
treated in the discipline of IR. However, I must stress that this is not a criticism of the 
balance of power concept. I do not aim to strip the concept naked, revealing it as untrue 
or unreliable, or its historical uses based on ‘misunderstandings’. The purpose is not to 
criticise the concept or the actors using it, but the stories that are typically told about it. 
Criticising or indeed trying to demolish the concept would be to deny its long genealogy, 
and to ignore the crucial ways in which it has shaped historical trajectories, the IR 
discipline included.59   
Rather, my focus on the practical uses of the concept over time aims at capturing new and 
interesting things worth understanding, about historical political processes, and about the 
IR discipline today. The balance of power has profoundly affected how what we now call 
‘foreign policy’ has been conducted, how polities have been differentiated, and 
conceptions about international structure. The balance of power is important and had 
consequences, but, I maintain, in a different way than normally imagined, namely through 
its rhetorical deployment. 
 
Genealogy 
Does it matter how our theories, like theories of the balance of power, have emerged and 
been constructed? Some would say that whether people have been using and speaking 
about the balance of power in times past does not matter. It could equally well be just a 
fancy or even a dream, as long as we are careful and scientific in testing such theories, 
whatever their origins, against the evidence.60 The methodological aspects of a genealogy 
are important because my only possible response to this would be methodological. I seek 
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not to establish systematic cross-case correlations and law-like conjectures, but to 
demonstrate that the historical trajectory and uses of the concept itself have effects – 
including the formulation of precisely such ‘hypotheses’ and treating the balance of 
power as an analytical tool. 
There is little reason why we should not be interested in how we got from the 17th 
century to today, how our concepts have been used in the past, and what lineages connect 
us to the past. A story about the balance of power can be the story of such lineages, what 
we see as their causes, and how this led to the features of the present in which we are 
interested.61 This is a genealogy – a history of the present in terms of the past.  
My genealogy is a deliberately incomplete, but not false, depiction of a historical network 
of trajectories – developments that fork, break off, and long remain unaware of one 
another, before contingently coming together. Genealogy alludes to how random 
occurrences come together to drive a certain part of history forward. Events relate to each 
other in ways similar to individuals and (quite literally) their intercourse as depicted in a 
family tree.  
The methodological aspects of a genealogy concern the relationship between the observer 
and the observed. If there are historical facts of matter, there will always also be an 
interpreter. Most would agree, but some would aspire to getting as close as possible to 
historical truth – to at least try to put themselves in the historical actors’ shoes. One can 
be attentive to historical context and ‘participant rhetoric’, in trying to understand what 
historical actors really meant. The aim is then to give an objective picture of historical 
meaning. Still, the role of the scholar doing this investigation in the present would then 
disappear somewhat from view. By focusing solely on the interpretations of the historical 
actors we study, we assume that we can objectively assess what they really meant in 
saying and writing what they did. Conversely, if the focus is exclusively on our 
interpretation as scholars, then we fail to take into consideration the contingencies and 
variable contextual effects of a wide variety of public utterances in history, imposing an 
order that might not have been there.  
The genealogical ‘postulate’ is that one cannot even come closer to an unhindered 
perspective of the past – because it is not at all clear what ‘coming closer’ would imply, 
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and on what basis such a movement could possibly be adjudged to have been realised. 
What a genealogy does is to take this seriously, making the ‘history of the present’ not 
only an object of inquiry, but also a methodological precept. How we study what we 
study in the past is of relevance to us also because of the time and place we live in, and 
how what we choose to study has come to be seen as worthy of study. A genealogy 
therefore comes with a methodological selecting tool, which is my/our present context. 
This delimits what is important, and what is marginal.  
This is not to say that categories and practices that are no longer important to us but were 
important to historical actors are not worth investigating – quite the contrary. The point, 
however, is that in questioning historical developments, we already know the outcome. 
The puzzle then becomes why and how such categories and practices fell out of use and 
were replaced by others, and how paths have crossed and concepts and practise 
intermingled, fused, or torn apart, to produce our present condition, as opposed to the 
infinity of alternative conditions.62 This means, at a general level, acknowledging that 
what is taken to be ‘truth’ is always a precondition of an investigation, and not the result.   
We find no increasing consensus or clearer direction as history moves along, only an 
unending battle over meanings in practice. A genealogy reconstructs these battles, and 
brings them to light – a light that can also be shed on present-day concerns.63 It should 
now, therefore, be clearer what I mean when I say that in writing a genealogy of the 
balance of power, my goal is to identify and chart these different disputes and fights in 
which the balance of power has been involved, and how they have resulted in changing 
conditions of possibility for action.  
   
Why not treat the balance of power as an ‘idea’, or norm? 
One objection to my project could be that this could equally well be a constructivist 
‘history of ideas’ or the history of norms transmission. It could, but I want to be more 
specific.  
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As Chamberlain himself pointed out above, historical actors are ‘thrown’ into the world, 
as Heidegger put it, facing practical problems in need of solutions in medias res. The 
balance of power is a rhetorical resource that often served as a convenient sense-making 
tool in such situations, without actors necessarily reflecting much on its use. I choose to 
emphasise these aspects of the balance of power as a concept, and how actors through 
their use of it stabilised the concept – rather than stabilising the concept analytically 
myself, by defining it as an entity I can call ‘an idea’.  
If not rejecting any ‘history of ideas’ tout court, I at least want to specify it in ways that 
enable me to empirically detail the effects of using the balance of power. The problem 
with ‘ideas’ in this respect is that if we cannot show how such ideas exert independent, 
causal influence, then ideas might be brushed away as mere pretexts or covers for the 
‘real’ interest of actors – or, alternatively, as filling in residual explanations for the really 
important, material explanatory factors. However, asserting the causal role of ideas is 
problematic if they, as they often are, are hypostatised and seen to be ‘clashing’ between 
themselves in abstract space. This makes it difficult to study how such ‘ideas’ are 
connected to actual debates, disputes, and empirical practices of historical actors. As 
Skinner once noted in critiquing the idealist Arthur Lovejoy, one is then writing ‘a history 
not of ideas at all, but abstractions: a history of thought which no one ever actually 
succeeded in thinking, at a level of coherence which no one ever actually attained’.64   
The mere presence of an ‘idea’ in this sense tells us little about how it concretely affects 
social practice or politics. As long as the concrete causal links between ‘idea’ and 
outcome are not specified, an idea does not explain anything. So what happens when, 
armed with such an abstract approach to the balance as an ‘idea’, we encounter such 
concrete but incoherent debates and practices in the sources and secondary literature? In 
applying idealism, we risk simply adding yet another variable to already existing 
‘materialist’ accounts of the balance which, in a weird division of labour, has all but 
monopolised concreteness. Accepting the idea/materialism dichotomy makes it possible 
to explain residual factors, but not really to assert another explanatory framework in its 
own right.65   
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If ‘norms’ or ‘ideas’ are hypostatised as entities, they become mysterious agents of 
change.66 For example, while I argue in Chapter 3 that the very concept of an 
international system was constructed by rhetorically linking it to the balance of power 
around the Utrecht negotiations, Andreas Osiander asserts that the international system in 
itself wielded effects independent of actors’ practices.67 The risk in operating with such 
causally effective ‘undetectable’ and hypostatised entities is that such ‘structures’, 
‘concepts’, or ‘ideas’ themselves become mysterious agents of change, ‘making 
intermittent entries into the mundane world from the idealism’s heavenly spheres’,68 or 
merely adding gloss to other explanatory frameworks. Structural forces clashing are what 
determine actor behaviour, and ‘what actors do’ is out of the theoretical picture. What is 
left to explain in accounts such as Osiander’s is where such structuring principles come 
from, how they endure or change, and how such structural principles ‘become inscribed 
into the practices of actors’.69  
What if we add rhetorical practice to ‘ideas’? Would not setting ideas in motion in this 
way solve the problem? No, because the risk in asserting that ‘ideas’ or their associated 
‘motivations’ is acting upon the world through rhetoric lies in the potential charge of 
idealism – that this would imply a ‘language miracle’, whereby existential change occurs 
through the mere act of speaking. The solution for avoiding this idealist trap is to find a 
way of explaining how the balance of power is used and how invoking it can produce 
concrete effects in the world and on policy – without claiming that it is the balance of 
power concept in itself that is ultimately the cause or that does the acting.  
 
The balance of power as a concept 
Here, I take my cues from relationalism.70 In my view, the balance of power is not a thing 
with certain properties, which then starts interacting with its environment, producing 
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effects.71 If the balance of power is seen as an entity with relatively stable properties, as 
‘idea’ or otherwise, then the effects or results of using the balance of power could, in the 
end, be traced back to its attributes.   
Relationalism finds it more useful to treat relations as the primary ontological focus – 
especially when studying phenomena that might include unit-level changes,72 as in my 
project. Instead of starting with defined entities, we can begin by looking at relations as 
the foci of study, so that it is possible to investigate also how any entity came about and 
how it might be changing. Seen from within a relational ontology, then, the entities are 
involved in constant transactions. Such a starting point makes it nonsensical to speak of 
entities as existing before the transactions or relations take place, as they cannot be taken 
out of the relational context within which they operate. Entities gain their characteristics 
not from what is inherently inside them, but what is between them – that is, through their 
relations.  
Consequently, a further characteristic of a relational ontology is that relations are most 
often seen as unfolding processes.73 This does not mean that everything is changing all 
the time, or that relations never stabilize and become enduring. Those are empirical 
questions. The default setting of a relational ontology is that the social is never coherent, 
but constantly in a process of change. What, then, makes relations take on a stable and 
enduring form? Instead of assuming order, and aiming to explain change, relationalism 
would take change for granted and explore the dynamics and power processes involved in 
(the history of) institutionalization or sedimentation of certain relations. To specify this 
rather broad ontology of relationalism, I will treat the balance of power as a concept. 
Seeking to shift the agency from concepts ‘in themselves’ to actual historical actors, their 
struggles, contentions, and debates, I focus on the effects of using the concept.74 What 
‘does’ things is how concepts are deployed during controversies, in concrete debates, 
contentions, and crises. The importance of concepts comes from political debates and 
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political practice, and is not disconnected from them. I do not distinguish between the 
concept as an idea ‘in itself’ on the one hand, and some set of isolated historical, social, 
cultural, political, or economic factors on the other, as if they were external to it. Here 
concepts cannot be studied independent of their use.  
I see concepts as being commonly established and relatively stable rhetorical resources 
that historical actors can seize and use to make sense of relevant occurrences and events 
in their historical context.75 What is common is not shared ideas or agreements about 
meaning, but a set of concepts to be used as public resources in arguments and to 
formulate positions. Concepts are ways of looking at problems to generate arguments.76  
Concepts are therefore literally useful in debates and controversies. Concepts can be of 
use, but they do not determine meaning. Concepts are open for contestation – not despite 
being so common, but because of that. Concepts are vague, and therefore useful. Imagine 
trying to draw an exact picture of a blurred image. How can we judge whether the one 
corresponds to the other? It would seem that ‘the degree to which the sharp picture can 
resemble the blurred one depends on the latter’s degree of vagueness’.77 The vaguer the 
picture, the more ways there will be of drawing an accurate one. The same happens when 
we use concepts that are so public, so common in their use, that they are difficult to pin 
down and define. Any attempt at drawing a sharp picture of an everyday concept can be 
both accepted and disputed. Wittgenstein asked, ‘is it even always an advantage to 
replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn’t the indistinct one often exactly what we 
need?’78  
Similarly, concepts are vague and difficult to pin down, so different arguments can 
creatively be constructed or destructed from the same concept.79 Inexact does not mean 
useless, and vagueness may contribute to efficient political use. Concepts contain the 
source of arguments, but at the same time also the source of that argument’s 
counterargument. By using the balance-of-power concept, arguments can be both closed 
down and opened up. Agreement or assent is therefore not the basis for the existence of 
concept – they emerge through the contingent use of rhetoric for practical purposes in 
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context. Such ambiguities in concepts are not a fault of language: they are indispensable 
for the use of concepts in making sense of events.80 The advantage of this framing is that 
the coherence or ‘correctness’ of the balance of power need not be a concern here, as it is 
for more traditional conceptual analysis that seeks to establish clear boundaries for 
explanatory efficiency. A wide range of historical actors have used the balance of power 
concept in differing ways, in attempts to legitimise different political projects. We can tell 
a story about those attempts, regardless of their success or coherence.81  
From this perspective, all talk and accounts of what the balance of power ‘really’ is are 
attributions, not observations.82 Such attributions are part of the processes that can 
stabilise and make a particular area of rhetoric seem incontrovertible. In consequence, 
when I examine participant rhetoric, the goal of treating the balance of power as a concept 
is not to impose an analytical stability, but to investigate the rhetorical stabilities that have 
actually emerged through rhetorical practice. Stability is not assumed: it is to be 
explained.83 
 
Why the balance of power concept is not really only about ‘the balance of power’: The 
contingent linking of the balance to other concerns 
Change occurs when a concept is creatively used during actual debates and contentions. 
An important mechanism in effecting such change is the rhetorical linking together of 
various concepts and concerns previously considered separate. This implies that the 
balance of power is not really only about the balance of power ‘in itself’, but an array of 
other stuff too.  
Concepts do not contain a single inner rule that makes them consistent – they are 
continuously reinforced or challenged during controversies and events. In using concepts, 
we are not using something already set, but are linking up with events and other concepts 
in rhetorical practice, in disputes and debates. When a concept is ‘stable’, that is not 
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because of its inherent stability, but because the things and practices surrounding it are 
seen to be ‘in their place’.  
Even if we assume, for the sake of the argument, that concepts do have an inherent 
meaning and stability, actors would still be obliged to find new ways of expressing them, 
given the situation and concatenation of other factors, and such new ways of using a 
concept will not leave it completely unaltered.84 The application of existing concepts to 
new events and circumstances is always ‘risky’, because this may serve to change them 
and thereby the limits for action and the conditions of possibility, intentionally or not.85 
However, not any kind of links can be made – a concept both enables and restricts – so 
one cannot use the balance of power for just anything at any time. For example, as I will 
show in Chapter 3, Austria’s attempt to link the balance to dynastic politics did not 
succeed, because of the already established uses and meanings of the balance of power as 
the fight against universal monarchy, and against private interests. 
These links are not inert connexions through resemblance. When the balance of power is 
linked to other concerns or other concepts, these links are concrete: the linkages are made 
explicitly during debates and controversies.  
By linking or delinking to political positions and political projects, concepts are used as 
resources for legitimation or de-legitimation. Such processes of legitimation are central to 
social action, and this need for legitimation restricts our space for action. A criticism that 
the balance of power was used to legitimise something that the actors would have done in 
any case misses the point. The concepts that are used to legitimate actions can also be a 
part of a causal explanation for those actions86 – not a cover for ‘real interests’, or a 
pretext. As Skinner has put it, concepts will ‘attach to political relations’, making it 
‘appropriate to analyse political theories as contributions to ideological controversies and 
as weapons of vindication or subversion in the strategies of local political forces whether 
or not the author intends or recognises it’.87 That is, concepts are used with effects, also 
regardless of the user’s intentions. The balance of power affects the space for action, the 
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scope of possible political alternatives – the ways of framing and justifying an issue are 
also part of producing a policy.88 
In sum, the contingent linking of the balance of power concept to other concerns and 
other concepts is a key mechanism – examining such relational processes enables me to 
historically amend common arguments about the balance in IR. This is so because the 
focus on linking, and therefore also my (scope and use of) historical material, differ from 
what IR scholars often draw on.  
 
Conclusions 
In continuation, I will show how links were often made to the standing and differentiation 
of polities, and their relation to the overall structure or system of the international – from 
‘the public interest of Europe’ to ‘international anarchy’. This is also the history of the 
emergence and change of the state as a type of political unit, and what it meant for 
historical actors. It is a history of how political units, what is being ‘balanced’ in the 
balance of power, have been performed in relation to others. As we shall see, this changes 
dramatically in the timespan under study here. 
Tracing a genealogy of the balance of power concept, and how it was linked to other 
concerns, is also an engine of social change.89 It can show how and when different 
conceptions of what a political entity is may change over time, and how the balance of 
power has been centrally involved in this, through processes of contingent linking. The 
history of the balance of power is also by implication a history of how political entities – 
that which is to be balanced – may change over time, as well as how the ‘power’ in the 
balance of power also changes over time, eventually becoming associated with the 
capacities of atomistic nation-states, mainly through the development of ‘statistics’ and 
state-centrism.  
At any given point, more conceptual options existed than those to be detailed here, but 
my aim is to explore the options actually chosen, in context, and their effects. I do not 
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think it makes sense to separate between events in themselves and the concepts and 
rhetorical resources used to describe, explain, or make sense of them. There is not a world 
of real politics on the one hand, and an external ‘intellectual’ context on the other – 
precisely the point made above. This is why actors respond not only to events or 
‘practical politics’, but also to the theories used to describe or explain it.90 These are not 
two, parallel histories: they are interlinked, as concepts and rhetoric participate in making 
something an ‘event’ in the first place, and in presenting historical narratives. This is a 
further reason why in this chapter I have focused on illuminating potential relationships 
between theorising and political practice, and also how that distinction itself is used in 
practice to score political points in struggles over legitimation. This speaks to what I 
began by saying: how knowledge claims are assessed within different communities makes 
a difference. The general methodological points above concern not only me and us, but 
have also been consequential in historical practice – be it scientific communities, or 
communities with otherwise differing standards of validity.  
In the next chapter, I begin the genealogy by looking at the emergence of the balance of 
power as a concept in English debates in the late 17th century. We will see how this came 
to develop as a concept in early modern Europe through contingent rhetorical links to 
other central concepts and debates of the period, with the prevalence of debates over 
Universal Monarchy, interests and the public and private spheres. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
The Emergence of the Balance of Power as a Concept  
in Early Modern Europe 
 
 
The balance of power was not a stock-in trade ‘realist’ concept from the beginning, but 
was heavily influenced by classical republicanism, focusing on virtue, mixed 
constitutions, checks and balances, intimately connecting domestic politics with the 
‘international’ system of Europe. As noted in the previous chapter, I do not consider the 
balance of power to have any internal logic of its own that ‘made’ it evolve. Context, as 
well as concrete policy debates in England and across Europe, influenced its emergence 
and were influenced by it. The various debates came together in the period of the Anglo–
Dutch wars: England could justify attacking the Dutch because they were presented as a 
threat, an aspiring Universal Monarchy. Eventually, the English came to oppose the wars 
– by appealing openly to the balance of power, which in the process had become 
cemented as a concept and thereby as a rhetorical resource that could now be used to 
convince England that France was the real danger to Europe.  
Increasingly, then, from the Glorious Revolution in 1688, when William III (‘William of 
Orange’) succeeded to the English throne, and until the 1713/1714 Treaties of Utrecht, it 
was in the name of the balance of power that England, Austria, and the Dutch organised 
alliances against France. The concept helped to join these polities together, even if 
unintentionally. The rallying force of the balance of power was used for what it was 
worth, and would have implications for English and international debates leading up to 
the Utrecht Settlement (see Chapter 3). In the process, England came to be seen as the 
leader and the ‘hand that holds the balance’, made possible by the natural opposition 
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between the balance of power and Universal Monarchy. Holland, on the other hand, was 
no longer seen as a ‘Great Power’.1  
Some authors, among them Paul W. Schroeder,2 maintain that the Glorious Revolution in 
1688 had nothing to do with European affairs, but was a matter of religion and domestic 
politics. Therefore, according to Schroeder, the assertion that England sought to balance 
against France is mistaken – it was rather to save the Dutch and their religion. However, 
as I will show, if we take the actors’ rhetoric seriously, we cannot disregard the balance of 
power by dismissing present-day theory as an inefficient tool for analysis, exactly 
because of the boost in the usage of the concept at the time. If the analytical concept of 
the balance of power is taken as the point of departure, the actual debates and concepts 
employed in the period will be used incorrectly in the analysis. Schroeder writes that ‘the 
primary British motive would be domestic, not international’3 – to defend the domestic 
gains from the Glorious Revolution. However, I hold, the separation between the 
domestic and the ‘international’ was not so clear-cut – precisely because political actors 
were linking the central concept of the balance of power to other concepts like the ‘public 
interest’ and domestic debates over the mixed constitution. Even if often couched in 
religious terminology (like ‘the Protestant Interest’), from the 1670s, opposition to France 
had become the main debate in English politics, intrinsically linked with domestic 
developments.  
 
Early modern debates: Universal monarchy, interest, and the public/private 
distinction 
In pamphlets published during the 30 Years’ War, many issues concerning French–
Spanish relations can be identified as problems of the balance of power – as seen from a 
present-day, analytical perspective. One pamphlet from the 1640s advocated setting the 
German princes up against France, which threatened to become a dangerous ‘Universal 
Monarchy’; another proposed that England should make closer associations with the 
Dutch. However, none of these pamphlets associated the potential French threat of 
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universal monarchy with the balance of power. Attacks on France’s intentions were 
commonplace, but the balance of power was not invoked. France was seen as 
representing the threat of tyranny, a threat to the freedom of Europe – concepts that only 
later would be linked with the balance of power.  
On the other hand, the term ‘balance of power’ was used before the period under 
investigation here, as noted in the introduction. ‘Balance’ as a metaphor for a political 
relation can be traced as far back as at least the 15th century. My focus, however, is on 
when it became a concept, widely and publically used and accepted as a resource in 
political struggles, and the analyses of such struggles. The first step in this is to chart 
prevalent debates of the period in which the balance of power emerged as a concept. I 
consider three dominant concepts in particular as important for the emergence of the 
balance of power: Universal Monarchy, interests, and the public versus the private.  
 
Universal monarchy 
The fight against what was called a ‘Universal Monarchy’ will be a recurrent topic in the 
following chapters, as this was commonly considered by far the most severe threat to 
European polities. In theory, a universal monarchy came to imply a tyrannical world ruler 
with sovereignty over all kings, in practice predominance or hegemony over Europe. 
Even if a literal world empire was unrealistic, the idea of a Universal Monarchy remained 
an important commonplace in European political culture for several hundred years.4 As 
late as in the mid-19th century, Universal Monarchy was used, linked to the balance of 
power. To understand how this became so, it is worth having a short look at the prehistory 
of this concept.  
That one Empire should and could dominate the whole of Europe had in fact long been a 
legitimate aspiration, particularly given the important prehistory of the Roman Empire. 
That empire, it was argued, had been successful because of its pietas – a loyalty to the 
community, its laws, and its religion. Empire in this sense implied order: the outside and 
inside of the Roman Empire had been separated by the particular virtues of the inside, or 
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rules of conduct. Empire or universal rule did therefore not entail the unconstrained use of 
power, but a regard for the common good of the community – the utilitas publica.5  
Initially, Universal Monarchy was generally accepted by the European powers as a 
legitimate aspiration. It was based on mediaeval developments in political thought, where 
the general outlook was to start from the whole, while attributing intrinsic value to every 
part of the whole, right down to the individual – based on ideas about the divinely willed 
Harmony of the Universe. The principles of human society must emanate from the 
divinely organised universe,6 so the principle of Unity also provided the foundation for 
hierarchical theories within societies. A Universal Monarchy therefore promised the 
installation of political order. European rulers like Charlemagne, Charles I, and Charles V 
all invoked such a Universal Monarchy, based on a Universal Church.7 
As with the Roman Empire, some considered ‘Europe’ to be one respublica christiana, 
with a common law providing the framework.8 A koinos nomos, a universal code of law, 
could establish links between secular politics and the spread of the Christian religion. 
Both were needed, in mutual support.9 Inspired by the Roman Empire, a Universal 
Monarchy was not considered literally universal in its aspirations. With the growing 
awareness of the existence of different cultures and continents, becoming the ruler of the 
whole world was not a realistic option. Even the Romans, the English pamphleteer 
Charles Davenant pointed out, were only a small part of a bigger world, and they ‘did at 
last sit down in quiet’ after having conquered what they could and wanted.10 Rather, 
universal rule meant the secular leadership of the ‘inside’ of Europe, being recognised as 
the leader of Christendom, or at least the Habsburg territories, in the fight against the 
infidels on the outside.11  
However, a distinction gradually emerged between the divine and the temporal aspect of 
human societies and rule. Dante Alighieri, for example, had argued that the only solution 
for the divided Italy was foreign rule, but in the realm of secular politics. For the 
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Habsburg Empire to serve as a uniting force, this required a separation between secular 
and religious authority. The Pope, Dante argued, was responsible for the human soul, 
whilst the emperor was responsible for the temporal well-being of humans on earth.12 
Even if the Church still accorded religious legitimacy to the Empire until 1648,13 the 
Christian Empire itself became a secular institution. This division, however, requires 
some kind of ordering principle also for the temporal sphere, or an alternative 
‘Archimedean point’ from which to think about and construct order. This became Reason, 
and ultimately the notion of ‘natural interests’, which accorded value to diversity.  
Throughout the 17th century, Universal Monarchy increasingly faced opposition. It was 
no longer directly connected to ‘God’s plan’, as Catholics and Protestants were pitted 
against one another, and different ways of organising human societies were gaining value. 
By the time of the Holy Roman Emperor and King of Spain, Charles V (1500-1558), a 
fear of Universal Monarchy was expressed. With the aid of money and official 
historiography, Charles V established continuity between the Spanish monarchy and the 
Habsburg Empire, and explicitly sought to dominate Europe.14 In the translatio imperii to 
the Spanish Empire in the early 16th century, Charles V underplayed the Roman legacy of 
pietas, and rather emphasised the Christian view that differences between ‘men’ should 
disappear. However, that no longer resonated well throughout Europe. The Reformation 
had undermined Papal authority and the universality of Europe, and the old principles of 
law of the respublica christiana was no longer accepted.15   
Fears arose that Spain, in particular, was bent on a Universal Monarchy that would lead to 
the enslavement of Europe. Spanish kings were the leaders of Catholicism against both 
Protestants and Turks.16 Spain, by ‘fraud, policy, treason, intestine divisions and war’, 
aimed to fight the Protestant princes together with the Pope to achieve ‘their long 
prosecuted Universal Monarchy’.17 
                                                          
12 See Dante’s ‘Monarchia’, III, xvi, 10, in Bruno Nardi. 1996. Dante Alighieri Opere minori, vol. 3. 
Milan/Naples: Ricciardi. 
13 Pagden, Lords, p. 31. 
14 Ibid, p. 32. 
15 Lesaffer, ‘The Grotian Tradition’, p. 115. 
16 Ibid., p. 114. 
17 William Prynne (attrib.). 1663. Philanax Protestant. S.n.: London, quoted in Steven C. A. Pincus, 1992. 
‘Popery, Trade and Universal Monarchy: The Ideological Context of the Outbreak of the Second Anglo–
Dutch War’, The English Historical Review 107: 1–29, p. 18. 
68 
 
The increasing opposition to Universal Monarchy in the 17th century was also a result of 
contrasting Asian or ‘Oriental’ rulers with those of Europe, and journeys and expeditions 
to the East could show the differences empirically. Jean Bodin had distinguished between 
different forms of monarchy. On the one hand, he had argued, there existed a monarchie 
seigneuriale, based on the Aristotelian master/slave logic, where the king had all power 
over his subjects. On the other hand, monarchie royale was based on limits to the legibus 
solutus, the absolute power of the monarch18 – specifically concerning property rights, 
natural law, and the particular laws of the polity. Bodin had illustrated this difference by 
contrasting France with the Ottomans. The Ottomans practised monarchie seigneuriale, a 
boundless power where the king is the owner of his subjects.19  
Further, Giovanni Botero in his Relazioni Universali had backed up this distinction with 
empirical observations from travel literature. Despotic forms of government, he had 
argued, extended across Asia and were not limited to the Ottomans.20 Later explorers, like 
François Bernier, Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, Paul Rycaut and others, all pointed to the 
terrible consequences of despotic governments: taxation, lack of private ownership, 
oppression and violence, cruel arbitrary government, bad administration, the absence of 
reason and virtue, and the lack of nobility.21  
If Universal Monarchy was a threat against Europe, it was also a potential threat within 
Europe. In contrast to Aristotle, Bodin had argued that the tyrannical form of monarchy 
was based not on the character and nature of peoples, even if these existed, but on the 
practice of territorial expansion and conquest. His different types of monarchies were not 
different species, but different modes of operation.22 ‘Oriental Despotism’ and arbitrary 
power was not limited to Asia, but could also be present in Europe – as had, he argued, 
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indeed been the case with Louis XI of France and the Emperor Charles V, following the 
example of Julius Caesar.23  
Some held onto the aspiration of Universal Monarchy. For instance, in France, certain 
religious groupings had argued that the calling of the King was to create a Christian 
empire, and not merely extend the frontiers of the monarchy.24 The problem, however, 
was that Europe in the 17th century was increasingly considered a multiplicity of 
individual communities, part of one totus orbis, but where lawful authority came from ius 
publicum Europaeum and not universal authority. Dynastic rights were subservient to the 
shared, public good and an integrated system, now called not Christendom, but Europe.25 
Montesquieu therefore likened the absolute powers of the French King to Oriental 
Despotism, and Michel le Vassor likened the power of Louis XIV to that of the Grand 
Seigneur or the Grand Mogol.26 France was increasingly despised across Europe, for the 
king’s attempt to seek Universal Monarchy unjustly, based on violence and betrayal. 27 
At least from the times of Charles V on, the fight against Universal Monarchy had 
become a central element in political debate on the continent. In England, in particular, 
countering Universal Monarchy had since the Age of Elizabeth been a central tenet of 
debates about the continent.28 In the Restoration period, from about 1660, the debate was 
about Universal Monarchy, and much less about the nature of true religion.29  
The historical examples invoked in making the case against Universal Monarchy (most 
conspicuously that of Charles V) held sway for centuries. As I will show in the next 
chapter, after 1706, when England was fighting a war to reunite Spanish and Austrian 
territories, Bolingbroke argued that these were the former possessions of Charles V’s 
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Universal Monarchy, and represented a policy at the expense of the balance of power. He 
defended the Tory peace policy instead.30  
In sum, Universal Monarchy would lead Europe into slavery and tyranny, as opposed to 
good forms of monarchy. The central opposition was between true monarchies and 
tyrannical ones, bent on universal expansion. The important distinguishing features were 
therefore the characteristics and properties of rule in single polities, but there was little 
talk about any system until after the Utrecht Settlements. However, eventually, the 
systemic notion of the balance of power would become the ‘counter-concept’ to Universal 
Monarchy, as Universal Monarchy and the ‘true’ or ‘natural’ interests were linked. But in 
the 1660s, with France increasingly seen as threatening to what had become a more 
shared notion of Europe, ‘balance of power’ was not a concept widely used – whereas 
‘Universal Monarchy’ was.  
 
Interest 
The idea that ‘one vice may check another’ is well known, not least from the works of St 
Augustine. The ‘passions’ that came to be explicitly linked to serving such a 
countervailing role were known as ‘interest’.31 As we shall see, interest would in turn 
come to be viewed as crucial to the maintenance of international order and the balance of 
power. ‘Interest’ is a historical product – not a starting point.  
The ‘self-love’ taken as the basis of interests, became increasingly legitimate as a moral 
principle, based on Classical Epicureanism.32 ‘Invisible-hand’ arguments emerged from 
such social theorising, whereby ‘the advancement of private persons will be the 
advantage of the publick’, giving moral support to self-interest.33 Montesquieu held that 
as a result of pursuing private ‘passions’, like glory-seeking or the desire for money, ‘it 
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turns out that everyone contributes to the general welfare while thinking that he works for 
his own interest’.34   
By the late 17th century, there existed a reading public as well as an emerging public 
sphere. Widely read was Herzog von Rohan’s work (1638) on the princes of Europe and 
their interests.35 In line with a long-standing medieval tradition, the book was written as 
advice to all princes on the conduct of their foreign relations.36 Rohan’s became a classic, 
widely read, debated, commented upon, and cited.37 The first two printings of the English 
version appeared within three years of publication.  
Around the 1660s, the debate was still about the Habsburgs, and about preventing them 
from gaining Universal Monarchy. Rohan was one of the most central authors to warn 
against the danger from Spain. He depicted possibilities for a Universal Monarchy on a 
scale not seen since the Roman Empire. Rohan had visited England in 1600, and his 
arguments resonated well there, as the protection of Christendom – in the form of 
Protestantism – was his main concern, and he recognised England’s special position in 
this.38   
This book laid some of the foundations for the concept of ‘national interest’. Rohan 
argued that, since impartiality was required in order to analyse interest, the 
‘Archimedean’ standpoint was provided by interest itself. Princes may fail, but ‘interest 
alone can never fail’. Interest itself will never betray the king. If a political leader, a state, 
or action more generally fails, it is because of a misperception of interest. A political 
failure can never undermine the validity of ‘interest’, but may easily be provoked by 
subjective ‘passions’ or ‘private’ interests.39 Passion and private interests, in turn, threaten 
order and the system, and can lead to Universal Monarchy. As pointed out in Parliament 
in 1677, Spain’s Philip II had himself written that aspiring to Universal Monarchy would 
lead to ruin, and make ‘the rest of the World jointly his enemies’; however, he had 
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38 Gunn, ‘“Interest will not lie”’, pp. 553–554. 
39 Bartelson, Jens. 1995. A Genealogy of Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 174–
175. 
72 
 
succumbed to the temptation because ‘ambition blinds men, suffers them not to look back 
on such Experiences’.40 The maxim ‘interest will not lie’ was thus popularised in England 
in the 17th century.41 It was the political version of Descartes’ truism: interest, ergo sum. 
You cannot doubt your interest, because without interest, you would not exist. Interest 
was a fundamental and universal way of human existence.  
Even more important for my purposes here, Rohan was probably the first author who 
squarely linked ‘balance of power’ to ‘interest’. The concept of ‘interest’ as such had not 
been particularly common before Rohan’s book. Thus, one of the first consistent uses of 
the term ‘interest’ accompanied one of the early important books on the balance of power 
in Europe.42 For Rohan, in international politics, ‘the interests of the principal parties are 
often exactly opposite to one another’ – one prince’s interest is the mirror image of that of 
another, as Rohan aimed to show in the rivalries between France and Spain.43 But even in 
such circumstances, both parties could gain from abiding by the rules of the game, 
eliminating some of the ‘passions’ through the concept of interest. Here, the balance of 
power played a central part. Putting aside both irrational passions and whimsies and the 
advice of unreliable councillors, parties were to pursue their goals as defined by the 
objective requirements of interest and the maintenance of the European balance of 
power.44 One could arrive at the objective interest through studying a polity’s military 
forces, its geographic position, its religious practices, and its reputation and ambitions. 
The innovation in Rohan’s approach was the focus on how interests were oriented 
towards the future, how governments could be objects for knowledge, and how the 
balance of power bound this together.45 
When self-interest was now applied to princes and polities, the balance of power became 
relevant for systematising and understanding the relations between polities. As opposed to 
Universal Monarchy, the ‘tranquillity’ and ‘security’ of Europe was a common good to be 
protected by treaties between princes as representatives of the natural interests of their 
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states.46 The French pamphleteer Gatien Courtilz de Sandras also explicitly pointed out 
the importance of interest. His book on the interest of princes47 was read across Europe, 
and was issued in several editions.48 Sandras pointed out how the new preoccupation with 
‘interest’ took precedence over dynastic squabbles and religious affinity in European 
Diplomacy49 – the state was not solely a descendant of the Divinely Organised Universe, 
but had its own reason, a raison d’état.   
With Marchamont Needham in the mid-1600s, the statement that ‘interest cannot lie’ 
received an important corollary. He connected the existence of true interest, based on 
universally applicable self-love, with the possibility of predicting outcomes: ‘If you can 
apprehend wherein a man’s interest to any particular game on foot doth consist’, 
Needham wrote, ‘you may surely know, if the man be prudent, whereabout to have him, 
that is, how to judge of his designs.’50 This understanding of interest based on calculation 
was important for understanding and knowing the ‘public business’. Natural interest, as 
opposed to passions, can be known and classified.51 It was predictable, not ‘passionate’ as 
associated with private interests. Needham’s writings became particularly important to 
the Whigs in England.52  
In the development of interest – a concept to be explicitly linked with the balance of 
power in debates – two concerns were mixed: On the one hand, there was the practical 
need to be able to predict the behaviour of others (essential in diplomacy). On the other 
hand, this would also prepare the use of the more ‘analytical’ concept of the balance of 
power. I return to both developments in later chapters. 
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Republicanism, the public, and the private 
The balance of power had not been a stock-in-trade ‘realist’ concept from the beginning. 
Rather, the concept of a balance of power was linked to classical republican arguments 
focussing on virtue, mixed constitutions, checks and balances. 
Res publica can be translated as ‘public thing’, and the public, as opposed to the private, 
was seen as the Good Thing. With time, the concept of a commonwealth had become the 
translation of Cicero’s res publica. Others suggested that the proper translation would be 
the ‘public weal’.53 Commonwealth was a way of talking about the public interest both as 
the common good of a community, and as a kind of polity or the form and purposes of a 
government. The commonwealth was a republican concept, linked to the public interest. 
Universal Monarchy, on the other hand, was linked to the private interest of a ruler. 
Republicanism does not imply that a republic, in the modern sense, is the preferred form. 
Republicanism, or civic republicanism, is a broader term,54 and was concerned with 
opposition to tyranny – be it in a monarchy, republic, or any other form of government. In 
short, it is concerned with the Roman ideals of political liberty. The republican aspects of 
liberty relate to ‘liberty to’ rather than ‘liberty from’. This was not a liberty from concrete 
interventions, as in later periods, but a more fundamental liberty from structures of 
dominance, such as in a slave-master relationship. It was liberty from Universal 
Monarchy and arbitrary rule. Such Liberty was in turn seen as promoting the exercise 
and expansion of virtú.55 Concerning English republicanism, Skinner and Pocock have 
also pointed out the centrality of the protection of law and parliamentary representation to 
liberty from tyranny. Without it, one would become a ‘slave’. The publicness of liberties 
was thus emphasised.56 In short, it was liberty as ‘non-domination’,57 parallel to the 
resistance to both Universal Monarchy and ‘private interests’.  
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The king’s interest, therefore, was no longer exclusively private – unless he was despotic. 
Before Rohan, also Richelieu had discussed this. For Richelieu, the activity of the state 
should be ‘purely and exclusively, raison d’état, the “public interest”, purified of all 
particular and private motives and of all materially egotistical constituents’58 – thus 
subjecting even the monarch himself to the ‘Goddess Reason’ inherent to the state. The 
king cannot act in his private interest, but becomes ‘a soldier in the service of the idea’.59  
Something extraordinarily important happens when this is accepted. The king’s interest 
had to contain the public interest, and in consequence, the balance of power would serve 
as an unbreakable link between the individual ruler and country, and the ‘public interest 
of Europe’. Not only did the concept of interest make possible the assessment of states – 
it also established the view that the balance of power is always the objective public 
interest. The ‘private’ became linked with ‘passions’; and the concept of ‘interest’ 
eventually split into private versus public interests, where the king’s interest had to 
contain the public interest. 
Rohan had defined interest as dynastic, pertaining to princes and their dealings with one 
another. In a further expansion of the concept, in England during and after the Civil War, 
domestic groups were included in the equation of interest. With time, ‘England’s interest’ 
came to be associated less with princely intent versus other European powers, and now 
included domestic struggles, religious interests, and commerce.60 The prince, in turn, 
represented not only the state, but also the different groups within it. After devastating 
religious wars and domestic sectarian conflicts, people had started arguing that just as 
various interests between princes could lead to stability abroad, the same advantage could 
come from the tension between interests in domestic politics.61 
Rohan himself had emphasised the important connexions between order in the state, and 
order outside of the state. He had assigned prominence to England in ordering European 
affairs, arguing that the stability and order of the English state was of the utmost 
importance. England, geographically isolated as it was, was so strong that only domestic 
disorder could undermine it – it was a ‘mighty animal which can never die except kill 
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itself’.62 As a result, Rohan was cited in national quarrels to support arguments against 
factionalism, and the importance of national unity through principles like the ‘balanced 
constitution’ inspired, inter alia, by Harrington’s The Commonwealth of Oceana and 
republican thought.63 As the poet John Suckling, invoking Rohan, wrote, in a chaotic 
world, ‘pure interest alone (said the Duke of Rohan) cannot err’.64 Praise of the balance of 
power in the English constitution is found ‘virtually in all Augustan writings on 
politics’.65  
One analogy for the commonwealth, which was the public interest, was the body politic. 
The health of the body relied on a proper balance among its elements. This metaphor 
could emphasise the mixed constitution of the res publica.66 The spirit of liberty was 
instantiated in the mixed and balanced constitution ‘whose parts were so balanced that no 
one part depended on the other, while the spirit of faction was embodied in any threat 
against the ideal constitutional structure’.67 Bolingbroke would make further links 
between history, domestic factional struggles in Britain, and the balance of power in 
Europe (see next chapter). Republican arguments transposed domestic political dynamics 
onto the international scene, through some basic principles. Like many other writers of 
the period, Bolingbroke would employ the distinction between ‘public’ versus ‘private’ 
interests when discussing the balance of power. At the core lies the notion of a public 
constitution – England’s constitution, and that of Europe. Bolingbroke thus ‘projected 
onto the international sphere the preoccupation with balance and limitations on power 
which characterized his image of the English constitution. The very terminology of the 
domestic equilibrium could be transferred to the international.’68 Or we could say that the 
‘domestic’ and ‘international’ were inseparable – and this implied continuum between 
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national and international politics was to be a ‘hallmark of English political writing’ for 
many years to come.69  
The expressed wish was to subordinate ‘private’ interests to the public, just as in domestic 
settings. Another result of the focus on the public interest, then, was that this covered, by 
definition, all the political units and their ‘equality’ and ‘autonomy’. It was a widespread 
idea, underscored by the importance of the principle of the balance of power. This, 
however, was also a very useful resource if others could be convinced that your goals 
were indeed an expression of the common interest of Europe.70 England, for one, 
succeeded in gaining acceptance for its role as a ‘balancer’.  
As ‘the interest of England’ became important, it was linked to the ‘international’ scene, 
as English stability prevented both ‘civil war’ and international instability. Following the 
national, and natural, interest was therefore inherently linked with, perhaps even 
constitutive of, international order and the balance of power. Interest was in itself 
stability, wherever it was to be found.  
The tyranny of Universal Monarchy had, as seen, been associated with the rule of a 
despot, ‘owning’ his subjects, and disregarding laws and freedoms. Now interest shifted 
from denoting the position between passion and virtue, to being split into ‘private’ and 
‘public’ interest. The good and objective national interest was public. This was a central 
conceptual pair in political rhetoric. ‘Private interests’ were not inherently bad, but should 
not dictate policy, as they did in the personal and tyrannical rule in Universal Monarchies. 
With this split between public and private interests, the ‘public’ had gained an inherent 
value. It was no longer solely a question of avoiding tyrannical rule, but of positively 
protecting the public order. The means of doing so was the balance of power. In the early 
1700s Swift could write that the ‘badness’ of tyrannical rule is not the rule of a single 
individual, but precisely the fact that the balance of power is being broken.71 An ‘eternal 
rule in politics among every free people’ was the balance of power. This balance of power 
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applied inside as well as outside of the states. What happens when the balance of power 
breaks down  
gives the truest account of what is understood in the most ancient and approved Greek 
authors by the word tyranny, which is not meant for the seizing of the uncontrolled or 
absolute power into the hands of a single person (as many superficial men have grossly 
mistaken), but for the breaking of the balance by whatever hand, and leaving the power 
wholly in one scale; for tyranny and usurpation in a state are by no means confined to any 
number, as might easily appear from examples enough. 
For Swift, tyranny is not necessarily the ‘private’ power of an individual prince, but the 
act of breaking the public order – that is the wrongness of Universal Monarchy, and that 
is the wrongness of any internal development leading to tyranny. This is a change from 
the previous separation between types of monarchical power. It is no longer merely about 
the ‘possession’ of properties and subjects, but the breaking of public order. The 
connexion between the public interest and Universal Monarchy and tyranny is made 
through introducing the balance as ‘counter concept’, thus enhancing its systemic quality. 
What threatened to break the balance and the public interest was ‘private interests’.  
‘Real interest’ should not be doubted, but ‘private interest’ and accomplices to Universal 
Monarchy, also at home, could corrupt it. The private interest in money and ambition of 
such accomplices of Universal Monarchy could undermine the public and objective 
interest. Warnings against ‘arbitrary government’ referred to the danger of universal 
monarchy, but also to its ‘accomplices’ in domestic politics, corruption and wealth – in 
the case of England, ‘giving up the ancient constitution’.72 Public business could be 
predicted, but this could be corrupted and undermined by bad counsel. To avoid bad 
counsel and to reveal the real public interest, reasoning in the open was paramount. 
Optimal reasoning in public took place in Parliament, not behind closed doors. During 
these developments, the Parliament became steadily more important in English political 
life.   
This provided an important dividing line whereby things would be evaluated very 
differently according to their status as public or private. This offered a potent rhetorical 
addition to balance-of-power arguments: every failure to balance, it could now be argued, 
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served to confirm the dangers of ‘private’ interests, since the public interest ‘could not 
lie’. In Holland, it was argued that it was ‘the private interests’ of the ruling De Witts that 
brought increased prospects of a French Universal Monarchy; and in Britain, the private 
interests of various English monarchs had prevented the nation from recognising the 
dangers that threatened it from the lack of balance on the continent. In addition, internal 
troubles came from an unbalanced constitution.  
In short, new conceptions of interests provided rhetorical resources for promoting the 
balance of power as a counter-concept to Universal Monarchy, as well as providing 
crucial links to other central debates of the time, lending legitimacy to the concept. To 
separate private from public interest, putatively neutral and external descriptions were 
required. For this, in turn, there must be something that could be assigned an objective 
quality – and that was the balance of power. In this sense, the objective quality of the 
balance of power came about by linking it to other concerns, such as the republican 
distinction between public and private interest.   
With the extrapolation of such arguments to the international sphere, the ‘liberties of 
Europe’ were, eventually, to be protected from Universal Monarchy by the balance of 
power, just as domestic liberties were protected from tyranny by a balanced constitution. 
The public interest was what was considered objectively good for the state, and for 
Europe as a whole. 
The connexion made between the domestic and the balance of power foreshadows 
arguments over independence and intervention in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.73 
Eventually, the debate over the balance of power was to move from balance concerning 
dominance, to balance concerning interference – that is, ‘liberty from’.74 Should the 
balance protect small states or nations? Could domestic regime type affect the European 
balance? Could one then legitimately intervene in the name of the balance? The balance 
came to function as ‘inter-state policing’: good government is necessary also in states 
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other than one’s own, in order to uphold the balance, something that culminated in 
Vienna in 1815.75  
 
Emergence in practice: from the Anglo–Dutch Wars to the balance of power 
The balance of power concept did not develop due to some internal logic of its own, but 
emerged as a concept through contingent links to other concerns. Contingent 
circumstances and concrete policy debates in England and elsewhere influenced its 
development, and were in turn influenced by it. National differences provided an 
important practical context for the development of the concept, so resisting Universal 
Monarchy by means of the balance of power had its roots in ideal notions of a polity’s 
internal constitution from the beginning, particularly based on republican arguments.  
I have indicated how the threat of Universal Hegemony had come to be associated with 
Spain. By the 1650s, however, there was no obvious potential hegemon on the horizon.76 
With Spanish power clearly waning, the challenge was to identify the new aspirant to 
Universal Monarchy. At the time, England and the Dutch Provinces enjoyed extensive 
mutual trade, but were also fierce competitors. Today’s balance of power theory would 
probably predict that England and the Dutch would join forces against France.77 This did 
not happen. Instead, Charles II allied with France against the Dutch. 
Supporters of the Restored monarchy, the Anglican Royalists, were convinced that the 
Dutch were turning into a new Universal Monarchy based on trade. After the 30 Years’ 
War, it had become clear that the power of the state depended on economic resources.78 
Even if England at the time saw no immediate economic gains to be made from fighting 
the Dutch, their power and ‘natural interest’ in trade expansion might affect England 
negatively in the long-term future. Even the trading companies supported the war. War 
was not for commercial gains in this instance, but for protecting the common interest, 
based on resistance to Universal Monarchy. As France was a true monarchy (not a 
monarchie signeuriale), the faithless Protestants of the United Provinces were singled out 
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as the heirs to Spain.79 These ‘perfidious, self-ended neighbours’80 were ‘of the former 
King of Spain’s mind’.81 The Dutch had ‘an immoderate desire to engross the whole 
traffic of the Universe’,82 and wanted to subject ‘the trade and treasures of all countries 
and nations upon earth to their unlimited East-India arbitrary government’.83 On the seas 
they were what ‘the Great Turk’ was on land.84 They were taking English fish, capturing 
English colonies in the East Indies, massacring the English in the process.85  
Additionally, the ruling John de Witt, who led the Dutch Republicans, seemed committed 
to the overthrow of the English monarchy. He had fallen from Protestant virtue, and the 
English associated him with secular materialism instead of godly virtue. De Witt 
bargained with France for a deal for dividing the Spanish monarchy (which failed). 
France in turn repeatedly urged England to oppose the Dutch. As late as 1670, Colbert de 
Croissy, the French ambassador to England, had argued that the King should be 
‘dissatisfied’ with the Dutch; playing the royalist card, de Croissy argued that ‘the Time 
was come of being revenged upon a Nation that had so little Respect for Kings’.86  
England went to war with Holland in 1652–54, and the English king Charles II went to 
war again in 1665–67, but now suffered terrible losses to the Dutch. In 1667, however, 
the War of Devolution started where Louis XIV, who had become King of France in 
1661, occupied the Spanish Netherlands, claiming Spanish inheritance rights by an 
obscure Brabant law.87 Alarmed by France, Britain and Holland ended their war, and 
allied with Sweden in the Triple Alliance of 1668. Louis XIV negotiated peace at Aix-la-
Chapelle, but continued working to break the Triple Alliance (in which he was to succeed 
in 1670, allying with England).  
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Sir William Temple is often considered the architect behind this Triple Alliance, together 
with the Dutch Jan de Witt. Temple had argued for the idea of a European system, based 
on the balance of power. He also warned about the dangers of the predominance of 
France, now on the offensive against the Spanish possessions. The allies in fact disguised 
their triple alliance as serving a mediating role between Spain and France, as Charles II 
still wanted to pursue a pro-French policy. Still, they had secretly agreed that the alliance 
could employ force against France to secure peace with Spain. In the end, however, 
England, Holland and Sweden used the alliance to bargain a deal with France, at the 
expense of Spain. The role of Britain as a ‘balancer’ in a system of different polities was 
foreshadowed in Temple’s design – a view that would be widespread in England and, 
importantly, also amongst other countries for decades to come. That England should 
‘hold the balance’ really meant suggesting that England should assume the leadership of 
Europe. It was possible to suggest this, even for countries other than England, because it 
was framed in balance-of-power terms: In focus was not a preponderant Universal 
Monarchy-style leadership, but leadership in balancing. Other powers did not speak of 
this as a threat, but rather almost as a public service. The balance of power made 
England’s ascendancy possible.  
In 1668, Temple argued, ‘since we only draw a war upon ourselves by desiring a peace, 
to endeavour on the contrary to draw on the peace by making all the appearances of 
desiring a war’ should be the idea, and the King asked Parliament for funds to strengthen 
Britain’s forces.88 At the time, however, the balance of power was not yet a ‘concept’ or 
‘commonplace’ used by policymakers or in debates, so Temple’s arguments stand as an 
early instance of using the balance of power against France, and promoting the idea of 
England as balancer.89 This arguably gave rise to the Whig view on the balance of 
power.90 But – where did this come from?  
Temple knew the Imperial diplomat Franz Paul von Lisola. They were both later to serve 
as advisors to the Dutch-born King William III of England, known to be exceedingly 
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preoccupied with the balance of power.91 In the same year as the war ended, in 1667, 
Lisola published a highly influential pamphlet, Bouclier d’Estat et de Justice (The 
Buckler of State and Justice).92 Lisola was also involved in negotiations and contact 
between the English government, the French, and the Austrian Emperor Leopold.93 The 
English state even supported the translation of his pamphlet into English.94 It was mostly 
a juridical pamphlet, but also dealt with the impact of the wars on ‘the interests of the 
Christian princes’. This supplied a crucial link between Rohan and later writings on the 
balance of power.  
At the time, the Dutch (and, by some, the Habsburgs) were seen as the main threat to 
England and Europe. Lisola’s Bouclier d’Estat et de Justice was ‘the most influential 
political pamphlet published in the struggle now beginning against Louis XIV’.95 This 
was conceivably the most successful PR campaign in early modern Europe, and a key 
event in the emergence of the balance of power as a concept, as it was successfully 
linked, for the first time, to what was seen a pressing concern of national interest.96 After 
the 1670s, policy debates increasingly concerned the balance of power.  
Lisola argued for Rohan’s conception of the balance of power, but had one complaint – 
that Rohan had always used the balance of power in the wrong way. Lisola’s innovation 
was to use the Frenchman Rohan’s concept as a weapon back against France itself. 
Lisola tried to divert Europe’s attention away from the Habsburgs, Austria and Spain, and 
towards France, by using the balance of power. If the balance had been employed 
forcefully and correctly, Lisola argued, then Europe would have enjoyed ‘d’une profonde 
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tranquillité’.97 The Habsburgs, Lisola now argued, were lovers of peace. Charles V had in 
fact not aspired to Universal Monarchy – that was a lie spread by French diplomats. It 
was France that had long been plotting Universal Monarchy, and France was a threat to 
the liberties of Europe, commerce, and religion.98 The European powers had deviated 
from the ‘reason of state’.  
Concepts are linked together not because they in some way naturally belong together, but 
because they are actively tied together in specific instances. Lisola, then, linked the 
distinction between Universal Monarchy and the public interest of Europe to a policy of 
opposing France, all under the umbrella of the balance of power. These associations 
resonated well in England, and Lisola gained a rather broad readership there.   
In the same year as Lisola’s pamphlet was spread in Britain, I find the first mention of the 
balance of power touching on the relationship between England and France. This was in a 
brief from Arlington to Sir William Temple. Arlington mentioned the importance of 
‘keeping […] the balance even between the two crowns’. The following year, Temple 
himself wrote that opposition to France was necessary to secure the Balance of Power. 99 
Further French aggression against the Netherlands followed in 1670, and a French–Dutch 
war ensued in 1672, culminating in Louis XIV invading the United Provinces. In the 
wake of the invasion, the Republic collapsed, de Witt was executed, and William III 
assumed the position of Stadhouder. Yet again, however, England joined the French in 
the war against the Dutch with its rebuilt fleet. However, the balance of power had now 
become a rhetorical resource to be employed in public debates. It was no longer just a 
question of a single threat from a Dutch Universal Monarchy.  
An anonymous Austrian called out to England to fight against French power, instead of 
the Dutch. The author tried to convince England that the general principle of the balance 
of power in this case would benefit England’s own interests.100 In a 1671 pamphlet, from 
the Spanish Netherlands, we find the same argument that Europe’s freedom depends on 
England. Both Spain and France, it argues, are seeking the alliance of England. However, 
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for the sake of the balance of power, they should side with the weakest part. As interest 
cannot lie, there should be no doubt about what to do: ‘Henry VII held the balance 
between the two crowns, Elizabeth followed the same principle; just as Jacob, Charles I 
did the same, and also the current ruler has let that lead to the Triple Alliance and the 
Peace of Aachen […] that means, to follow England’s interest!’101 
In the same year, I also find the first mention of the balance of power in an English 
pamphlet. The author employs the concept to oppose the war the government was waging 
against the Dutch. England’s freedom, he argues, is inextricably linked with that of 
Europe – and Holland in particular – and the balance of power is the means of protecting 
both.102 In 1673, Temple followed up by proposing an alliance with Spain to maintain 
‘the true Balance of Christendom’.103  
Another pamphlet, possibly also authored by Lisola, was published in 1673.104 This 
addresses the political consequences of the French-English wars against Holland. This 
anti-French pamphlet was aimed at England. Directing his words to Charles II, the author 
argues that the only way to achieve public security in Europe is to ‘hold the Powers of 
Europe in a balance’. The war against Holland, he argues, is wrong and no good can 
come of it for England. He appeals to the Dutch as well, telling them that the French 
aggression is a threat to English liberties. The Dutch, therefore, had better ally themselves 
with England against France, to preserve themselves. France, he insists, aims to rule the 
world. All the Powers – particularly Sweden and Portugal – must acknowledge what is 
right, as it ‘has been a principle of states at any time, to balance the states of Europe in 
such a way that none of them come to such a size, that makes the others fear it’.105 In 
1674, Parliament insisted on peace with the Dutch.  
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In the 1660s and 70s, winning England over to the anti-French side was an important 
objective,106 and appeals to a balance of power that encompassed the natural interests of 
England and Europe as well as resistance to Universal Monarchy were introduced as a 
powerful rhetorical resource to this end. With the arguments presented in terms of the 
balance of power, an anti-French policy was facilitated by appealing to common interests. 
The debates at this point, now concerning the balance of power, were to frame subsequent 
debates about England’s position, the ‘French problem’, and the European system. It now 
concerned more than only commercial or military strength – the future of Europe was in 
the balance.  
After the third Anglo–Dutch war in 1672–1674, public opinion was shifting, from 
supporting the wars against the Dutch, to seeing France as the imminent danger.107 This 
was not based solely on the protection of Protestantism, but also, importantly, on the 
concept of the balance of power.108 After the departure of the De Witts in 1672, there 
were many voices urging an alliance with the Dutch against France. The publication of 
anti-French pamphlets increased – appealing to England and the Dutch to fight France in 
the name of the balance of power. The Dutch, rumour would have it, were already 
negotiating with the French. What was feared was a separate deal, leaving England alone 
in the fight against France. However, as was argued in Parliament in 1677 in the context 
of Universal Monarchy, the Dutch were interested in repressing the French, just as 
England and ‘they knew their interest’, so if England should join the Dutch, ‘they cannot 
find one Syllable of Reason to desert the Common Cause’.109 Natural interest, reason, and 
the fight against Universal Monarchy were linked in the balance of Europe as the public 
interest of Europe. ‘Private interest’ – the opposite of the public interest of Europe 
encapsulated in the balance of power – was seen as the reason why England had been 
fighting the United Provinces instead of the real enemy – France. France’s designs had 
been supported by ‘the private interest of the two De Witts’ which ‘hindered that 
common-wealth from being on her guard, as early as she ought to have been, against 
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France’.110 Destroying the mutual gains by trade, the wars had only made France more 
powerful commercially.111 France had duped England.  
Francophobia was prevalent in England as result of France being seen as a potential 
Universal Monarchy.112 The French had infiltrated the English nation. French dress, 
manners, fashions, music, plays, fruit – all were accursed witchcraft. By playing on the 
concept of Universal Monarchy, some even suggested that France was promoting a 
‘Universal Fashion’.113 The Papists had become so numerous in England because a ‘great 
Prince aspiring to the Western Monarchy, and a great protector of the Popish interest’ 
supported them.114 As France represented Catholic Christendom, and often acted on 
behalf of christianité, its opponent increasingly started using the term ‘Europe’. The 
religious denominator was overtaken by the new term ‘Europe’.115 The political collective 
was no longer Christendom, but the natural community of Europe, linked with the 
balance of Power in the defence of its ‘liberties’.  
Whether Louis XIV really intended to establish a Universal Monarchy, or whether he was 
only trying to secure his own borders, is not particularly relevant here. The fact is that the 
public rhetoric was increasingly geared towards opposing the French threat of Universal 
Monarchy by appealing to the balance of power.  
The De Witts had been hostile towards England. With them out of the picture, and the 
Orange King William and the balance of power in, the rhetoric altered. The pamphleteer 
Henry Stubbe, formerly a staunch supporter of the anti-Dutch policy,116 had changed his 
rhetoric. He now invoked ancient history to argue the soundness of opposing a growing 
power such as France. Not only did he now argue for a balance of power – he even 
justified his very own change of mind with the balance of power: as European politics 
had shown, the balance of power ‘made it esteemed lawful and wise to change alliances, 
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according as either side declines’.117 The war against the Dutch was also against 
England’s natural interest, which was based on trade and the seas, it being an island.  
The Commons in Parliament were furious. They opposed Charles II throughout the 1670s 
with what was, relative to context, very strong language. In 1678, it was argued directly 
to the King that refusing the advice of Parliament was due to ‘those misrepresentations of 
our proceedings, which have been suggested to your Majesty, by some particular persons, 
in a clandestine way’.118  
In the 1680s, France was again seen as threatening Holland. This was now considered a 
Protestant bulwark against French threats, and Charles II was seen as neglecting it and 
allying with the enemy. Parliament again limited funding for the king’s wars. With the 
accession of James II to the throne in 1685, tolerance was the order of the day. A Catholic 
himself, he opened up careers to Catholics and other ‘dissenters’. Many, however, saw 
this as a pro-Catholic policy, and as running France’s errand. Huguenot refugees from 
France joined with the opposition, to defend the Protestant interest and denounce the 
king.  
Parliament was suspended, but the discussions and debates only moved elsewhere. 
Pamphlets flourished in the public sphere, and fomented fears of popery and universal 
monarchy.119 It was argued that France would subject first the Netherlands, then 
Germany, to a ‘complete Conquest of that branch of the miserable House of Austria’.120 It 
was now a question of the ‘holding and casting of the balance of Europe, and Protection 
of the Protestant Religion’.121 ‘Now, because there is no separate kingdom or state in 
Europe sufficient to balance the weighty body of the French monarchy’, an anonymous 
pamphleteer wrote in 1680, ‘there must be a new fond of power and interest raised up, 
sufficient to keep the balance of Europe from being called back into a chaos, out of which 
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the French may form an universal monarchy’.122 England, having ever kept ‘close to that 
righteous maxim of holding the balance of Europe’,123 would have to join the struggle.  
James II sought to supress any discussion of European affairs, and was seen to adopt a 
French style of government – forming a standing army, contracting papists, and subduing 
Parliament and the ‘public’. The revocation in 1685 of the Edict of Nantes, which had 
granted rights to French Protestants (Huguenots) now fleeing to England in growing 
numbers – did not help the situation. In the Dutch Republic, the Dutch Stadhouder 
William III (William of Orange) led a coalition opposing Louis XIV, while England 
remained passive. The English therefore welcomed William III’s intervention and 
‘revolution’ in 1688. At the invitation of Whig peers, he landed in England to accede to 
the throne, as he was married to the daughter of James II, Mary. James fled the country.124 
William III, whom Lisola and Temple had counselled, now asserted that England had 
long been prevented from having ‘the share in the Balance of Europe that naturally 
belongs to it’.125 By 1688, then, the battle for the Balance of Europe was seen as being 
fought in England. Charles Davenant later explained that 1688 happened because both the 
Dutch and England were opposing the growth of the French Monarchy.126 The Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 bound the interest of England together with that of Europe: it was not 
only about ‘what European absolutism might do to English freedoms, but what England 
could do for the “liberties of Europe”, that is the balance of power’.127 Changing England 
was necessary to preserve Europe, and preserving the European balance was necessary to 
protect England’s interests and freedoms. 
In addition, to foster loyalty to the new Orange King, his predecessors were denounced 
for having betrayed and destroyed the balance of power in Europe.128 An English 
historical myth of continuous balance-of-power policy was constructed, but so was a 
history of failures to maintain that balance. Schroeder suggests that these wars against the 
Dutch discredited the balance of power.129 However, at that time, the ‘balance of power’ 
was not a prevalent concept – it was not widely used in political struggles. The concept 
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began to become a commonplace in England just as opinion was turning against France. 
With pamphlet wars emphasising the need to balance France, the retrospective story told 
was that successive English kings had failed to balance against France, betraying the 
‘age-old’ concept of the balance of power. It seemed that the French had been seeking 
Universal Monarchy all along – this was now seen as credible. Even the Dutch wars 
themselves were blamed on a French divide-and-rule strategy to achieve Universal 
Monarchy, as the French had been ‘mediating’ between England and Holland.130  
As Bolingbroke would later ask, why did the princes of Europe not foresee the changes in 
the balance? Cromwell in England, Bolingbroke answers, might have perceived it – but 
‘he was induced by reasons of private interest to act against the general interest of 
Europe’,131 joining with Spain against France, instead of joining the weaker parts against 
the stronger. The real balance of power was not recognised, because it was corrupted by 
private interests. Also in Holland, private interests obscured the true interests of Holland 
and of Europe. Holland’s ‘true interest’, he wrote, ‘was to have used her utmost 
endeavours to unite closely and intimately with England on the restoration of King 
Charles. She did the very contrary. John de Wit […] governed. The interest of his party 
was to keep the house of Orange down; he courted therefore the friendship of France, and 
neglected that of England’ – and ‘the pique of merchants became the pique of nations’.132 
It was the failure of recent English policy, not of the balance of power concept, that was 
at issue. Charles II had not recognised the threat of Universal Monarchy shifting from 
Spain to France, and had done nothing to preserve the balance,133 but rather the contrary. 
He had sent troops to Portugal, seen as undermining Spain, which many English now 
considered a potential ally to restrain French preponderance. Moreover, Charles had sold 
Dunkirk to France – an important bulwark against France on the continent. As Lord 
Townsend and Mr. Poyntz argued in Parliament, ‘to have a good barrier against France in 
the Netherlands, is as necessary for us as it is, to preserve a balance of power on the 
continent, and to prevent all Europe’s being enslaved by France’.134 Charles had used the 
money from this sale to wage war in Portugal. He had gone to war with the Dutch in 
1664–67, and in 1672–74, in alliance with France. This was seen as catastrophic and as 
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isolating England.135 As Baxter writes,136 alliances at the time were often termed ‘social 
wars’, and these wars were seen to have failed. However, ‘the balance’ was soon to 
replace ‘social wars’, becoming an even more explicitly ‘social’ and systemic concept. 
That substitution, and the accompanying linkages to the debates of the time, made a 
difference. Not only could the balance of power attribute blame and explain the failures 
of anti-Dutch policy: when combined with opposition to the concept of Universal 
Monarchy, and promoting the concept of the public interest, these resources could 
legitimise the shift in policy towards opposing France. This also inaugurated a new 
English policy of intervention on the continent as a ‘balancer’, despite – or perhaps 
because of – the failed Dutch wars.  
First, by being linked in debates with the concepts of Universal Monarchy and the Public 
Interest, the Balance of Power had become a commonplace rhetorical resource that could 
be employed to rally support. With William III, the balance could be turned into political 
practice. Oddly enough, there appear to be fewer mentions of the balance of power in the 
pamphlets associated with the wars waged by William III.  
Second, as the balance of power had become firmly established, it seems that the balance 
of power was not so much needed as a justification for English foreign policy, but was 
used more for domestic purposes in internal party struggles, precisely because it had 
become so commonplace. As I will show in the next chapter, debates over the balance of 
power now came to focus on its implementation and its usefulness, particularly regarding 
the Tory/Whig struggle over whether to intervene on the continent in its name. That is, 
one started to speak from ‘within’ the discourse of the balance of power, debating 
implementation, not principles.137 This indicates how all the preceding rhetorical work 
had firmly established the balance of power as a concept to be used in solving practical 
policy problems.   
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Conclusions 
The 1670s and 1680s were the decades when ‘balance of power’ was introduced – albeit 
presented as being an English tradition dating 600 years back in time.138 It was now a 
struggle against universal monarchy and for the balance of power, not a continuation of 
the religious conflicts of the Thirty Years War: England should protect Protestantism, but 
not in a crusade. Even if England should protect the Protestant countries, ‘the general end 
of holding the balance of Europe is Universal’.139  
Lisola’s propaganda campaign helped to foreground the balance of power as a central 
weapon in the fight against Universal Monarchy, combined with awareness of the real 
interest of England. Richard Temple wrote that foreign alliances are for the purpose of 
securing ‘the balance of power & obviating the designs [for universal monarchy]’.140 The 
pamphlet campaign rhetorically linked various concepts that resonated well with the 
English experiences into a whole: the balance of power. When the balance of power 
rhetoric used by Lisola was turned against Louis XIV and his expansion, this forced the 
English King and English policymakers to explain the alliance with France, and the wars 
with the Dutch.141 Continuing the war became difficult to justify in terms of a fight 
against ‘universal monarchy’, as it was now clearly not in the ‘nation’s interest’ which, it 
was argued, ‘is laid aside for private interest’.142 Publically legitimate reasons were 
needed. The introduction of the balance of power played an important part in this, as it 
was connected to ‘true interest’– and this true interest was now depicted, not as short-
term self-interest, but as entrenched in a larger, public European interest. Interest is here a 
historical product, not an a priori assumption. France was identified as a threat to the 
balance of power, and the balance of power was what legitimated this policy shift. 
From this implicit critique of government and king, it followed that England must be 
governed according to English customs. Further, debates had to be made public, not 
private, as the public interest is what was to be served in England, as in Europe as a 
whole. The language of interests was used to suggest wars against the Dutch or the 
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French. Just as in the ‘fundamental law’ of the balanced constitution, there could be no 
universal rule, because of the differing natural interests of nations.143 This, in turn, 
elevated the importance of Parliament – since interest cannot lie, a nation cannot act 
contrary to its interest in the representative assembly. Parliament was the place for public 
business. In short, ‘foreign policy’ would have to promote the real national interest, which 
could only be arrived at in public debates in Parliament. And, true enough, ‘never again 
would an English Monarch go to war without consulting national opinion in 
Parliament’.144 In the next chapter I show how, as political party conflicts became more 
prominent in England, embattled elites placed the balance of power centre-stage in their 
increasingly public debates over international political developments.  
By focusing on an analytical balance of power theory (as does Schroeder), one may forget 
that even if the IR Realist world did not exist in the late 17th century, the balance of power 
did.145 One may also forget that the balance of power was a concept used extensively also 
in domestic disputes and debates in England – even more so after the Glorious Revolution 
of 1688, when the balance of power finally had been ‘secured’ in practice by William III. 
Schroeder is indeed correct in noting that whatever may seem to accord with predictive 
Balance of Power Theory were largely unintended and contingent outcomes.146 However, 
the single act of ‘opposing France’ is not the issue, but the specific trajectory by which 
France came to be opposed.147 When we examine the balance of power as historical 
‘category of practice’, it does not make sense to present contingent historical facts as 
opposed to the balance of power, or the balance of power as opposed to domestic 
concerns.148 It was contingency and agency that helped to stabilise it as a concept, as well 
as to change it. Domestic concerns were intimately entangled with the balance of power – 
and, ultimately, also the concerns of Europe.  
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In this chapter, I have emphasised the emergence of the balance of power concept as a 
generally accepted principle. The next chapter will focus on struggles over the 
implications of it in context, once relatively stabilised. I will argue that struggles over the 
concept of the balance of power played a crucial part in enabling the Peace of Utrecht, as 
well as in shaping the settlement and its outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
 
Fixing the Balance: Britain, Austria, and the Utrecht 
Settlement 
 
 
In this chapter, I argue that balance of power rhetoric contributed to the differentiation of 
various polities within a European international system, at the expense of dynastic 
politics. I hold that domestic policy debates in Britain shaped outcomes at Utrecht, and 
the rhetorical resources available to Austria and others. Austria’s influence on their 
international environment depended on historically contingent designs of domestic 
politics and policymakers, and a particular conceptualisation of the international system. 
How and when the balance of power emerged as a concept, how and when rhetorical links 
were forged and stabilised in Britain and internationally, and how and when one had 
‘invested’ in the concept – all had effects during the Utrecht negotiations. Austria’s range 
of policy options at Utrecht were narrowed because of previous investment in the 
balance-of-power concept. Due to contingent developments in British politics, the 
concept and the implications connected to it had been partly reconstructed, and that 
prevented Austria from using the balance in ways that had been available earlier. The 
Austrians were left rhetorically exposed. It was therefore the very deployment of the 
balance of power concept that was the fundamental element for the construction of a post-
war international order. 
The previous chapter took the story up to the time of the Glorious Revolution in 1688. 
William III had gathered an alliance of England, Holland, and Sweden, and from 1688 to 
1697 fought against Louis XIV’s France in the Nine Years’ War, or the War of the Grand 
Alliance. This war was to terminate in the Utrecht Conference – a ‘prominent landmark 
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[…] in the landscape of modern history’,1 repeatedly mentioned in contemporary writings 
on the balance of power because that concept was included in some of the treaty texts. 
Still, I will argue that this inclusion of the concept in treaties does not exhaust the 
importance of the balance of power in this period. However, some have acknowledged 
how Utrecht helped to establish the idea of a ‘system’ based on legitimacy or consensus.  
Ian Clark argues that Utrecht marked the acceptance of the balance of power as a 
‘legitimacy principle’ by international society.2 Clark, writing from an English School 
perspective, is explicitly concerned with the legitimising function of the balance of power 
as a concept. Narrow self-interest could not explain the Treaty of Utrecht, he claims, but 
what made it possible was the willingness to give reasonable ground to others. However, 
‘self-interest’ is also a historical phenomenon, and contrasting it to some supposedly 
liberal/benign motivation to restrain oneself and give reasons to others (as if reason-
giving were not always a feature of the social world) removes power considerations from 
the role of rhetoric. Furthermore, Clark does not answer the crucial question of how 
conceptions of interest and the establishment of consensus on the balance of power came 
about – except for the balance of power, in the analytical sense, ‘in itself’ potentially 
making this possible.3 To say that the balance of power led to the ‘balance of power’ 
being legitimated is a rather implausible (and tautological) thesis about the exact 
correspondence between a modern theoretical concept and historical actors’ perceptions 
of their social environment.  
Andreas Osiander attributes the success of Utrecht to the reliance on the balance of power 
as a ‘consensus notion’ in the international system. He argues that ‘the international 
system has no physical reality. Ultimately, the international system exists exclusively in 
the mind. It is what people think it is. It is a mental construct, resting entirely on shared 
assumptions.’4 Osiander aims to look at this international system ‘not primarily in terms 
of what the participating actors do, but in terms of certain fundamental assumptions 
relating to the structure of the system’.5 He posits that some basic structural principles 
‘determine the structure of the system rather than the day-to-day policies of the actors that 
                                                          
1 Clark, Ian. 2005. Legitimacy in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 72. 
2 Ibid, p. 81. 
3 Ibid, pp. 71–84. 
4 Osiander, Andreas. 1994. The States System of Europe 1640–1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of 
International Stability. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 4. 
5 Ibid., p. 5. 
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make up the system’6 and the existence of an ‘abstract consciousness of the system that 
was independent of participation’.7 Since the stability of the system requires common 
frames of reference and common expectations, ‘consensus principles’ regarding the 
structural principles are crucial.8  
In such a theoretical framework, systemic variables, embedded in actors’ minds but 
emanating from the structure itself, do all the causal work. The international system 
‘itself’ has ‘a kind of “Zeitgeist”, which alters as a result of dialectical contradictions and 
complementarities’ where actors’ behaviour is dictated by the content of their ideas.9 
Structural forces clashing are what determine actor behaviour, whereas ‘what actors do’ is 
left out of the picture. What remains to be explained in accounts such as Osiander’s is 
where such structuring principles come from, how they endure or change, and how such 
structural principles ‘become inscribed into the practices of actors’.10  
My take on the international system and order is different. Traditionally, balance of 
power as a type of international order is considered to be separate from hegemonic orders, 
even if the logic behind both kinds of orders is based on differences in capabilities. 
However, when looking at the balance of power not as an analytical take on the 
distribution of capabilities, but as a historical, empirical phenomenon, we see that the 
balance of power has actually effected and taken part in power transitions. In short, the 
rhetorical deployment of the concept of the balance of power influences the international 
order.  
For concepts such as the balance of power to be enduring, they must be seen as legitimate 
in principle – apart from their concrete implications.11 Even so, once the concept has 
become relatively stabilised, also the way of presenting these implications can be an arena 
for rhetorical struggle, and a factor in how the concept can be used for purposes of 
legitimation. This was particularly true in the early 18th century, with the complexities 
                                                          
6 Ibid., p. 139. 
7 Ibid, p. 110. 
8 Ibid, pp. 6–7. 
9 Nexon, Dan. 2005. ‘Zeitgeist? The new idealism in the study of international change’, Review of 
International Political Economy 12: 700–719, p. 702.   
10 Ibid., p. 702. 
11 Meyer, John W. and Brian Rowan. 1977. ‘Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and 
Ceremony’, American Journal of Sociology 83: 340–363, p. 344. 
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and diversification of international politics increasing, now including developments from 
the Mediterranean to the Baltics.  
Thus I argue that, at the time of the Utrecht Conference, the balance of power was no 
longer used as in a duality between France and the others, but increasingly as a systemic 
concept, opposed to any power aiming for predominance, and increasingly distant from 
dynastic politics. Here I begin with some historical background for the War of the 
Spanish Succession, which ended in the Utrecht Settlements. Continuing from the 
previous chapter, I pay particular attention to developments in England where party 
politics grew stronger, and the balance of power became the axis of debates. It is worth 
taking a closer look at the rhetoric and role of Bolingbroke (or St. John), often considered 
the personification of balance-of-power politics in the 18th century. Bolingbroke’s 
writings, even his private letters, were framed as appeals to a broader public, often aimed 
at recipients he knew could spread the message, for example the Dutch (like the many 
diplomatic messages that were ‘intercepted’).12  
From the 1680s, Austria was increasingly pictured as essential to the balance of power. In 
the Utrecht negotiations themselves, however, Austria was relegated to a position of 
almost irrelevance because of the social power of the balance-of-power concept – more 
specifically, Austria’s previous ‘investments’ in the concept as developed in Britain 
affected its position.  
Austria had to address two sets of audiences simultaneously. Its rhetoric therefore 
involved both the dynastic issue of legitimate succession, and the balance of power and 
the public interest of Europe. Whilst accepting the principle of the balance of power, 
Austria sought to question its implications, by linking it to inherent succession rights and 
the stability of coalitions. This was unsuccessful, given that the balance in the meantime 
had changed to become a more systemic concept. 
In this period, Austria’s range of policy options narrowed because Austria had already 
invested in the commonplace of the balance of power. But since Britain in certain senses 
had ‘captured’ the concept, with new developments there, the concept and its alleged 
implications changed, denying to Austria opportunities to use the balance that had been 
available at earlier points.  
                                                          
12 See Osiander, The States System, p. 24. 
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In short, the way the concept of the balance of power became settled and accepted during 
the Utrecht settlement rhetorically side-lined Austria, and thereby also led to a new post-
war order and conception of the European ‘system’. Contra Osiander, it was therefore the 
very deployment of the balance of power concept that was the fundamental element for 
the construction of a post-war international order. 
The argument that developments in the British domestic setting shaped the outcomes 
elsewhere in Europe is not dependent on the formation, shaping, and ranking of 
preferences or capabilities, but timing matters, process matters, and sequence matters. 
The timing of concept developments shapes the abilities of actors to defend policies, 
internally and externally. Actors’ influence on their international environment depends on 
historically contingent designs of domestic politics and policymakers.13 The theoretical 
point is that contingent alterations in the uses of the concept through actual deployment in 
debates leads to new constraints and conditions of possibility for agentic action.  
 
The War of the Spanish Succession 
Already one year after the Glorious Revolution, in 1689, the Grand Alliance could force 
Louis XIV to conclude the Treaty of Aachen, renouncing his gains in the Spanish 
Netherlands. Soon after, Spain joined the alliance against Louis XIV.14 Also Austria had 
emerged as an important player after Emperor Leopold I had driven back the Ottoman 
forces at Vienna during ‘the glorious campaign’ of 1683.15  
Amid the ongoing fight against France, a fundamental challenge to the balance of power 
was seen to be emerging: the future status of Spain and its territories. The Spanish 
question would eventually turn into ‘the hinge on which the whole reign of Louis XIV 
was turning’.16 At issue were inheritance rights, and a dual claim to the Spanish throne. 
The death of Spain’s Charles II was seen to be imminent, and he had no children. His 
                                                          
13 Nexon, Daniel. 2012. ‘Historical Institutionalism and International Relations’. E-International Relations. 
Available at: www.e-ir.info/2012/04/16/historical-institutionalism-and-international-relations [02.05.2014]. 
14 Michael, Wolfgang. 1908. ‘The Treaties of Partition and the Spanish Succession’, Chapter XIII, pp. 372–
400 in Ward, A. W., G. W. Prothero, and Stanley Leathes (eds) The Cambridge Modern History, Volume V, 
The Age of Louis XIV. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 376. 
15 Lodge, Richard. 1908. ‘Austria, Poland, and Turkey’, Chapter XII, pp. 338–371 in Ward, A. W., G. W. 
Prothero, and Stanley Leathes (eds) The Cambridge Modern History, Volume V, The Age of Louis XIV. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 364. 
16 Michael, ‘The Treaties of Partition’, p. 376. 
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passing was dreaded in Europe17 because, through marriages, both France and the 
Austrian Habsburgs had claims to his throne. The possible transfer of all Spanish 
territories to France was deemed fatal to the balance of power, which hitherto had been all 
about the fight against Louis XIV. On the other hand, if the throne went to German 
relatives in Austria, which had re-emerged strongly, that would threaten to reconstitute 
the dreaded Universal Monarchy of Charles V from the 1500s, seen as the archetypical 
European Universal Monarchy.  
The candidates for the succession were Philip Duke of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV of 
France (who was eventually to become Philip V of Spain), and the Austrian Habsburg 
candidate, Archduke Charles. Both solutions threatened to result in a new, strong 
Universal Monarchy in Europe, potentially including the Spanish Netherlands just across 
the channel from England.  
Negotiating a solution was temporarily put on hold, given the intense fight against 
France, but in 1697, the Congress of Ryswick set out to solve the problem, and to make 
peace with France. The problem of the Spanish succession had finally been recognised as 
crucial, also by Louis XIV himself. Louis XIV and William III resolved to divide the 
Spanish dominions to prevent them from falling into the hands of either the French 
Bourbons or the Austrian Habsburgs in their entirety. This was the conclusion of the First 
Treaty of Partition, signed in The Hague on October 1698.18  
The Congress of Ryswick illustrates an important change in how the balance of power 
and international relations in Europe were approached. With substantial French 
concessions, France’s ambitions were restrained, and Louis XIV himself recognised that 
the balance of power in Europe was a problem. This marked the first step in a 
development from the threat of the single power of France, to seeing the balance of power 
as the expression of a far more complex international system, where any power might 
have to be restrained. I return to this later. 
The partition treaty resulting from Ryswick, and the very idea of dividing the Spanish 
monarchy, built on the balance of power as it had developed in England. Republican 
                                                          
17 Ibid., 379. 
18 Also known as The Treaty of The Hague. 
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writers in particular inspired the Whigs.19 One central influence was William Penn. He 
was a friend of Slingsby Bethel, who had written an important tract on the various 
interests of the European Powers.20 Penn’s essay from 1693, An Essay Towards the 
Present and Future Peace of Europe, was based on the balance of power in the context of 
a variety of European interests, and can be seen as a central influence on the peace in 
1697.21 Penn had called ‘civil interest’ the foundation of government.22 Like Bolingbroke 
later, he transposed this view of domestic government, characterised by ‘Just weights and 
an even Ballance’23 in support of the public interest, to the situation in Europe. To make 
his point that Europe needed a peace based on the balance, Penn invoked the vision of the 
revered figure of French King Henry IV (Henry of Navarre). Henry was seen as the 
epitome of all that had been good in previous times;24 in Penn’s view, ‘he was upon 
obliging the Princes and Estates of Europe to a Politick Ballance, when the Spanish 
Faction, for that Reason, contrived, and accomplished His Murder, by the Hands of 
Ravilliac’.25 For Penn, even the assassination of Henry in 1610, which in some respects 
triggered the dogmatic conflicts associated with the Thirty Years’ War, had been carried 
out to prevent a balance of power. Penn quotes balance-of-power pioneer Sir William 
Temple, Lisola’s associate from the previous chapter, in defending a peace based on the 
balance of power – what Temple himself had aimed for in establishing the Triple Alliance 
in 1668.26  
In concluding the first Treaty of Partition and the peace of Ryswick, the ‘sole interest’ of 
the English king had been ‘the universal Welfare of Europe’.27 With that Treaty, England 
                                                          
19 Scott, Jonathan . 2000. England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in 
European Context. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 494. 
20 Bethel, Slingsby. 1681. The Interest of the Princes and States of Europe, 2nd ed., London: John Wickins.  
21 Penn, William. 1693. An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe: By the Establishment 
of an European Dyet, Parliament, Or Estates. London: s.n. 
22 Penn, William. 1679. One project for the good of England that is, our civil union is our civil safety: 
humbly dedicated to the great council, the Parliament of England. London: s.n., quoted in Scott, England’s 
Troubles, p. 372. 
23 Penn, An Essay, p. 11 
24 See Toulmin, Stephen. 1990. The Hidden Agenda of Modernity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
pp. 45–56. 
25 Penn, An Essay, in ‘The Conclusion’. 
26 See also Schmidt, H. D. 1966. ‘The Establishment of “Europe” as Political Expression’, The Historical 
Journal 9: 172–178. 
27 ‘The Memorial of the Ambassadors of the most Christian King for the General Peace, deliver’d to the 
Ambassador Mediator Septemb. I. 1697 at the Palace of Ryswick’, pp. 102–104 in Bernard, The Acts and 
Negotiations, p. 102. 
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had ‘contributed such mighty Weights towards reducing the Kingdoms and States of 
Europe to the happy Balance they at present enjoy’.28  
On 7 December 1697, Parliament responded to the King’s speech announcing the good 
news from Ryswick: ‘The Prospect of the Benefits your People will receive from the 
Peace is very pleasing: The Honour your Majesty has restored to England, of holding the 
Balance of Europe, gives your Subjects great Content.’29 
The concept of the balance of power now stood strong. As it had surged in direct 
opposition to France, the negotiations were made in balance-of-power terms.30 Louis XIV 
himself had recognised the unacceptability of Bourbon or French succession to the 
Spanish throne. Concretely, the partition treaty proposed that France and Austria share 
Spain’s Italian possessions, whilst the Crown should be transferred to Charles II’s most 
direct heir, his nephew Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria, Prince of Asturias.  
But the troubles did not end. Surprisingly, Joseph Ferdinand died in 1699 only six years 
old – and that before the frail King Charles II. This called for yet another solution, and it 
came from French King Louis XIV himself the same year. ‘The question’, Louis XIV 
wrote, ‘has […] to be settled how a partition can be made into two equal halves and in a 
manner to assure the public tranquillity’.31 Again, Louis acknowledged the strong social 
power of the balance of power, and that Europe would be alarmed if his power should be 
greater than that of Austria: ‘I know how Europe would be alarmed to see my own power 
rise above that of the House of Austria, so that this kind of equality on which it makes its 
repose depend would no longer obtain between one and the other’.32 On the other hand, 
he argued,  
But also the power of the [Austrian] Emperor is so increased, both because of the 
submission of the princes of the Empire, and because of the advantageous peace that he 
                                                          
28 In preface to Bernard, Jacques (ed.). 1698. The Acts and Negotiations, Together with the Particular 
Articles at large, of the General Peace, Concluded at Ryswick. London: Robert Clavel/Tim Childe 
29 Parliament, Great Britain. 1803. ‘House of Commons Journal Volume 12: 7 December 1697’, Journal of 
the House of Commons, volume 12, 1697–1699, pp. 2–3.  
30 Michael, ‘The Treaties’, pp. 382–384. 
31 Ibid, p. 388. 
32 ‘Je sais combien l’Europe serait alarmée de voir ma puissance s’élever au-dessus de celle de la maison 
d’Autriche, en sorte que cette espèce d’égalité dont elle fait dépendre son repos cessât de se trouver entre 
l’une et l’autre’. Louis XIV in letter to Tallard, ambassador to London, Feb. 1699. Legrelle, A. 1890. La 
Diplomatie Française et la Succession D’Espagne. Tome III. Le Troisième Traité de Partage (1699–1700). 
Paris: F.-L. Dullé-Plus, p. 15. 
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has just concluded with the Porte [the Ottomans], that it is in the general interest, if it 
becomes even larger, that my [own power] should still be in such a state as to 
counterbalance it.33  
Others also increasingly started to notice changes in Austria’s position. As seen above, 
and as noted in the previous chapter, most of the debates concerning the balance of power 
after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 focused on domestic, British issues and were 
increasingly used in party struggles. The one exception was a pamphlet from 1694.34 In 
addition to the usual attacks on France, it concludes under the heading ‘A Balance to be 
made betwixt France and the House of Austria’, arguing ‘Tis the general Interest of all 
Christendom to resettle the House of Austria in a sort of equality with France. This 
Equilibrium is necessary for the Security of the People, and even for that of the 
Sovereigns too’. It is in the interest of England ‘to re-establish this Equality, that she may 
have the Balance in her hand, and turn it to which side she pleases’.35 After Ryswick in 
1697, the balance on the continent between Austria and France stood increasingly central 
in English discourse.  
Austria was now on the rise, Louis XIV argued, employing balance-of-power rhetoric in 
his arguments during renewed negotiations with London. However, William III still 
insisted on the importance of preventing the very specific threat of a French universal 
monarchy.36  
A solution was reached with the Second Partition Treaty37 in 1700. France would receive 
Spanish territories in Italy38 and Lorraine. The rest of Spain would go to the Austrian 
Habsburg Archduke Charles (soon to become Emperor Charles VI), who was to succeed 
to the Spanish Crown. Archduke Charles was the son of Austrian Emperor Leopold I, 
who had fought France precisely in order to gain the Spanish Monarchy for the 
Habsburgs. Nevertheless, Emperor Leopold I refused: he wanted all or nothing – an 
                                                          
33 Ibid.; Michael, ‘The Treaties’, p. 388. 
34 Anon. 1706[1694]. ‘Reflections upon the Conditions of Peace offer’d by France; And the Means to be 
employ’d for the procuring of Better’, pp. 412– 422 in Count de Maiole (ed.) A Collection of State Tracts, 
Publish’d during the Reign of King William III. Vol. II. London: s.n. 
35 Ibid., p. 422. 
36 See Legrelle, A. 1892. La Diplomatie Française et la Succession D’Espagne. Tome IV. La Solution 
(1700–1725). Paris: F.-L. Dullé-Plus, p. 149-151; Osiander, The States System, p. 124. 
37 Also known as the Treaty of London. 
38 The kingdoms of Naples, Sicily, parts of Tuscany, and some other provinces. 
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undiminished Spain, or continued war.39 In 1700 England, France, and the Dutch went 
ahead, signed the Second Partition Treaty, and officially communicated this to both Spain 
and the Emperor. On hearing the news, the Spanish King Charles II ‘flew into an 
extraordinary passion’, while his Queen set about smashing everything in her room.40  
Yet another obstacle would emerge, this time triggering a renewed European war – the 
War of the Spanish Succession. When the Spanish king died in October 1700, a large 
group of nobles had gathered to open and read his will in public. The will was Charles 
II’s final attempt at saving the integrity of the Spanish monarchy; it stated that the 
Spanish Monarchy should never be divided, and should pass in its entirety to the Bourbon 
Duke Philip of Anjou (becoming Philip V of Spain), grandson of the King of France.41 
This created unprecedented problems. The ball was now in Louis XIVs court, quite 
literally – would he accept this will? 
Further, according to the terms of the will, if Louis XIV rejected this, the whole of Spain 
should go to the son of the Habsburg emperor. The Spanish wanted their empire intact, 
not divided. Louis XIV accepted the late King of Spain’s will and the accession of Philip 
of Anjou to the Spanish Throne, thereby breaking the Second Partition Treaty with the 
allies. To justify this, as he wrote, he privileged ‘the just cause’ of legitimate succession 
and dynastic rights42 over his treaty obligations – that is, over the balance of power on 
which the alliance and the peace were based. Genealogical principles were perhaps the 
only ‘contender’ to the balance-of-power concept, but proved unsuccessful in this case, as 
they would later in the case of Austria. French troops then violated the Dutch barrier and 
Louis XIV seized Dutch barrier towns.  
Negotiations began among the allies, aimed at renewing the Grand Alliance between the 
Empire, Holland, and England. Now, however, as King William III’s last speech to the 
Parliament in 1701 indicates, the party-political divisions within England were seen as 
threatening – not only to the interests of England, but to the balance itself: 
Let me conjure you to disappoint the only Hopes of our Enemies, by your Unanimity. I have 
shewn, and will always shew, how desirous I am to be the common Father of all my People: 
                                                          
39 Michael, ‘The Treaties’, p. 390. 
40 Ibid, p. 391. 
41 Michael, ‘The Treaties’, p. 393. 
42 Torcy, quoted in translation in Michael, ‘The Treaties’, p. 394. 
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Do you in like manner lay aside all Parties and Divisions; let there be no other Distinction 
heard of among us for the future, but of those who are for the Protestant Religion, and the 
present Establishment, and of those who mean a Popish Prince and a French Government…I 
will only add this, if you do in good earnest desire to see England hold the Balance of Europe, 
and to be indeed at the head of the Protestant Interest, it will appear by your right improving 
the present Opportunity […] By the French King's placing his Grandson on the Throne of 
Spain, he is in a Condition to oppress the rest of Europe, unless speedy and effectual 
measures be taken […] the Eyes of all Europe are upon this Parliament.43 
The balance of power had become firmly established as a concept. There was no luxury 
of neutrality – or to paraphrase a more recent political leader, ‘you’re either with us or 
against us in the fight against the French Government’.44 Balance was the ultimate good, 
with no middle way. The Alliance was put back together on 7 September 1701.  
France was the main antagonist, but Austria and the Habsburgs had not been forgotten. In 
1701, a pamphlet written by Marchamont Needham in 1678 was reissued. As seen earlier, 
Needham had introduced the possibility of predicting the balance based on interests. He 
referred to ‘that excellent Prince the Duke of Rohan, in his little but weighty Book, 
stating the Interest of several Princes’ and how Rohan ‘determines it is the Interest of 
England to keep such a Balance of their Powers, as not to permit that either of them to 
grow so great as to be able to oppress another’. Already in 1678, the consequence of this 
was, according to Needham, ‘that we ought ever to hold it even betwixt France and the 
House of Austria; and if either of them exceed, to reduce it to an Equality. This was 
accounted a principal part of the Antient Grandeur of the English Nation’.45 It is 
significant that this pamphlet was now reprinted in 1701, with the explicit justification in 
the text that the same point now applied to new circumstances. There was an important 
continuity between Needham’s analysis of interests and the Spanish problem, not as 
                                                          
43 Cobbett, William, John Wright and Thomas C. Hansard. 1809. The Parliamentary History of England 
from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, Vol. V., A.D. 1688–1702. London: T. C. Hansard, cols. 1330–
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44 Said to originate with Vladimir Lenin, later popularised by George W. Bush. 
45 Needham, Marchamont. [1678/1701] 1707. ‘Christianissimus Christianandus: or Reasons for the 
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medieval analogy, but as an objectified lesson of history – an analogical confirmation of 
the current state of the balance of power.46  
In 1701, another pamphlet asserted that it was in the interest of all to ‘help keep the 
Balance betwixt France and Austria in an equal Counterpoise’.47 Moreover, in speeches in 
Parliament, and in the King’s/Queen’s speeches, the importance of the Franco-Austrian 
balance was avowed, but this was not an exclusively British project. Austria was 
generally seen as a central player in Europe, particularly after defeating the Ottomans and 
vastly expanding its territories in the 1680s. With the increasing centrality of the balance-
of-power concept, however, steps were taken to reassure others that these developments 
were not menacing. During the reign of Emperor Leopold (1658–1705), the Austrians had 
put great effort into arguing that this relative growth of Austria posed no threat to the 
balance of power. Philipp Ludwig Wenzel von Sinzendorf, later to become Austrian 
ambassador and envoy to the Utrecht negotiations, had insisted on this. In 1699, the year 
between the First and Second Partition Treaties, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Colbert de Torcy, and Sinzendorf had explicitly agreed that Habsburg expansion in the 
east of Europe should be of no concern to the balance.48  
Such international agreements were crucial given the particular position of Austria. After 
Charles II’s will was made public in 1700, Emperor Leopold of Austria had been 
cautious, because he had a double audience to address. On the one side, Europe and the 
other polities had to be addressed in balance-of-power terms. On the other, a legitimate 
rhetoric for addressing the multifaceted ‘German’ audience and the Imperial Diet had to 
invoke the legal terms of dynastic succession. The Emperor had to use a mixed or 
multivocal rhetorical approach.49 For idiosyncratic legal reasons, he could not accept the 
partition, nor Charles II’s will: it was unlawful to relinquish Imperial territories without 
consent – consent that Leopold could not give, because that was in the hands of the 
composite estates.  
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In addressing England, the rhetoric was different, couched in terms of an anti-French 
alliance, to secure the balance of power – which would surely be also in the interest of the 
British monarch.50 This can be seen in the pamphlet The Lion’s Share from 1701. 
 
The Lion’s Share 
As noted, Austrian expansion in the eastern parts of Europe had been agreed to be no 
threat to Europe – but now that the territories of the pivotal European power of Spain 
were up for grabs, potential Austrian territorial expansion here did become a concern to 
the balance of power. Austria would have to respond in kind.    
As the Spanish question emerged, and the idea of a division of the Spanish Monarchy 
gained traction, the Habsburgs continued to invoke the balance of power, at least in their 
externally aimed rhetoric. The central pamphlet in these efforts was The Fable of the 
Lion’s Share from 1701.51 It is an appeal to other countries, under the banner of the 
balance of power, denouncing the Second Partition Treaty of 1700. This pro-Habsburg 
pamphlet argued that any peace with France or division of Spain would dangerously 
weaken the Empire. Instead, England, Holland, and the Keiser should join Austria in its 
fight for the Spanish Crown. As the author summed up his argument,  
the Succession of Spain is not a particular Controversy between the Emperor and most 
Christian King, but a Busines of the utmost Importance to all Europe…there is no way of 
restoring the Balance of Christendom, which is so necessary for the Common Good, but 
by settling the whole Monarchy of Spain upon the Arch-Duke.52  
The Partition Treaty was ‘not only a Conspiracy against the Austrian Family, but against 
the liberties of Christendom; directly tending to enslave Mankind to the House of 
France’.53 The pamphlet addressed the ‘enormous injustice’ in the Partition treaty in 
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breaking ‘the Balance of the two Crowns, so necessary to Europe’54 promising the 
enslavement of the whole of Europe by France. The author admits that objections to 
Charles V had been reasonable, as France at that time was not so powerful. Now, 
however, ‘If the Crown of Spain passes from the Catholic King to the Arch-Duke 
Charles, the House of Austria increases not in Power, the State of Europe remains the 
same’.55 The Archduke’s lot was now ‘vastly disproportionate to the French’.56  
By now, these appeals are recognisable. This pamphlet had all the necessary ‘ingredients’ 
for making a convincing case: the threat of Universal Monarchy and enslavement, the 
public interest of the whole of Europe, joined in the balance of power, and even excusing 
the behaviour of Charles V centuries earlier. In addition, and crucially, the pamphlet 
argued that England should be the leader and ‘holder of the balance of power’. Courting 
England as the ‘holder of the balance’ and as the authority on defining the balance of 
power was a recurrent rhetorical move that would have unintended consequences for 
Austria later. 
This was how the balance of power was portrayed in Austria, and it was consistent with 
the English emphasis on the balance relying on an equal standing between Austria and 
France. However, as I will explain below, as general peace negotiations approached, and 
the English realised that they were increasingly fighting to reunite the historical 
possessions of Charles V at the expense of the balance, Austria would soon find itself 
lacking any sustainable way to rhetorically link the balance of power to their concerns. As 
anti-French argumentation would soon lose its sweeping centrality in the balance-of-
power concept, the multivocality of the Austrian rhetoric would eventually break down, 
and Austria would come to appear as a representative of private interests and ambition, 
quite contrary to any conceivable notion of the balance of power. For the present, 
however, Austria was part of the coalition against France, together with England, 
Holland, and later Portugal and Italy/Savoy.  
Just after the Alliance had been concluded, William III died, and Anne, the daughter of 
James II, succeeded to the throne. In 1702, upon her succession, the Lords declared their 
support to obtain ‘such a Balance of Power and Interest, as may effectually secure the 
                                                          
54 Ibid., p. 153 . 
55 Ibid., p. 139. 
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Liberties of Europe’.57 Also the Commons voiced their support for a balance of power. 
Parliament authorised war, and the War of the Spanish Succession broke out in 1702. 
Also this time, Protestants across Europe looked to Britain for leadership.58 As William 
III had said, the eyes of Europe were upon the British Parliament.59  
Queen Anne continued to support intervention in the name of the balance. In her opening 
speech to Parliament on October 27, 1705, she stated:   
Nothing can be more evident, than that, if the French King continues Master of the 
Spanish Monarchy, the Balance of Power in Europe is utterly destroyed, and he will be 
able in a short Time to engross the Trade and the Wealth, of the World. No good 
Englishman could at any Time be content to sit still, and acquiesce in such a Prospect.60 
 
Tories, Whigs, and party politics in Britain 
As argued, the balance of power had emerged out of the linking and rhetorical 
arrangement of Universal Monarchy, interests, and the public/private divide into a whole. 
Encapsulating many of the common concerns in the beginning of the 18th century, the 
concept increasingly moved to centre stage in domestic politics in Britain. As party-
politics took shape, the emerging rift between Whigs and Tories centred on the balance of 
power. In addition, the further strengthening of the public sphere ‘placed English […] 
politicians under an obligation to justify their foreign policy to the public; and because 
foreign policy and grand strategy became the primary motor of party-political 
polarization under Queen Anne’.61 This coincided with the increasingly complex and 
fragmented political environment in Europe. These debates are important, because 
domestic debates in Britain would directly impinge on how the balance of power could 
legitimately be used with reference to Europe and the public interest, and in turn affect 
Austria’s room for manoeuvre, as I show below. 
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Renewing the Alliance against France was the subject of party attacks and pamphlet 
campaigns in England. William III had to deal with a Tory majority which did not want 
war with France. On 11 November 1701, he had in fact dissolved Parliament to gain 
support for his policy of intervention. Only after the creation of 12 new peers would the 
new House of Lords support the renewed Grand Alliance. This was justified with the 
balance of power on the continent and, as Swift wrote, also to support the balance 
internally in government.62 However, it further increased the polarisation between Whigs 
and Tories.  
Political parties, and not only loose associations, became important. The main issue in 
these growing party struggles were precisely differences over the balance of power – 
policy and strategy regarding the continent, and the war with France and, in the end, 
peace or not.63 For Tories, the Whigs were associated with trading companies and the 
‘moneyed interests’. Also, the Whig faction was traditionally the pro-war party. Tories, 
while very much in favour of wars at sea, increasingly became the ‘peace-party’: they 
were opposed to standing armies and expensive land wars on the continent, and harboured 
pro-French views. They even wanted to get rid of references to the ‘peace of Europe’ in 
parliamentary motions.64 In consequence, the principal debates in Parliament, and in 
Europe, in the first year of the 18th century concerned whether to intervene in the name of 
the balance. This became particularly salient with the Spanish Succession crisis and the 
prospects of a final showdown with France.  
The governing ‘war party’, the Whigs, responded to the Tory opposition by starting a 
‘pamphlet war’, emphasising the continued threat to the balance of power of an 
expansionist France. The project of the Whig Party was to protect the balance of power in 
Europe, so as to protect English liberties at home. The Tories, on the other hand, were 
sceptical to the balance, favoured a ‘blue-water policy’ over continental involvements, 
and favoured a quick-fix peace with France. Interestingly, however sceptical the Tories 
initially were towards the balance of power, a Tory government was to be the most active 
user of the concept in making possible the Utrecht Settlement.  
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In short, the core issue occasioning the increasing divide between Tories and Whigs was 
the standing of the balance of power. Was Britain, as the Whigs advocated, to lead 
balancing efforts or, as the Tories argued, to stay isolated as a relatively disengaged 
balancer?  
The Whig–Tory conflict over such issues had long antecedents, as in the heated debates 
over a standing army after the treaty of Ryswick. The crucial difference between the two, 
at least in the Tory opinion, was between Court and Country. The Court represented the 
bureaucracy with its private interests and corruption, being for high taxation and a 
standing army. Many Parliamentary representatives paid a land-tax; they wanted to 
reduce expenditures, and feared that a large national debt would lead to despotism by 
strengthening the executive.65 In addition, a standing land army in Britain was seen as a 
potentially sinister device for tyranny – a tool for monarchs to subvert freedoms, and 
associated with corruption and arbitrary government. A king, it was held, could govern 
either through nobles or through an army.  
The Tories, the landed aristocracy, associated freedom with possession of land and 
property, and regarded a ‘balance of property’ as highly important. This balance could be 
destroyed by the selling and buying of land, which was seen as the result of the Whig 
‘monied men’.66 Consequently, Parliament should be independent of the Court, so as to 
maintain ‘the balance of the constitution’ between King, Commons, and Lords.67 The 
stability of this political system was even a precondition for individual morality. The 
political balance and the balance of property secured this stability within the state. 
Corruption, therefore, referred to more than bribery – it meant disturbing the balance and 
the public interest.68 
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Ichabod! Bolingbroke, Davenant, and the ‘conservative’ balance of power 
In this ‘warfare between the noble ancient landed interest, and the new monied interest’,69 
the strongest champion of these ideas of the ‘country gentlemen’, was Henry St John, 1st 
Viscount Bolingbroke.70 As Bolingbroke later would write, in defence of his actions at 
Utrecht, reflecting the common discourse on Universal Monarchy and Oriental 
Despotism, the history of France  
is the history of one state under a more uniform and orderly government; the history of a 
monarchy wherein the prince is possessor of some, as well as lord of all the great fieffees: 
and the authority of many tyrants centring in one, though the people are not become more 
free, yet the whole system of domestic policy is entirely changed.71  
The same elements were now threatening England. The Tories equated universal 
monarchy with the interventionist strategy of the Whigs, with the threat of a standing 
army, taxation, undermining liberties, and the balance of property, and control of opinion. 
Their countermove was to argue for a more open and public government in contrast to the 
corruption of private interest and moneyed men.72 For instance, Jonathan Swift argued 
that Whig supremacy meant party rule – which meant ‘tyranny’ as opposed to the ‘true 
public interest’.73  
According to Bolingbroke, the financial revolution (ca. 1690–1740), with development of 
banking and credit, was the root of the evil that pervaded British society74 and therefore 
also Europe. A true balance of power in Europe, in the public interest, had not been 
established because of the undermining and corruption of the state and of the aristocratic 
order established since the Tudors in England. Even worse, this basic principle – to 
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maintain the balance of Europe – had been converted to a new use, to legitimise private 
interests against King and Country.  
For Bolingbroke, the ‘public interest’ was linked to sentiments of conscience and 
obligation based on tradition as a mechanism governing the affairs of men. Whiggism, 
however, included in the concept of interest also ‘the presumed will of the people’ and 
popular government. This was linked to the financial order that Bolingbroke despised. 
‘The whole constitution of our country, and even the character of our nation’ he wrote, 
‘has been altered […] the men called Whigs have made (worse use of) long wars and new 
systems of revenue’.75 And he, as his Tory peers, worried about the increasing influence 
of Parliament over royal power, and how parliamentary service had gone from being a 
duty to becoming ‘debased since it became a trade’.76 Reflecting on the state of Britain, in 
a chapter tellingly titled ‘Ichabod!’,77 Bolingbroke writes that the state itself ‘is become, 
under ancient and known forms, a new and undefinable monster; composed of a king 
without monarchical splendour, a senate of nobels without aristocratical independency, 
and a senate of commons without democratical freedom’. He expands the reasoning:  
the very idea of wit, and all that can be called taste, has been lost among the great; arts 
and sciences are scarcely alive; luxury has been increased but not refined; corruption has 
been established, and is avowed […] public and private virtue, public and private spirit, 
science and wit, decline all together.78 
Bolingbroke’s ideal was Elizabethan England, where ‘virtuosity, glitter, and dazzling 
personal force were set upon a sharply delineated stage and when the fate of England and 
Europe was worked out in public by a group of brilliant players around one central and 
most brilliant player’.79 That had also been the age of the real balance of power. Now, all 
that was left was an empty public performance, and shallow and divisive party politics.  
Charles Davenant also linked such ideas about prudence, order in the state, and order in 
Europe. His Essay upon the Balance of Power (1701) begins, ‘There is no surer Mark that 
a Government is near its utter destruction, than when the People are observ’d to be 
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careless and unconcern’d at a time when they are press’d and encompass’d with dangers 
of the highest nature’.80 People were too intoxicated with private money to be concerned 
with the public interest. Decaying virtue and merit in Britain was leading to indifference  
in what relates to the common Welfare: If their Purses feel heavy, they take little thought 
of what becomes of the ballance of Europe, nor to which side the Scale inclines. If we 
represent to ‘em the Growth and Power of France, and the dangers that threaten England, 
they are not at the least alarm’d, as knowing they have got wherewithal to buy their own 
Peace.81 
Davenant concluded his essay on the balance of power thus:  
Nothing can more enable us still to maintain our Post of holding the Balance of Europe, 
nor contribute so much to our Preservation, as for all good English Men to lay aside the 
Name of Parties, and to join in due Obedience to the King, and firm Zeal for his real 
Service […] And to encourage his People to concur with him in this Great Work, nothing 
can more conduce than to see their Liberties put upon so firm a Foot, That there may be 
no more Danger of the Nation’s falling at any time hereafter under Arbitrary Power.82  
‘Where there is no Council’, he writes, ‘there can be no real strength.’83   
In Bolingbroke’s diplomatic correspondence, in his history of England, in his articles in 
The Craftsman, and in the Defence, the balance of power is the ‘cardinal prescription for 
England’s dealings with the outside word’.84 And the real balance of power, not the 
specious Whiggish one, was in the true interest of Britain and its foreign affairs, as 
opposed to ‘those principles of conduct that […] have no other foundations than party-
designs, prejudices, and habits; the private interests of some men and the ignorances and 
rashness of others’.85 Bolingbroke also judged previous English rulers on the criteria that 
they adhere to the balance of power principle. Elizabeth was held high in regard, with 
Cromwell relegated to the other end of the scale (also because he was associated with 
standing armies).  
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Bolingbroke ‘projected onto the international sphere the preoccupation with balance and 
limitations on power which characterised his image of the English constitution’.86 As also 
William Penn had implied in his 1693 essay, Bolingbroke transferred the peculiarities of 
the English constitution and its preoccupation with equilibrium and the balance of power 
to the international order, a transfer that would continue to be a ‘hallmark on English 
political writing’ for years to come.87 (And Hans Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations 
would indeed use ‘checks and balances’ to introduce the balance of power to US readers, 
see Chapter 9). 
 
‘And now, gentlemen, what next?’ 
In 1703, Portugal and the Duke of Savoy joined the Grand Alliance against France, and 
the Habsburg Emperor’s son Archduke Charles was crowned Charles III of Spain. Still, 
both claimants to the Spanish monarchy – Austria and France – were courting Spain and, 
not least, Spanish public opinion, to garner support for their succession rights. During the 
war, France became increasingly unpopular also in Spain, as it was seen to be betraying 
Spain’s interest.88 Here the balance of power was used to support Spanish arguments 
against France, and, as was common, to appeal to England as the acknowledged keeper of 
the balance.89 
From 1704, the allies won a string of crucial battles, and Louis XIV was increasingly 
ready to make peace after 1706. France repeatedly sought peace with the allies, and Louis 
was prepared to make great sacrifices for it. The allies, however, let the opportunity pass, 
imposing unacceptably harsh terms for a peace, so the war continued. This changed when 
the Tories, the pro-French ‘peace party’, replaced the Whigs in Britain. By then, France 
was slowly receding from the role of the singular, Universal Monarchy in Europe.  
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In 1706, the troops of Louis XIV had been ousted from the Spanish Netherlands and from 
Italy. Bolingbroke, who had had risen to prominence in British politics in the early 1700s, 
argued that the objectives of the war, and defending the balance of power, had been 
achieved in 1706 – France had been sufficiently weakened to restore the balance.  
In 1706, as France was seen to be declining, Daniel Defoe asked, what would come 
next?90 He argued that now, in an increasingly complex Europe, the balance of power was 
‘little understood’,91 and with England’s role as ‘balancer’ growing in this context, it was 
time for a reassessment. Now, Defoe wrote, it did not only concern the fight against the 
Universal Monarchy of France – the original circumstances in which the balance of 
power emerged as a concept – but preventing any part of the European system growing 
too large. That was the role of England – a role now expanded beyond fighting against a 
single enemy, to effectively take care of and lead the entire system of Europe. In 1706, 
when Defoe wrote, the allies had gained the upper hand, and France was as seen being 
defeated. This was in itself a potential problem. ‘WHAT’S NEXT?’ he repeatedly wrote. 
Defoe listed the powers of Europe: there is a Spanish Power, an Austrian Power, Sweden, 
France, Germany, Holland etc. Therefore,  
Should any of the Branches of the present Confederacy push at a Conquest, and by the 
Advantage of the falling Greatness of the French power, engross to themselves a 
Dominion too large, or any Superiority of Power above his proper Sphere, that very 
Power or Prince would in his degree become equally obnoxious to the rest, and the 
Balance of Power being thereby broken, would be as much the public enemy as the 
French are now92  
Europe was seen to have changed – and so had the balance of power and its implications, 
now championed by Bolingbroke and the Tories. 
Still, the Austrian Emperor, and the British commander Marlborough, wanted to continue 
the war. Their battle cry was ‘No peace without Spain’, against any treaties of division. 
The Tory government, however, advocated peace from 1706 on. Still, after 1706 when 
the ‘coalition government’ was increasingly filled with Whigs, both Robert Harley, the 
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later Earl of Oxford, and Bolingbroke were replaced. The Tories had been too vehement 
in their promotion of peace.93  
 
The London Preliminaries 
The Tories accused Whig negotiators of setting excessively high demands for a peace 
with Louis XIV in the 1709/1710 negotiations at Gertruydenberg and The Hague. The 
continuation of the war was based on the Whig balance of power in strategic unison with 
the Dutch, as reflected in the Barrier Treaty with the United Provinces (1709). The Tories 
still despised the Dutch, as had been common in the mid-1600s, were sceptical of the 
Glorious Revolution, and were therefore also opposed to the balance of power, which was 
seen as a Whig project. Robert Harley was against the Barrier Treaty, arguing it would 
favour Dutch trade.  
The war did not go well after 1710, and Queen Ann increasingly turned to the Tories. She 
aimed at a joint government, but the differences were too great – Bolingbroke, for one, 
was against the war, against the Dutch, and against all things Austrian.94 
After the unsuccessful peace conference at Gertruydenberg in 1710, the Whigs were 
dismissed from office, and Harley and Bolingbroke, who had formerly led a coalition 
government, were recalled to office. They returned to power with a programme 
emphasising ‘the public good of the nation’, which included ending the war, attacking the 
‘moneyed power’, and defending the church.95 Their version of the ‘balance’ would 
promote all this.  
The Dutch resented the new Tory government, which was now making approaches to 
France. The Dutch were afraid of Britain negotiating bilaterally with France and 
obtaining advantages for themselves. Indeed, that is exactly what happened. The Tory 
ministry secretly concluded a separate, bilateral peace with France, known as the 1711 
London Preliminaries, which would become the basis for the Utrecht settlement.96  
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Now in power, the Tories used the rallying power of the balance of power for their own 
purposes. And this was also necessary to emphasise the benefits for Europe as a whole: 
The French Minister of Foreign Affairs Torcy, Louis XIV himself, and Bolingbroke and 
Robert Harley, the Queen’s chief minister, all invoked the balance of power to justify 
ending the war. The balance of power as a commonplace – the issue which Bolingbroke 
now called ‘the great article’ of the whole settlement – would enable the peace.97  
After negotiating the preliminaries, the Duke of Ormond, having replaced Marlborough 
as commander of the British forces, received Bolingbroke’s ‘restraining orders’, 
effectively telling him to betray and abandon the allies in favour of the private settlement 
with France. Britain defected from the alliance, leaving the others to fight alone. The 
Dutch and the Austrians were furious. Despite this, the Dutch agreed to discuss a peace. 
The Whigs were equally furious, and strongly opposed the Preliminary articles. The 
Whigs equated peace with ‘French interest’ and Universal Monarchy, and the ‘French 
interest’ with the Jacobite Pretender, the contending would-be James III. By 1711, then, 
the peace had most definitely become the overriding party issue.98  
 
Austria in the Utrecht negotiations 
The history of the War of the Spanish Succession has been analysed in a relatively 
extensive literature. The role played by Austria is less known. A puzzling feature of the 
processes before and at Utrecht was the absence and near-irrelevance of Austria and its 
Emperor after 1711, not least since the allies in many respects had fought the war on his 
behalf. As opposed to the centrality of France (and the Dutch), Austria, with the Empire, 
was marginalised, and Bolingbroke and other diplomats treated it with indifference.99 One 
of the keys to understanding this is balance of power rhetoric, and the special position of 
Austria.  
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I hold that the domestic policy debates in Britain shaped outcomes at Utrecht, and the 
rhetorical resources available to Austria and others. Austria’s influence on their 
international environment depended on historically contingent designs of domestic 
politics and policymakers, and a particular conceptualisation of the international system. 
How and when the balance of power emerged as a concept, how and when rhetorical links 
were forged and stabilised in Britain and internationally, and how and when one had 
‘invested’ in the concept – all had effects during the Utrecht negotiations. Austria’s range 
of policy options at Utrecht were narrowed because of previous investment in the 
balance-of-power concept. Due to contingent developments in British politics, the 
concept and the implications connected to it had been partly reconstructed, and that 
prevented Austria from using the balance in ways that had been available earlier. The 
Austrians were left rhetorically exposed. When balance of power rhetoric changed 
affected how actors could defend their policies.  
After the death of Leopold in 1705, his son Joseph I had become Emperor, but in 1711 he 
died without an heir, amidst the preparations for Utrecht. The death of Joseph I now 
seriously raised the prospect of an Austrian Universal Monarchy because the 26-year-old 
Archduke Charles, now about to become Emperor Charles VI, was a claimant to the 
Spanish throne. Reunification of Spanish and Austrian inheritances became a real 
possibility, and that would mean reconstituting the Universal Monarchy of Charles V. 
When the Archduke Charles became Charles VI, the Habsburg argument that ‘the interest 
of the Emperor is that of all Europe’, and of the balance of power,100 now seemed 
unwarranted. With this new situation, Britain was now fighting to place the Austrian 
Emperor himself on the throne of Spain, reconstituting the Universal Monarchy of 
Charles V!  
This, in turn, helped the Tory cause in supporting a peace. It backed up Bolingbroke’s 
argument that the Alliance had been established to prevent the hegemony of France, and 
that the ‘no peace without Spain’ argument and winning the Spanish monarchy for the 
Habsburgs could not be the aim. The Tories were more friendly towards France, and 
presented the balance of power rather as a general principle of a European ‘system’, as 
Bolingbroke repeatedly termed it, and not as a fight against the single power of France. 
This had an impact on Utrecht – a settlement that came about because of the peace policy 
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of Bolingbroke and the Tories, and based on their conception of what the balance of 
power implied.   
 
The Conduct of the Allies 
In 1711, the year of the London Preliminaries, Bolingbroke had also been involved in 
founding a club simply called ‘The Society’, later ‘the Brothers Club’, with, amongst 
others, his close friend Jonathan Swift, and Alexander Pope. It was to be composed of 
people with ‘power and influence’, and who ‘have a corporation of patrons to protect and 
advance them’.101 Writing to influence policy was one of their stated aims.  
And indeed, Jonathan Swift’s The Conduct of the Allies, and of the Late Ministry in 
Beginning and Carrying on the Present War102 from 1711 helped in publically supporting 
the idea of a separate peace with France, based on the balance of power. It exploited the 
new situation concerning Austria, arguing for a separate peace with France, as stipulated 
in the London Preliminaries. And peace had long been at the core of Tory policy.  
A central point in the pamphlet was an attack on the moneyed power and private interests 
that supported needless wars and interventions. The Whigs, as Swift argued, were the 
‘war-party’,103 a government of politics of administration, and of manipulating politics to 
the degradation of public life.104  
Swift’s pamphlet was hugely influential, and sold remarkably well. Seven editions were 
printed in two months, 11,000 copies in all.105 Swift worked with Temple, who together 
with Lisola was mentioned in Chapter 3 as among the pioneers of the balance-of-power 
concept in England. As a converted Whig, he was also hand-in-glove with Harley and 
Bolingbroke.106 Swift was indeed a part of the political power elite; central politicians 
requested and were granted various alterations to the pamphlet in its new editions. It was 
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therefore frequently used in policy debates, and had a considerable impact – ‘The noise it 
makes is extraordinary’, Swift remarked.107  
The centrality of The Conduct of the Allies lies in how it provided the rhetorical tools for 
the debates – ‘supplying ammunition’, as Swift himself wrote, and ‘the use of proper 
words in proper places’.108 Swift attacked the Austrian Emperor Charles VI, his 
‘indifference […] to the Common Cause’ and ‘how little the Emperor regarded his Allies, 
or the Cause they were engaged in, when once he thought the Empire it self was 
secure’.109 The Emperor, wrote Swift, chose to ‘sacrifice the whole Alliance to his private 
Passion’ by waging war and oppressing Hungary instead of fighting France.110 How did 
the Emperor defend himself? The Austrians ‘had nothing to offer but some general 
Speculative Reasons’.111  
As Swift strongly (and successfully) argued, the public interest of Europe should 
outweigh private interests and ambitions. As seen in the previous chapter, the 
synchronisation between different interests had been argued in the case of England: 
England’s interest was also the interest of Europe and therefore that of the balance of 
power. England could mobilise the Alliance around the shared concept of the balance of 
power and its implications, as England was still seen as the central player in the fight 
against France and Universal Monarchy. Britain could argue from an almost 
institutionalised position as the ‘balancer’. Austria had no such role. A similar 
synchronisation failed with Austria, with its dual audiences. Austria could not link 
dynastic politics to the balance of power, as this had become precisely the difference 
between private and public interests that I considered in the previous chapter. These 
English arguments, united in the concept of the balance of power, were used to discredit 
the Austrians during the Utrecht negotiations in 1712.112 
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Austria’s ‘old rhetoric’ 
These debates in Britain did not go unnoticed in the Empire, and so Austria responded. 
The Imperial Government issued a pamphlet to the public as a direct response to the 
debates in London, which were increasingly geared towards supporting peace and the 
division of Spain. In 1712, Imperial publicist Jean Dumont wrote the pamphlet Les 
Soupirs de l’Europe.113 Sinzendorf had recommended him to the Emperor, and Dumont 
became Charles VI’s historiographer.114  
The views of the balance of power in Dumont’s pamphlet paralleled those established in 
the 1701 pamphlet The Lions Share (see above). There was criticism of Britain for 
abandoning its old principles, and of the London Preliminaries. Dumont referred to 
decade-old discussions in the English Parliament from 1701, the year the Lion’s Share 
was published, when it had been argued that the Spanish monarchy should be restored to 
the House of Austria. This restoration, he argued, was why the war had begun in the first 
place. Why then should Spain now be given to the heir of France? That would not 
promote the repose and peace of Europe, he argued.115 Further, ‘So many Writings have 
already proved and demonstrated his Imperial Majesty’s Title to the Whole Monarchy of 
Spain, without Exception, that no Man, who is not altogether a Stranger to the Affairs of 
Europe, can be ignorant of it, or call it in Question’ – these were arguments ‘founded on 
the Right of Blood’. Dumont even drew a ‘Genealogical Table’.116 These arguments from 
dynastic succession and ‘blood’ were combined with a particular view on the implications 
of the balance of power. Austria was playing both cards. 
He goes on to argue that the division of Spain has nothing to do with the balance of 
power, and quotes the English Queen’s speech to Parliament in 1703: ‘[there] could be no 
Ballance of Power in Europe, without Recovering the Monarchy of Spain from the House 
of Bourbon, and restoring it to the House of Austria’.117 He also invokes William III in 
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arguing that ‘The Ballance of Power in Europe cannot be restor’d, but by restoring the 
whole Monarchy of Spain to the House of Austria’.118  
Also relying on British sources and arguments, Dumont then foments fear of France as a 
Universal Monarchy. ‘You will, undoubtly agree’, he avows, ‘that the taking away from 
the House of Austria one Half of her Dominions, to give them to a Prince of the House of 
France, would not be the means to restore the Ballance’.119 One takes from the weak, and 
gives to the strong. Those for a partition ‘do not deny the necessity of settling a Ballance 
of Power between the Two Houses; but they pretend that the method which for these Fifty 
Years past has been used to bring it about, is improper’.120 Dumont makes the case that 
‘the House of Bourbon has in all […] respects infinitely the Advantage of the House of 
Austria’.121 
Austria found itself in a particular situation, where two sets of audiences had to be 
addressed simultaneously. Involved were both the dynastic issue of legitimate succession, 
and the balance of power and the public interest of Europe. Austria attempted to link the 
two as a way of defining the implications of the balance of power, but they were not 
complementary. This can be seen in the multivocality of the rhetoric in Dumont’s 
pamphlet – it had to be sufficiently ambiguous to be able to combine balance-of-power 
arguments and dynastic concerns, simultaneously. However, this dual rhetoric, courting 
two audiences at the same time, did not succeed, leaving Austria isolated during the 
Utrecht negotiations in 1712. Why did the rhetoric fail?  
 
Austria’s failure  
Here I will show how Austria, whilst accepting the principle of the balance of power, 
questioned its implications by linking it to dynastic politics, succession rights, and the 
stability of coalitions, but failed. 
Austria had previously been considered crucial to the balance of power, and Austria had 
couched its arguments in balance-of-power terms. Today’s balance-of-power theory 
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would predict a degree of balancing in response to Austria’s vast territorial expansion and 
relatively more powerful situation in Europe in the late 17th century.122 In contrast, 
balance-of-power rhetoric had the opposite effect, of dampening any concerns, as seen 
explicitly in Austria’s interchanges with Britain. I do not need to invoke any objective 
distributions of ‘material power’,123 or any ‘real beliefs’ on the part of the actors to make 
this argument. Changes in the balance of power owed more to the actual deployment of 
the concept in debates – ‘objectifying’ a version of the balance – rather than to any 
objective assessment of power and territory.  
What underscores this point is precisely the effect on Austria of the new rhetorical links 
made in the debates that were conducted, and the eventual failure of the Austrian strategy 
during the Utrecht negotiations. This is clear from Austria’s marginalisation at Utrecht, 
and can be illustrated in a rather ‘pure’ form, in the case of the rhetorical attacks on the 
Austrian ambassador, Philipp Ludwig Wenzel von Sinzendorf.   
Emperor Charles VI had been elected in 1711, but did not renounce his claims to Spain 
and its territories in their entirety, even when offered substantial territory in Italy.124 He 
eventually instructed Sinzendorf to oppose any peace congress based on the London 
Preliminaries.125 However, Charles VI could not make his claims legitimate in the eyes of 
others.126 When he insisted on Austria’s rightful claims to the Spanish Monarchy, 
Austria’s position was attacked on the grounds that the Emperor was ignoring the balance 
of power, thinking only of his own ‘private interests’ and ambitions. That was even less 
acceptable in view of the history of Charles V, the prototype of a Universal Monarch in 
Europe.  
The Congress of Utrecht opened on 29 January 1712, but Sinzendorf did not arrive until 
he had been given assurances that the London Preliminaries were not binding for the 
Conference. As concerns policy substance, little of importance happened during the 
negotiations at Utrecht. Most of the action was bilateral, between Britain and France – 
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everything depended on an Anglo-French understanding.127 They could dictate the terms 
in Utrecht.  
What Austria could not accept were the implications conveyed regarding the balance of 
power: namely, the partition of the Spanish monarchy. Still, Austrian counter-arguments 
were to no avail. Basically, the balance was now increasingly seen as a system preventing 
any power from becoming too dominant.   
The pamphleteers did not rest during the Utrecht negotiations. One significant pamphlet 
directly addressing, and attacking, Sinzendorf caused considerable commotion during the 
negotiations.128 The anonymous author alleges:  
Since we can no longer ignore the objective that you aim for, what do you suspect that we 
think when you so heatedly oppose everything that could advance the conclusion of a 
general peace treaty? We must believe that you will try to make us continue the war until 
the entire fortune that the great Charles V. possessed at his greatest height has been put in 
the hands of the Emperor. Is this the balance you want to offer Europe? Is an excess of 
power dangerous only when it is not in the hands of the House of Austria? But is this the 
object, are these the principles, of our Alliances and Treaties of League? 129 
In retrospect, the charge that the balance applied to everyone except oneself could 
imaginably have been levelled against Britain as well – but that did not happen. As other 
countries had been using the very concept of balance of power to argue for Britain as the 
leader of the balance, or holding the balance of power, such criticism would not be 
sustainable. Appeals from other countries, including Austria, supporting Britain as being 
indispensable to the balance of Europe were routine.  
The pamphleteer goes on to state that the real ‘objects’, ‘principles’ and the ‘essential 
aim’ of the Alliance was to prevent either the Empire and Spain, or France and Spain, 
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from ‘falling into the same hands’. The Dutch had been ignoring this for too long, due to 
Austrian trickeries.130  
Now, however, none other than Jonathan Swift had revealed this sinister plan. The 
pamphlet’s author addresses Sinzendorf directly: ‘all this has been reported in English 
writings, and particularly in the one entitled, The Conduct of the Allies’. Austria had long 
sought to confuse and bewilder, but Swift’s pamphlet ‘made clear for the entire world the 
wrong that we have done to our nation [Holland], by sacrificing its interests in favor of 
the ambition of the House of Austria’.131  
The appeal to Swift’s Conduct makes for an important intertext. It connects the rhetoric 
from British policy debates directly with the international negotiations at Utrecht, using it 
authoritatively against Austria, and again emphasising the central role of Britain (and 
France). 
This also illustrates how France was no longer considered the lone antagonist – in fact, 
Britain and France now stood together. It had become a question of protecting the system, 
the public interest of Europe, from any preponderant power, and in the case of Austria, 
the ‘entire fortune that the great Charles V possessed’ was an ominous historical token. 
Austria initially had to frame its arguments in balance-of-power terms, but the Austrian 
version of implementing it and a continued war could not be defended. In effect, being 
against the League was being for one’s private interests and ambitions – and thereby 
against the balance of power.  
Given the aims of this project, this argument does not depend on an analytical separation 
between ‘material interests’ and ‘ideas’. The argument is therefore not that Charles VI 
privileged his ‘material interest’ over the ‘ideas’ of the balance of power, or the like. 
Neither is it about Austria’s lack of political finesse, expertise, or awareness, but the 
effect of the Austrian rhetoric in context.132 Nor is the fact that the Emperor initially 
refused to participate in the Utrecht deliberations particularly consequential to the 
argument. The point is that Austria was affected by the balance of power rhetoric, 
limiting its choices in the first place, regardless of whatever interest in debating and 
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talking. The Austrians were ‘rhetorically trapped’. Irrespective of Austria’s ‘material 
interests’, or the Emperor’s ‘real beliefs’, Austria could simply not sustain its public 
opposition to the Utrecht Settlements, either at home or abroad.133 Given the balance-of-
power principle, and what was taken to be the ‘correct’ implications of it, Austria’s 
attempt to link the concept with dynastic concerns failed. It was left with no effective 
rhetorical response, other than to give in – as it eventually did. The paucity of rhetorical 
resources left Austria to fight alone, which it did for some time, before finally accepting 
the partition scheme.  
Austria’s arguments appeared invalid in the historical context. As seen for instance in the 
pamphlet Soupirs, Austria had itself been appealing to England’s role as ‘holder of the 
balance’. However, from 1711, Austria began using earlier British  balance-of-power 
rhetoric against Britain itself.134 This was, firstly, an attempt at undermining Britain’s 
latest position favouring a division of Spain by putting the spotlight on the inconsistency 
in British arguments. Secondly, Austria concurrently invoked legitimate succession and 
dynastic genealogy as reasons for its own claims to Spain.135   
The failure of these arguments also illustrates how rhetoric may have unpredictable 
effects. Situations like the Utrecht Conference are socially, culturally, and strategically 
complex. In addition, historical investments in commonplaces like the ‘balance of power’ 
linger on, and may have path-dependent effects.136  
First, the historical luggage associated with a potential unification of the Spanish and 
Habsburg Crowns was heavy. The example of Charles V still carried rhetorical force, and 
was frequently used in arguments as a historical parallel, or ‘analogical confirmation’.137 
Secondly, and as I will show in greater detail in the next chapter, Austria was linked with 
Hungary, and eastern Europe was a region seen as being on the margins of relations 
between the major European powers, and therefore as less relevant to the balance of 
power. This is a case of how the balance of power served to polarise, making broad 
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alliances more complicated, but also making the concept more socially powerful, as the 
borders of what constituted the balance became more firmly defined. As mentioned, back 
in 1699 France and Austria had agreed that eastward Austrian expansion was of little 
consequence for its standing in the balance of power. Bolingbroke later wrote of the 
Emperor that ‘the Austrian ambition and bigotry exerted themselves in the distant 
countries, whose interests were not considered as a part of this system’ such as Hungary 
or Transylvania. This was opposed to the ‘ambition and bigotry’ of Louis XIV as exerted 
in the Low Countries, the Rhine, Italy and Spain, ‘in the very midst of this system’.138 
Austria’s centrality in Europe was simply less than that of, for instance, Britain, Spain, 
France or Holland – powers deemed far more relevant to what was increasingly becoming 
a European system. All this was to change in the 1720s.  
Thirdly, the contingent linking of the balance of power to other concerns is central – how 
concepts and positions are tied together. Such creative tying-together can potentially 
change the boundaries of what the balance of power can legitimately be taken to mean, by 
combining previously unrelated positions and concepts together. Austria, whilst at least 
tacitly accepting the principle of the balance of power, sought to question its implications, 
by tying it to inherent succession rights and the integral stability of coalitions, but failed. 
Austria’s arguments here were based on a historical still life of the balance of power in 
the early 1700s, when Britain had favoured the Spanish monarchy going to Austria. But 
this conservative and static position on the balance did not resonate. The situation was not 
seen as one of static duality between France and the rest, as Austria implied in its 
pamphlet Soupirs, but as a rather dynamic system. 
 
Conclusions: New implications of the balance of power  
There is a central point to note about the arguments made in Soupirs in 1712, relative to 
the arguments made in the pro-Habsburg The Lion’s Share published a decade earlier. 
The implications of the balance of power are taken to be practically exactly the same – 
unification of Austria and Spain in order to counter the all-encompassing French threat.  
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If we consider the status of the balance of power at the time of the Utrecht Conference, it 
becomes clear that the balance was no longer used as indicating a duality between France 
and the rest, but increasingly as a systemic concept, opposing any power that might aim 
for predominance. With Charles VI, Austria itself had emerged as a threat to the balance. 
That triggered new analyses of the balance of power.  
In 1706, the first year when France was commonly seen to be declining, Daniel Defoe 
had asked, ‘Well, gentlemen, and WHAT NEXT?’139 A re-assessment was needed. The 
issue was now about preventing any part of the European system growing too large. The 
balance of power and its implications had changed. Appeals to a fixed standing of the 
balance of power from a decade ago were fruitless. The balance of power had emerged as 
an opposition to the concept of a Universal Monarchy, as an expression of a public, not 
private, interest, and being placed centrally in the opposition to France, with England as 
the central ‘balancer’. By inserting the balance of power into this constellation, England 
had succeeded in ‘capturing’ the concept, and could continue to do so even when the 
implications of the balance of power and ‘the public interest’ of Europe changed.  
During Utrecht, the balance of power allowed a portrayal of what was at stake as the 
public interest and peace of Europe. Echoing Needham’s arguments, the rhetoric of 
interests served purposes of objectification, enabling actors to offer purportedly neutral 
descriptions (as opposed to private, normative agendas), by presenting rich, empirical 
details of other countries. The rhetoric of interest served to produce the balance of power 
as neutral and external, with a quality of ‘out-there-ness’,140 a ‘thing’ needing ‘protection’ 
against any aspiring universal monarch. Any opposition would have to be couched in 
terms of principle of the balance of power, coming from within the balance-of-power 
discourse. Secondly, the implications of the balance of power were no longer only about 
the fight against France: they had expanded to being about protecting the public interest 
of the European system at large.  
After 1711, in both these respects, Austria had no sustainable social basis from which to 
make its claims141 and was seen as irrelevant to negotiations ‘to settle and establish the 
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peace and tranquillity of Christendom by an equal balance of power’.142 Arguing directly 
against the balance-of-power principle itself, or trying to establish a competing principle, 
would have been exceedingly difficult and costly.143 On the other hand, rejecting a plan 
explicitly based on balance-of-power terms as agreed by the major powers meant, in 
effect, isolating oneself. It meant choosing not to align with the public interest, and 
consequently favouring one’s own ‘ambitions’ and private interests over the balance.  
Many of the positions and arguments in this chapter are recognisable from the preceding 
chapter, concerning the emergence of the concept during the Anglo-Dutch wars. Now, 
however, the balance of power as a principle had become taken for granted. It was a 
question of its implementation, and using the balance of power as a weapon in domestic 
debates which can, however, not be separated from the international and public.  
The balance of power, seen as depending as much on developments within as between 
countries, served as a tool for translating, building conceptual bridges between the 
relations of peoples and their rulers – or, in modern terms, between the domestic and the 
international. The quality of government and the balance of power hung close together. 
As Charles Davenant argued, ‘To put us in a Condition to hold the Balance, our 
Distempers at home must be first Cur’d’.144 This also helped to link an array of new 
political developments under the purview of the balance of power – from constitutional 
developments in Sweden, to administrative changes in Spain, to political developments in 
Russia.145 With this, and the Tory government of 1710 in Britain, the balance of power 
became more systemic.  
Even if in power for only a relatively short period, the Tory government fundamentally 
shaped the concept of the balance of power through its pro-French and anti-Austrian 
rhetoric. From a Tory position, the balance of power equalled peace, which equalled 
Utrecht negotiations and a treaty with France. Being against any of these meant being 
against the balance of power and being for Universal Monarchy, war, ambition, and the 
private over public interests. 
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Increasingly from 1706, France was no longer the sole, overarching threat. The balance of 
power was no longer used only to fight the Universal Monarchy of France. Britain was 
the ‘balancer’, recognised by the others. If that standing originally came from the 
opposition to France, it had now been expanded to the whole European system, so that 
any state, not only France, might now need to be balanced. Austria failed in linking this to 
a stable conception of inheritance rights. It also indicates that the boundaries of the 
balance of power had become fairly fixed – there was little rhetorical ‘wiggle room’ for 
rebutting claims associated with the balance of power.146 This will change in the next 
chapter.  
True enough, Austria did attempt to ‘capture’ the concept of the balance of power from 
Britain, by using the British rhetoric against itself, and by claiming links between the 
balance of power and its own inheritance rights. In the run-up to Utrecht, however, the 
balance of power had become strongly linked with the systemic, public interest of 
Europe, pointing in a specific policy direction under the Tory government.147 The balance 
of power now deprived Austria’s rhetoric of a sustainable link to their position and to 
dynastic politics – because of Britain’s position, Austria’s own position multivocally 
emphasising succession rights, and a series of analogical confirmations establishing a 
narrative of how Austria all along, since Charles V in the early 16th century had been 
aspiring to a Universal Monarchy, just as had been argued concerning France and the 
Dutch before it. Austria did not have the rhetorical resources to answer Defoe’s question, 
‘what’s next’. By 1714, left without allies, the Emperor had few options but to settle for 
the peace.148  
This shows how contingent alterations in the uses of the concept through actual 
deployment in debates leads to new constraints and conditions of possibility for agentic 
action, and how time and place matters. Things could have been different, for sure. And 
that is the point. There is always contingency. Other ways of framing stuff could have 
existed, and there could have been other ways of getting the same historical result or 
outcome, as seen in isolation. But the process, the way there, would have looked 
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different, had it not been for balance-of-power rhetoric working out exactly as it did in 
this period.149  
After Utrecht, the settlement became a bone of contention in British politics. Various 
central architects from Utrecht, including Harley, now the Earl of Oxford, and 
Bolingbroke, were impeached for precisely the same sins they had condemned in arguing 
for the peace. The accusations were of the gravest nature: that they had betrayed the 
balance of power for the sake of their own private interests.150 These were still debates 
over how to implement the balance of power. However, as I will show in the next chapter, 
from the War of the Austrian Succession onwards, the very principle of the balance of 
power began to be challenged in the 1740s and 1750s.  
Also the two preceding chapters have dealt with Europe in isolation. However, as the 
balance of power principle itself became increasingly disputed from the 1740s, another 
problem emerged – what to do when the balance-of-power system must confront its 
‘outside’, particularly Russia and the Ottomans? What the case of Austria also shows is 
how one effect of the balance-of-power concept was a stratification of Europe. Even if a 
common European sociability ‘did not admit of graduations so easily’,151 the balance of 
power in fact did. This balance was both inclusive and exclusive at the same time. That a 
hierarchy among actors within Europe was discarded at Utrecht152 may be true of the 
practical procedures at the conference itself. However, at the same time, assessing the 
balance and the interests of its different component parts required stratification – there 
must be greater and lesser powers in order to classify any power.153  
A factor that contributed to Austria’s exclusion was that Spain, the European heartland, 
was now involved. For Britain, in particular, the problem was not Austria’s ‘objective’ 
rise in terms of capabilities – in fact, before the War of the Spanish Succession, Austria 
had been allowed to grow. Paradoxically, then, there were no worries about the rise of 
Austria in the East partly because of the balance of power and how it was seen. The 
balance of power did not manifest itself as reactions to a rising power, but as a means to 
                                                          
149 Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, p. 42. 
150 See debates in the House of Commons on the impeachment, 3 September 1715. Parliament, Great 
Britain. 1767–1830. ‘Fifth Parliament of Great Britain: first session (17 March 1715–21 September 1715)’, 
Journal of the House of Lords: volume 20: 1714–1717: 199–222. 
151 Osiander, The States System, p.111. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Bartelson, Jens. 1995. A Genealogy of Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p 171. 
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overlook this. What mattered was that this growth now began to concern the major 
powers in Europe, Spain in particular. The balance of power here is not an expression of 
anarchy, but a means by which to establish hierarchies through authoritative justification.  
That provides the starting point for the next chapter, dealing with developments after 
Utrecht, until the Ochakov crisis in 1791 and 1792, and how the epistemic backing of the 
balance of power came under attack.   
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CHAPTER 4 
Attacking the Balance: Knowledge and Politics at the 
University of Göttingen 
 
This chapter focuses on how the rhetorical coordinates were shifting in debates over the 
balance of power, from the Utrecht Treaties of 1713/1714. The main empirical focus is 
the emerging criticism of the balance of power as a concept, from about 1740–50.  
Criticism of the balance of power concerned what could be considered real and verifiable, 
as opposed to abstract speculations employed for partisan purposes. A precondition for 
this attack on the concept was therefore a reconfiguration of what knowledge is and 
should be used for. Without this reconfiguration of knowledge, attacks on the balance of 
power would not have taken place, at least not in ways detailed in this chapter. The 
balance was seen as an expression of a political tradition – British, in particular – and was 
justified by pointing to that same tradition. After Utrecht, the balance of power was taken 
for granted as a system, no abstract theory was needed to support it, and so the question 
of abstraction and ‘real’ practice did not arise. A distinction between abstract and useless 
‘university knowledge’ and politically useful knowledge could not be used as a rhetorical 
weapon against the balance of power, until that concept was connected to international 
law, where debate about the abstract versus the practical was already ongoing. 
Increasingly, critical arguments concerning the balance of power were heard throughout 
Europe. The inflection point in this section, chapters 4 and 5, is when this culminated in 
an all-out attack on the very concept of the balance of power itself, and not only on its 
implications as had been debated at Utrecht. In this chapter, I explore how such criticism 
of one of the most basic concepts of European politics became possible, and the 
unintended consequences of the deployment of such critical arguments. This foreshadows 
important debates concerning different academic fields, and their relationship to 
‘practice’ or politics (see the last section: chapters 8 and 9). 
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As Koselleck has stressed,1 the mid-18th century was a dynamic period in terms of 
conceptual developments, with many concepts and rhetorical strands intermingling and 
flowing together. Therefore, it is important to explore the conceptual linkages that were 
being forged with the balance of power, because these underlie the contentions over and 
changing uses of the concept, and particularly as regards rhetorical attacks on it. The main 
conceptual linkages facilitating such a critical position were those forged between the 
balance of power, international law, empirical measurements and ‘statistics’, and a new-
found ‘science of states’. Despite this variety of conceptual linkages, I will also identify 
one overarching rhetorical trajectory in this chapter: the increasing distinction between 
what historical actors considered to be abstract knowledge on the one hand, and 
practically useful knowledge of political handicraft on the other.  
Not only do abstract and concrete knowledge come in different combinations, but the 
very distinction between what is abstract and what is practical and ‘real’ appears at some 
point in time. This is not a natural, given separation. Also this distinction, as used by 
participants in balance of power politics, needs to be unpacked historically. With 
reference to the balance of power, this happened in the mid-18th century, with 
consequences for the use of the concept and for policy. Actors respond not only to events 
or ‘practical politics’, but also to the theories used to describe or explain them.2 This is a 
further reason why it is so important to shed light on the possible relationships between 
theorising and political practice, as well as how that distinction itself is used in practice to 
score political points in struggles over legitimation.  
The distinction between abstractions and practical realities also impacted on how it was 
possible to argue concerning the balance of power. The inflection point here came around 
the years 1750-60, when it became possible to reject the whole balance-of-power concept 
as an abstract ‘chimera’ of little relevance for political problems. The new conceptual 
links, and the distinction between ‘academic’ and ‘useful’ knowledge, were the 
conditions of possibility for such attacks on the balance of power.3 That such a critical 
rhetorical position became available in turn affected what could be done in European 
                                                          
1Koselleck, Reinhart . 1972. ‘Einleitung’, pp. xiii–xxvii in Reinhart Koselleck, Werner Conze, Otto Brunner 
(eds) Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland. 
Bd. 1. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta; Id. 1985. Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
2 Hampsher-Monk, ‘Political Languages’, pp. 104–106. 
3 In 1826, the liberal Lord Brougham even founded The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. 
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international politics. Again, my point here is not to categorise different types of 
knowledge, but that the historical actors, seeking to score political points, themselves 
increasingly started to use such distinctions as a new rhetorical resource in their 
arguments.  
As noted in Chapter 1, my presupposition is that the balance of power concept did not 
‘do’ anything in this account – the action came from historically situated actors who 
seized the concept and deployed it in policy debates relevant to political events in Europe 
at the time. In seeking to make sense of their surroundings and their situation, actors 
resorted to the concepts already available to them. The balance of power was central to 
debates over the European order, and had become a commonplace reference. The 
relationship between concepts and action is not dependent on logical links between ideas 
and practice, but on contingent sequences of historical action. Here the most important 
political events of this period are the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), the 
Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), and the Ochakov Crisis (1791–1792), which I address in 
the next chapter. The protagonists were Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. 
This chapter consists of three parts. The chapter starts with an introduction to the political 
landscape after Utrecht, in what was a relatively quiet period. After Utrecht, Austria was 
as seen excluded, but Britain and France joined in an alliance that remained until 1738. I 
will examine how the balance of power had become relatively stabilised in this period, 
particularly as a tool for stratifying Europe. This quiet period would be partially broken 
with the War of the Polish Succession, and then totally shattered with the War of the 
Austrian Succession.  
In the second part of the chapter,  I then set the latter war in connexion with some central 
debates happening at the University of Göttingen in Hanover, Britain’s territorial foothold 
on the continent after the Hanoverian succession. This was the central institutional hub 
for discussions on the balance of power, and it was here that many of the rhetorical 
innovations concerning the balance of power evolved. I show how developments in 
international law, statistics, and the sciences of state contingently linked with the balance 
of power concept through debates emanating from this university. The resultant 
configuration of concepts was an important precondition that made possible a 
fundamental critique of the balance of power, further examined in the third part of the 
chapter. 
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There I take a closer look at the critical arguments themselves in debates during the 
second major political event of the century – the Seven Years’ War. This criticism was 
the first attempt to challenge the epistemic underpinnings of the balance of power. Central 
in this was Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, and how he turned the concept of ‘interest’ 
against the balance of power concept. Justi’s advocacy for self-interest and individual 
rights of states involved delinking what was the ‘true interests’ from the public, and 
thereby also from the balance of power. This is pivotal to understanding how criticism of 
the balance of power could become an accepted position and a place from which to argue. 
This line of critical argumentation, this kind of position on knowledge, could not be used 
against the balance of power until the concept had become connected to international law, 
where such discussions about the abstract versus the practical were already ongoing. That 
such a rhetorical position became possible would have consequences for the use of the 
balance of power in the Ochakov debates in 1791–92, which are the topic of the next 
chapter in this section.   
 
The ‘quiet years’ after Utrecht, 1713–1740  
The War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) had finally resulted in the partition of 
the Spanish Monarchy. The Austrian Habsburg pretender to the Spanish throne – Charles 
VI – was by many seen as a possible new Charles V. Through the rhetorical deployment 
of the balance of power, as described in the previous chapter, Austria had become isolated 
and excluded. This marginalisation also led to the possibility of greater, and 
unprecedented, French–British cooperation in supervising the Utrecht system. France and 
Britain were the ‘winners’, Austria and Spain the ‘losers’. Still, Austria and its status 
were to become the centre of attention in international politics in the years after Utrecht, 
and for much of the 18th century. Austria returned to the British fold in 1731, in an 
alliance that would last until 1756.  
The years from the Utrecht Settlements until the War of the Austrian Succession in 1740 
were relatively quiet and peaceful in Europe, despite some comparatively minor wars and 
the shifting constellation of the principal powers. During this period, there were four 
major players in European international politics: Austria, Prussia, France and Britain. The 
influence of the Dutch had receded, and they never again came to play a central position 
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in European international politics. Habsburg Austria held the throne of the Holy Roman 
Empire. Besides being increasingly involved in the core of the European system, Austria 
also was in conflict with the Ottoman Empire during much of this period. In the northern 
parts of the German territories, the small state of Prussia was more homogeneous and 
centralised than Austria – a fact which Frederick II (‘Fredrick the Great’) would come to 
exploit. Then there were the traditional antagonists, Bourbon France and Great Britain. 
The most notable feature immediately after Utrecht was how these two adversaries allied, 
primarily against Spain. 
With Utrecht, France’s putative ambitions of establishing a Universal Monarchy in 
Europe had been blocked. The Bourbon Philip V had indeed been placed on the Spanish 
throne, but the territories of the Spanish empire had been partitioned. Now, the focus for 
most states was on rebuilding and consolidating after the devastations of the War of the 
Spanish Succession. The French influence in Spain now instigated administrative and 
military reforms, which permitted a renewal of Spanish influence in the Mediterranean 
and in the Caribbean. Spanish assertiveness led to increasing tensions with Britain, and to 
a reassessment of the Utrecht system, which had been designed to restrain France. It was 
no longer regarded as adequate for a new situation where Spain, and also Russia, were 
increasingly seen as threats.4   
As viewed from Britain, the connexions between what was considered a Northern and a 
Central balance of power became tighter – events in Europe from the Baltic to the Italian 
provinces were seen to be interconnected. Another circumstance made these connexions 
even more salient for Britain: the Hanover Succession, which provided a foothold on the 
continent.  
Queen Anne died in 1714, and was succeeded by the Elector of Hanover, George I, who 
was the closest Protestant relative of the Stuarts. Britain had imported a German monarch, 
and Hanover was now all but a British province on the continent. Both the succession and 
the corresponding anglophilia in Hanover were largely based on balance-of-power 
arguments5 – also because this was generally a Whig project, and the Whigs were the 
main champions of continental involvement and the balance of power. George I was 
                                                          
4 Simms, Brendan. 2008. Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 
1714–1783. London: Penguin, p. 135. 
5 Harding, Nick. 2007. Hanover and the British Empire, 1700–1837. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press. 
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succeeded by George II in 1727. They both spoke German as their everyday language and 
maintained fairly close contact with Hanover.  
The Hanoverian succession made British debates over the balance of power even more 
complex, as Britain was now practically a part of continental Europe, also as regards 
territory. Hanover was seen to have a pivotal role in protecting the balance of power,6 and 
it was here the University of Göttingen was to be founded. Still, much of the debate in 
Parliament during this period concerned the question of military or economic support to 
Hanover. Should British resources and the military be used for Hanoverian purposes? The 
support to Hanover also provided a good opportunity for the opposition to criticise the 
Whig ministries of Stanhope and later Walpole.7 In short, the Hanover succession again 
accentuated the debate between a policy of continental engagement versus isolation based 
on naval supremacy.  
In addition to a resurgent Spain, Russia was increasingly considered to be a threat, and 
relevant to the balance of power in Europe. After Peter the Great’s victory over Sweden at 
Poltava in 1709, Britain feared an increasing Russian influence within ‘the Baltic 
Balance’, in an area of crucial importance to British trade. It was rumoured that the 
Russians wanted to establish a naval base in Mecklenburg, a province just north of 
Hanover on the Baltic littoral.8 Such an outpost would be a danger not only to trade, but 
also to the integrity of Hanover. Developments in Spain and Russia, then, prompted 
France and Britain to coordinate, eventually forming an alliance in 1716, negotiated in 
Hanover.  
What about isolated Austria from the previous chapter? Since the succession of the 
Hanover king George I, British politicians had increasingly sought to mend relations with 
Austria.9 Meanwhile, the renascent Spain aimed at retaking Italian territories granted to 
Austria at Utrecht, and invaded Sardinia in 1717 while Austria was engaged in war with 
the Ottomans (1716–1718). In 1718, after making peace with the Ottomans, Austria 
joined France and Britain (and the Dutch, who had joined in 1717) in what became 
known as the Quadruple Alliance to supress Spain.  
                                                          
6 Simms, Three Victories, p. 90 
7 Ibid., p. 123 
8 Thompson, Andrew C. 2006. Britain, Hanover and the Protestant Interest, 1688–1756. Woodbridge: The 
Boydell Press, p. 150. 
9 Simms, Three Victories, p. 115. 
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Spain was defeated by this Quadruple Alliance in 1720, and renounced its claims to 
Sardinia, and a peace was concluded with the Treaty of The Hague. The alliance also 
concluded treaties that pacified the Baltics. That Britain and France were fighting on the 
same side was a historically curious situation. The Quadruple Alliance was to remain an 
important factor in Europe until the Treaty of Vienna in 1731, when an Anglo-Austrian 
alliance was established. As concerns Russia, the Great Northern War between Russia 
and Sweden ended in 1721 with the Treaty of Nystadt, and Europe was seen to be stable.  
Even if Great Britain had been an ally of Austria in the Quadruple Alliance, fears of a 
renewed Austrian Universal Monarchy lingered. As noted, the Austro-Spanish Empire of 
Charles V was seen as the pre-eminent historical example of a European Universal 
Monarchy. During the 1720s, therefore, Austria was once again seen as a threat, 
particularly in Britain – even more so than France or Russia.10 Debates in Parliament 
concerned whether the growing opposition to Austria was good or bad for the balance of 
power.11  
All these fears were confirmed with the 1725 Treaty of Vienna, when Austria and Spain 
concluded an alliance that could easily be interpreted as the reconstitution of Charles V’s 
Empire: it had been composed exactly of the Holy Roman Empire and the Spanish 
Empire. Austria pursued such an alliance with Spain to obtain guarantees for the 
‘Pragmatic Sanction’ – an edict to secure the Austrian succession, to which I return 
below. In exchange for Spain’s acceptance of the Pragmatic Sanction, Austria finally 
relinquished its claims to the Spanish throne, so vigorously pursued during and after the 
Utrecht negotiations. In addition, Austria would now help Spain to reclaim Gibraltar, 
which had been ceded to Britain at Utrecht.  
For Britain, this new Austro-Spanish alliance complicated the European situation even 
further. The balance of power in Europe, or what was by now seen as various European 
balances in the plural, would have to be re-conceptualised. Also in 1725, as a direct 
response to the Austro-Spanish alliance, Britain formed its own alliance with France and 
the newcomer Prussia in the Treaty of Hanover.  
                                                          
10 Ibid., p. 159–171. 
11 Ibid., p. 192. 
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These shifting alliances and conflicts may seem confusing. As the 1730s approached, the 
situation in Europe was as follows: Britain-Hanover, France, and Prussia (as well as 
Denmark, Sweden, the Ottoman Empire, and some smaller German states) stood together 
against Austria, Spain, and Russia. However, that was to change in 1731.  
In 1727 Spain attacked Gibraltar with the help of Austria, but the campaign did not 
succeed, and Spain and Britain reached a peace agreement in 1728. This rapidly-
concluded peace with Spain can be seen as a preparation for the 1731 Treaty of Vienna 
(yes, there are many of them) which formally established an Austro-British alliance, 
because the peace with Spain also implied that Spain broke its ties with Austria. Only 
three years after the Spanish-Austrian aggression, then, Britain joined Austria in an 
alliance that would remain for decades. It was Philipp Ludwig Wenzel von Sinzendorf 
who signed the treaty on behalf of Austria – the very same statesman who had been so 
effectively excluded at Utrecht by using the balance of power concept. Austria was now 
back in the fold.  
The British turn to Austria, the feared Universal Monarchy, had to do with shifting 
opinions in Britain, where France now was seen to be on the rise again. The anti-Austrian 
politician Lord Townsend resigned as senior Secretary of State, and the austrophile Duke 
of Newcastle now aimed to re-establish relations with Austria. In the early 1730s, 
therefore, Britain and Austria stood against France and Spain. 
Despite these shifting alliances and minor wars, the period from Utrecht until 1740 was 
generally stable and peaceful, except perhaps for the War of the Polish Succession (1733–
1739), in which Britain chose not to take part. France and Austria fought over the right of 
their claimants to succeed to the Polish throne after the death of Poland’s Augustus II. 
The War of the Polish Succession was the final nail in the coffin of British–French 
rapprochement after Utrecht. Britain saw this as yet another Bourbon attack on the 
Habsburgs12 and as definite confirmation of the resurgent French threat, reaffirming the 
importance of strong links with Austria. During this war, Britain founded the University 
of Göttingen in Hanover, which would play a crucial role in the changing balance of 
power rhetoric in Europe. We return to this below, but let us first examine the general use 
of balance of power rhetoric in this ‘quiet period’ after Utrecht.   
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The balance of power and stratification 
After Utrecht the balance of power was well-established as a concept, and stood stronger 
than ever. As will be shown in connection with debates at the University of Göttingen, 
new rhetorical configurations between concepts changed the conditions of possibility for 
what could be argued over and debated. Still, the balance of power had largely ‘settled 
down’ and stabilised after Utrecht. Even popular satirical plays made fun of the concept 
as the embodiment of politicising and the excessive interest in international politics.13 
How was this ‘commonplace’ of the balance of power used in the years after Utrecht and 
until 1740? 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the balance of power in this period was used to 
stratify Europe. With increasing complexity and shifting alliances, various regional 
balances or ‘inferior’ balance were seen to exist, all somehow linked to the overall 
European balance of power. The balance of power distinguished between and stratified 
the different polities that made up the European order, and was also used to distinguish 
between the inside and outside of Europe.  
The system from Utrecht was based on four principal powers: Britain, France, Spain and 
Austria. The balance of power could now be invoked to protect Europe from any 
predominant power, and not only France. However, after Utrecht, political debates 
increasingly came to revolve around the complexity of the system, with changing 
alliances and new actors like Prussia and Russia entering the scene. The shape of the 
international order in the mid-1700s, it seemed, was becoming more and more ambiguous 
and unclear. 
In this period – which Pocock calls the ‘Utrecht Enlightenment’14– Europe was often 
treated as a kind of federation, which in turn was integral to the jus publicum Europaeum. 
What was seen as the common European sociability was based on politeness, manners, 
                                                          
13 Murphy, Arthur. 1758. The Upholsterer: or what News? A Farce, in Two Acts. London: P. Vaillant.  See 
Headland, Garry. 2007. ‘Arthur Murphy and Eighteenth-Century Stage Business’, Studies in Theatre and 
Performance (28)1: 23–37. 
14 Devetak, Richard (2015) ‘Historiographical Foundations of Modern International Thought: Histories of 
the European States-System from Florence to Göttingen’, History of European Ideas (41)1: 62–77, p. 75. 
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science, liberty and protection against arbitrary rule through the jus gentium in Europe.15 
The balance of power was, in Richard Little’s term, on the whole considered an 
‘associational’ one.16 This conception of Europe would be shared by many throughout the 
century. For example, in 1763 it was argued that  
those who have ever heard of the balance of power will consider the states of Europe, as 
an eminent writer somewhere expresses it, as forming one great republic, which interests 
itself in the concerns of every individual state […] If on this view of things the question is 
started, of what benefit it is to make conquests by arms, if we are liable to lose them by 
treaties? The reply may be, they are seized as pledges to reduce an unreasonable state to 
submit to the arbitration of a congress: and should success incline to the unjust side, the 
same end is still effected of bringing private disputes to a public discussion.17  
As the expression of the public interest of such a ‘republic’, the balance of power also 
helped to distinguish the inside of a European ‘system’ from its outside. Even before it 
had emerged as a commonplace concept to be used in political debates, reference to a 
‘balance’ implicitly relied on a distinction between what was inside and outside of 
Christianity, or of Europe. The ‘Turks’ in particular, were the domain of Oriental 
Despots, with no civitas. Such arguments reflect the centrality of Universal Monarchy as 
that which the balance aimed to prevent, as discussed in Chapter 2. As the balance of 
power helped to fix the border between Europe and its outside, it was, in a sense, the 
operationalization of a specific kind of political rationality. 
The balance of power could serve these purposes also because of its, particularly British, 
republican origins, valuing the freedom from dominance above all else, domestically and 
in Europe. As also shown in Chapter 2, the concept emerged on the basis of opposition to 
dominance, in the form of Universal Monarchy and Oriental Despotism, which was seen 
as a discredited and ‘arbitrary’ system of rule, and on the basis of support of the public 
interest – the public interest of Europe, that is. Europe stood in a tradition of reason and 
law, as opposed to the Orient and other actors outside of the system. There could be a 
systemic balance of power because European ‘reason’ could find its expression in the 
                                                          
15 Pocock, J.G.A. 1999. Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment,  Revolution and Counter-Revolution; a 
Eurosceptical Enquiry, History of Political Thought (20)1: 125–139, p 128; Devetak, Historiographical 
Foundations. 
16 Little, Richard . 2007. The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
17 Noorthouck, John (1773) A New History of London Including Westminster and Southwark (London: R. 
Baldwin), pp. 403–419. Emphasis added. 
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‘natural interests’ and natural law fundamental to a range of states that occupied various 
positions and had different interests.  
However, the balance of power progressively became a tool for stratification also 
internally within Europe. Back in 1699, France and Austria had agreed that Austrian 
expansion eastward in Europe was of little consequence for their standing in the balance 
of power, as this was something that took place in ‘distant countries, whose interests were 
not considered as a part of this system’.18 What mattered were the ‘principal nations of 
the West’, like Britain, France and Austria. It was from these principal powers that the 
idea of a balance of power in Europe had arisen.19  
There are numerous examples of how the balance of power was used to rank states 
internally in Europe, and how different regional balances were important, in varying 
degrees, to the overall balance of power. How these different parts of the overall balance 
of power stood, and how they should be ranked relative to each other, was also a major 
topic of debate and contention. What Britain saw as a Baltic problem, or a German 
problem, for example, did not fit into preconceived notions of the balance of power as 
used for protection against France. These were new and complex problems, but they still 
needed to be framed in balance-of-power terms to have weight. Increasingly, the 
‘Northern’ and the ‘Southern’ balances were seen to be interconnected; in addition came 
other regional or ‘inferior’ balances, such as the ‘Baltic balance’. Thus emerged a more 
fragmented view of the various balances within the European balance of power, and the 
relationship of this with its outside. The balance came to serve as a hierarchically based 
notion as regards both the inside and the outside of ‘Europe’. Just how to assess and 
measure such complex balances – to ascertain where oneself and others stood in this 
hierarchy – was to become a new problem during the 1740s.  
 
The Pragmatic Sanction and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) 
Such was the situation in the ‘quiet period’ between Utrecht and 1740. The balance of 
power was seen to be ‘fragmented’ into various sub-balances, all of which were accorded 
                                                          
18 Bolingbroke. [1735] 1932. Defence of the Treaty of Utrecht. Letters VI–VIII of The Study and Use of 
History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 56. 
19 Ibid., p. 18. 
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a certain priority within the European balance of power. This fragmentation would remain 
a constant feature throughout the 18th century, but what changed from the 1740s was that 
a completely new rhetorical position became available: all-out criticism of the very 
concept and existence of a balance of power. This would have important consequences 
for international politics.  
Before turning to the reconfiguration of balance of power arguments, it is necessary to 
recap the developments from the 1740s, when the relatively calm period in Europe ended. 
What happened in 1740? This is when the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48) 
started, with Prussia invading the province of Silesia, eventually becoming the Seven 
Years’ War (1754–1763) which can reasonably be termed a world war. Above, I 
promised to come back to the Pragmatic Sanction, which was one of the main reasons for 
the (in Britain unpopular) alliance between Austria and Spain in 1725, and now is the 
time.  
The Pragmatic Sanction had been promoted by Charles VI of Austria since the Utrecht 
Treaties in 1713. The aim was to avoid another succession crisis in Europe by ensuring 
that a woman could legally take over the Habsburg hereditary possessions. Charles VI’s 
only heir was his daughter Maria Theresa; through this edict, Charles sought legitimacy 
for her succession both internally from the estates of his dominions, and externally with 
other European powers. The debate over this unheard-of proposal raged in Europe, but 
eventually most European powers ratified the Pragmatic Sanction, granting Maria 
Theresa the right of succession. As noted, Spain accepted the Pragmatic Sanction in 1725. 
Britain accepted it in 1731, having entered into the alliance with Austria. All the major 
European powers had signed and accepted the Pragmatic Sanction, but when push came 
to shove in 1740, it was disregarded, and war broke out.  
In 1740, Charles VI died, and Maria Theresa succeeded him. At that moment, both France 
and Prussia (and Bavaria and Saxony) retracted their support of the Pragmatic Sanction 
and disputed the succession. Europe again faced a succession crisis, just as before the 
War of the Spanish Succession. This was, however, also an internal struggle in the Holy 
Roman Empire, and it was Prussia that triggered the war. Frederick II of Prussia, also 
known as Fredrick the Great, disregarded the Pragmatic Sanction and invaded the 
Austrian province of Silesia in 1740, only months after Maria Theresa had succeeded to 
the throne.  
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Frederick II had himself just ascended to the Prussian throne in 1740. While he had few 
opportunities to make Prussia a wealthy state, he could, however, work on its resources. 
Through internal economising and organisation, Prussia began to grow under Frederick 
II, showcasing the importance not only of extractive but also of regulatory capacity.20 The 
Prussian infantry had become, in Frederick’s own words, like ‘the best made watch’ 
through disciplinary innovations.21 And this capable fighting force now took aim at the 
Habsburg territories.  
In addition to the controversies surrounding the succession issue, Austria was weak, still 
recovering after yet another war with the Ottomans. In this moment of Austrian 
weakness, with an ‘unentitled’ female successor at the helm, the 28-year-old Frederick 
invaded Silesia in December 1740 in an attack that took everyone by surprise. Like 
vultures following a predator, Spain, France, Sweden, Bavaria and Saxony joined Prussia.  
The spectacular surge of Prussia was a reason for grave concern, particularly as Prussia 
had grown strong through domestic developments and prudent administration, and not big 
armies and territorial expansion. This surge fomented debate about the regional ‘German 
balance of power’ and, as we will see, the role of domestic or ‘secondary’ effects on a 
state’s power – the domestic constitution of states increasingly became a problem. This 
focus on the domestic, combined with the incorporation of the balance of power into 
international law, triggered debates about the legitimacy of ‘interventions’ into other 
states in the name of the balance of power. In the face of increasing complexity, the 
balance of power did not become more ‘elusive’ – rather, the extent of what could 
possibly fall under its scope increased.  
Britain was in alliance with Austria. However, Britain was still engaged in trade conflicts 
with Spain in the Caribbean, and chose to support Austria with payments rather than with 
soldiers. The main legitimising device for such massive expenditures was the balance of 
power.  
In official treasury books, among dry accounting numbers, we can find this entry from 29 
July 1741:  
                                                          
20 Gorski, Philip S. 2003. The Disciplinary Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 76–77 
21 Ibid., p. 96. 
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Order for the issue out of the 1,000,000/. from the Sinking Fund for the service of 1741, 
of 75,000/. to the Paymaster of the Forces on the unsatisfied order in his name for 
200,000/. part of 300,000/. granted by Parliament for supporting the liberties and balance 
of power in Europe.22  
The following year, a similar entry is made for 2 July:  
Henry Pelham to the Treasury, dated Pay Office, Horse Guards; for the issue of 150,000/., 
to answer His Majesty's warrant of the 1st July, payable to the minister of the Queen of 
Hungary23, in further part of 500,000/. for the support of the House of Austria and 
restoring the balance of power in Europe.24  
Again, in 1743, under the field ‘The Account on which the Order or Warrant is made’, it 
is written ‘for support of the House of Austria and restoring the balance of power’.  
The difference between justifications of purpose in various of these entries – between 
mundane ‘buying new boots’, as it were, and ‘restoring the balance of power in Europe’ – 
might seem almost comical, but it attests to the power of the concept in legitimising such 
expensive continental involvements. And the balance of power was here hypostatised as a 
tangible thing indeed.  
While Britain supported Austria, it also needed to keep a watchful eye on its ‘own’ 
province of Hanover – conceivably under threat from Frederick II and Prussia. Debates 
erupted in the British Parliament over whether to support Austria with money or with 
soldiers, whether to support Austria at all, and whether to concentrate on defending 
Hanover instead.  
Maria Theresa rose to the occasion and defended Silesia well. The war went on, with 
varying intensity, for eight years, until the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. France had 
declared war on Britain in 1744, and now a return to the status quo ante bellum was 
agreed between the two. It was also agreed that Frederick could keep Silesia. Prussia had 
                                                          
22 1901. ‘Treasury Books and Papers: July 1741’, pp. 476–488 in William A. Shaw (ed.) Calendar of 
Treasury Books and Papers, Volume 4, 1739–1741. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Treasury 
Minute Book XXVIII. pp. 356–7.   
23 Hungary had disputed the Pragmatic Sanction, but was appeased, and Maria Theresa became Queen of 
Hungary.  
24 1903. ‘Treasury Books and Papers: July 1742’, pp.51–62  in William A. Shaw (ed.) Calendar of Treasury 
Books and Papers, Volume 5, 1742–1745. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, Treasury Board Papers 
CCCVIII. No. 22. 
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doubled its population and resources by gaining it, increasingly moving Prussia towards 
being regarded as one of the principal powers of Europe. Austria had long been the main 
force in the Holy Roman Empire, and Vienna was the centre of the German lands and 
principalities. Silesia had been the jewel in the crown – and Maria Theresa was set on 
getting the province back. Later, in what has been called ‘the diplomatic revolution’, she 
would unexpectedly ally with France to attain this goal – and so Britain came to ally with 
Prussia, turning the whole European system on its head.  
Broadly speaking, the 1740–1748 War of the Austrian Succession was seen to concern 
the local ‘German Balance’. Should the German territories be separated, or should they be 
unified under the leadership of either Prussia or Austria? From the 1740s, this dualism 
(Deutscher Dualismus) between Austria and Prussia would be a constant in Europe, 
culminating in the Seven Years’ War between 1754 and 1763, which was in many 
respects a continuation of the War of the Austrian Succession. 
During the 1740s, despite the fairly clear status hierarchy based on the balance of power, 
it was increasingly uncertain what the implications of this were. Objective assessments of 
the different states and sub-balances sought to stabilise the terms of the balance of power 
in what was now a more differentiated European order, where the picture was more 
blurred than during the War of the Spanish Succession. Even if the balance of power was 
accepted, how a more general and abstract balance could be converted into a concrete 
policy became a new problem.  
How did the stratified order, with different polities and different regional balances, relate 
to the overall European balance? This was a matter of great contention, and coincides 
with an increasing interest in how to concretely assess and measure the balance. 
Publications concerning the measurements of the different states flourished – what was 
called ‘Statistik’ in German from the 1740s (earlier ‘political arithmetic’ in England). 
True, the implications of the balance had been discussed, as shown in the previous 
chapter on the Utrecht negotiations. Still, in the face of increasing disorder and war in the 
1740s, it seemed imperative to measure more concretely where the balance of power 
stood, and the disposition of the various states, both in isolation and in their relationships. 
Classifications also led to a more objective, accepted conception of differences between 
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powers, based not only on status, but also on internal resources and capabilities.25 
Gradually, a distinction was made between the balance-of-power principle itself, and its 
empirical and concrete expressions, and a more ‘theory-like’ use of the concept emerged.  
Some saw problems in applying the balance of power to their current situation, something 
that was accentuated with assessments of the value of such measurements. People started 
questioning the whole idea of a balance of power – where does it come from? And what 
can the balance of power do for us?  
It was in the political debates during the Austrian War of Succession, concerning the fate 
of Europe facing a new succession crisis, that arguments about the nature of the balance 
of power, its connexions to international law, and the possibilities of its measurement, 
were to emerge – specifically in British Hanover, at the University of Göttingen.  
 
Against tradition: Balance, law, and statistics at the University of Göttingen  
The inflection point I address in this section came in the 1740s and 1750s, with a 
principled attack on the balance of power. Here, I examine the preconditions that made 
criticism possible, before moving on to the criticism itself. It is important to understand 
how criticism of the balance of power became possible as an accepted position and a 
place to argue from. That such a position became possible was to have consequences on 
the use of the balance of power in the Ochakov controversy in 1791–92, to be explored in 
the next chapter.  
Interlinked developments during the War of the Austrian Succession in arguments over 
history, law, science and measuring, led to a new configuration of positions and 
arguments, and also new rhetorical tools for deploying the balance of power. As 
mentioned, in the case of the balance of power, the site where these developments came 
together was at the University of Göttingen (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen) in 
Hanover. Göttingen intellectuals from Martens to Hereen, many of whom had immigrated 
to Hanover, made a significant imprint on political discussions in 18th and 19th century 
Europe.  
                                                          
25 Keene, Edward. 2013. ‘International Hierarchy and the Origins of the Modern Practice of Intervention’, 
Review of International Studies 39(5):1077–1090. 
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The University of Göttingen was founded in 1737, just two years before the War of the 
Austrian Succession, by Gerlach Adolph von Münchhausen, who was King George II’s 
chief minister in Hanover and a confidant of the Duke of Newcastle.26 In many respects, 
the university was a British one, created with the aim of strengthening the British 
connexion with the continent, and producing ‘diplomatic’ knowledge concerning states.27 
The balance of power had been the rationale for the union between Hanover and Britain, 
and became an important element in the widespread Hanoverian ‘anglophilia’,28 and 
scholars at Göttingen focused on the concept. That this knowledge-producing centre 
should be ‘British’ is no coincidence, as Britain used the balance of power as an outer 
frontier defence. The university was the central institution for development and 
discussions of the balance of power in Europe, and it would continue to serve this 
function well into the 20th century. In particular, Göttingen was a hub for the links 
increasingly made between the balance of power concept and international law, and the 
emerging field of ‘statistics’ of states. This would become the model for later German 
balance of power arguments, which eventually impacted IR theory in the USA, which I 
address in the last section (Chapter 8 and 9). 
During these discussions over the nature of the balance of power and international law, a 
crucial methodological shift took place, concerning the role of science, history, tradition, 
and the standing of the European system of states. Both criticism of and support for the 
balance of power increasingly came from universities, justified explicitly by reference to 
academia and science. In the debates emanating from Göttingen, in the throes of the 
European situation concerning the Pragmatic Sanction and Maria Theresa, there emerged 
a tendency to separate what was seen as political and practical, from what was seen as 
purely abstract and analytical.  
I have noted the emerging importance of the ‘public interest’ of Europe, as opposed to 
particular or private interest. In the 18th century, science became linked with the political 
quest for order and stability within the ‘republic of Europe’, concomitant with the public 
interest,29 and intellectual and practical affairs became increasingly indistinguishable as 
                                                          
26 Prime Minister during the Seven Years’ War. 
27 Goetting, Hans, 1969, ‘Geschichte des Diplomatischen Apparats der Universität Göttingen’, 
Archivalische Zeitschrift, 65(1): 11–46.  
28 Harding, Hanover. 
29 Ibid., p. 92. See also Leira, Halvard. 2008. ‘Justus Lipsius, Political Humanism and the Disciplining of 
17th Century Statecraft’, Review of International Studies 34: 669–692. 
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the utility of science was emphasised in practices of codification, assessments, 
categorisations, and statistics. Things did not simply ‘happen’: by using abstract 
knowledge, human intervention could set up social systems to establish order. It was not 
enough for theory to be the expression and perfection of reason. Theory and abstract 
knowledge should also work for the public interest, and be put to reasonable and correct 
practical uses to establish stability and order. This we can see in how science was defined 
as the opposite of passions and particular interests – it was public.  
Academic dissent and disputes became an evil that would have to be removed to secure 
order. The universities were held to blame for such disputes. It was necessary to find the 
correct procedures, the right method, to cure knowledge of its ills. Connecting knowledge 
to concrete, practical knowledge was seen as the cure that could make knowledge and 
science efficient in the service of the state. Abstract knowledge that could not be 
witnessed or experienced was divisive, and undermined the collective labour for the state 
in which it should be deployed and used.30 What was embedded in the public was 
common sense (quite literally), as opposed to ‘metaphysics’ and myths – abstract, 
disconnected, and useless knowledge from universities. Oft-cited oppositional conceptual 
pairs were empirical/metaphysical, natural/unnatural, and reasonable/unreasonable.31 
Whereas ‘real’ science and practical politics were part of the same endeavour, purely 
intellectual uses of knowledge were increasingly discredited. Enlightenment science, 
commonly known as ‘natural philosophy’, was largely based on empirical 
experimentation, not speculation.32 Scholars and academics had long been criticised for 
being too abstract, and for not speaking to the practical needs of the state. From Bacon to 
Boyle to Descartes, much innovative argumentation was based precisely on critical 
assessment of traditional ‘university knowledge’– which resulted, inter alia, in the 
foundation of alternative, private scientific societies like the Royal Society. ‘Men of 
speculation’ or ‘men of letters’ – as opposed to practical politicians – was a recurrent 
                                                          
30 Shapin, Steven. 1996. The Scientific Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
31 Hundert, E.J. 1986. ‘A Cognitive Ideal and its Myth: Knowledge as Power in the Lexicon of the 
Enlightenment’, Social Research 53(1): 133–157. 
32 See Shapin, Steven and Simon Schaffer. 1985. Leviathan and the Air-Pump. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
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demeaning rhetorical device during the Enlightenment, employed by politicians like 
Bolingbroke and Burke, among others.33  
Importantly, however, such a position on knowledge could not be used against the 
balance of power until that concept had become connected to international law, where 
such discussions about the abstract versus the practical were already ongoing. Previously, 
such critical arguments against the balance would have been irrelevant, because the 
balance of power was seen as an expression of a practical, historical tradition of a state or 
statesmen in the first place, based on ‘the ancient constitution’ and the like. If the balance 
of power is taken for granted in this way, with its authority rooted in tradition, and that 
tradition by default explains the present, then no such abstract theory is applicable and the 
question of theory vs. practice never arises – it is simply the expression of political 
practice and its transmission.34 However, once the balance of power had become linked 
with international law, particularly at the University of Göttingen, and conceptualised as a 
part of or a precondition for law, then it could be queried how the balance of power could 
be seen as compatible with an increasingly complex state practice. The balance of power 
as an abstraction and as state practice was not necessarily synonymous anymore.  
This link inaugurated a new kind of debate – between abstract knowledge on the one 
hand, and what would become a practical science of statecraft on the other. Only when 
these links had been forged, combined with a greater focus on precise and empirical 
measurements, could such criticisms concerning the status of knowledge ‘contaminate’ 
the balance-of-power concept. So let me have a look at how the balance of power became 
a preoccupation of jurists, and the emergence of the science of states, or ‘statistics’.  
 
‘International law’ 
A central concern was to construct a science that was relevant and useful for political 
practice. In other words, societal interests were at stake in intellectual disputes. 
                                                          
33 Maurice Crosland. 1987. ‘The Image of Science as a Threat: Burke versus Priestley and the “Philosophic 
Revolution”’, The British Journal for the History of Science (20)3: 277–307. Only in the 19th century 
would we find a differentiation between ‘scientists’ and other groups. Here, it was more a question of 
individuals and their mentality 
34 This point returns forcefully in the writings of early IR scholars, like Morgenthau, discussed in Chapter 9. 
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Considerations of use were central to intellectuals and philosophers.35 The goal was to 
make state practices, politics as actually practiced, consistent with the laws of the 
European ‘republic’. In Chapter 2, I mentioned how a koinos nomos, a universal law 
code, linked the increasingly differentiated domains of secular politics and the Christian 
religion. Now, the goal was not to unify mankind in Christ, in a Universal Monarchy, but 
the converse: to establish the legal basis of the balance of power because what was called 
‘natural rights’ were seen to have concrete and practical implications. Theory was to be 
subjected to practice, and positive law distilled the sociability and communal aspects of 
Europe in the balance of power.  
Throughout the 1740s and 1750s, more and more juridical dissertations focused on the 
balance of power. Natural law theory was originally a tradition distinct from writers like 
Rohan, who focused on interests and reason of state, as seen in Chapter 3.36 Such 
arguments did not become linked with the law tradition until the 1740s, at Göttingen. 
Lawyers began employing historical frameworks, including diplomatic practical 
traditions, for reasoning about natural law.37 At Göttingen, legal arguments converged 
with arguments from tradition and the history and recording of the practice of states and 
statesmen, in ‘positive’ international law. Much of the discussion emerging from 
Göttingen drew on the work of Emer de Vattel, which had an enormous impact in this 
period.38 Vattel had been writing on the balance of power and the nature of great 
powerhood, stressing how ‘Europe forms a political system in which the nations […] are 
bound together by their relations and various interests into a single body […] a sort of 
Republic’ which is ‘what has given rise to the well-known principle of the balance of 
power’.39  
As seen, the balance of power was an expression of the public interest or public good. 
Now also international law was mustered to support this image of European sociability. 
Substantially, such legal discussion often revolved around Maria Theresa and the 
Pragmatic Sanction, seen as an issue of the balance of power. As the jurist and publicist 
                                                          
35 Shapin, Steven (1981) ‘Of Gods and Kings: Natural Philosophy and Politics in the Leibniz–Clarke 
Disputes’, Isis (72)2: 187–215, p. 215. 
36 Bull, Hedley. 2002[1977]. The Anarchical Society. Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 31. 
37 Keene, Edward. 2005. International Political Thought. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 99–100. 
38 Koskenniemi, Martti. 1999. ‘The Advantage of Treaties: International Law in the Enlightenment’, 
Edinburgh Law Review 13:27–67; Devetak, ‘Historiographical Foundations’, p. 14; Armitage, Foundations, 
p. 224. 
39 Vattel, Emmerich de. 1916[1758]. The Law of Nations. Washington DC: Carnegie Institution, pp. 251–
252.  
155 
 
 
 
Jean Rousset de Missy stated in his influential pamphlet from 1743 on the Pragmatic 
Sanction, ‘Histoire de la grande Crise de l’Europe’,40 conserving the balance of power is  
a matter of the PUBLIC INTEREST of all Europe to which, according to all the laws of 
man and nature the INDIVIDUAL INTEREST of any State or Potentate whatever should 
be sacrificed’.41  
Europe therefore had to stand up for Maria Theresa’s rights, he argued, because Europe’s 
liberty and the balance of power were in the common interest, and promoted the ‘public 
good’. That pamphlet was probably the first instance where a widely circulated argument 
employed the balance of power for a political purpose by linking and legitimising it with 
natural rights and the right of peoples.42 For the first time, the balance was linked to 
international law. What then happened was that the discussions and debates already 
underway in the field of legal discussion and international law became connected to the 
(epistemic) standing of the balance of power. 
The foremost exponent of linking the balance of power to international law was Ludwig 
Martin Kahle,43 professor at the University of Göttingen and a central intellectual figure 
in Europe. He had studied metaphysics, and even discussed such ‘metaphysical questions’ 
with Voltaire44 Still, Kahle’s dissertation from 1744 was on the relationship between the 
politics between states, law, and the balance of power.45  
Kahle’s text was translated into French the same year,46 and provoked intense debate 
about method and matter, particularly because of Frederick’s surprise invasion of Silesia 
                                                          
40 De Missy, Jean Rousset, 1743, Histoire de la grande Crise de l’Europe. Ou des suites de la Pragmatique 
Sanction, Et de la Morte de l’Empereur Charles VI, Jean Nurse: London.  
41 De Missy, Histoire, pp.2–3: ‘Il s’agit ici de L’INERET PUBLIC de toute l’Europe auquel, suivant toutes 
les Loix de la Nature & des Gens, doit être sacrifié L’INTERET PARTICULIER de quelque Etat ou 
Potentat que ce soit…C’est un principe diƈté par la Loi naturelle & qui à été reçu dans le droit public, 
comme dans le droit civil’; Kaeber, Ernst. 1907. Die Idee des europäischen Gleichgewichts in der 
publizistischen Literatur vom 16. bis zur Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts. Berlin: Alexander Duncker, p. 93. 
42 Kaeber, Die Idee, p. 93. 
43 Ibid., p. 94; Maurseth, Per (1964) ‘Balance-of-Power Thinking from the Renaissance to the French 
Revolution’, Journal of Peace Research 1(2): 120–136. 
44 1740. Vergleichung der Leibnitzischen und Newtonischen Metaphysik (Comparaison de la Métaphysique 
de Leibnitz avec celle de Newton). Gœttingue: s.n.; Voltaire. mdcclxii. ‘Answer to Mr. Martin Kahle, 
Professor and Dean of the Philosophers of Gottingen, in relation to the above metaphysical Questions’, pp. 
228–230 in Smollett, T. (ed.) The Works of M. de Voltaire. London: printed for J. Newbery et al. 
45 Kahle, Ludwig Martin. 1744. Commentario iuris publici de trutina Europae, quae vulgo appellatur ‘Die 
Ballance von Europa’. Göttingen.  
46 Kahle, Ludwig Martin, 1744 ‘La Balance de L’Europe considérée comme la règle de la paix et de la 
guerre’, 1744, Les Freres Schmid: Berlin et Gottingen. It was dedicated to the Duke of Gotter, Prussian 
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in 1740, construed by some as a breach of the balance of power.47 Kahle was attacking 
Frederick II, seen as the friend of France. Recall that Göttingen was a university 
patronised by Britain: Kahle was attacking France and Spain, while defending England’s 
George II by means of linking the balance with natural right. It was a defence of the ‘old 
system’ with Britain at the helm – but now this ‘old system’ was defended not only with 
reference to tradition, but also with support in law. The balance was linked with law to 
allow Kahle to argue that the communication between Fredrick II and France in search of 
an alliance is a violation of the rights of peoples, whereas the saviour is George II, 
maintaining the balance.48 The balance of power, Kahle argued, could put a stop to 
European infighting, halt Universal Monarchy, and promote trade.  
Like de Missy in his pamphlet the year before, Kahle argued that just as states might have 
to sacrifice their individual interests to the public interest, states might have to sacrifice 
territory to preserve the balance of power in Europe. This he justified this with reference 
to international law – the law of peoples: the balance of power is a valid and legal 
justification for interfering with the rights of individual states.49 These republican 
arguments in support of Britain emphasised resistance to dominance as more important 
than any individual state’s liberty to act. Kahle basically accepted the legitimacy of 
preventive wars to forestall any disturbance to the balance of power, which was an 
integral principle of international law.50 All European states were under a moral 
obligation to preserve the balance of power. It was not only a right, as Wolff had argued, 
but a positive duty.  
One of the most widespread criticisms of the thesis was that it pretended to be science, 
while really being a political argument. Christian Frederick Stisser, from Prussia, argued 
that Kahle’s argumentation was too political in what was presented as an academic 
dissertation.51 Kahle was directly attacking France as a Universal Monarchy, while 
ignoring the earlier excesses of the Habsburgs.52 One of Stisser’s main contentions 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Grand Marshall and minister (d’etat), and curator of the royal academy of sciences. I have used this French 
translation as reference. 
47 Kleinenschmidt, Harald. 2000. The Nemesis of Power. London: Reaktion Books, p. 127. 
48 Kaeber, Die Idee, pp. 95–96. 
49 Adam, Ulrich. 2006. The Political Economy of J.H.G. Justi. Bern: Peter Lang. 
50 Maurseth, ‘Balance-of-Power Thinking’, p. 131. 
51 Stisser, Christian Frederick. 1745/6. Fortsetzung der freimütigen und bescheidenen Erinnerungen wider 
des berühmten Göttingischen Professors, Herrn Doctor Kahle, Abhandlung von der Balance Europens, als 
der vornehmsten Richtschnur des Krieges und des Friedens. Leipzig: s.n.  
52 Ibid., 117, 172, referred to in Kaeber, Die Idee, p. 97. 
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concerned the balance of power as a concept, denying it any role as an academic term. 
Even if the balance of power was not eliminated from the vocabulary of international law 
before the late 1880s,53 this further supports the point that the distinction between 
practical political handiwork and science was becoming more relevant in the mid-18th 
century.  
The debate between Kahle and Stisser54 is important, as it is, as far as I can establish, the 
first instance where an alleged division between science and politics was employed in a 
discussion of the standing of the balance of power. However, it was not to be the last: 
using this distinction as a rhetorical tool became commonplace in discussions of the 
balance of power. As I show in chapters 8 and 9, practice became ever more separated 
from abstractions, and a ‘pure’ political practice was used to establish a theory of IR in 
the 20th century. 
During this period, the Renaissance ideal of Uomo Universale still prevailed – gentlemen-
scholars with a general knowledge base, often also serving in important political positions 
at European courts or governments. Therefore it makes little sense to speak of politicians 
and diplomats as acting in complete isolation from scholars, philosophers, and lawyers.55 
Still, in the mid- to late 18th century, a beginning specialisation in international law, 
eventually fusing with the balance of power, became a science of states – a relatively 
confined area of inquiry, with a proper name and a label. The Göttingen movement 
played an important role in linking the balance of power and natural law in tandem, 
simultaneously inspiring the transformation of natural law into the new sciences of the 
state – ‘statistics’, ‘diplomacy’, and ‘police’.56 
 
 
 
                                                          
53 See Chapter 9. 
54 See discussions of the Kahle–Stisser debate in Weidlich, Christoph. 1748. Geschichte der jetzlebenden 
Rechts-Gelehrten in Deutschland und zum Theil auch ausser demselben, als ein Rechts-Gelehrten Lexicon. 
Merseburg: Johan Gottlob Schubarth, pp. 442–455. 
55 Keene, International Political Thought, p. 145. 
56 Nokkala, Ere. 2010. ‘Passion as the foundation of natural law in the German enlightenment: Johann 
Jacob Schmauss and J.H.G. von Justi’, European Review of History/ Revue européenne d'histoire 17(1): 
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Statistics as a new empirical science 
Parallel to these discussions in international law, there came an increasing focus on 
measuring, exactly and empirically, the balance of power, and the polities that comprise it 
– including their domestic aspects. What became known as ‘statistics’ led to a major 
change in how the balance of power was used. With statistics, politics became less about 
deducing ideal forms of government, in what was termed ‘moral philosophy’, and politics 
was increasingly distinguished as a particular practice, different from 'science'. In 
consequence, the distinction between such politics and what it was not also became 
clearer. And what it was not, was abstract theory. 
In general, the problem of order in a given society or field is inherently tied to the 
problem of knowledge and its warrants and backing.57 One such problem of knowledge 
that could emerge only after the establishment of relatively stable polities was the 
assessment of the powers and capabilities of others. When politicians and ‘gentlemen 
scholars’ alike discussed the surprising rise of Prussia, the role of Russia, and the impact 
of this for the European order, a question that featured prominently was precisely that of 
how to measure power. 
As seen in previous chapters, ‘the concept of interest provides the point from which the 
detection of differences in a plurality of states can proceed’.58 In the mid-1600s, authors 
such as Marchamont Needham (see Chapter 2) had argued that ‘true interests’ could be 
known and registered, implying that what he called ‘public business’ and behaviour in the 
balance of power were predictable. The alleged ability to predict the behaviour of others 
was of major value for diplomacy. On the other hand, such conceptualisations of the 
balance of power would also prepare for the more ‘analytical’ use of the concept.  
That so much attention was paid the issue of measuring on the level of individual polities 
further indicates the growing distinction between the balance of power as an abstract 
theory and the practice of politics. Once something is seen as a ‘theory’ or otherwise 
more abstract than everyday political practice, and universalist arguments require its own 
particular mode of argumentation and are not taken for granted, there must be some way 
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of determining what the balance of power actually refers to, in empirical terms.59 By the 
mid-18th century, these lines of argumentation were followed by explicit attempts at 
empirically measuring and quantifying the properties of various parts of the system. 
The need for precise measurements of difference and the concern with status and 
stratification triggered massive amounts of what was called ‘statistical’ literature. The 
term did not refer to the use of quantitative techniques and measurements as it did from 
about the mid-19th century, but dealt with knowledge about the general conditions of 
different states and governments, and what that meant for practical politics.60 One writer 
later described it as ‘the branch of political knowledge which has for its object the actual 
and relative power of the several modern States’.61 Typically, the Göttingen scholars 
combined traditional histories of the various states with an assessment of their ‘natural’ or 
‘political’ interests, based on geographical, constitutional, and legal characteristics. 
However, little time was spent on quantifying armies or economies − making early 
statistical assessments of states ‘virtually useless as a way of determining their relative 
strength’.62 However, in the 19th century, linked with the emergence of a bourgeoisie 
public sphere, the interest in quantifying populations, territories, national economies, and 
military force, allowed for measuring ‘the distribution of capabilities, in order to place 
individual states within the international system’ (see Chapter 8).63 
The word ‘statistics’ is also related to the word ‘static’, which from about 1630 was used 
to denote the scale of weights, and placing something in balance. And statistics was 
indeed connected to the balance of power in Europe.  Statistics linked to the balance of 
power a preoccupation with quantification and supposedly precise measurement of states’ 
capabilities and dispositions, also in the domestic realm.  
This made the gradation of states easier.64 De Missy, mentioned above as one of the first 
to link the balance of power to law, was also concerned with the ‘ceremonial’ – the 
practices of diplomatic rankings, conventions and customs, which he developed into ‘une 
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64 Ibid. 
160 
 
Loy positive pour le réglement de leurs rangs’.65 Within and between polities, more 
precise rankings could be established, based on natural interests and facts. Measuring and 
ranking was important, also because the internal government of states was seen to be of 
crucial significance, particularly after the surprising rise of Prussia and the domestic 
differentness of the new actor, Russia.  
A state could be assessed according to the relationships it maintained with other states, 
but it could also be ‘regarded for itself’.66 The statistical literature catalogued 
commonalities and differences between states, and the ‘interests’ of the various states 
could be deduced from the ‘particular nature of the individual situation’ on the one hand, 
and from the ‘connection to other countries’ on the other, as another Göttingen scholar 
maintained.67  
The ‘internal’ and ‘external’ measuring of states was also linked to the developments in 
international law detailed above. The statistical literature, although highlighting the 
plurality of states, saw Europe as forming one entity through its public law, an ‘ius 
publicum Europaeum’. There was, or should be, synchronisation between domestic laws 
and international law. The latter was increasingly linked with the balance of power as 
positive law, emphasising the convergence between private and public interest. Such 
arguments invoked a common and ‘public’ European interest, as well as the natural 
interests of particular states. In this period, this picture was refined, as Armitage argues:   
[O]ut of these discussions on the scope and nature of international law emerged 
conventional and abiding distinctions between internal and external forms of law which in 
turn mirrored differences between domestic and international histories and rendered them 
mutually incomprehensible.68  
Later in the century, Jeremy Bentham would coin the term ‘international’. The law of 
nations, he maintained, had to be distinguished from natural law.69 International law was 
therefore identified more with customary or positive law, the practices of different kinds 
                                                          
65 Quoted in ibid. p. 1083. 
66 Darjes, Johan Georg. 1764. Einleitung in des Freyherrn von Bielfeld Lehrbegriff der Staatklugheit zum 
Gebrauch seiner Zuhörer verfertig. Jena: s.n., p. 304, quoted in Bödeker, ‘“Europe” in the Discourse’, p. 6. 
67 Achenwall, Gottfried. 1748. Die Staatverfassung der heutigen vornehmsten Europäischen Reiche und 
Völker. Göttingen: s.n., p. 35, quoted in Bödeker, ‘“Europe” in the Discourse’, p. 7. 
68 Armitage, Foundations, p. 146. 
69 See Conway, Stephen. 1987. ‘Bentham versus Pitt: Jeremy Bentham and British Foreign Policy 1789’, 
The Historical Journal 30(4):791–809. 
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of states.70 In other words, Europe was under a common law, but arguments in 
international law also emphasised the value of diversity. The stratification within Europe 
presented earlier in this chapter – between different states and sub-balances – was linked 
to international law, as it brought to the fore the assumption that, in contrast to a 
Universal Monarchy, diversity between different independent states was of value. As 
Rousseau wrote, as opposed to ‘Asia and Africa, which are a random collection of 
peoples who have nothing more in common than names’, Europe was united through 
historical connexions, ‘the constant mingling of interests’ and the ‘large number of small 
size states that […] leaves one always relying upon the other’.71 Combined with the 
balance of power, such arguments further promoted the use of statistics to categorise the 
different interests within this diversity, as well as the various regional balances in Europe 
and how they related to the overall European balance. 
Measuring power implied stratification – as did the idea of various balances sustaining 
the European, overall balance, which was the direct concern of the great powers (England 
‘holding the balance of Europe’ etc).  
There was thus a general balance of power in Europe, as well as various regional sub-
balances. Within such sub-balances, states were ranked in the attempt to establish 
objective and necessary measurements to establish where any balance stood at any time, 
and its relationship to the overall European balance. The statistical literature dealt with 
what was seen to be the core part of Europe, including Spain, France, Britain, Austria and 
increasingly also Prussia.  
Europe after Utrecht was being stratified and categorised, with the balance of power 
being used as a tool. When law and the balance became linked in the science of statistics, 
a subtle shift occurred, as Keene has pointed out, from a ranking of powers, as in 
diplomatic orders of precedence, to a gradation of powers based on measurement.72 Now, 
ranking states according to status did not necessarily correspond with the authority of 
those states. Vattel had maintained that the size of states and their rights were different 
issues, and that the former did not affect the latter. With statistics and grading, however, 
the rights and duties of the diversity of states were increasingly distinguished according to 
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their differences in measured power.73 This development was to be crucial for the later 
nationalisation of the balance of power during the late 19th century.  
This measured power certainly had to include what was going on within states. Balance is 
not a physical equality of strength, Antoine Pequet averred, but the ‘balance can be 
estimated exactly only by the more or less judicious and intelligent use’ states make of 
their ‘forces’.74 The balance of power ‘depends almost as much upon secondary as upon 
primary causes’. The balance of power is therefore shifting all the time, because ‘a Power 
better governed than others’ can ‘shift the real balance and that of opinion in its favour’.75 
In these discussions over the balance of power and how to measure it, a crucial question 
arose: what if a country grew not by territorial conquest, but by exploiting its internal 
resources, domestically? Statistics on state capabilities and dispositions were applied also 
to within states, to the domestic realm.  
The question particularly concerned the centrality of the separate, German balance of 
power. Prussia had emerged as a great power due to its domestic developments. This is 
when the internal constitution of states gained importance – the ‘secondary causes’ of 
state power on the balance of power. It was not territory alone, but also the internal 
disposition of forces and, not least, a state’s ‘passion’ that counted. This was dangerous to 
Europe. Also Kahle had argued that a sudden growth in wealth, domestically, could 
justify interference. It was not freedom from interference – the classical liberal 
conception – that was important for Kahle, but the traditional republican justification of 
preventing dominance and arbitrary rule. Here the balance of power was the main tool, 
and internal domestic factors were important in preventing Universal Monarchy.  
These developments, however, also inadvertently served as a condition enabling a 
fundamental critical assessment of the balance of power and its existence. Kahle’s 
arguments would be turned upside down by his fellow Göttingen academic, Johann 
Gottlob von Justi.  
                                                          
73 Ibid. 1086 
74 Pequet, Antoine. 1757. L’Esprit des Maximes politiques pour server de suite à L’Esprit des loix, du 
Président de Montesquieu. Paris, pp. 191–206. 
75 Ibid. Pequet had, as a response to Montesquieu’s L’Esprit de Lois, titled his book L’Esprit des Maximes 
politiques.  Although defending the maxim of a balance of power, he argued that it does not depend upon 
‘geometrical principles’ and that the balance of power rests on the practices of statesmen, not on jurists who 
‘find nothing but difficulties, and sow nothing but thorns’. 
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Challenging the balance of power 
The debate that would ensue between Kahle and Justi is crucial, as it marks a shift in the 
conditions of possibility for using the balance of power in arguments. Here I should point 
out that increasing criticism does not imply the demise of the concept. The defence of the 
concept relied on historical precedents and tradition, and the balance of power stood 
stronger than ever throughout the 18th century. The interesting thing here is the possibility 
of fundamental critical assessment of the balance of power, which would have 
repercussions. The increasing criticism as such must also be kept separate from what I 
investigate here, which is the use of the concept. Using the concept does not imply that 
the concept as such must be valued. Criticism can also be applied in political projects and 
legitimating strategies.  
Criticism of the balance of power concerned precisely the question of what could be 
considered real and verifiable, as opposed to speculations employed for partisan purposes. 
The charge was levelled against the balance that it was a ‘chimera’ – a theoretical 
invention of jurists and theorists, that it was not concerned with practical realities and was 
therefore not properly scientific, but political and moral. Critics pointed to problems of 
measurement, and problems of fit with both the historical and contemporary records. This 
foreshadows important debates concerning different academic fields, and their 
relationship to ‘practice’ or politics (see the last section: chapters 8 and 9). I will show 
just how this happened, by taking a closer look at the first challenges to the balance of 
power on its own merits. This happened as the War of the Austrian Succession 
transitioned into the Seven Years’ War.  
 
The Seven Years’ War 
Prussia, poor and fragmented, with its core area on the coast of the Baltic Sea and various 
enclaves throughout Rhineland, had risen to become a European power to be reckoned 
with. Reforms had incorporated the aristocratic elite into the ruling strata of the kingdom, 
and emphasised the Army and education. Frederick II’s attack on Silesia in 1740 had 
inaugurated the War of the Austrian Succession, and he retained Silesia in the peace 
treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748.  
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After the War of the Austrian Succession, Maria Theresa, like Fredrick II, emphasised 
internal reforms in government, finances and the military. She renewed an alliance with 
Russia, which put pressure on Frederick’s Prussia, already threatened by France and 
Britain. Prussia’s answer to a potential threat from the British-Hanoverian connexion was 
a secret alliance with Britain, which would also abort Britain’s existing scheme to pay for 
Russian troops. Also Münchhausen, the founder of the University of Göttingen, had 
argued for such an alliance with Prussia. To protect Hanover, the most important thing 
was to support ‘the balance of Europe and […] German liberty’ together with Prussia.76  
France was furious at being left out of this plan. France then allied with Austria and 
Maria Theresa, and started financing the Russian armies in Britain’s place. This 
rearrangement in Europe in 1756 has been called ‘The Diplomatic Revolution’ because 
the traditional enemies of France and Austria allied, and Britain − surprisingly − allied 
with Prussia.  
The traditional alliances in Europe had now become completely reordered. With tensions 
rising, Prussia acted pre-emptively and attacked Saxony with its now greatly increased 
army. This attack started the Seven Years’ War (1756–63), which involved a three-front 
Prussian war of defence against Austria, Russia and France, as well as a war in the 
colonial theatre between Britain and France.  
Relying on superior military tactics and recruitment patterns, Prussia gained ground 
thanks to Frederick’s many tactical victories. Britain sent troops and money to protect 
Hanover and to support Prussia against France. Through his efforts in rationalising the 
military and in war, Frederick II gained an unprecedented status in Prussia, as ‘Frederick 
the Great’, for his efforts against France.  
This was a more global war than ever seen before. It even included a side-event in 
America (where it was called ‘the French and Indian War’), where France and Britain 
fought over territories in the Ohio Valley, which was ultimately a fight also over the 
disposition of resources in Europe.  
                                                          
76 Quoted in Simms, Three Victories, p. 441. 
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Eventually, however, the tide turned when Tsarina Elisabeth died, and Russia under the 
prussophile Peter III pulled out of the war.77 However, Austria and Prussia kept fighting, 
and Britain continued to support Hanover to strain France’s resources, thus gaining an 
advantage in the colonial wars and its trade. In yet another turn of events, Spain sided 
with France in 1762, but was crushed by Britain. The year after, in 1763, the Treaty of 
Paris was signed, ending the war. Prussia retained Silesia, and Britain gained territories 
from France in both India and Canada. Prussia and Russia had by now irrefutably 
established their position as principal powers in Europe.  
The Seven Years’ War is also when the balance of power was used for the first time to 
attack and defend the new arrival Prussia − a polity previously seen as lying on the 
periphery of the system − indicating its increased status in Europe’s stratified order. The 
pamphlet Staatsbetrachtungen über den gegenwärtigen Preussischen Krieg in 
Teutschland (1762) represents perhaps the first instance of the balance of power being 
rhetorically deployed against Prussia.78 If one used the ‘true principles’ of states in an 
unpartisan way, one should understand that Prussia could not be allowed to grow too 
powerful.  
During the Seven Years’ War, the domestic sources of state power began to figure 
prominently in mainstream political debates. The distinction between state power and a 
European sociability became clearer:79 The balance of power is no longer applicable to 
the relations between the European peoples, it was argued, but it is now ‘ein jeder für 
sich, Gott für uns alle entgegen setzen’.80 Prussia had become pivotal to the European 
balance of power, it became a great power (grosse Macht or principal power) and the 
cause of this was seen to be domestic. Debates over Prussia concerned whether the 
balance of power should be invoked to support or resist it, or whether the concept was in 
fact useless. It was not difficult to argue that Prussia threatened Europe with a Universal 
Monarchy, as ‘Universal Monarchy’ had also had connexions to the internal rule of states, 
                                                          
77 What Frederick II called ‘the Miracle of the House of Brandenburg’. 
78 Anon. 1762. Verteidigte Staats-Betrachtungen über den gegenwärtigen Preussischen Krieg in 
Teutschland gegen die grundlose Anfechtungen der zu Berlin in Druck ausgegangenen  groben 
Lästerschrift von dem sogenannten wahren Interesse des Teutschen Reichs bey dem gegenwärtigen Kriege 
zwischen den Häusern Preußen und Oesterreich. Wien: Leopold Johann Kalliwoda.  
79 Kaeber, Die Idee, p. 109. 
80 Ibid., p.113. 
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as described in Chapter 2.81 Furthermore, just as at Utrecht, invoking the Empire of 
Charles V was a powerful warning, and much used.  
However, arguments to defend Prussia were also made. But how could a defence of 
Prussia deploy the balance of power? This is a crucially important issue, because, as 
shown in the case of Austria, one can find oneself locked into an unfavourable position, 
given the social power of the concept. One alternative was to deny the very existence of 
the balance of power. However, this was difficult, as it had become so ingrained, 
allegedly based on decades if not centuries of European tradition. How could one oppose 
such a position? By arguing that the balance was only an idea covering the real interest of 
states. The way in which critics of the balance of power established an image of the past 
that at the same time denied the authority of that past on the present was ingenious.82 It 
was argued that the balance of power had been a self-serving tool to deceive people about 
the real nature of state practice. Now, with advances in international law and statistics, 
this had become apparent. The balance of power was not a universal principle of 
European sociability at all, but an expression of will and self-preservation. The status of 
knowledge-claims was central to the arguments increasingly levelled against the principle 
of the balance of power. The increasing importance of measurements and statistics was 
used as a resource for arguing against the balance on this basis – criticism of the balance 
of power was directed precisely at the impossibility of measuring this balance, 
particularly when domestic factors were to be included.  
A principled critique against the concept itself had first appeared at the start of the Seven 
Years’ War, although the balance of power carried positive connotations throughout the 
18th century. My point here is that, even if the attack on the balance of power was a 
minority position, the principled critique indicates an inflection point  ̶  that the conditions 
of possibility had changed. The power of a concept is not necessarily confined to its being 
used to convince or persuade people. A new rhetorical resource had become available, 
and was indeed used in policy debates over intervention at the turn of the century, as I 
will show.  
                                                          
81 Arbitrary power, the hallmark of Oriental Despotism, is to be ‘detested, dreaded, and abhorred’ also 
within European states. Shapin, ‘Of Gods and Kings’, p. 213.  
82 Pocock, John Greville Agard. 2009. Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Methodology. 
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Whereas politicians, lawyers and pamphleteers had questioned the applications and 
implications of the balance of power, some of them now began attacking the balance of 
power as such. From parliaments to universities, the balance of power could be 
denounced as a fictitious entity, a chimera, even a charade. Amazingly, in the course of 
only a few decades, it became possible to pronounce fundamental criticisms concerning 
the very existence of the balance of power. After all, this concept had been the foundation 
for making sense of European politics. And it is easy to underestimate the powerful 
rhetorical combinations that had to be mustered to question a concept so essential for the 
political elites. For instance, in politics today, one can imagine the massive difficulties 
entailed in constructing a socially sustainable criticism of the existence of ‘democracy’ or 
‘freedom’.  
 
The balance is questioned: Early rhetoric  
Prussia, even if it had been growing in importance, was not attacked by means of the 
balance of power concept before the 1760s. But even from the 1740s, and solidifying in 
the 1750s and 1760s, another movement at the University of Göttingen prepared the way 
for devastating criticism of the principle itself – also serving to defend Prussia.  
The balance had for some time been criticised for being used as a pretext for partisan 
political actions. For instance, in 1726 William Wyndham declared in Parliament that 
Britain  
Penelope-like […] were continually weaving and unravelling the same web; at one time 
raising up to the Emperor to depress France, and now we were for depressing the 
Emperor, which could not be done without aggrandizing France, which, in the end, may 
make the latter too powerful : so that at this rate, under the pretence of holding the 
Balance of Europe, we should be engaged in continual wars.83  
Still, he was not criticising the principle itself, only how it was used. The ‘original 
principles’ espoused by Bolingbroke and his allies were rejected by many. What had to be 
challenged in such arguments was that the past and the ‘traditional’ had authority over the 
                                                          
83 Great Britain, Parliament. 1811. Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England from the Norman Conquest, 
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present. One questioned the assumption of continuity and automatic transmissions from 
past times to the present.84 The past was seen as ‘barbaric’ and no longer relevant. 
In the early 1740s, the main political debate in Britain concerned whether to support 
Austria − and, if so, by sending troops or by sending money. In parliamentary debates in 
1742, it was argued that Germany, not Austria, was the central issue. The balance of 
power could no longer be justified by tradition – restoring Austria was ‘chimerical’, and it 
was ‘evident, that the Balance of Power cannot be established upon its antient basis’, so 
Austria should be of no particular concern.85 Others criticised Britain’s role as the holder 
of the balance of power – a criticism unconceivable some decades earlier. The tone used 
against the concept is sharper:  
The Advocates for the Ministry have on this Occasion affected to speak of the Balance of 
Power, the Pragmatic Sanction, and the Preservation of the Queen of Hungary, not only 
as if they were to be the chief care of Great Britain […] but as if they were to be the Care 
of Great Britain alone.86  
This kind of argument was countered by reference to tradition: abandoning the balance of 
power on the continent would be ‘inconsistent with all Sense and Reason, contrary as it is 
to the universal Principles of Policy by which this nation hath been governed from the 
Conquest to this hour’.87 Lord Strange again emphasised that one cannot adhere to such 
maxims without considering the differences of time and circumstances, that one should 
not be ‘swayed in their Opinion by those Sounds they have been long accustomed to, or 
those Maxims they have long adopted’.88 When Austria equalled the Empire, the balance 
of power in Europe and the power of the House of Austria were synonymous terms. But 
now, with the Elector of Bavaria chosen Emperor, the two terms had become distinct − 
and the balance of Power in Europe had nothing to do with Austria. 
Criticism of the balance of power became even fiercer. For half a century, ‘we have given 
ourselves too much Concern about preserving the balance of power’ and have committed 
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too many troops to the continent. Britain was being ruined by undertaking alone the 
support of what ‘some Gentlemen are pleased to call the Balance of Power’.89  
In 1744 a pamphlet written by Lord Chesterfield, at the time ambassador to The Hague, 
had declared that Frederick II’s gains in Silesia had nothing to do with the balance of 
power – ‘in what respect is the immediate Interest of England or Balance of Power 
concern’d […] how can the Balance of Power be affected by the King of Prussia’s having 
the small Part of Silesia […]?’. Chesterfield went even further: ‘The Balance of Power is 
an Ideal Chimera, introduce’d among us by corrupt and designing Ministers, to subject 
and fleece their deluded Countryment. But supposing the thing of real Existence; France 
is the only Power to be apprehended’. 90 However, he wavers between dismissing the 
concept, and dismissing its use. Later in the pamphlet, he himself invokes the Balance of 
Power as a reason for avoiding divisions in the Empire.  
What was debated was if and how historical transmission happened, and whether the 
concepts of the past were applicable to new circumstances – a debate concerning the 
balance that was quite different from the debates surrounding Utrecht. Still, this played 
out as debates over British isolation versus intervention and not over the balance of power 
principle as such. The existence of the balance was still accepted but new rhetorical 
resources were being deployed, challenging the contemporary applicability, if not the 
existence, of the concept itself. We can note some examples of how a central concept was 
questioned by calling into doubt the authority of tradition, in the process separating an 
abstract concept from its execution. This may be essential for understanding how it 
became possible to reject the balance of power itself. 
In 1743 Jean François de Spon, who was close to Charles VI, had discussed the balance 
of power through a duality of rights versus opportunism.91 The balance of power, he 
declared, relied on opportunism and not on rights. England, for one, used the balance in 
political opportunism. The attack on the balance of power, particularly in Britain, had 
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been initiated. Again, links between the balance of power and concepts of law were 
central in making criticism possible – there had to be another publically accepted 
universalist basis from which to criticise.     
Also at Göttingen, the basis underlying legal theories incorporating the balance of power, 
including Martin Kahle’s text, was to become contentious. One rather radical movement 
at the university was a group of scholars who developed natural law theories based not on 
reason or a European sociability, but on passion. Inspired by Pufendorf and Christian 
Thomasius, Johan Jacob Schmauss was one of the initiators of this movement,92 in which 
the balance of power was a central topic of discussion; Schmauss had written a book on 
the theme in 1741, Historie der Balance von Europa. Schmauss’ circle at Göttingen 
employed a new vocabulary to discuss rights, distinguishing between the subjective and 
the objective: between law as objective, and rights as the subjective capacity to act 
morally. A distinction was made between what really existed, what is, and what we are 
able to do.93 Schmauss argued that our human instincts are in accordance with nature and 
are the basis of natural rights, as separate from positive law based on convention. There is 
a difference between human-made systems and laws, and individual rights or subjective 
ius, which should be understood as natural – ius naturae subiective sumtum.94 This 
separation between abstract theoretical knowledge and how things really are, in nature, 
was used to depict rights as being held individually.  
The argument was that previous theories were artificial, intellectualist and based on false 
premises, such as the idea of a ‘European republic’ or a ‘common public interest’. Natural 
law, precisely because it was natural, should be simple and immediately comprehensible, 
based on how things are and not how they could be.95 Natural rights should therefore not 
be grounded in contemplative reason or abstract arguments. The basis of the interaction 
between polities was self-preservation, not intangible notions of European commonalities 
– and law and rights must take this into account. The movement emphasised rights over 
duties, passion over reason.96  
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This was a radical argument indeed. The implication was also that natural law, since it 
was ultimately not based on common reason and sociability, would apply to everyone, 
even heathens and atheists outside of Europe. Everyone had rights – a capacity to act and, 
in principle, to act rationally. Even if a civitas based on reason might be constructed 
within Europe or within individual states, this would not change human will and human 
nature.97 In the context of political relations in Europe, this was a new universal principle, 
based on neither tradition nor reason but on ‘human nature’.  
This emphasis on the inviolability of the individual also indicates the coming episteme 
shift, away from the republican tradition, prominent in Britain, which served as the 
traditional basis for defending the balance of power. It was no longer a question of the 
duty to defend Europe against dominance and arbitrary rule, but of attending to the 
‘singuli’ and the inherent rights of any state or individual. Private interest and self-love 
were not amoral, even in the absence of a common public interest. Rights were more 
important than obligations, freedom to act more important than freedom from a Universal 
Monarchy. In Part II, in chapter 6 and 7, I shall explain how such more liberal arguments 
became a dominant component of balance-of-power rhetoric with and after the Congress 
of Vienna. 
 
The balance is challenged: Justi’s arguments 
One of Schmauss’ pupils, Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, opposed his colleague 
Kahle’s work on the balance of power. In 1758, Justi denounced the concept by devoting 
an entire book to attacking Kahle’s thesis on the balance of power and international law.98 
Instead of trying to turn the concept to Prussia’s advantage, Justi, in a radical move, 
defended Frederick II by rejecting the balance of power altogether.  
Justi in his Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts von Europa (1758) successfully and 
creatively linked his criticism with international law, the domestic governance of states 
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and the issue of measurements, and the separation between abstract and practical 
knowledge. By creative use of existing rhetorical resources, he employed the same terms 
from the Staatsklugheit and Staatswirtschaft to attack the balance of power itself. They 
were combined in new ways of attacking England and defending Prussia. The balance of 
power has nothing to do with the nature of the European powers, Justi declared; no power 
has ever acted on the balance of power principle, ‘but […] they have only used this 
theoretical system to gain allies, and to hide their particular interest and their passions that 
lead them to war’.99 Never in history has there been a war that has had the balance of 
power as its true and main reason. Wars have been fought because of the ‘particular 
interest of the state or the passion of the rulers’.100 The very application of the balance of 
power has been driven by envy and fear, Justi argued, not by altruism or a concern for the 
public interest. It has been a cause of war, not the remedy. The balance of power has 
camouflaged self-interests and the ‘real motives’ of states and statesmen.101  
Justi argued that the particular interests of states should be taken more seriously, and not 
be dependent on some European sociability. Also, Britain could not be seen as the 
disinterested ‘holder of the balance’. That was merely a cloak for self-interest − which 
was not unique to Britain, but to the principle itself, as it had no ethical underpinnings. 
This argument was also used to emphasise and legitimise Hanover’s own, particular 
interest. Justi attacked the dynastic union between Britain and Hanover which had been 
justified by reference to the balance of power.  
Ingeniously, Justi here turned the concept of ‘interest’ against the balance of power 
concept. His advocacy of self-interest and individual rights of states delinked what were 
the ‘true interests’ from the public, and thereby also from the balance of power. As part of 
his argument, Justi also explicitly denounced the counter-concept so often invoked to 
legitimise the balance of power, ‘Universal Monarchy’, as a convenient but false fiction.  
Justi’s attack on the balance also concerned the impossibility of measuring power. As 
seen, science should serve practical ends, and clear standards of measurement would have 
to be a requirement for this. Otherwise, Justi argued, the balance of power is just an 
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empty vessel to make wars appear as just. As shown by the case of the rise of Prussia, real 
power came from the internal organisation of states and their governments. The balance 
of power would hamper the advantageous development of states by not permitting states 
to be successful, as that would be a cause for just interference. States, Justi explained, are 
guided by ‘private interests’, not by a ‘chimerical balance of power’ which only caused 
‘mutual slavery’.102 Again, the traditional link between state interests and the public 
interest was dissolved in Justi’s arguments. It was all about the sovereign choices of 
individual states, and there was no ‘common republic of powers’. Justi’s claims 
undermined the naturalness of European sociability, leaving it to politicians to organise 
their states properly. This focus on the internal organisation and administration of states 
came from Justi’s concern with the ‘police sciences’.  
In addition to theories of raison d’état, there also existed theories of police, part of the 
‘tendency during the second half of the century to give increasing weight to the wealth of 
a state, to the quality of its government’.103 Whilst state reason provided tools for 
distinguishing the activities of states from other spheres of life, and defined the ‘art of 
governing’ according to a state’s strength, ‘police’ defined the objects for the states’ 
activities – it defined where the state intervenes. This is what enables the state to make 
full use of its potential, at the same time as the newly emerged entity, the ‘population’, 
can be kept happy. It is a matter of the internal, not external, relations of a state.  
At Göttingen from 1755, Justi studied ‘cameral sciences’ and ‘police sciences’. As 
opposed to in the international realm, he maintained, the domestic was the sphere of 
sociability and reason. Justi, as professor of police sciences, emphasised the benefits of 
the correct disposition of things internally, and effective public administration to get the 
most out of a country’s resources – as regards everything from crimes, to finance and 
agricultural practices, and politeness and how to treat the citizenry.104 Justi argued for the 
need of government intervention, but not intervention in relations between states. What he 
objected to was the idea that there existed a similar authority in Europe, a sociability that 
would call for interventions in state-to-state relations.  
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The perfectly ruled state was Justi’s aspiration – the machine-state.105 The balance of 
power has never served the people. This ‘construction of knowledge’, as he termed it, has 
only served allies to hide their passions and particular interests.106 And terrible 
consequences will follow when bad theories are transformed into practice. Justi’s 
arguments made an impact. Even Martens eventually wondered whether it was still 
permitted to speak of the balance of power.107 
However, as noted in Chapter 1, concepts or arguments do not do anything on their own. 
It was not Justi’s arguments that numinously produced an effect, but how they were 
deployed as part of a concrete, political debate. Neither did such arguments evolve 
naturally from the progress of the intellectual milieu, or from some inherent tensions in 
the concept. That such arguments and links should be made was not self-evident: it was 
connected to specific policy debates, particularly in England, concerning relations with 
Hanover and Austria. Justi’s rhetorical position in his texts was a response to this. Why is 
the balance of power not used against Prussia’s ally Britain, when it is used against 
Prussia? What resources could be used to attack the pre-eminent political concept of the 
time?  
What made such criticism possible in the mid- to late 1700s was a particular 
configuration of crisis narratives, the importance accorded to practical knowledge 
(particularly in international law), making it possible to tap into a repertoire of critique of 
abstract knowledge, and the difficulties of measuring an increasingly stratified order. It 
was a battle between specificity and images of a unified order – in differing proportions 
and combinations. One main tension is the paradox between analytical versus practical 
knowledge, between formalisation and specificity, ‘of being able and not being able to 
formalise the empirical’.108 Criticism of the balance of power as a ‘chimera’, not 
corresponding to state practice, is the first attempt to challenge the epistemic backing for 
the balance of power. In 1758, the same year as Justi published his attack on the balance, 
one British pamphleteer had written, quite typically,  
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What gravity or attraction, we are told, is to the system of the universe, that the ballance 
of power is to Europe: a thing we cannot just point out to ocular inspection, and see or 
handle; but which is as real in its existence, and as sensible in its effects, as the weight is 
in scales.109  
Justi asked: why should the balance of power, and not passions and natural law, be seen 
as the originating cause of this? What is this ‘balance of power’? How have we come to 
know what it is, and what are really its purpose and consequences? 
That such questions could be asked at all indicates how the authority of tradition was 
changing, particularly in view of the increasing complexity of political relations. The 
balance of power, as it had originated in England, was seen as the re-establishment (in 
1688) of an old tradition, based on the ‘ancient constitution’. But why should one assume 
a continuation from the past to the present? How did the past become the present? When 
the authority of tradition is accepted as a universal principle, these questions will receive 
the same answer. When tradition is challenged, they receive different answers; and if the 
present is different from the past, we should ask how it came to be so.110 If the balance of 
power is accepted as a universal principle, at least we should explain how we ended up in 
this mess, and must question the transmission from past to present. Indeed, such 
arguments began to emerge in the debates in the British Parliament from the 1740s. The 
other alternative, however, is to reject the principle itself. First came attempts at 
specifying what the balance of power is, based on law, measurements and statistics. 
Hence, the new argument that old concepts, based on tradition, could be revealed as 
deceitful and a chimera became possible. History could be used for the wrong purposes. 
If the balance of power is simply taken for granted with its authority rooted in tradition, 
and that tradition by default explains the present, then no theory is needed – it is simply 
the expression of political practice and its transmission. Those wishing to criticise the 
traditional, then, need to refer to some principle of action outside of tradition, other than 
transmission. Such questioning of the past, traditions, continuities, and the present can 
centre on historical interpretation, which in turn can be based on some (new) universal 
principles, or on actual state practice. The point is not necessarily to change the received 
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facts, but to question what authority they have over the present.111 One condition of 
possibility for such critical questions was the increasing importance of positive law and 
jurisprudence, which became a new means of answering the above questions. 
Systematising the principles of law made it possible to describe and compare historical 
societies as different from the present, because law articulated their formal 
organisation.112 This practical systematisation of law was one of the origins of the science 
of states; it also made it possible to distinguish Europe more clearly from the rest, and 
different polities within Europe, with different ways of arranging their states 
domestically, in a stratified order.  
Whereas criticising abstract knowledge was nothing new, the explicit links made between 
international law concepts and the concept of the balance of power allowed for new 
rhetorical innovations, of which Justi was the main exponent. The links with statistics and 
empirical measurements provided new rhetorical possibilities for defending the balance of 
power, but also enabled a radical re-assessment of the concept itself, which had 
previously been impossible.  
Justi’s arguments rejected politics as an expression of the ‘common good’, and re-
articulated it as a more manipulative concept, as ‘the art of the possible’,113 also in the 
domestic sphere. This was also a critique of republican arguments based on tradition, and 
signals a changing in views as to the status of historical transmission as well.  
The conceptual links between science, international law and statistics had provided a 
space for Justi to launch a trenchant rhetorical attack on the balance of power. This new 
rhetorical reconfiguration would in turn provide the opposition with a legitimate space for 
criticisms in the Ochakov controversy late in the century, to which I now turn.   
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CHAPTER 5 
Abstractions and Reality in the Ochakov Controversy 
 
A general point in this project is that ideas and concept do not operate ‘on their own’, as 
some independent causal force. Concepts are used, change and are forged in concrete 
debates over policy. To showcase how the concept was deployed and affected policy, in 
this chapter I focus on the relatively unknown, but for me crucial case, which is the 
Ochakov controversy. In these debates, the balance of power was attacked by 
distinguishing between abstraction and practice, and how it was countered by arguments 
from tradition. A fundamental criticism of the balance of power was here used to bring 
about the British Prime Minister William Pitt’s first foreign policy defeat. The rhetorical 
repertoire connected to the balance of power had expanded; in these debates the balance 
of power concept linked with a new problem: that of intervention into independent states, 
particularly as regards an emerging new class of powers – the ‘principal’ or ‘great’ ones. 
Had it not been for the interlinked but contingent developments in focus in the previous 
chapter, these political debates and their outcomes would have looked different, and 
would have happened in different ways. Moreover, British discussions over intervention 
and the balance of power in the ‘Ochakov case’ were to have an impact also in the first 
half of the 19th century, during the Congress of Europe.  
 
Britain in decline 
Prussia had held on to Silesia, even when faced with the combined might of Austria, 
Britain, France and Russia. After the war, Austria continued in alliance with France as the 
Prusso–Russian alliance was still seen as a threat to Austria.  
In the Russo–Turkish War (1768–1774), Russia gained parts of southern Ukraine and 
Crimea from Turkey. Both Austria and Prussia then sought compensation for Russia’s 
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gains, in the form of territories in Poland. After the Seven Years’ War ended in 1763, 
both Russia and Prussia had set their sights on Poland; and in 1772, Poland was 
partitioned for the first time. This partition, initiated by Frederick II, was justified with 
explicit reference to securing the balance of power in light of Russia’s recent gains.  
No one intervened to protect Poland. That Poland could be divided at the whim of the 
great powers would by some be used to argue that the balance of power was indeed a 
chimera – should not the balance serve to protect the independence of its component 
states? This debate over intervention and independence would be a hallmark of balance-
of-power debates also during the Congress of Europe (see chapters 6 and 7).  
Conflicts between Austria and Prussia continued throughout the 1770s and 1780s, even if 
Austrian relations with Russia improved. When Maria Theresa died in 1780, Joseph II 
ascended to the throne of the Habsburg Empire, and challenged Prussia over the province 
of Bavaria. This failed, and Austria turned its attention to the Balkans. 
As for Britain, in the American War of Independence, or the American Revolutionary 
War (1775–1783), it was confronted by France, Spain and Holland, who had been 
financing the independence movement in the thirteen colonies. In parallel, Britain had to 
fight the French in India, when war broke out between the East India Company and the 
French-supported Kingdom of Mysore. The war ended with the treaties of Paris and 
Versailles in 1783. Britain was left weakened and humiliated, France was left bankrupt, 
and America was left with a fledgling democratic republic. While the republican idea of a 
domestic balance of power to protect against despotism of people and ruler alike was 
adopted by the American ‘Founding Fathers’, the balance of power between states was 
rejected, as one of the points of seeking independence had been to remove America from 
the scales of Britain in the balance of power.1 This would eventually inspire the French 
Revolution.  
In the British Parliament, the persistent battle between Tories and Whigs over a strategy 
of intervention versus naval-based isolation intensified. Even internally, the uses of the 
balance of power concept waned. There is a notable difference between the exaltation of 
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the balance in the British Parliament before mid-century, and the more resigned 
complacency in which foreign policy debates were conducted from the 1770s.  
For Britain, Russia had been considered a natural ally for many decades, but this was to 
change under William Pitt.2 Catherine II of Russia organised the First League of Armed 
Neutrality, threatening England with cutting supply chains to prevent the British Navy 
from interfering in neutral trade and shipping. Britain, however, was searching ships for 
French contraband. According to the ‘rule of the Seven Years’ War’,3 neutral shipping 
was to be free from interference by other countries. Prussia, Austria, the Dutch, and 
Ottomans had all agreed to this. France and the newly independent United States of 
America also adhered to the principle. Britain did not, but sought to avoid interfering so 
as not to upset Russia – most British supplies came through the Baltic. 
The balance of power was increasingly turned against Britain. After the Seven Years’ 
War, Britain’s colonial policy became closely connected to its standing in Europe and the 
fight against France.4 The French took advantage of this by linking the balance of power 
to the balance of trade, and the British superiority at sea became a concern.5  
The French publicist Maubert de Gouvest argued that the balance of power exists not to 
fight a Universal Monarchy, but to defy England, to avoid a monopoly of trade. There 
must be a balance on the seas. It is in the interest of all to resist England, he declared. 
England planned to break Europe. The only balance that exists is an ‘Equilibre du 
commerce’, and the ‘rule of the Seven Years’ War’ – that only the motherland could trade 
with its colonies – was working to Britain’s advantage.6 A ‘universal monarchy’ could 
become a possibility only by unbalanced naval strength, and the French minister Duc de 
Choiseul argued that ‘the English, while pretending to protect the balance on land which 
no one threatens, are entirely destroying the balance at sea which no-one defends’.7 
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In addition, Britain had lost its American colonies, and was at low ebb when William Pitt 
the Younger assumed office in 1783. Britain was seen as being in decline, perhaps even 
as regards its position as a principal power in Europe. In line with the Tory tradition, Pitt 
emphasised a rebuilding and revitalising of the navy8 to end this isolation, and again 
assert British interests on the continent.  
This would require alliances. In 1788 Britain joined with the Dutch and Prussia in a 
Triple Alliance to exert influence in Europe: securing the status quo of the Dutch barrier 
against any French incursions based on local support, defending Prussia, and also 
defending Sweden from Denmark. The Triple Alliance of 1788 also attempted to appease 
Russia by reining in Prussia − Prussian ambitions could drag Austria into a war that 
would certainly involve Russia as well.9 
Britain had again become an important player in Europe – but this came to an abrupt halt 
with the Ochakov crisis.   
 
The Ochakov crisis10 
The year before this Triple Alliance was established, in 1787, the Ottoman Empire had 
declared war on Russia, seeking to regain the parts of Ukraine and Crimea annexed by 
Russia in 1783. Austria had declared war on the Ottoman Empire in support of Russia, 
whereas Gustav III of Sweden supported the Turks. In 1788, during these two parallel 
Russo–Ottoman (1787–92) and Austro–Ottoman (1787–1791) wars, Russia’s capture of 
the Ottoman seaside garrison town of Ochakov on the Black Sea and the estuary of the 
Dniepr River had passed almost unnoticed. However, three years later Pitt and his 
government would argue that to help regain the fortress of Ochakov to Turkey was of the 
utmost importance to protect the balance of power.  
During these Ottoman wars, Britain’s relationship with Russia changed. Britain expressed 
fears that the Russians would direct their attention towards the eastern Mediterranean, 
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perhaps finding it convenient to ally with Bourbon France in their projects. Settling 
affairs in the East was therefore considered pivotal, and this was achieved in 1790 in the 
Treaty of Reichenbach. Prussia and Austria worked out their differences in light of recent 
Austrian and Russian gains in the war against the Ottomans. Austria retained Ottoman 
territory, whilst Prussia had to dampen its expansionist ambitions. The treaty put a halt to 
further territorial swaps, by being based on the status quo ante bellum.11 
However, this was not seen as affecting the Russian threat. Catherine of Russia may have 
accepted the futility of conquering territory from the Ottomans, but she insisted on 
retaining the coastal town of Ochakov as compensation for the Ottomans having initiated 
the war. It was Ochakov and its fate that became the focus of the conflict between Russia 
and the Triple Alliance.12 
The origin of this ‘Eastern Question’ is disputed, but some date it to 1791, when the Tory 
government proposed expanding the British Navy to confront Russia.13 Some see this as 
the first consistent Parliamentary debate on the Eastern Question. In any case, the debates 
of 1791 are recognised as a ‘new and significant enlargement of Britain’s diplomatic 
horizons’.14 And here I have found that the balance of power figured more prominently 
than perhaps ever before in the British Parliament.  
The tendency in British politics during the final decades of the 18th century had been 
towards more foreign involvement on the part of the navy, as also promoted by Pitt. The 
Ochakov crisis would put a definitive halt to this. In the historical literature, the crisis has 
been largely overshadowed by the French Revolution, but the debates had important 
repercussions.15 Also throughout the 19th century, Ochakov was a historical reference 
point invoked in debates and contentions over Russian expansion and the possibilities of 
intervention.16 
The Ochakov crisis also had linkages with Poland. The largest river in Poland, the 
Vistula, runs from the Baltic Sea. With relations with Russia deteriorating, Britain 
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proposed to rely on Poland and the Vistula for naval supplies, rather than on Russia. 
However, it was Prussia that controlled the Vistula, and would have to be courted. As a 
counter-demand, Prussia wanted the Polish territories closest to the Baltic Sea – Danzig 
(Gdánsk) and Thorn (Toruń). Poland, however, refused this territorial deal.  
Prussia instead began to focus on preventing Russian and Austrian gains in Turkey to 
maintain the balance of power. Britain, relying on Prussia, bought into Prussia’s plan to 
dam up the Russo-Austrian influence in Turkey. Pitt demanded that Russia agree to end 
its war with the Ottoman Empire on the basis of status quo ante bellum, surrendering 
Ochakov. Catherine refused, and Britain agreed with Prussia to enforce the demand by 
war, if necessary. Pitt threatened Russia with a British naval intervention − a strategy of 
intimidation previously proven successful in deterring France and Spain, and the Russians 
in the Baltic.  
Pitt’s main argument during the debates over whether to defend Ochakov by armed force 
was that Russia represented a danger to the balance of power and was a new candidate for 
Universal Monarchy. All the same, Pitt insisted that the alliance was defensive in nature. 
Prussia, however, was pressuring the British to make a showing with their Navy to deter 
Russia. Britain kept insisting that it should take no part in an offensive alliance, and that 
the Ottoman Empire had nothing to do with British security or with the ‘public utility’. 
Catherine herself had maintained, through her ambassador Vorontsov, that Russia had ‘no 
intention of destroying the balance of Europe’ or conquering the Ottomans.17 
However, this changed when Catherine refused the Triple Alliance proposal for 
negotiations between Russia and the Ottoman Selim II, condemning this as an attempt to 
‘dictate in so arbitrary a manner to a sovereign perfectly independent and in want of no 
assistance’.18 Pitt requested expansion of its naval force until Turkey and Russia had 
made peace. When this proposal was presented to the Commons, the ensuing debate and 
opposition took the government by surprise.  
Pitt’s main opponent Charles James Fox, and what can only loosely be termed ‘Whigs’, 
feared British entanglement in Prussia’s plans of expansion. Fox was an admirer of 
Catherine, and both he and his entourage were good friends with the Russian ambassador 
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183 
 
 
 
to London, Prince Semyon Vorontsov.19 Fox denounced Pitt’s policy regarding Ochakov 
as a plan for war against a friendly power, involving no British interests. Fox had, as 
foreign secretary, declared in 1783 that the Northern Powers like Russia and Prussia ‘ever 
have been, and ever will be, the system of every enlightened Englishman’.20 Also Lord 
Grenville, another influential critic in the cabinet, held that Britain would never maintain 
the balance of power with Prussia alone, but would need Russia’s help. 
With the help of Vorontsov, Fox’s group engineered a public outcry against the plan in 
Parliament and in the British press, raising doubts about Pitt’s leadership. Public opinion 
was crucial. Support for an anti-French policy had been strong in 1787; likewise in 1790 
as regards confrontation with Catholic Spain. In 1791, however, with Parliament back in 
session, the dislike of Russia had disappeared. Opposition to war was strong, and spread 
throughout the country. Russia was a ‘natural ally, a Christian country’ opposing the 
uncivilised Turks. Defending the Whigs, Edmund Burke stated that ‘the considering the 
Turkish Empire any part of the Balance of Power was new’ and condemned the ‘Turkish 
savages’.21 
Public and Parliamentary opinion firmly rejected Pitt’s arguments. The prime minister 
suffered a humiliating defeat and even considered stepping down, while the opposition 
was considering impeachment. Russia retained Ochakov. 
This controversy is crucial, because here, through political arguments, the various 
concerns and rhetorical positions mentioned in the previous chapter – abstract knowledge, 
international law, statistics and measurement – were all linked in debates over concrete 
policy. Furthermore, the controversy also influenced developments to come in the wake 
of the French Revolution, during the Concert of Europe, which is the topic of the next 
Chapter 6. It concerned the role and standing of Russia and the Ottoman Empire as 
regards independence and the balance of power, the problem of interventions and the 
connexions to international law, and the relationship between political practice and 
abstract knowledge and principles. At times the debate approached a theoretical 
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discussion of the standing of the balance of power and the nature of knowledge − all in 
the context of a debate over policy in the British Parliament.  
 
The balance of power in the Ochakov controversy  
Not only was the balance of power disputed as justification for the specific claims 
regarding Ochakov: the balance of power concept was itself rejected as a chimera 
incapable of serving to back any kind of argument. This new position to argue from was 
used to its fullest in the Ochakov controversy.  
As otherwise throughout the century, the main debate in Parliament stood between a 
policy of continental engagement and relative isolation from European affairs. The 
distinction between Whigs and Tories was not as clear-cut as previously. Prime Minister 
William Pitt the Younger was not affiliated with any party, although he was often 
considered to be associated with the Tories. By contrast, his arch-rival, Charles James 
Fox, was clearly a Whig politician. The Foxite Whigs generally supported the French 
Revolution, opposed Pitt’s interventionist policies, were pro-Russian, and advocated 
individual freedoms and legal rights. In this, they were in agreement with Jeremy 
Bentham, who had famously rejected the idea of natural law and natural rights as 
‘nonsense upon stilts’. Bentham was also pro-Russian, and, like many Whigs, argued that 
secrecy in foreign policy was associated with abstract theories and principles.22 This 
opposition to secrecy in foreign affairs was an aspect of Bentham’s project of 
‘demystifying the law’.23 Whilst Pitt and the government considered Russia as a threat 
that had to be managed in order to uphold the balance of power, the Whigs and Bentham 
urged a policy of non-intervention.  
In the Ochakov controversy, the balance of power was put to various uses to support or 
oppose British intervention and engagement. Pitt and the government argued for the 
traditional approach to the balance of power, and Pitt’s only argument for intervention 
was the balance of power as a true concept based on tradition. Amongst his opponents, 
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some held that the balance of power was a real phenomenon, but that it did not apply in 
the specific case of Ochakov and Turkey: the balance of power could be taken too far and 
be misapplied. This was connected to another argument, namely that the balance of 
power, even if important, could not be the sole responsibility of Britain. These arguments 
tapped into the longstanding isolationist argument, recurrent in Parliamentary debates 
during the 1740s, that it could not be Britain’s responsibility alone to protect the balance 
of power in Europe.   
For me, however, the most interesting arguments now were those made by the Whig 
opposition in James Fox’s circle, forcefully rejecting the concept altogether. Given the 
developments in the previous chapter, this was now an available position. Unlike Pitt, 
with his insistence on the balance of power as a true principle, embodying a European 
sociability and the public interest, Fox (like Justi), maintained that the balance of power 
was a useless abstraction that did not serve the interests of Britain. Opposition rhetoric 
saw the national interest of Britain as a concern separate from the balance of power. The 
link between the national interest and the public interest, as embodied in the balance of 
power, no longer holds, they said: the real interest of Britain is delinked from the balance 
of power, which was rejected as an abstraction. Being able to argue from a new position, 
situated outside of the balance-of-power discourse itself, made it possible to attack the 
concept as a matter of principle rather than of implementation.24 The concept of ‘interest’ 
became delinked from the balance of power in the process.   
The ‘Ochakov crisis’ as a historical occurrence is usually dated to 1791. In the early 
months of 1791, Britain was still hesitant to act on Prussia’s wishes.25 However, this 
gradually changed, and in March the Prussian pressure increased, leading to a harder line. 
Pitt prepared fleets for the Baltic and the Black Sea, to be dispatched by the end of 
March. To this, only Lord Grenville objected.26 On 28 March Pitt requested Parliament 
for an increment of the naval forces, and debates over the proposal started the next day. 
Here, Pitt’s nemesis, Charles James Fox, maintained that arguing with a basis in the 
balance of power was nothing but ‘enveloping oneself in mystery and importance’ 
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without explaining anything.27 The presentation of the case for invading Ochakov was 
made to be ‘alarming’, but it was alarming ‘only in point of expence’. If the threat to the 
balance of power was supposed to be so worrying, then proponents of this ‘ought to shew 
how it was endangered’, and if it was because of Russia – which Fox saw as a completely 
new argument in the House – or Prussia, they should show ‘who she meant to attack’.  
The debates continued throughout April. Charles Grey, the Second Earl Grey28 did not 
dismiss the balance as such, but emphasised the distinction between theory and practical 
political handicraft by arguing that the balance of power should be left in the hands of 
those skilful enough to manage it. That is, it was a matter of prudent political practice to 
manage the balance properly and not ‘a romantic idea’. He considered the balance of 
power important, but did not see how it could possibly be endangered in the case of 
Ochakov.29 
Fox proceeded to dismiss the balance of power, and ‘charged the minister with insolence, 
arrogance, incapacity, and willful imposition on the House of Commons, in the conduct 
of foreign affairs, and dared him to the proof’.30 
John Freeman Mitford, First Baron Redesdale, declared that the ‘real interest and internal 
prosperity of Great Britain’ had nothing to do with meddling in the affairs of other 
countries to ‘hold and preserve the balance of power in Europe’.31 Quite the contrary, if  
this was how the balance was protected, it would be ‘unsuccessful, useless, and even 
extremely dangerous to the true interests of this country’. Here the balance of power was 
not automatically associated with the interest of Britain, as it had previously been.  
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31 Commons debate, 25 May 1791, PR17/29, p. 523. Emphases added. 
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Pitt was advised to ‘look out for some expedient to get out of the scrape’.32 Pitt explained 
why Ochakov was of value to Turkey, but the balance of power did not offer grounds 
good enough for explaining the value of Ottoman relations to Britain.33  
The strong opposition in Parliament caught the government off guard, and continued to 
spread throughout the country.34 Parliament did not agree to provide Pitt with the supplies 
necessary for the Ochakov campaign, and Pitt suffered defeat. The crisis had passed, but 
the debate continued with even greater force the next year when Parliament was back in 
session. This debate has gone largely unnoticed in the literature, because of the focus on 
the crisis itself, and how it was resolved. Discovering ‘the ministers in flight’, the debate 
became even fiercer after Pitt’s retreat.35 Pitt, it was charged, was ‘intriguing in all the 
courts of Europe […] the great posture master of the balance of power’.36 
Earl Grey accepted the ‘general propositions’ on the balance of power, and did not feel 
the need to dispute these points ‘most strenuously maintained’. However, in the specific 
case of Ochakov, he was not convinced. ‘Much had been said with regard to the policy of 
preserving the general balance of power […] But […] he37 had failed to produce 
conviction on his mind’.38  Maintaining the balance of power was a ‘laudable object’, but 
only when not ‘pursued to too great an extent’. In this case, invoking the balance of 
power was simply not justifiable. ‘That Great Britain had pursued this object too far 
would not be denied, when it was considered that in her progress after it she had travelled 
as far as the banks of the Black Sea’.39 Again, Grey did not attack the existence of the 
balance − only how it is managed or used. Implicit here is the argument that the balance 
exists to stabilise European international politics.     
Then, Grey turned the balance-of-power concept against one of its proponents, pointing 
out and explaining the ambiguities:  
By his own evidence, the whole of Administration would appear to deserve censure. If the 
possession of Oczakow by the Empress was dangerous to the balance of power, which he 
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had insisted, there was a proof we had abandoned it to that danger; for Oczakow was, 
after all, ceded to the Empress!40  
MP Grant, being in favour of Pitt’s interventionist stance and the balance of power, also 
argued for a right of intervention in the case of Russia:  
They had then heard it asserted that they had no right to interfere, that Russia was an 
independent power, and had a right to judge for herself and act accordingly. This position 
was surely pushed to a degree of extravagance, for it went to the length of maintaining 
that no consideration of the danger of the balance of power being exposed, should weigh 
with Parliament in this case, for agreeing to this armament.41 
In short, the Whig insistence on independence and anti-intervention did not trump 
considerations of the balance of power.  
Quite on the contrary, William Wyndham, a friend of Fox’s, saw no danger in Russian 
possession of Ochakov. An intervention in the name of the balance of power ‘was a 
pretext so extensive, that it applied to every thing. On the balance of power we were 
called on to interfere, for reasons, as it was said, that could not then be explained […] 
nothing appeared but the same remote cause, the same undefined balance of power’.42  
Another member of Fox’s circle, Sir Philip Francis, also used the language of intervention 
in arguing that ‘Our government had interfered in the quarrel between Russia and the 
Porte [Ottomans]’43 and that the documents presented to the House had, in his opinion, 
nothing to say on the reasons for why Britain had intervened. He noted how the eloquence 
of the defenders in their speeches overshadowed the fact that there was no ‘substantial 
truth and reason’ to what had been said. The taxpayers have a reason to know why so 
much money was being spent, and the benefits obtained from it.44 The balance of power 
could now not legitimise these expenses.  
Francis continued by calling on the Prime Minster ‘to tell us, why these things have been 
done. What general concern had England, more than any other nation, in the question 
between Russia and the Turks? What specific interest of ours could, by any possibility, be 
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affected by the cessation or restitution of Oczakow?’45 This was a recurrent argument, 
tapping into the isolationist streak in British debates. Now, however, it was strengthened 
by the possibility of actually rejecting the entire concept of the balance of power. 
None of the articles in the treaty with Prussia justified this meddling, Francis declared. 
The contempt for the balance of power as the opposite of the true interest of Britain 
shines through. He argued that the case was so weak, that  
Gentlemen have been reduced to call in the balance of power in Europe to their 
assistance. In this place, Sir, I wish I had the ability to attract the attention of the 
House…on some considerations connected with the subject in debate […] essential […] 
to the future peace and security of the Kingdom.46  
Neither is Britain the ‘holder of the balance of power’, as traditionalist argument went:  ‘I 
desire to know why it was our particular concern, how it came to be our specific interest, 
rather than that of the continental states of Europe, to support this imaginary balance!’47 
He continued, ‘If the cause be common, why should we take the lead in it? Why is this 
island for ever to be the victim of continental politics? The position, that separates, ought 
to secure us […] we are insulated in vain’.48  
And the balance was defunct, as universal principles must be common to all – ‘unless the 
rule be made general, we have no right to the instant use of it’.49 As a result, the ‘real 
substantial interests of the kingdom have been utterly neglected and forgotten’50 at the 
expense of this imaginary balance of power.  
The ‘real interest’ of Britain could now be used compellingly against the balance of 
power. This marks a radical change from the traditional use of the balance of power from 
the late 17th century, as embodying the public interest. The national interest has become 
separated from the public interest of Europe, as embodied in the balance of power. This 
would open up for a defence of private interests, as I show in chapter 8. 
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Thus far, Fox himself had remained quiet during the debates. Now came his long-awaited 
speech. The parliamentary records note how he was met with cheers and exaltations. Fox 
started by asserting that the balance of power was not relevant to the issue at hand:  
Much argument has been used on topics, not unfit, indeed, to be mixed with this question, 
but not necessarily; topics, which undoubtedly may be incidentally taken up, but which 
are not essential to the discussion. In this class I rank what has been said upon the balance 
of Europe.51  
Fox then turned to what he considered the main debate, between isolation or intervention 
on the continent. If he had to choose, he said, complete isolation would be better than 
entanglement in continental affairs. But, he went on to say, these extremes are not 
necessary. This is a false choice, due to the balance of power concept. And now began the 
attack on the principle itself.  
He proceeded to dismiss the whole concept of the balance of power as an inconsequential 
principle; moreover, following its logic and supporting allies and the allies of allies, it 
would in fact not result in a balance favourable to Britain.52 As Justi, he claimed that the 
balance of power − if such existed − would obstruct prosperity for Britain and would not 
be in Britain’s interest. Then he played his strongest card: that the balance of power, as 
opposed to real practical politics, is a mere abstraction:  
What then are we to conclude from this intricate system of balances and counterbalances, 
and these dangerous theories with which the honourable gentleman seemed to amuse 
himself? Why, that these are speculations too remote from our policy; that in some parts, 
even according to the honourable gentleman’s argument, they may be defective, after all, 
and consequently, that if the system he builds upon it fails in one of its possibilities, it 
fails in the whole of them. Such must ever be the fate of systems so nicely constructed.53 
Fox went on to link it to the Whig isolationist rhetoric: 
But it is not true, that the system necessary to enable this country to derive the true benefit 
from the Dutch alliance, ought to be founded upon those involved and mysterious politics 
which make it incumbent upon us, nay, which prove its perfection, by compelling us to 
                                                          
51 Ibid., p. 358. 
52 PR17/31, p. 359. 
53 Ibid., p. 359, emphases added. 
191 
 
 
 
stand forward the principals in every quarrel, the Quixotes of every enterprise, the 
agitators in every plot, intrigue, and disturbance, which are every day arising in 
Europe.54  
The central bone of contention regarding intervention was the standing of the principle of 
the balance of power and, consequently, the relative isolation or not of Britain, and all of 
this in terms of Britain’s ‘interests’. The balance of power, maintained Fox, was just a 
fancy theory, invented with no relevance for the real interests of Britain and how politics 
really work. The important point was how to deal with any immediate need that should 
arise, and how to protect Britain.  
‘It was explicitly stated’, Fox observed, ‘as the only argument for our interference at all, 
that the balance of Europe was threatened with great danger, if Oczakow was suffered to 
remain in the hands of Russia’.55 Invoking the balance of power could not suffice. The 
balance of power no longer had the rhetorical power necessary for legitimating expensive 
foreign policies or interventions. Pitt’s rhetoric had failed in this, and Fox went on to 
criticise the balance of power, this time immanently:  
In order to shew that His Majesty’s Ministers merit the censure which is proposed, I will 
admit that the preservation of the Turks is necessary for the security of a balance of 
power. I trust, at the same time that this admission, which I make merely for the sake of 
argument, will not be disingenuously quoted upon me, as hypothetical statements too 
commonly are, for admissions of fact.56  
He attacked the historical event of Utrecht, using history in a different way from those 
who defended the balance on the basis of tradition.57  Utrecht was an error that showed 
how the balance of power was merely used as a cloak for partisan politics.  Regarding 
Louis XIV,  
he persisted in the war, until the folly and wickedness of Queen Anne’s [Tory] Ministers 
enabled him to conclude the peace of Utrecht, on terms considerably less disadvantageous 
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even than those he had himself proposed. And shall we, Sir, the pride of our age, the 
terror of Europe, submit to this humiliating sacrifice of our honour?58  
In addition to rhetorical attacks, the responses to them are of equal importance. Is the 
balance of power defended, and with resort to what? The balance of power was essential 
to Pitt’s defence. Now came the moment for Pitt to defend himself, and his rhetoric is 
interesting in underscoring the points made above. Pitt defended himself precisely by 
attempting to hold abstractions and practice together, rejecting the distinction between 
theory and politics in a revealing assertion:  
the general question of system is one part necessarily connected with the merits of the 
exercise of that system, and because it is impossible to separate the conduct of Ministers 
from the principle on which they acted […] then he should proceed to state the grounds 
on which this subject was taken up on that system.59  
In short, it is impossible to make a distinction between an abstract system, and the 
conduct of policy. And therefore, there is no need to enter into discussions of it either! 
The balance cannot be criticised, because it is by definition the instantiation of a wise 
political practice. ‘The wisdom or folly of the whole system will, in a great measure, 
depend on what is called the balance of power in Europe’.60 This was an explicit defence 
of the balance of power as both theory and practice combined – that is, the ‘traditional’ 
rhetoric. It was employed to oppose what Fox was doing – like Justi, Fox sought to 
distinguish clearly between useless abstractions and real policy. 
Pitt then turned to the second argument of Fox, disputing the presumed disconnexion 
between Britain’s interest and the balance of power, and tried to link the two together 
again. This is worth quoting at length:  
Many gentlemen seemed to think that the question of the balance of power has been 
improperly introduced into this subject, and that it has nothing to do with the discussion 
of this case, but was totally inapplicable […] The general balance of power, as applicable 
in this case to the arguments on the whole of the subject, has by some been the object of 
argumentative attack, and decried, and by others treated with affected ridicule; but on the 
regular discussion of this, much, in his opinion, depended. He had heard it allowed that 
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the balance of power was a question in which both sides of the House agreed in principle 
[…] when gentlemen admit that there is such a thing as the balance of power, what is it 
but saying, that if we are ourselves, or if our ally is, in a situation of danger from the 
overgrowth of another power, we should, from due regard to the tranquillity of Europe, 
use our endeavours to check the growth of that power; and indeed we may be engaged 
ourselves immediately in the calamity of war by neglecting this principle, when applied to 
one ally only. […] we ourselves might become the objects of attack, in consequence of 
inattention to the principle of the balance of power […] the point […] was, that the 
principle of the balance of power was such as we ought to regard with vigilance and 
attention, because we are so deeply interested in its consequences.61 
No nation in Europe, including Britain, would be safe if the balance of power were 
disregarded.62 In the quote above, Pitt also assumes the general agreement on the balance 
of power principle as backing for concrete claims, even if disputed, and tries to direct 
attention back to the implications of the balance of power.63 The balance of power as a 
principle was indeed disputed, as we have seen. Pitt, however, disregards this. ‘The 
balance of power is a thing’, he declared, ‘on which depends much of the happiness of the 
world, because, though in some particular instances it led nations to war, it contributed on 
the whole to promote general tranquillity, and to render wars of ambition less frequent 
and less destructive’.64  
The principle of the balance of power ‘cannot reasonably be denied’. Thus, the important 
question was its implications in the present situation: ‘whether the situation of the Turkish 
empire was such as to be affected in any great degree by the projects of the Imperial 
Court; and if so, whether this would, in fact, or probably might, have any effect on the 
balance of power in Europe?’65 That the relevance of Ochakov for the balance of power 
was contended in Parliament  
made it necessary for him to trouble the House so much upon the subject, that the balance 
of power, as applied to the Turkish Empire, was a wild and chimerical idea. Indeed, it was 
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contended last year specifically, that the whole of the question of the balance of power 
was irrelevant.66  
Now Pitt invoked the full authority of history and tradition against the balance of power 
as a ‘chimera’:  
from the earliest periods of the Turkish empire, down to the present, it had been held 
essential to the balance of power […] France, ever since the reign of Francis I., had been 
considered as forming a very material part of the balance of power of Europe […] in this 
country, since the reign of King William, in every memorable æra, down to the present 
period, it had been regarded in the same light. The principal powers of Europe had 
entertained the same opinion of it.67  
Further, he noted, not only is it based on tradition − Turkey’s importance to the balance 
of power had been argued  
by the best authors who have written upon the subject. It is remarked by Montesquieu; 
nor has it ever been denied by any author of any authority whatever. If this be true in 
general, how much more so must it be of the Turkish empire, when considered as 
threatened by the ascendancy of so great a maritime power as that of Russia.68  
The link between a national interest and the general public interest as expressed in the 
balance of power had been weakened. Even if Pitt had tried to reconnect the two, and 
recapture the notion of interests, as a final countermove he admits to their separation, but 
then tries to link the balance of power with self-preservation, as championed by Justi: ‘not 
only as an ally of Prussia, but also for the sake of the general principle of self-
preservation, our interference was dictated’.69 If this was the case, then  
the point of offensive or defensive war was not the question to be considered by those 
who were to interfere for the sake of preserving the balance of power […] this, he 
believed, was the origin of the dispute between the parties, and if so, it is not very 
material even on the point of justice, much less on the system of the balance of power.70  
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The balance of power concept cannot be studied apart from its uses, and studying 
controversies such as this allows me to catch a glimpse of the rhetorical processes 
constituting inflection points. This controversy clearly shows how some British 
politicians were attacking the balance of power by distinguishing between abstraction and 
practice, while others countered such attacks with arguments from tradition. In Pitt’s 
rhetoric, the balance of power is not about internal political party interests only, but based 
on historical precedents and generally valid maxims. The balance is given a ‘quality of 
out-there-ness by appealing to tradition, and authorities on the subject agreeing’, 
including the ‘principal powers of Europe’, as well as equalling the abstract principle to 
the empirical practice of ministers.71 It is a debate between universalist principles based 
on tradition, and the exigencies of practical politics. 
Pitt escaped charges of misconduct72 but left the debate further wounded and humiliated, 
and with his government seriously weakened. He had failed to legitimise his policy by 
deploying the balance of power concept. The balance of power no longer carried the same 
rhetorical force – it could be countered with accusations of its being an abstraction, as 
opposed to the reality of political practice and the ‘real interests’ of Britain.  
For those who still considered the balance of power a valuable principle, Pitt might have 
invoked Prussia and the need to uphold its position in Europe for the balance of power, 
but arguments about Turkey and against Russia could find no support in balance-of-
power arguments. These were, as explained above, founded on a European tabulated 
order of states.  
As a consequence of Pitt’s failure in these debates, the prestige of Britain plummeted on 
the continent. The Triple Alliance was dissolved, but by then the allies could gather 
around the French Revolutionary Wars.73 The Ochakov controversy was also an element 
in a wider contest between Britain and Russia over influence in Europe.74 It was a contest 
over the meaning and, not least, over the extension and applicability of the balance of 
power, as well as being a contest for leadership in Europe – for control over the balance 
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of power, between Britain and Russia. It concerned hierarchical relations both within and 
outside the system, couched in balance of power terms.75  
 
Conclusions: The European Commonwealth and the problem of intervention  
The case of Ochakov was one of the first formulations of the problem of intervention. In 
the 1790s, interventions were not yet seen as distinct from war, as a problem sui generis, 
but later interpretations of the Ochakov debates would reconstruct it as such. Ochakov 
became a reference point for intervention debates – an exemplary dilemma. In many 
respects, the most important actors during the Congress and the Congress system were 
Russia and Britain. In British debates, the experience of Ochakov was frequently adduced 
in policy debates concerning Russia and interventions during the first decades of the 19th 
century.76 
Edmund Burke (1729-1797) was also struggling with the repercussions of the Ochakov 
controversy. Today Burke is known primarily for formulating a conservative view of the 
European order. Less familiar is how his arguments shifted over the years. Burke changed 
his rhetoric according to the political circumstances.77  
Before Burke succeeded in triggering the British Revolution Controversy with his 
Reflections on the Revolution in France,78 he had for some time sought to convince the 
political establishment of the necessity of military intervention in France. Vattel and 
Grotius alike had argued that there was a right of non-interference, irrespective of the 
form of domestic government; and, as the 18th century drew to a close, few disputed the 
internal integrity of states in international law. The principle of non-intervention was, in 
John Vincent’s words, ‘a protector of state sovereignty’.79 Nevertheless, Burke’s early 
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argumentation creatively used Vattel and the kind of international law that was emerging 
to argue for intervention in France.  
Burke had begun by arguing that France was divided, so the revolutionary government 
did not represent its own nation, as it were. He had defended the French aristocracy 
against the revolutionaries who were threatening France with arbitrary rule. This 
argument had not concerned the preponderance of France as a European power, but 
France’s form of domestic government – it was an argument for regime change to protect 
the real French nation.80 However, even if states regularly did intervene in the domestic 
affairs of other states, publicly legitimising and arguing for intervention was another 
matter entirely. That was supremely difficult, and Burke struggled with this rhetorical 
task.81  
After the balance-of-power concept had failed to deliver the rhetorical goods during the 
Ochakov debate, the British government and its ministers were extremely cautious about 
arguing for anything resembling interventions and foreign escapades.82 In 1791, during 
the Ochakov controversy, Pitt wrote ‘that we wish wholly to avoid committing ourselves 
in any degree to any thing, which can show any disposition to encourage any sort of 
interference in the internal affairs of France’.83 
Despite Burke’s forceful arguments and the general hostility to the French Revolution, 
few calls to intervene were heard in Parliament or in public. Even when the 
Revolutionary Wars turned into a coalition war against the potential universal monarchy 
of France, intervention was a difficult case to argue.  
However, during the Ochakov debates, in a dramatic public display, Edmund Burke had 
broken with his friend and ally Charles Fox. After Ochakov, Burke stood free to argue his 
own policies as regarding France. His problem was how to convince the ‘extremely 
neutral’ Britain, as he called it, to intervene.84 Some developments helped Burke’s cause: 
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French military success threatened the Dutch republic – the traditional barrier against 
France – and France now explicitly aimed to export the revolution abroad.85 
From emphasising the internal harmony of France as a nation, based on principles of law, 
Edmund Burke now maintained that the fight against the revolutionary movement in 
France was a fight not only against a stronger power, but also against abstract knowledge 
and principles, which were not only useless, but now also dangerous. ‘We are at war with 
a principle’, he reiterated, whilst emphasising political practice against metaphysics.86 
What was needed was a return to ‘the idea of considering Europe as a vast 
commonwealth, of the several parts being distinct and separate, though politically and 
commercially united, of keeping them independent, though unequal in power’.87  
France, Burke now argued, was a threat to the European Commonwealth as a whole. It 
was a threat to all European monarchs – but it was also a threat domestically, since liberal 
sympathisers in Europe as well as in America were lending their support to an 
increasingly universalist revolutionary project.88 Thus, any talk of protecting the 
independence of France by refusing an intervention to stop the revolution did not make 
sense: revolution in France was not an exclusively French concern, but equivalent to a 
domestic concern for Europe as a whole.89 Europe was not in a Vattellian state of nature, 
but a ‘“diplomatick republic” with a right to decide whom to admit’,90 and where no 
member had the right ‘to revolutionise itself’.91 As Britain’s political circumstances 
shifted, Burke relied on political-practical precedence to argue for a commonwealth as 
being a prerequisite for international order, and the occasional ‘publick necessity’ of 
intervention.92 Here his arguments are noticeably different from contemporary views of 
‘international anarchy’. Burke argued the complete opposite: international politics in 
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Europe was – by custom, not by law – the equivalent of domestic politics. The domestic 
order in Europe, the ‘neighbourhood’, could be policed by means of intervention.93  
Only when Burke connected his concerns about the French Revolution to the protection 
of a European Commonwealth as a practical-political concern94 (and not with legalistic 
arguments over the status of domestic government) did his arguments gain resonance. 
Burke did indeed influence the British government, but only after changing his original 
rhetoric and linking it to political practice.95 Other politicians soon came to support 
Burke’s position, which now combined the traditional concern with the public interest of 
Europe and the individuality of states and the importance of orderly, domestic 
governance. The emphasis was on the Commonwealth of Europe, and the value of an 
orderly international society. Whig MP James Mackintosh initially objected that this 
emphasis on order ‘violated the sacred principle of national independence’ and ‘public 
morality’, but even Mackintosh eventually argued that the close connexions in Europe 
‘approached the condition of provinces of the same empire’.96 Castlereagh was later to 
describe the Congress system as ‘giving to the counsels of the Great Powers the 
efficiency and almost the simplicity of a single State’.97 
Burke, as both philosopher and politician, linked a problem of intervention to the classical 
idea of order and the public interest, while emphasising the dangers not only of a state too 
powerful, but also of a state too weak to support the European order. This is a concern 
with the domestic order of states, and is important because of a clear trajectory from 
Burke, to Prime Minister Pitt, and later to Castlereagh’s arguments during the Congress: 
getting rid of small powers is necessary, as they cannot carry the weight of the European 
order.  
As I go on to show in the next chapter, during the Congress period, the actors spoke of 
‘equilibrium’, not a ‘balance of power’. Henry Kissinger has pointed out how 
Metternich’s view of the European social order influenced Castlereagh and the concept of 
European equilibrium.98 However, also Burke was an important influence on this use of 
                                                          
93 Welsh, ‘Edmund Burke and the Commonwealth of Europe’. 
94 Burke, Reflections, p. 90. 
95 Hampsher-Monk, ‘Edmund Burke’s Changing Justification’, p. 82. 
96 Quoted in Hampsher-Monk, ‘Edmund Burke’s Changing Justification’, p. 99. 
97 Quoted in Pollard, Alfred Frederick. 1923. ‘The balance of power’, Journal of the British Institute of 
International Affairs 2(2): 51–64, p. 55. 
98 Kissinger, Henry A. 1957. A World Restored. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
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‘equilibrium’ rather than ‘balance of power’, and the implication that small states could 
be sacrificed. Castlereagh quoted and summarised Burke’s writings in his letters to his 
step-grandfather, and Friedrich von Gentz, aide to Metternich and secretary of the ‘group 
of eight’ at the Congress, translated Burke’s works into German.99 Edmund Burke helped 
make interventions a central problem in international politics. Burke emphasised orderly 
international affairs, but at the same time argued for intervention and the use of force 
against France, as well as against other states that might destabilise the moral, social-
systemic and cultural underpinnings of the European system.100 The Congress view of the 
‘equilibrium’ would in turn be a precondition for the later re-emergence of the balance of 
power as a concept – it would then be used to oppose the Congress diplomacy and to 
maintain an anti-interventionist position.  
 
 
  
                                                          
99 Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna, p. 21. 
100 Welsh, Jennifer Mary. 1995. Edmund Burke and International Relations: The Commonwealth of Europe 
and the Crusade against the French Revolution. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Balance of Power and the Congress of Europe 
 
In a genealogy, identifying breaks and inflection points in the historical development is 
central. This is the first chapter in my Part II where, according to the episteme shift, I will 
chart the break from a republican focus on the public interest of Europe, to a liberal focus 
on various national interests, and therefore also the premises for the problem of anarchy 
in international politics. A liberal focus on independent nation-states and national 
passions, combined with a focus on measuring capacities, led to the predominance of 
national positions over the public interest. Increasingly, the focus on interest – which 
‘could not lie’ –  and on the singularity and commonality of a European community or 
commonwealth composed of different interests shifted, and state interests and state 
survival became nationalised power politics, with heavy reliance on the military and on 
material capability. Both were new elements in the concept of the balance of power. Once 
capacities are to be calculated, the balance of power becomes tied to national positions 
and, importantly, the prediction of state behaviour and national trajectories. The balance 
of power had previously been oriented towards the past and tradition. Now it became 
oriented towards the future as well.1 This is the twisting trajectory of the balance of power 
in the 19th century – characterised by vacillations in the balance-of-power concept and the 
rhetorical positions it is used to defend.  
However, this episteme shift I identify is just that – a shift – and not a clear break. 
Therefore, the argument in this section is that the Congress indicates the gradually 
increasing ‘liberal’ focus on atomistic, independent states and the associated intervention 
problem. As we shall see, the balance of power started as a positive promise for the future 
peace of Europe, but then became a criticism of the ‘Congress system’. I show how the 
central debate during the Congress of Europe period involved the independence of states 
versus the European, international order, or the public interest. The public interest 
becomes associated with the Congress ‘equilibrium’, as opposed to the balance of power. 
                                                          
1 This fits Koselleck’s point about the new relation of past and future that emerged in this period. Tradition 
was rejected, and statistical measurement was the new thing, Historie was out, Geschichte in, etc.: see 
Koselleck, Reinhart. 1985. Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
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In a turn from the previous century, the balance of power was now used to oppose the 
Congress ‘equilibrium’, and to protect the independence of individuated nation states. 
When the Congress failed, actors picked up the old version of the balance of power 
concept to argue against interventions. Again, radical, liberal critics went on to denounce 
it. In this process, the balance of power increasingly emphasised national positions, as the 
concept was itself eventually nationalised. 
By ‘liberal’ here and in the next chapters, I do not mean to invoke some coherent 
‘tradition of thought’, but merely that a new type of argumentation implies a new canvas 
of possibilities.2 There were many liberalisms, and not just one tradition of thought with 
clear and stable boundaries. As I address in the next section, increasingly, self-proclaimed 
‘liberal’ arguments were associated with the emergent middle classes.3 The focus is still 
on argumentation and contestation – not only in the sense of ‘who says what’, but also the 
changing conditions ‘under which saying this or that can have a truth value, and therefore 
be effectively deployed, or capable of being uttered at all’.4 In this case, one changing 
condition concerned states as objects – during the 18th century, there was an atomisation 
and individuation of the states of Europe.  
 
… 
 
In the previous chapters on the 18th century, the balance-of-power concept concerned 
European order on the systemic level. As seen in Chapter 2, after the balance of power 
had become a counter-concept to Universal Monarchy, hegemony was rejected in theory, 
so other orders than a European empire or respublica christiana had to be devised. The 
problem was therefore in many ways one of imperial reconstitution. It addressed 
European order and governance in the positive sense as the promotion of a European 
public interest or ‘commonwealth’ and negatively as the opposition to universal 
                                                          
2 Hacking, Ian. 2002. Historical Ontology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 97. 
3 Bell, Duncan. 2014. ‘What is Liberalism?’, Political Theory 42(6): 682-715, p. 693; Leonhard, Jörn. 2004. 
‘From European Liberalism to the Language of Liberalisms’, Redescriptions 8: 17-51.   
4 Hacking, Historical Ontology, p. 79. 
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monarchy.5 ‘Order’ here did not imply anarchy, as is often assumed in discussing the 
balance of power. Rather, my empirical study of the balance of power rhetoric shows it as 
a means through which to establish hierarchies by means of authoritative justification. 
This hierarchy is visible already in the Utrecht Treaties; Austria tried to appeal to the 
dynastic order, but this failed as the balance of power was increasingly seen as a system 
to prevent any power from growing too big, and some polities gained a stronger claim to 
represent the ‘public interest’ than others.6 As detailed below, the Congress of Vienna 
was largely also a hierarchical affair – the Congress system of 1815–22 had its origins in 
the systemic and hierarchical understanding of the balance of power, which gained 
momentum from Utrecht onwards. The hierarchical ‘great power principle’ was not a new 
invention, but had been evolving from previous balance of power theorising about the 
European order. 
The hierarchical order of the Congress of Vienna is an important context for how political 
leaders could link the balance of power to liberal arguments about anti-intervention and 
the independence of nation-states. The Congress of Vienna was important, not as an 
instance of the frequent use of the balance of power – indeed, that concept was 
conspicuous by its absence during much of the Congress – but because the balance of 
power was first used to oppose the Congress in a manner that seems different from its 
18th-century uses. I look for contentions and debates, and the central debate during the 
Congress period involved the independence of states versus the European, international 
order, or the public interest.  
In this scheme of things, the Congress of Vienna is important, not so much for being an 
instantiation of balance of power politics as for being a crucial step in the transition from 
a concern with a communal European order to the individuation and atomisation of 
European states. The trend, seen in Justi, of emphasising the domestic aspects of political 
order (or ‘police’, as it was then called) continues here.7 When the protection of the 
public order of Europe was the overriding priority, the dominance of a too-strong state 
was the concern. In the early 19th century, the problem often concerned the presence of 
                                                          
5 See Chapter 2, Chapter 3. 
6 See Chapter 3. 
7 See Bukovansky, Mlada. 2002. Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in 
International Political Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 163. 
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states that were too weak. The issue was now not whether a dominant power should be 
confronted, but whether too-weak powers should be extinguished. 
This is how I will proceed: First, I will briefly show the development in arguments over 
the European Commonwealth, embodying the public interest, from the Ochakov crisis to 
the Congress of Vienna. I have shown the role of Edmund Burke’s arguments in linking 
the European Commonwealth, the public interest, and what was becoming a new, central 
problem – that of interventions in the domestic government of another state. Interventions 
became a prerequisite for a new order, and not its violation. One of the central documents 
for the Congress period, William Pitt’s plan from 1804, in turn reflects Burke’s argument, 
as it promotes the necessity of sacrificing small powers on the altar of a European order.  
I argue that the Congress system was a pre-eminently hierarchical order, led by the great 
powers. The hierarchical tendencies identified in the previous chapter came to fruition in 
the Congress, where categories of greater and lesser powers were institutionalised. In 
light of this trajectory from the early intervention debates to the institutionalisation of the 
rights of the great powers, I discuss the puzzling absence of balance-of-power rhetoric. 
Neither the political commentators of the day nor the delegates to the Congress of Vienna 
saw it as an issue of the balance of power. It was rather retrospectively constructed as 
such later in the century.  
The entire political project during the Congress period came to focus on aligning and 
synchronising domestic and international goals, as defined by the political leaders of the 
great powers, to protect the European Commonwealth and order.8 However, this 
synchronisation was nothing new, considering the emphasis put on the compatibility of 
the public and private interests in the 18th and 17th centuries. This trend had been 
underway since Utrecht, emphasising the systemic and pragmatic understanding of the 
balance of power, and rejecting Austria’s claims to dynastic legitimacy. What was new, 
however, was that domestic governance and international order were no longer assumed 
                                                          
8 See Kissinger, Henry A. 1957. A World Restored. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.; also: Simms, Brendan. 
2011. ‘A False Principle in the Law of Nations: Burke, State Sovereignty, (German) Liberty and 
Intervention in the Age of Westphalia’, pp. 89–110 in Brendan Simms and David J. B. Trim (eds), 
Humanitarian Intervention: A History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lawson, George and Luca 
Tardelli. 2013. ‘The Past, Present, and Future of Intervention, Review of International Studies 39(5): 1233–
1253, p. 1238.  
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to be the same thing. As the Göttingen academic Arnold Heeren noted, ‘the history of the 
European state system is not the history of the individual states’.9  
The Congress was conservative, emphasising the ancien regime, great powers, and 
European public interest and order in the face of revolutionary ideas. Metternich wrote 
that the welfare of Europe depended upon ‘the understanding between the great powers, 
based on the conservative foundation of their happy and grand alliance’.10 Still, the 
internal, domestic forms of government, or securing ‘police’ in all the European states, 
were important at the Congress11 – there should be ‘internal tranquillity in individual 
states’.12 Conversely, this focus on the domestic can be seen also in the 
institutionalisation of a group of ‘great powers’, differing not only in their capabilities and 
in size, but also how they were governed or policed internally.13 And yet, from the early 
19th century, a process of individuation of states, underscoring their independence and 
individual characteristics, gained momentum – what can, in retrospective, be called a 
classical liberal argumentation. The paradoxical change in the Congress period, then, is 
that in defining the commonwealth, or the public interest of Europe, one also emphasised 
the individuality of states, and the importance of domestic governance. The European 
order was treated as separate from the issue of national independence – and with this 
separation, the new problem of intervention came to the fore.    
Intervention was now seen as something different from war – as an act of assistance, not 
of aggression – and derived from the assumptions that the great powers of the Congress 
were the guardians of Europe’s interest.14 The Congress statesmen considered 
interventions as necessary to protect the European order, as a form of police assistance. 
                                                          
9 ‘Die Geschichte des Europäischen Staaten-Systems ist keineswegs die Geschichte der einzelnen Staaten’, 
Heeren, Arnold Hermann Ludwig. 1822 [1809]. Handbuch der Geschichte des Europäischen 
Staatensystems und seiner Colonieen, von seiner Bildung seit der Entdeckung beider Indien bis zu seiner 
Wiederherstellung nach dem Fall des Französischen Kaiserthrons, und der Freiwerdung von Amerika. 
Göttingen: Johan Friedrich Röwer, p. 6.  
10 Quoted in Haas, Ernst B. 1952. Belgium and the Balance of Power, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Columbia University, p 157, in Haslam, Jonathan. 2002. No Virtue like Necessity: Realist Thought in 
International Relations since Machiavelli. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 115. 
11 See Foucault, Michel. 2007. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–
1978. Houndmills: Palgrave, pp. 314–315. 
12 Talleyrand, quoted and translated in Osiander, Andreas. 1994. The States System of Europe 1640–1990. 
Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 227. 
13 See Neumann, Iver B. 2008. ‘Russia as a Great Power, 1815–2007’, Journal of International Relations 
and Development 11(2): 128–151. 
14 See Keene, Edward. 2013. ‘International Hierarchy and the Origins of the Modern Practice of 
Intervention’, Review of International Studies 39(5):1077–1090; Bullen, Roger. 1979. ‘The Great Powers 
and the Iberian Peninsula, 1815–48’, pp. 54–78 in Sked, Alan (ed.) Europe’s Balance of Power 1815–1848. 
London: Macmillan, pp. 54–55. 
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Interventions were now not a violation of the order, but a prerequisite for the new order.15 
The liberal anti-interventionists, by contrast, privileged the independence of states and 
argued that interventions violated essential civic liberties like the right to protest against 
arbitrary government.16 Still, both ways of arguing increasingly emphasised the domestic 
aspect of states – be it the internal form of government, or the protection of particularities 
through a focus on national independence.  
For example, Burke had argued that national independence and liberty were important, 
also in the case of France. Still, this liberty was nothing to celebrate until one could see 
how it was combined with ‘government; with public force; with the discipline and 
obedience of armies; with the collection of an effective and well-distributed revenue; with 
morality and religion; with the solidity of property; with peace and order; with civil and 
social manners’. And, Burke added, ‘liberty, when men act in bodies, is power’.17  
This development becomes even more interesting when I find that balance of power as a 
concept all but disappears during the Congress period, only to return when the Congress 
breaks down over precisely the issue of intervention. The Congress’ pro-interventionist 
arguments were connected to an emphasis on the public interest of Europe. The balance 
of power, however, was soon deployed to support anti-interventionism. This use of the 
concept is one important step in the conversion of the balance of power to a concept 
concerning national positions rather than protecting the public interest of Europe, and the 
increasing focus on national state capabilities over any notion of an international society. 
It is an important prerequisite and forerunner of ‘Realpolitik’ and, eventually, what we 
now recognise as classical realist arguments.  
The balance of power returned to official discourse in the 1820s and 1830s as a way of 
defending the individuality and independence of states from the universalist peace project 
associated with the Congress. The first step in explaining how this change could come 
about is to examine a central document that preceded the Congress, drafted by one of 
Burke’s most intimate interlocutors: by this, I mean William Pitt’s plan from 1804.  
                                                          
15 Bullen, ‘The Great Powers’, p. 55; Clark, Ian. 2005. Legitimacy in International Society. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 92. 
16 Bullen, ‘The Great Powers’, p. 56. 
17 Burke, Edmund. 1790. Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the Proceedings in Certain 
Societies in London relative to that Event. In a Letter intended to have been sent to a Gentleman in Paris. 
London: J. Dodsley, p. 9. 
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Pitt’s 1804 plan  
In 1804, as Napoleon was advancing through Europe, the Russian Foreign Minister, 
Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, presented Pitt with a scheme for a new Europe – a high-
flying, philanthropic proposal for a new and liberal European order.18 The old order was 
to be replaced by new, liberal governments throughout Europe, supported by a joint 
guarantee issued by Great Britain and Russia.19 Pitt did not agree that other countries such 
as Prussia and Austria should be ignored, but given the importance of Russia, he had to 
respond to Czartoryski’s proposal. He haphazardly wrote down a response, a ‘draft’, 
which would inadvertently become one of the crucial statements of British Congress 
diplomacy.20 In this document, officially from 1805, Pitt sets out the principles that would 
be upheld by and guide British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh at the Congress,21 
amongst them that some of the small states and ‘petty’ territories of Europe should not be 
restored to their former status after being liberated from France. They were too weak to 
fend for themselves, Pitt argued in this letter, and thereby also too weak to play a role in a 
future European order.  
Pitt’s proposal was not for a European federation, as the more liberal Czartoryski had 
imagined, but for a union of great powers who would mutually guarantee their own rights, 
thereby ‘re-establishing a general and comprehensive system of public law in Europe […] 
for repressing future attempts to disturb the general tranquillity’.22 In contrast to the 
Ochakov debate, there was no mention whatsoever of the balance of power. Pitt’s main 
substantial point concerned the importance of defeating and restraining France, and 
erecting barriers around it by strengthening Holland, Austria and Prussia as strong, central 
European powers.23  
                                                          
18 Frederic-Cesar de la Harpe, a Swiss follower of Rousseau, was tutor to Alexander I and had schooled him 
in liberal principles, which he took to heart. Herold, J. Christopher. 2002. The Age of Napoleon. New York: 
First Mariner Books, p. 342.  
19 Nicolson, Harold. 1961 [1946]. The Congress of Vienna. A Study in Allied Unity: 1812–1822. London: 
Methuen & Co., p. 52. 
20 Pitt’s Official Communication made to the Russian Ambassador at London, on the 19th January, 1805, 
explanatory of the views which His Majesty and the Emperor of Russia formed for the deliverance and 
security of Europe, reproduced in Webster, Charles K. 1921. British Diplomacy 1813–1815. London: G. 
Bell and Sons Ltd., pp. 389–394. 
21 Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 9, 53. 
22 Webster, British Diplomacy, p. 393. 
23 Gulick, Edward Vose. 1955. Europe’s Classical Balance of Power. New York: W.W. Norton, p. 143. 
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The war against Napoleon continued, and the allies eventually occupied Paris. The Fourth 
Coalition had defeated Napoleon and France, and the question was how to reorganise 
Europe after nearly 20 years of war and revolution. Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria 
were explicitly set on reconstructing a European order, and here the 1814 Treaty of 
Chaumont was the most important element. This was explicitly a ‘plan for the future 
rearrangement of Europe’ – and this treaty was based largely on Pitt’s rashly penned plan 
from 1804. The Chaumont Treaty bound the allies together, also in peacetime after the 
Congress,  
to concert together on the conclusion of a peace with France, as to the means best adapted 
to guarantee to Europe, and to themselves reciprocally, the continuance of the peace […] 
to maintain the equilibrium of Europe, to secure the repose and independence of it States, 
and to prevent the invasions which during so many years has desolated the world.24 
Castlereagh managed to incorporate clauses to ensure that the alliance would last for 20 
years after the peace, and barriers against France. He stated that it should also be a refuge 
for all the minor states.25 Less than a year later, he would disprove his own assertion.  
Castlereagh’s general foreign policy drew heavily on Pitt’s legacy, as did his extremely 
unpopular rhetoric and policy during the Congress. Facing heavy attack in Parliament 
over the issue of Genoa, Castlereagh produced Pitt’s 1804 original document as ‘a kind of 
scriptural justification for his own policy and action’.26 
The new problem of interventions was closely linked to the debate between liberals and 
conservatives, and to the view of the Congress, the leadership of the great powers – and 
the ends this was intended to achieve.27  
 
The Congress of Vienna and hierarchy  
The Congress of Vienna is a significant inflection point in the genealogy of the balance of 
power. However, it is not important because the balance-of-power concept was frequently 
                                                          
24 Ibid., p. 227; Jarrett, Mark. 2014. The Congress of Vienna and its Legacy. War and Great Power 
Diplomacy after Napoleon. London: I.B. Tauris, p. 57. 
25 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 10 March  1814, in Webster, British Diplomacy, p. 165. 
26 Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance, p. 145. 
27 Bullen, ‘The Great Powers’, p. 56, 58. 
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used – in fact, the importance of the Congress of Vienna for the balance of power lay not 
so much in what happened in the negotiations or at the Congress itself, but in what was 
going on ‘around’ it: shifting, contextual rhetorical coordinates that would impact the 
balance-of-power concept on its ‘return’ when the Congress broke down. One of the 
important things that happened around the Congress was the preventive incorporation of 
liberal elements in a conservative political order – most representatives at the Congress 
were conservative royalists, but they were not blind to the changing political 
environment. 
The Congress of Vienna was held from September 1814 until June 1815. Initially, the 
chief aim was to regulate and restore the European order after the Napoleonic Wars, by 
sorting out the territorial redistribution in Europe, and restoring the integrity of the 
monarchies that had been overthrown by Napoleon.28  
With time, however, the goal of preventing European radical and liberal revolutions came 
to dominate. After France was added to the four powers in 1818, the five great powers 
‘considered themselves as “Europe”; speaking in the name of Europe, they asserted 
successfully the ascendancy of the great Powers. France ceased to champion the cause of 
the minor Powers’,29 and the Congress turned its attention to fighting revolutionary 
tendencies throughout Europe, seeking to defend the traditional monarchical order.  
Austrian Foreign Minister Prince Metternich is often considered the main architect of the 
Congress. He advocated a conservative political order, rejecting most aspects of 
liberalism and national ideas. This task required a stable system of equilibrium that relied 
on solidly constituted states, also domestically. Now, it seemed, the problem was now not 
whether too-strong powers should be allowed to exist, but whether too weak-powers 
should  ̶  the problem was not universal monarchy, but useless and destabilising small 
states.  
Promises of extensive consultations with the smaller powers at the Congress were smoke 
and mirrors. The great powers snuffed out the independence of states at whim; this was, 
particularly after the vivisection of Poland, soon constructed as the opposite of everything 
                                                          
28 Even after the borders of France had been settled, there were still about 32 million ‘souls’ in territories to 
be settled. Jarret, The Congress of Vienna, p. 69. 
29 Peterson, Genevieve. 1945. ‘II. Political Inequality at the Congress of Vienna’, Political Science 
Quarterly (60)4: 532–554, p. 550. 
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the classical balance of power stood for. Those opposing the hierarchical Congress’ 
modus operandi would formulate their criticism in terms of the balance-of-power 
concept.  
The main issue at the Congress, and what triggered the cooperation of the four great 
powers in the first place, was the Polish–Saxon crisis. It is noteworthy that the Congress 
did not discuss this issue in a formal committee, but only informally with representatives 
of the four powers.30 In essence, Russia and Prussia together planned to divide the 
territories of Poland and Saxony between them. Britain and Austria feared this plan. 
France exploited this fear, and offered to stand on the side of Britain and Austria – if they 
would admit France to the ‘inner circle’ of the Congress. In the end, Russia received most 
of the Duchy of Warsaw, which was to become a new Kingdom of Poland, ruled 
independently of Russia. Prussia received about forty percent of Saxony. 
The issue of a division of Poland was once again a central problem of European 
international politics, and dominated the negotiations at Vienna.31 For my purposes, this 
is interesting for three reasons. First, the issue of Poland once again foregrounded debates 
over the independence of nations. Second, it illustrates how the great powers singled out 
states for incorporation based on their domestic, internal properties. These were 
measurable, and the Statistical Committee provided the Congress with complete 
population statistics – the number of ‘souls’ – for the territories conquered by Napoleon, 
to aid the powers in territorial redistributions.32 Third, it illustrates how the great powers 
were holding the reins of the European, hierarchical system.   
For some time, attacking the balance of power by invoking the cases of Poland and 
Ochakov had been a commonplace of radical rhetoric. For instance, in 1795, John Gale 
Jones, an English radical and supporter of the French Revolution, who was imprisoned 
several times for provocative actions against the government, argued that the balance of 
power had  
served with the present minister, as a favourite watchword to propagate delusion and 
excite alarm. When Oczakow fell into the hands of the Russian Empress, its vast 
                                                          
30 Webster, Charles K. 1963. The Congress of Vienna 1814–1815. London: Thames and Hudson, p. 91. 
31 Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 10–11. 
32 Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 146–47; Satow, Ernest Mason. 1922. A Guide to Diplomatic 
Practice, Volume II. London: Longmans, Green and Co., p. 80; Peterson, ‘Political Inequality’, p. 548. 
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importance was instantly held forth, and all Europe was said to be in danger: but when ill-
fated Poland was laid low, and her fruitful fields made desolate: when her liberties were 
invaded by lawless despots […] it was treated as a light and trivial occurrence.33  
Others, like Gentz in 1806, argued that the destruction of Poland was an abuse of the 
balance-of-power principle, and a terrible breach of it.  
In contrast, others argued that Poland was destined to be extinguished because it was too 
weak. It could not survive, given its capacities as a state and its rank in the civilisational 
order. Carl von Clausewitz’ opinions on Poland – the case ‘always on the lips of those 
who ridicule the idea of the balance of power’ – were representative. Rather than 
disproving the balance of power, he writes in On War, the division of Poland made sense 
because it was not a European state, but a ‘tartar state’ with a ‘disorganised political life’ 
and a population of ‘immeasurable frivolity’. In consequence, ‘it was impossible for it to 
last long’ because the ‘conception of an independent, separate state had disappeared […] 
Poland was little more than an uninhabited steppe […] a so-called state’.34 This line of 
argumentation is not unlike Pitt’s arguments: some small states are simply not strong 
enough to play a functional role in the European system. They create disorder, like a fifth 
wheel on a wagon.35 What is needed is the establishment of stronger, new states by 
integrating old ones – again an indication of the growing importance of national positions 
and individuation of states, also based on domestic capacity. 
The Congress of Vienna formally recognised the independence of states, but the great 
powers also had to protect the public order of Europe. In the conscious effort to 
reorganise Europe, the hierarchical organisation of Europe became more pronounced, and 
all but formalised into ‘great powers’, middle powers, and small powers. Great-power 
status depended on resources, but also on prestige and the way the domestic sphere was 
governed or its ‘police’.36 During the Congress, the five great powers were Britain, 
France, Russia, Austria and Prussia. Portugal, Spain and Sweden were secondary, middle 
                                                          
33 Jones, John Gale. 1795. Substance of a Speech, Delivered at the Ciceronian School, Globe Tavern, Fleet-
street, Monday, 2 Mar. 1795, on the Following Question: “At this Awful Moment of Difficulty and Danger, 
which Best Deserves the Public Confidence, Mr. Pitt Or Mr. Fox?”. London: Allen and West, pp. 12–13. 
34 von Clausewitz, Carl. 1952 [1832]. Vom Kriege. Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals Carl von Clausewitz. 
Bonn: s.n., pp. 104–108 in Wright, Moorhead (ed.) Theory and Practice of the Balance of Power 1486–
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powers, and could do little but to ratify the decisions of the great powers. Small states, 
such as Genoa, did not matter much at all, and could readily be sacrificed.  
The Congress of Europe was one of the most explicitly hierarchical collective 
arrangements that have existed in Europe – the European states were equal in name only. 
It has been called a collective hegemony37 or, in its own time, a collective universal 
monarchy. The hierarchical structure of the Congress is also reflected in the fact that it 
was not really a ‘congress’ at all: it was never formally opened, credentials were never 
verified, and it never convened in plenary session. The methodology of the Congress was 
not, and was not seen as, any different from previous diplomatic practices, except for the 
permanent geographic proximity of the representatives. Metternich himself declared that 
the Congress of Europe ‘was not a Congress; that its opening was not, properly speaking, 
an opening at all; that the commissions were not commissions; that in the assembly of the 
powers the only advantage they had to note was that of a Europe without distances: that 
they could agree, or they could not’.38  
Acting in the name of ‘Europe’ was nothing new. Still, it can be argued that including 
consultations also with the minor powers marked the institution of a new practice, even if 
the Congress itself was not particularly new or innovative, and did not lead to much (the 
important negotiations took place outside of the conferences themselves). But what did 
such consultation really imply? Castlereagh’s scheme was to organise a preliminary 
meeting before the Congress, to convince the smaller powers to let the great powers be in 
charge of business – a business that would include the extinction of some of those same 
small states. Here are Castlereagh’s own words, about his plan and how it should be 
presented to the smaller powers: 
the advantage of this mode of proceeding is that you treat the plenipotentiaries as a body 
with early and becoming respect. You keep the power by concert and management in 
your own hands, but without openly assuming authority to their exclusion. You obtain a 
sort of sanction from them for what you are determined at all events to do, which they 
cannot well withhold and which cannot, in the mode it is taken, embarrass your march; 
and you entitle yourselves, without disrespect to them, to meet together for dispatch of 
business for an indefinite time to their exclusion having at the same time the option to 
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confer with any of the plenipotentiaries separately upon the points in which they are more 
immediately interested […] The Further advantage is that, as you meet informally in the 
first instance as plenipotentiaries and not as a Congress, nothing is prejudged and nothing 
admitted till the leading Powers have had full time to weigh all questions well and to 
understand each other.39 
Castlereagh organised a congress in name only – the dominance of great powers was part 
of the plan from the beginning. However, that had to be concealed from the secondary 
powers – it must not be ‘offensively announced’, Castlereagh warned.  
Concurrently, Metternich’s project was to impose the ancien regime by force.40 It was 
made perfectly clear that it was the great powers – above all, England, Austria and Russia 
– that made the decisions. It was also specified that the Congress should not be based on 
the Treaty of Paris, but on the distinction between great and small powers.41 Portugal and 
Sweden had signed the Treaty of Paris, but were immediately excluded from participating 
in the central work of the Congress. Two of the other signatories, Spain and France, was 
allocated a humble role. All the other powers were excluded.  
The order in Europe was to be decided by the allied powers – ‘the effective cabinet 
should not be carried beyond the six powers of the first order’, Castlereagh asserted. As if 
this was not enough, there was to be another, even more exclusive, informal but real, 
inner committee of only four powers – England, Russia, Prussia and Austria – until 
France was accepted after 1818, and it became the committee of five. The ministers of the 
five powers made the real decisions in private, behind closed doors. 
The Congress never convened in full, but was composed of various less formal 
commissions and groups. The great powers brought the smaller ones along to be 
appeased, and then placed them in committees without any real power.42 Consider this: a 
committee of eight was supposed to address issues that affected the general interest of 
Europe as a whole: but it met only nine times during the Congress period, whereas the 
committee of five met 41 times. The committee of five, initially set up to deal with the 
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Polish–Saxon question, evolved into the real directing committee of the Congress.43 The 
committee of eight, which was supposed to be the most important one, only appeased the 
middle powers.  
As shown in the previous chapter, the balance of power served to stratify the European 
order, and increasingly so from the mid-1700s. This stratification reached its zenith 
during the Congress period. Therefore, the hierarchical ‘great power principle’ was in fact 
not a new invention of the 19th century – as argued by, inter alia, Webster, Nicolson and 
Osiander44 – but had been evolving from earlier balance of power theorising about the 
European order, and the different balances of which it was composed. This in turn means 
that the Congress does not mark an abrupt shift away from the ‘public interest’ of Europe 
to a new principle of ‘legitimacy’, based on, e.g., ‘consensus’ or ‘hierarchy’.45 Rather, the 
great powers had simply decided to run Europe by themselves – without involving the 
smaller powers, the public, liberals, revolutionaries, or indeed the intellectual élites of 
Europe in general.46  
One change in the legitimating practices, however, was that the commonplace of the 
balance of power was now not so much invoked as was the vaguer, more abstract notion 
of a ‘just equilibrium’. An ‘equilibrium’ and not the balance of power, was presented as 
the public interest of Europe. This would allow the balance of power to come back and be 
used as a criticism of the Congress, and to protect the independence of states. 
 
The Congress of Vienna and the myth of its balance of power  
The relationship between the balance of power concept and the Congress of Vienna is 
complicated, not because of what happened at the Congress, but because of subsequent 
interpretations of it. Political leaders or diplomats scarcely used the balance-of-power 
concept at all during the Congress period. It is only when the Congress broke down in the 
1820s that the balance of power was rhetorically mobilised in its classical sense, as 
prudent statecraft. 
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It is during this period, in the context of renewed criticism of the concept both in Britain 
and against Britain, that the Congress became reinterpreted as an instance of the balance 
of power. In its time, however, the Congress was never associated with the balance of 
power. Metternich referred to the balance of power as one of his principles but, again, 
only retrospectively in his memoires.47 Ranke (1795–1886) later argued that the Congress 
had really been an instance of the Balance of Power,48 and later, the balance of power was 
even equated with the European Concert system in general. In 19th and 20th-century Whig 
interpretations of the Congress, it was seen as violating liberal values and nationalism and 
consequently connected with the by then notorious, realist, and repressive balance of 
power.49 In the mid-1920s, in Strupp’s Dictionary of International Law and Diplomacy, 
for ‘balance of power’ we find the entry: ‘See European concert’.50 The interpretation of 
the Concert of Europe, instituted by the Congress of Vienna, as being a relatively 
peaceful period in European history thanks to a functioning balance of power has held 
sway until our times. The 1814–1815 peace settlement is therefore often quoted as a 
prime example of the balance of power in operation, or it is held that that the Concert 
facilitated or promoted a balance of power. 
However, the claim that statesmen designed a ‘concert system […] with the explicit and 
publicly announced objective of creating and sustaining an effective balance of power 
system’,51 that contemporaries discussed the Congress in balance-of-power terms,52 or 
that the ‘balance of power concept enjoyed pride of place’ in the Congress53 finds no 
support in the historical empirics. The one instance in which the balance of power is 
mentioned in a Congress treaty is in a secret article, not a public one.54 In 
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correspondence, treaties, or debates, the balance of power is barely mentioned and, 
although rate of use can tell us only so much, there is a decline in its use relative to the 
periods before and after the Congress.  
It is often pointed out that Friedrich von Gentz, the Congress secretary, wrote extensively 
about the balance of power. However, he wrote his Fragments on the Balance of Power 
in 1806, and later changed his views, rejecting the applicability of the balance-of-power 
concept during the Congress, preferring the conservative theory of the ‘new’ Congress 
system and great-power hegemony.55  
Paul Schroeder is therefore correct in maintaining that ‘any balance of power 
interpretation of the Vienna settlement is misleading and wrong’56 – although his reasons 
for rejecting this are altogether different, based on a study of ‘the actual distribution of 
power’ and whether this corresponded to a contemporary and analytical notion of ‘a 
working balance of power’.57  
My goal is different. It is not to construct a unifying narrative by trying to identify what 
was the real, motivating and all-encompassing concept in use or implicit at Vienna. As in 
the other chapters, to get at the meaning of the concept, I examine how the concept of 
balance of power was actually used by historical practitioners during this period.  
 
Equilibrium versus the balance of power 
One of my goals is to amend certain historical arguments prevalent in the discipline by 
looking at the balance of power in different ways. I hold that the balance was not central 
to the European congress, other than as a means by which to oppose it.  
Recall that one of the assumptions here is that many problems of interpretation arise from 
the ways in which a space of possible ideas has been formed – with Wittgenstein: our fly 
bottles are formed by prehistory.58 This applies to us, the analysts, as well as to the 
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historical actors we investigate. Therefore, it is important to take seriously yet another 
thesis: that the concept of ‘equilibrium’, frequently used by the historical actors and in 
treaties, is somehow equivalent to the balance of power. 
Is there a difference between ‘balance of power’ and ‘equilibrium’? How can we know, 
and what would it mean? Whereas both concepts concern the European system, broadly 
speaking, they are often assumed to be identical – that is, they are seen as expressing the 
same underlying but not specifically pronounced idea.59  
However, in line with the general precepts of this project, I will assume that if what 
historical actors meant was the balance of power, they would have said so, and not 
something else.60 Empirically speaking, references to the ‘balance of power’ are largely 
absent in this period (with a comeback after the Congress system), whereas ‘equilibrium’ 
is in fairly frequent use.  
Rhetorical practices and the uses of concepts are part of sense-making. Understanding 
involves classification, and the unfamiliar must be classified in terms of the familiar.61 
Actors seize on concepts that, with their publically established, commonsensical meaning, 
can help in making sense of the (political) environment. It follows, then, that 
‘equilibrium’ and ‘balance of power’ are necessarily different ways of doing this. They 
are not ‘the same’, simply because I note an abrupt transition in what was said.  
This is the crucial point: we have exhausted the concept of the balance of power not when 
we have identified all the other concepts that might correspond to it – but, strictly 
speaking, ‘when we have considered all the actual specific utterances of the 
corresponding words’.62 To use concepts as a frame is to explain why these words, and 
not others, were actually uttered.63 It appears that historical actors could do without the 
concept of the balance of power, as opposed to the central sense-making practices from 
previous decades, when the concept was all but indispensable for arguing about 
international politics. 
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The ways of framing and justifying an issue are also a part of producing a policy.64 If we 
accept that the balance and an equilibrium are indeed different, then framing European 
order as an ‘equilibrium’ instead of a ‘balance of power’ had consequences for the 
Congress period – just as the ‘return’ of the balance of power had consequences for the 
post-Congress period. Consider how Austria had been excluded at Utrecht, and now 
received poetic justice: Metternich successfully identified the ‘domestic legitimizing 
principle of Austria with that of the international order’65 in his use of the social 
‘equilibrium’ – a parallel, however imperfect, to what Britain had managed to achieve 
with the balance of power during the Utrecht negotiations.  
It is worth considering some possible reasons why equilibrium became the preferred 
concept for talking about European order. One answer could be that new problems had 
emerged, making the balance of power (which pertained to the ‘old system’) less relevant. 
If so, when the balance of power returned to the stage, it would have to be creatively 
reinvented, not least through liberal arguments. A related reason might be that the concept 
appeared less useful in an era of relative peace and stability. The war against France was 
not a war within the states-system against a dominant state, but ‘against an armed 
doctrine dedicated to the overthrow of the states-system as such’.66 That was indeed how 
Metternich conceptualised the forces and counterforces operating in Europe.67  
This points to equilibrium as a relation between social forces, and not an expression of the 
states-system only. Revolutionary principles were a threat to the system as such: and the 
balance-of-power concept was ‘internal’ to the system and could not conceptualise an 
external threat to its own existence. Another concept was needed to fill the rhetorical 
vacuum when the balance of power could not be used. Reference to some sort of abstract, 
unspecified ‘equilibrium’ in Europe between the social forces of revolution and reaction 
might then be seen as preferable. Furthermore, dynastic legitimacy was promoted, and as 
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such, the balance of power might not carry the right associations, particularly not for 
Austria’s Metternich.68  
Yet another argument is that the balance of power was implicitly present in the strategies 
of politicians and diplomats, but that they somehow found it unnecessary actually to 
invoke the concept, at least in public. Such arguments find support in some of the 
foundational documents preceding the Congress of Vienna,69 as well as the treaties made 
during the Congress period, which to some may seem instances of ‘balance-of-power 
thinking’, or the like. However, that line of argumentation would rely on an analytical a 
priori definition of the balance of power, and not empirical use of the concept. As 
mentioned, the balance of power does appears once in a treaty text – but then in one of 
the secret articles. The balance of power was not a public legitimising device during the 
Congress of Vienna. When used, it was tucked away in the secret, not public, clauses.  
In any case, one consequence of using ‘equilibrium’ instead of the classical balance of 
power was a shift for Britain away from the ‘balancer’ as a role, and helping to enforce an 
‘equilibrium’ in concert. As I show in the next chapter in the case of the Congress of 
Verona, when the Congress broke down, the British debate again started to revolve 
around the balance of power linked to the problem of intervention and involvement on the 
continent, in line with their classical role as ‘balancer’. 
There may be various reasons why the balance of power was no longer seen as necessary 
or efficient in political debates. Still, the precept of this project is to look for contentions, 
debates, and instabilities when the balance of power has been invoked. I have found three 
instances in documents of the time – one immediately before the Congress in 1813, as I 
addressed below. This is little more than a case of failed optimism on its behalf, and not 
really a contentious moment of debate, but it can serve to indicate the contentions and 
problems to come in the conflict between great-power order and small-state independence 
which I will show in the next chapter. There I will look at how the balance of power was 
invoked during the Congress negotiations in 1814, and in 1822 as the Congress system 
broke down in the period around the Congress of Verona.  
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The promise of a balance of power  
In 1813, the British Parliament debated the balance-of-power concept for the first time 
since the Ochakov crisis. With the promise of peace tangible, Lord Grenville was the one 
to re-introduce the concept in the Commons: 
The time, my lords, is now arrived (and I rejoice that I have lived to see the hour) when 
the walls of a British parliament may again re-echo a sound formerly held sacred in this 
country, and upon the observance of which, I will venture to assert, depends the hope of 
the restoration of peace to Europe: I allude to the old-fashioned term now almost 
forgotten, of a Balance of Power in Europe.70  
Britain was now yet again able to ‘pursue that which ought to be the only legitimate 
object of foreign policy; I mean the establishment and preservation of a balance of power 
in Europe’. Representatives shouted ‘hear, hear, hear!’, as Grenville went on to argue that 
Britain should ‘resume her ancient policy’ of maintaining the balance of power. The 
balance of power, and not ‘perpetual peace […] the visionary dream of visionary men’, 
was the only way to secure ‘the independence of the great commonwealth of Europe’ and 
the protection of the weak. Grenville was again interrupted by cheers, before he ended his 
speech with the now-familiar assertion that  
this country alone has no concern in such particular interests; she is the fit arbiter of all; 
and by whatever particular arrangements the balance of power is secured; her only care 
need be, that so beneficial an objects should be ultimately accomplished […] the balance 
of power should be the polar star that is to guide us in all our movements.71 
Prime Minister Liverpool agreed with Grenville ‘that we had reached a period when the 
balance of power might, without fear of ridicule, be talked of as the foundation on which 
might be erected a just and lasting peace’.72 These statements indicate the long absence of 
the concept, from after Ochakov.  
A few months later, the liberal Whig MP, philosopher, and professor of law, Sir James 
Mackintosh, indicated how the balance of power was now used, when he argued that the 
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main point of the wars had been for continental states to regain their independence. 
England should support this project, composed of the holy trinity the balance of power, 
the public liberty, and national independence. Britain was to ‘secure the permanent 
independence of those friendly states, by depriving others of the power of oppressing 
them’.73  
Seen from this position on the balance of power, the worst thing that had happened to it 
was the partition of Poland. Gentz had held that the partition was merely the pretence of a 
balance of power employed to achieve a criminal act: Mackintosh now argued that ‘had it 
not been for the criminal and disgraceful desertion of that system by the French and 
British governments, a great part of the calamities which have so long agitated Europe 
would have been avoided’.  
In contrast to Grenville’s optimistic cheers, Mackintosh continued,  
what security the allied powers may now seek in order to restore and maintain it [the 
balance of power], I know not. It is for his Majesty's ministers, and for those of the allied 
sovereigns, to view all the circumstances of Europe, with a reference to that most 
desirable object.74 
Lord Holland supported Grenville, and made a point of opposing any kind of intervention 
in the name of the balance of power. While emphasising the restoration of the balance, he 
warned that   
the re-establishment and maintenance of that balance can never consist in, depend upon, 
particular divisions of territory, so much upon the existence of a general feeling among 
the European states, that it is the interest of each to preserve the independence of each and 
all.75 
The balance of power, it seemed, was back. However, when invoked, the concept was 
now used to argue against interventions and for the independence of any state, however 
small. Still, the reason for the increasing criticism of the Congress was not the issue of 
Poland and Saxony. Poland had actually been granted independence under the Tsar – an 
advance from the previous division of the country; and only small parts of Saxony had 
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been ceded to Prussia. When it came to Genoa, however, its independence had been 
completely destroyed. Castlereagh, although not formally a Tory, was a strong personal 
supporter of Pitt. And Castlereagh’s Whig opponents, in presenting their case in 
Parliament, relied for their criticism – for the first time in over a decade – on the balance-
of-power concept – Pitt’s ‘own’ concept from Ochakov, as it were. The independence of 
nations and the balance of power became linked – a rhetorical configuration that hardly fit 
well with the great-power hegemony of the Congress system. 
 
Conclusions  
The Göttingen University attack on the balance inadvertently had led to a more liberal 
focus on individual states and their interaction. In the episteme shift, the balance of power 
shifted from being a republican concern with protecting the public interest, to being seen 
as a liberal expression of the independence of atomistic nation-states.  
In this, the Congress of Vienna is significant because of the shifting, contextual rhetorical 
coordinates that would affect the balance-of-power concept on its ‘return’ when the 
Congress broke down. The Congress of Vienna is not important because the balance-of-
power concept was frequently used, but because a different concept, ‘equilibrium’, 
appeared on the scene. For the Congress politicians, the public interest of Europe was 
now seen as being the equilibrium of Europe, to be managed by an exclusive group of 
‘great powers’.  
As the episteme shifted, the problem was not whether powers deemed too strong should 
be allowed to exist, but whether powers deemed to be too weak should. The problem was 
how to get rid of the small states now seen as useless, destabilising and lacking proper 
internal governance. 
In continuation, I will look at how these problems triggered a renewed use of the balance 
of power, used to oppose the Congress’ ‘equilibrium’, in the debates over the status of 
Genoa in 1814, and in the Congress of Verona of 1822, when the Congress system broke 
down as balance-of-power rhetoric was gradually invoked anew amongst politicians, to 
serve as a hitherto antiquated script. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The end of the Congress and the Return of the Balance: 
Interventions and the Public Interest from Genoa to Verona 
 
 ‘Well, Prince, so Genoa and Lucca are now just family estates of the Bounapartes’. This, 
the opening sentence of Tolstoy’s War and Peace, addresses the concern of the Russian 
aristocracy (the westernised Dvoryanstvo) with the independence of nations. Napoleon 
incorporated Genoa in his Empire in 1805, and Anna Pavlovna Scherer complained that 
the world had gone crazy when Genoa had to lay its petitions before Napoleon, ‘sitting on 
a throne and granting the petitions of the nations’.1 During the Congress system a decade 
later, the situation was paradoxically similar. The great powers, the vanquishers of 
Napoleon, the ‘Staatenaristokratie oder Oligarchie’, now ‘want to form a kind of tribunal, 
before which the small [states] must come so seek their rights, all political transactions 
must be registered and sanctioned, and the European international law has to await its 
authentic interpretation’.2 And Genoa had indeed come to approach Britain. In 1814, at 
the end of the war, Britain promised that if Genoa supported the allies against Napoleon, 
its independence would be restored.  
France wanted to negotiate bilaterally with England; Russia wanted a separate Russo–
British dual collaboration, whereas Britain itself wanted to include also Austria and 
Prussia, because the whole purpose of Britain’s policy was, once again, the opposition to 
France. In Castlereagh’s dispatches, no mention of troublemakers other than France can 
be found.3 The expressed goal of Castlereagh was to keep France out of the Italian 
provinces by using an extended Sardinia as a barrier, and to subdue any nationalist 
aspirations amongst the Italian states. Metternich also insisted that Genoa should be 
incorporated,4 whereas France and Spain protested. So did, naturally, the plenipotentiary 
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of the provisional government of Genoa, Marquis de Rignole.5 Crucially for Britain, both 
Austria and Prussia were to be a part of the settlement, and they would need some kind of 
compensation. What could be better compensation than European territory in the form of 
small states? One of the states that Britain deemed suitable as territorial compensation 
was Genoa. 
Lord William Bentinck was the British Minister in Sicily, and Castlereagh had instructed 
him to ‘take possession of Genoa in the name of his Sardinian majesty’.6 Bentinck replied 
that the Genoese were certain to resist fiercely such incorporation into Piedmont and the 
dominions of his Sardinian Majesty. Contrary to Castlereagh’s wishes, on 26 April 1814, 
he went ahead and promised the Genoese their liberty and independence in any case.7  
During the Congress period, Castlereagh was almost solely responsible for Britain’s 
foreign policy. Among his declared goals was the restoration for the independence of 
nations. Even so, as noted, he considered some nations too weak to be allowed to 
participate in the European community.8 Some small states, should independence be 
restored to them, ‘would be merely nominal and alike inconsistent with the security for 
the country itself, or for Europe’. These states should simply cease to exist: that was 
‘most conducive to the general interest’ as ‘there is evidently no other mode of 
accomplishing the great and beneficial object of re-establishing […] the safety and repose 
of Europe on a solid and permanent basis’.9 To Genoa’s dismay, Pitt and Castlereagh 
alike had placed it in this category. In April, Castlereagh agreed to the incorporation of 
Genoa into Piedmont because any other resolution would lead to a ‘weakness and 
therefore the insecurity of Italy’.10 A secret clause in the Treaty of Paris stipulated this, as 
an element in strengthening the barrier to be constructed around France. 
The Genoese delegation to the Congress, led by the Marquise de Brignole-Sale, was 
stunned to hear Britain argue that Bentinck had not been authorised to make his promises 
of liberty, and that Genoa was instead scheduled for incorporation into the Kingdom of 
                                                          
5 Ward, A. W. 1906. ‘Chapter XIX, The Congress of Vienna, I. 1814–15’, pp. 576–615 in A. W. Ward, G. 
W. Prothero, and Stanley Leathes (eds) The Cambridge Modern History. Volume IX. Napoleon. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 599–600.  
6 Nicolson, Harold. 1961 [1946]. The Congress of Vienna. A Study in Allied Unity: 1812–1822. London: 
Methuen & Co., p. 185. 
7 Ibid., p. 186. 
8 Kissinger, A World Restored, p. 38. 
9 Webster, Charles K. 1921. British Diplomacy 1813–1815. London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd., p. 391. 
10 Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 186. 
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Sardinia. As Castlereagh noted, Bentinck had been ‘inconsiderate’ in ‘making a 
declaration in favour of the old system’.11 Castlereagh wrote to Bentinck that he did not 
wish that ‘the too extensive experiment already in operation throughout Europe, in the 
science of Government’ should be augmented; further, that ‘it is impossible not to 
perceive a great moral change coming on in Europe, and that the principles of freedom 
are in full operation […] we have new constitutions launched […] it is better to retard 
than accelerate the operation of this most hazardous principle which is abroad’.12 
Incorporating Genoa into the kingdom of Sardinia was the first decision taken on behalf 
of the Congress.13 This very first decision was also the moment when the balance of 
power was again mustered in support of the independence of states, and against the 
dealings of the Congress. The more salient issues, like the Polish–Saxon question, were 
not discussed in balance-of-power terms, even though they were seen as the core of the 
whole settlement.14  
In this chapter I investigate two concrete debates – one of them over Genoa – which will 
also help to make it even clearer why the Congress of Vienna was an inflection point, and 
show the shift in episteme away from a republican focus on the public interest of Europe, 
towards a liberal focus on state independence: The public interest of Europe had now 
become associated with the ‘European equilibrium’. That was the order advocated by the 
great powers at the Congress, who were willing to sacrifice independent, small states. 
This public interest of Europe now came to be opposed by invoking the balance of power 
as a means to protect the independence of states from intervention, not the ‘public 
interest’.   
The conflict between the need for interventions to protect the order of Europe, and the 
independence and protection of even the smallest states, was at the core of the few 
debates where the balance of power was invoked in the first years of the 19th century. The 
only major controversy involving the balance-of-power concept during the Congress 
period occurred in the debate over Genoa, on the central problem of how to treat the 
independence of the smaller states. The debate over Genoa is an early instance in which 
                                                          
11 Castlereagh to Liverpool, in Webster, British Diplomacy, p. 180. Emphasis added. 
12 Castlereagh to Bentinck, in Webster, British Diplomacy, p. 181. 
13 On November 13th and 17th 1814. 
14 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 91. 
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the balance of power was invoked to support national positions, if not yet at the expense 
of a purported ‘public interest’.  
Not only were states increasingly individuated, and their independence and sovereignty 
formally asserted, but also arguments concerning nations and the national spirit inherent 
to diverse peoples began to make an impact. Europe was not seen solely as a mechanical 
system, but as an organic and natural one. Such arguments were initially linked to the 
equilibrium concept, used to defend the Concert system. Statesmen of the time were 
obviously aware of desires for nation-states across Europe15 – but these were largely 
ignored by the Congress.  
Some urged the Congress politicians to respond to the national ‘passions’, and questioned 
the legitimacy of the Congress itself.16 And some started questioning the appropriateness 
of ‘this kind of directory of four powers who are arrogating to themselves the right to 
decide the affairs […] of the rest of Europe without its participation’.17  
The balance of power did not figure centrally in political debates during the Congress 
period. However, as mentioned earlier, frequency of use as such is not a main point in this 
project. Therefore, in this chapter I will focus on the two exceptions to this notable 
absence of balance-of-power rhetoric – and exceptions are always interesting. These 
exceptions can tell us much about the new ways in which the concept was (to be) used 
after the shift in episteme – perhaps even more so than if it had been frequently deployed 
throughout the Congress. In both, the concept was deployed in arguments and rhetorically 
mobilised against the Concert and British concert diplomacy.  
In the first exception, the balance of power was now used to demean the politics of the 
Congress system for sacrificing small states, like the Republic of Genoa, for the interest 
of the great powers, or the ‘collective Universal Monarchy’ as one commentator labelled 
the pentarchy of great powers. Castlereagh’s Congress policies died with him in 1822, 
and the Congress system faltered. As a consequence of substituting ‘equilibrium’ for 
balance of power, the role of Britain shifted from that of the ‘balancer’, to a lukewarm 
                                                          
15 See Castlereagh to Bentinck above. 
16 Kleinschmidt, Harald. 2000. The Nemesis of Power. London: Reaktion Books, p. 167. 
17 Russian Foreign Minister Capodistraias in 1818, quoted in Bridge, Roy. 1979. ‘Allied Diplomacy in 
Peacetime: the Failure of the Congress “System”, 1815–23’, pp. 34–53 in Sked, Alan (ed.) Europe’s 
Balance of Power 1815–1848. London: Macmillan, p. 37. 
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contribution to the Concert equilibrium. In the second exception, the balance of power 
returned with élan: It was rhetorically mobilised – also in official discourse – in 
opposition to the Congress, now as prudent foreign policy in the British tradition, 
restoring Britain’s traditional role as ‘balancer’, which had been impossible to claim in 
the Congress system of ‘equilibrium’.  
 
Sacrificing Genoa 
No other Congress decision so infuriated the Whigs18 as the Tory Prime Minister 
Castlereagh’s abandonment of Genoa. In 1815, both the Commons and the Lords heatedly 
debated this transfer of Genoa at the hands of Britain, particularly given Bentick’s broken 
promise to the Genoese. This debate had its precursor in Burke’s arguments on the French 
Revolution. James Mackintosh was a liberal defender of the rights of man and the French 
Revolution. His main book Vindiciae Gallicae had been a response to Burke’s attack on 
the French Revolution, featuring a strong, Whig defence of the Revolution, even if he 
later withdrew his support for France.19 Now, he led the charge against Castlereagh in 
Parliament, seeking to save Genoa from being usurped, by using ‘national independence’, 
‘national spirit’ and, not least, the balance of power as his rhetorical tools. Sheehan 
argues that Mackintosh ‘misrepresented the reality of the pre-1792 system’20 and the 
balance of power. However, my concern here is not so much to judge whether historical 
actors were right or wrong in their use of the balance-of-power concept, as it is to show 
how the concept was used and deployed in concrete arguments and for concrete political 
purposes, regardless of historical ‘correctness’. 
The debate began with the accusation that the allies had made the Congress of Vienna 
‘unholy’ by their actions towards Genoa. Castlereagh, for his complicity in this act, 
should be ‘arraigned before the tribunal of the world’.21  
                                                          
18 Jarrett, Mark. 2014. The Congress of Vienna and its Legacy. War and Great Power Diplomacy after 
Napoleon. London: I.B. Tauris, p. 136. 
19 Phillips, Mark Salber. 2000. Society and Sentiment: Genres of Historical Writing in Britain, 1740–1820. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 193. 
20 Sheehan, Michael. 1996. The Balance of Power: History & Theory. London: Routledge, p. 125. 
21 Commons Sitting of Monday, 13 February, 1815. Hansard, Thomas Curson. 1815. The Parliamentary 
Debates from the Year 1803 to the Present Time, Vol. XXIX. London: Longman et al., col. 737. 
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It was argued that the ‘unfortunate Genoese had not only been delivered over, like droves 
of cattle,22 to the king of Sardinia, but they had been so delivered over by England; 
England had been the instrument of this oppression’. Such incorporation could not 
possibly be justified by a balance of power, which, it was now argued, ‘would always be 
found, by sovereigns, in the steady affections of the people to their government’.23  
In the debates, Macintosh started by referring to ‘the work of my celebrated friend Mr. 
Gentz’, who, he maintained, ‘would have found the incorporation of Genoa justly 
reprobated as one of the most unprincipled acts of French tyranny’.24 Far from being in 
accordance with the balance of power, the treatment of Genoa was ‘not the policy of the 
preservers or restorers of the European commonwealth. It is not the principle of the 
balance of power’, which should instead be defensive, and ‘a system which provides for 
the security of all states, by balancing the force and opposing the interests of great 
states’.25  
Mackintosh went on to invoke the balance of power. In a comment I find instructive, he 
argued, ‘the independence of nations is the end: the balance of power is only the means. 
To destroy independent nations in order to strengthen the balance of power, is the most 
extravagant sacrifice of the end to the means’.26 The independence of nations is what the 
balance of power is meant to promote – not the ‘liberties of Europe’, the ‘public interest’, 
or any other formulation familiar from the preceding century.  
This clearly shows the shift in episteme – the balance of power moves away from a 
concern with protecting the public interest, to being considered increasingly as a liberal 
expression of independent nation states, emphasising the freedom from interference and 
interventions. Furthermore, it foreshadows how the state would come to replace the 
balance of power as the first principle of international politics, as addressed in the next 
chapter.  
                                                          
22 This rural metaphor was recurrent in arguments for the independence of small states, and against the 
policies of the Congress. See Hemstad, Ruth (ed). 2014. Like a Herd of Cattle. Parliamentary and Public 
Debates Regarding the Cession of Norway, 1813-1814. Oslo: Dreyers Forlag.  
23 Commons Sitting of Tuesday, 21 February, 1815. Ibid., col. 930. 
24 Commons Sitting of Thursday, 27 April, 1815. Hansard, Thomas Curson. 1815. The Parliamentary 
Debates from the Year 1803 to the Present Time, Vol. XXX. London: Longman et al., col. 909.  
25 Ibid., col. 924. 
26 Ibid. 
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Castlereagh had inverted ‘all the principles of the ancient and beautiful system of Europe’ 
by inventing his own ‘maxime of what the noble lord, enriching our language with 
foreign phrases as well as doctrines, calls “a repartition of power”’.27 When Castlereagh 
argued that small states were incapable of existence, Mackintosh continued, he was 
avowing ‘that he is returned in triumph from the destruction of that system of the balance 
of power of which indeed great empires were the guardians, but of which the perfect 
action was indicated by the security of feebler commonwealths’.28 The interventions of 
the great powers had been made ‘into the sole title of dominion and universal tenure of 
sovereignty. Vienna […] made the treaty of Westphalia appear no more than an 
adjustment of parish boundaries’.29 The new order imposed after Vienna overrode ‘the 
ancient system of national independence and balanced power which gradually raised the 
nations of Europe to the first rank of the human race’.30  
The real balance of power, the argument went, had always been concerned with the 
protection of small-state independence; and ‘under this system, no great violation of 
national independence had occurred, from the first civilisation of the European states, till 
the partition of Poland’.31  
This was a debate over the meaning of the ‘public’ interest of Europe, or the European 
Commonwealth. Clearly, according to Mackintosh, it did not compose the interest of the 
great powers of the Concert. He employed a domestic analogy in talking of ‘principles, 
which stood in the stead of laws and magistrates’, to argue that the public interest of 
Europe should provide for the security of ‘defenceless communities’, in the same way ‘as 
the safety of the humblest individual is maintained in a well-ordered commonwealth’. 
This, he argued, was what permitted ‘calling such a society the commonwealth of 
Europe’. Now, however, ‘Europe can no longer be called a commonwealth’, because ‘her 
members have no safety but in strength’.32 In other words, the balance of power, as 
embodying the public interest, is something different from states relying on ‘strength’.  
                                                          
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., col. 900. 
30 Ibid., col. 901; see also Hampsher-Monk, Iain. 2005. ‘Edmund Burke’s Changing Justification for 
Intervention’, The Historical Journal (48)1: 65–100, p. 99. 
31 Hansard, Vol. XXX, col. 924. 
32 Commons Sitting of Thursday, April 27, 1815. Hansard, Vol. XXX, col. 925. 
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The new links between liberal argumentation and the balance of power concept, 
evidencing the episteme shift, become even clearer when he argues that the balance of 
power is ‘only a secondary guard of national independence’, and that  
the paramount principle, the moving power, without which all such machinery would be 
perfectly inert, is national spirit. To sacrifice a people actuated by this spirit, to overrule 
that repugnance to the yoke of a neighbour, which is one of the chief bulwarks of nations, 
is in the effect, and much more in the example, to erect a pretended balance of power by 
the destruction of that spirit, and of those sentiments, which alone render that balance 
effectual for its only useful purpose – the protection of independence. The Congress of 
Vienna seems, indeed, to have adopted every part of the French system, except that they 
have transferred the dictatorship of Europe from an individual to a triumvirate.33 
It is indeed difficult to find a clearer declaration of the burgeoning nationalisation of the 
balance of power than this. The balance of power is again presented as a true alternative 
to what we would now call ‘international anarchy’ as representing the public interest of a 
Commonwealth of Europe. Now, however, after the episteme shift, this public interest is 
based on ‘national spirit’, as contrasted with what is presented as the equivalent of a 
dictatorship. For Mackintosh, these principles of self-determination were not grounded in 
popular or abstract rights, but in the same considerations Burke had used in arguing for 
intervention in France: as part of an inherited and custom-based international system. 
This was crucial to the ‘existence of social order’, in which everyone had joined against 
France for ‘the re-establishment of that system, and these principles under which it had 
become great and prosperous’.34 Although a liberal, Mackintosh relied more on what Karl 
von Rotteck called ‘historisches Recht’, positive law, than on the ‘Vernuftrecht’, or 
natural law, on which liberals were often seen to rely.35 These were not the universalist 
abstractions associated with the French Revolution.36 
                                                          
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., col. 921. 
35 Holbraad, Carsten. 1970. The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and British International Theory 
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36 See Hampsher-Monk, ‘Edmund Burke’s Changing Justification’. 
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Castlereagh became extremely unpopular in Britain, seen as a suppressor of nationalism 
and the architect of the counter-revolution. When he committed suicide in 1822, he was 
not widely mourned.37  
This debate showcases one of the main conflicts of the first part of the century – between 
the European Commonwealth and ‘public interest’ as guaranteed by the great powers on 
the one hand, and the concern for another kind of ‘public interest’ – the independence of 
states and, increasingly, their national aspirations – on the other. This conflict dominated 
the Congress system and the debates in the wake of its demise, and in this, the uses of the 
balance of power are very different from the previous century, before the shift in 
episteme.  
It should be borne in mind that this debate is an exception – a rather isolated incidence of 
balance-of-power rhetoric. Perhaps not surprisingly, the concept did not return as a 
commonplace amongst élites and public officials until the death of Castlereagh and the 
demise of the Congress system some eight years later – when Mackintosh once again, and 
this time in concert with Castlereagh’s successor George Canning, breathed life into the 
concept. This revival triggered liberal criticism, with the radical Cobdenites attacking the 
balance of power, now by insisting on private interests and trade as being the road to 
peace and order.  
The balance of power and the rhetorical positions supporting it did indeed change. The 
balance of power had started as a promise of peace, but had turned into a means for 
attacking the Congress policies. In the next section, we will see how the Congress failed, 
and actors took up that classical concept to argue against interventions conducted in the 
name of the Congress equilibrium. These are steps in the trajectory towards emphasising 
national position following the episteme shift. 
Tolstoy started his War and Peace with the aristocracy blaming Napoleon for the 
submission of the independent nation of Genoa. Tolstoy notes:  
if we assume as the historians do that great men lead humanity to the attainment of certain 
ends – the greatness of Russia or of France, the balance of power in Europe, the diffusion 
                                                          
37 In fact, his poor reputation as a political leader can be said to have lasted until Kissinger’s PhD and book, 
A World Restored. 
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of the ideas of the Revolution, general progress or anything else – then it is impossible to 
explain the facts of history without introducing the conceptions of chance and genius.38  
Despite focusing on individuals saying things in public, I hope to avoid the same mistake 
of attributing every and any change in the concept to the designs of individuals, be they 
geniuses or not. The complex process of doing things with words in contexts often leads 
to unintended outcomes. One such outcome was the upswing in balance-of-power rhetoric 
just as the Congress was disintegrating during the Congress of Verona in 1822. 
 
Verona and the return of the balance of power as a liberal concept  
In the uproar against Genoa, the balance of power was used against the government, and 
for protecting state independence. The balance of power concept returned in this version, 
as Castlereagh died, and the Congress faltered. 
Politicians seeking to rehabilitate the balance of power in a new context, addressed Justi’s 
concerns and criticisms of the balance of power, as seen in the previous chapter, but 
managed to incorporate these into a new, liberal way of arguing with the balance-of-
power concept. The ‘passions of nations’ so feared by Metternich was now not used to 
argue against a mechanistic balance of power theory, as Justi had done, but was 
incorporated within it. The episteme shift identified implies precisely this: It was now less 
about protecting something, like the public interest, and more about dampening disruptive 
dynamics between nations in the European body39 – balance-of-power arguments now 
worked when they could mediate between conflicting national passions and national 
positions. Now, the balance of power did not express a common European interest, but 
participated in its demise.    
At the time of the Congress of Verona, a Greek revolt was brewing, and there was little 
disagreement that this was a European problem, to be dealt with jointly by the Congress 
powers (exactly what to do was disputed). The Greek question was the initial reason why 
Britain bothered to show up at all. Britain wanted recognition of the belligerent rights of 
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the Greeks, but without committing Britain to any intervention, and indeed, Greece was 
not found important or threatening enough to warrant intervention.  
Jennifer Mitzen cites the Greek question at Verona as an instance of a European public 
power, working to keep the competition between great powers at bay.40 Another side to 
the Verona story is how the allies approached the ongoing Spanish Revolution – an issue 
primarily concerning the central European powers of France and Spain, ‘in the midst of 
the system’, as Bolingbroke had said during the War of the Spanish Succession.41 
Whereas the topic of all the previous congresses, and now the Greek revolt, concerned 
‘the Eastern Question’, Spain held a different importance than eastern European powers 
further away from France and Britain,42 and was another matter entirely. Contrary to the 
standard arguments43 it was Spain, not Greece and the ‘Eastern Question’, that was the 
central issue at Verona as far as the balance-of-power concept is concerned, and the only 
issue discussed at the Congress of Verona itself. The balance of power was now involved 
not in constructing a common European interest, but in unravelling it.   
After Napoleon, the Congress powers had restored King Ferdinand VII to the Spanish 
throne. The reactionary monarch refused to adopt the Spanish Constitution of 1812, one 
of the most liberal of its time, and in 1820 faced a rebellion in favour of a constitutional 
monarchy. This was led by Spanish General and liberal conspirator Rafael del Riego, who 
captured and detained the king at Cádiz, the location of the Cortes, the Spanish national 
assembly. To the Congress powers, this revealed the conspiratorial and infectious nature 
of European revolutions.44  
Therefore, in October 1822, alarmed by these events, the European five great powers 
(Russia, Austria, Prussia, France and the United Kingdom) convened in Verona in 
northern Italy. As before, business was conducted between the ministers of the five great 
powers, this time in Metternich’s apartment in the Cappellari Palace in Verona: he had 
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proposed to ‘reduce the negotiations to simple conversations between the heads of the 
five cabinets’.45 
Only a month earlier, the death of Castlereagh had opened the Foreign Office to the Tory 
George Canning. Canning’s policy was to avoid too close cooperation with other 
European powers. He informed the Congress that, ‘come what may’, Britain would never 
support any intervention in Spanish internal affairs, and would take no part in the 
discussions at Verona.46 Canning saw the whole Congress system as a ‘very questionable 
policy’ and the alliance as superfluous after the defeat of France. He promoted the liberty 
of nations to make their own choices without the interference of the ‘despotic’ continental 
states.47 
The question of intervention was therefore the main issue at the Congress of Verona – 
how were decisions on interventions to be made? What was required? When should the 
great powers intervene, and who should participate? These discussions were made more 
complex because any perceived political profligacy on part of the continental allies – with 
Russia foremost in mind – could mean a British withdrawal from the Congress. The big 
question was how to mediate between Russia’s assertiveness, and Britain’s anti-
interventionist policy.48 
France had proposed to intervene in Spain to halt the insurrection; ‘dangers could be 
foreseen […] War was possible, perhaps even likely. Such a war could only be considered 
as defensive’, the French minister Montmorency argued.49 He posed three formal, and 
quite leading, questions concerning allied solidarity. If France acted, would the Allies 
withdraw their ministers from Madrid? Would they give France their moral support and 
‘inspire a salutary fear in the revolutionaries of all countries’? And what kind of material 
aid would the allies provide?50 France clearly wanted to keep the intervention French.  
The allies eventually resolved to send a communiqué to Spain, informing the Spanish 
government of the Congress deliberation, as well as recalling their ambassadors. This 
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49 Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 323–24. 
50 Temperley, Harold. 1925. The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822–1827: England, The Neo-Holy Alliance, 
and the New World. London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., pp. 65–66. 
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would be a clear threat of intervention. The Duke of Wellington, now British 
representative at the Congress, maintained that Britain would have nothing to do with any 
sending of declarations to Spain in support of France, arguing that the only power for 
improving domestic affairs in Spain was Spain itself. That Spain should be seen as a 
threat to France, he argued, was ludicrous.51 Wellington did not respond to any of 
Montmorency’s questions, and left the negotiations. The four other allies went ahead 
without Britain, and sent their instructions to Madrid.52 Eventually, the Congress 
authorised France to intervene in the conflict and restore the Antiguo Régimen of 
Ferdinand, with Britain abstaining from that decision. On 7 April 1823, some 100,000 
French soldiers crossed into Spain, and Ferdinand VII was successfully restored as King. 
Canning was furious. He objected to foreign interference in the domestic affairs of a 
sovereign country, but also to the evidently reasserted dynastic policies between Spain 
and France – a less than welcome historical trend. Also the British public protested this 
intervention, and it became one of the most contentious events of international politics of 
the day.53  
What Canning did not lament was the disintegration of the Congress. ‘The issue of 
Verona’, he declared, ‘has split the one and indivisible alliance into three parts as distinct 
as the Constitutions of England, France, and Muscovy […] so things are getting back to a 
wholesome state for us all. Every nation for itself, and God for us all’.54 The French 
envoy to Naples alleged that ‘the politics of the interest, of the ambitions of one power 
versus the other, the old politics, if you wish, will resume all its right’.55 Verona is ‘the 
last of the European congresses’, another Frenchman argued, as the sovereigns were now 
looking after ‘their personal interests and individual defense’.56 
The position of England, Canning later observed, was now ‘one of neutrality, not only 
between contending nations, but between contending principles; and it was by neutrality 
alone that we could maintain that balance […] essential to the peace and safety of the 
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world’.57 Britain returned to its classical role as ‘balancer’ – a role that had been 
impossible in the ‘just equilibrium’ guaranteed by a great-power concert.  
Again, my different perspective on the balance of power allows me to consider new 
empirical material connected to its practice. The literature generally considers the British 
break with the alliance to be the fact that lends the otherwise uninteresting Congress of 
Verona some historical importance. Still, just as with the Ochakov crisis, there was a 
connected but less recognised political debate, in a domestic setting but with international 
repercussions, that centrally involved the balance of power. The balance of power was 
linked with other issues not normally considered a part of it, because of the restrictions of 
an analytical, scholarly definition. 
 
‘The Interest of England’ and the 1823 controversy 
In addition to criticising the continental allies, the parliamentary debates of 1823 were 
also critical to Britain’s conduct at the Congress of Verona. At the Congress, Canning 
himself had hinted that Britain might intervene on the side of Spanish sovereignty,58 and 
now some used the balance of power to argue that it should indeed have done so. Why 
had not Wellington defended the Spanish constitutionalists against the ‘league of kings’ 
and the royalist, dynastic policies? Why did not Britain threaten with war from the start, 
when it could have helped?59  
Again, the balance-of-power concept, for so long the hallmark of British policy, emerged 
as a pertinent resource for unifying the various arguments and concerns that arose after 
the Congress broke down. Once again, actors used the ambiguity of the concept to gain 
support for their preferred course of action. No longer could the Congress framework, or 
equilibrium, be used to justify policy. This problem of legitimation was resolved by 
reintroducing the heritage of the balance-of-power concept, which was close at hand. 
However, the balance of power was not taken for granted as before, and discursive work 
was needed to re-establish it. One indication that the concept had fallen out of use and 
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would now have to be reasserted in new directions, often with the help of arguments from 
tradition, can be seen in the words employed by Canning and Blake in introducing the 
balance of power in Parliament. Canning referred to ‘respect for that established line of 
policy known by the name of “the balance of power” in Europe’,60 whilst Blake argued, ‘if 
we are to be drawn into a war, let us be drawn into it on grounds clearly British’. It was 
‘the duty of Britain to protect what is termed the balance of power’.61  
Here, the debate revolved around the issue of whether Britain should intervene on the side 
of Spain to protect national independence. Even if Canning had hinted at a British 
intervention, in debates in Parliament, he argued against such intervention. The balance of 
power concept was now reintroduced, and used to justify both policy positions.  
Interestingly, Ochakov was invoked as a precedent to both support and oppose the 
prospect of a British intervention. During the Ochakov debate, Earl Grey had argued that 
the balance of power was important, but had no bearing on the case of Ochakov. Great 
Britain had pursued the object of a balance too far, he had argued, when ‘she had 
travelled as far as the banks of the Black Sea […] Much had been said with regard to the 
policy of preserving the general balance of power’ but Lord Liverpool, now Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom from 1812, then called Mr. Jenkinson, ‘had failed to 
produce conviction on his mind’.62 
Now, in 1823, Earl Grey pointed out that Lord Liverpool had tried to establish that it was 
necessary to preserve ‘at all events’ the ‘balance of power in Europe, which at that time 
he considered in danger from the possession of Oczakow by the Russians’. In light of 
Liverpool’s declaration in the Ochakov debate, Grey wondered, ‘with a degree of 
surprise’, why he now insisted that ‘at all events […] Oh! Laudable ambition! Oh! Praise-
worthy determination […] “come what may” even though Spain should be subjugated to 
France […] his majesty’s government would not interfere in any way to prevent it’.63 As 
Grey exposed the contradictory applications of the balance of power concept with the 
help of the memory of Ochakov, that concept again became the centre of political 
contention.  
                                                          
60 Commons Sitting of Monday, April 14, 1823. Hansard, Thomas Curson. 1823. The Parliamentary 
Debates. New Series. Vol. VIII. London: T.C. Hansard, col. 873. 
61 Commons Sitting of Wednesday, April 16, 1823. Ibid, col. 1055. 
62 See Chapter 5. 
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Like Grey, also Mackintosh made reference to the Ochakov debates, bemoaning that the 
balance of power had disappeared from view since Ochakov, ‘that memorable 
occasion’.64 Liverpool had contended that the seizure of that ‘little town’ was a threat to 
the balance of power. Then, why did his colleagues now feel ‘no solicitude, though 
100,000 Frenchmen had taken military possession of Spain!’65 ‘We went to Verona 
without making a new protest’, he complained. Why had Britain not conducted the 
negotiations in adherence to ‘the independence of nations’ and ‘strictly maintaining the 
balance of power in Europe’? He could find no reference to the balance of power in the 
negotiations, as if the ministers ‘had been afraid to alarm the delicate sensibilities of 
prince Metternich’ by the bare mention of the balance of power. The negotiations, he 
assumed sarcastically, must have been so friendly that ‘we did not wish to disturb them 
[…] by any impertinent anxiety concerning the balance of power’. Mackintosh again 
linked the balance of power to the protection of the independence of nations, a balance of 
power that had ‘been lost sight of’ and ‘seemed entirely forgotten’.66 That the Congress 
had endangered the balance of power – the very means of protecting national 
independence – gave cause for preventive war against France, on the side of Spain.  
Should Britain have issued a direct declaration of war, Canning then wondered. For the 
protection of the balance of power? Well, that depended on whether ‘our honour or 
interest demanded it’. He answered in the negative. In his view, the French invasion of 
Spain would actually be a weakness, not strength, for France. To argue the justness of his 
own actions, he challenged the uses of the balance of power by his interlocutors. They 
misrepresented the balance of power, he argued. The balance of power is no longer the 
same thing as before. Mackintosh had referred to what Britain had done ‘in former times’, 
Canning continued, but ‘nothing could be more inconclusive than these general references 
to history, in which all the peculiar circumstances of the case were not brought into 
consideration’. The balance of power was not a question of ‘abstract principle’ but one of 
‘the interest of England’.67 The balance of power was a commonplace concept that was 
now rhetorically mobilised in its classical sense, as prudent statecraft, emphasising 
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England’s interest. However, in a new episteme, its uses were to be very different from in 
the past century. As opposed to the Realist reading of the balance of power as a timeless 
principle of international politics, Canning himself admitted as much when he, a centrally 
placed actor, in medias res, asked,  
is the balance of power a fixed and unalterable standard? Or is it not a standard 
perpetually varying, as civilization advances, and as new nations spring up, and take their 
place among established political communities? […] while the balance of power 
continued in principle the same (over the centuries), the means of adjusting it became 
more varied and enlarged […] in proportion to the increased number of considerable 
states […] To look to the policy of Europe, in the times of William and Anne, for the 
purpose of regulating the balance of power in Europe at the present day, is to disregard 
the progress of events, and to confuse dates and facts which throw a reciprocal light upon 
each other.68 
As Humboldt had noted in 1813, nature both united individuals in nations, and separated 
humankind into nations, and politics cannot ‘act against the natural order of things’. 
Nations were natural and inalterable phenomena.69 More than protecting a common, 
European public interest, or the systemic interests of princes, the balance of power served 
to mediate between nations and national positions. ‘Nation’ had come to signify the 
people as potentially standing against the rulers, with an identity of its own.70 The new 
connexions were plainly drawn also in James Daly’s argument in 1824, that ‘England had 
never held the balance of power with a more even or steady hand’ than now. Why was 
that? Because of the progress of freedom in South America, vindicating the dignity and 
independence of human nature, to make the South American states ‘rank amongst the 
nations of the earth (hear, hear!)’.71 The balance of power is here equated with the 
promotion of national independence. In other words, for the balance of power to have 
resonance, new rhetorical links had to be made, because the preconditions were different 
from those a century earlier. 
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In 1823, there was unanimous agreement that a French intervention should be opposed, 
but the debate in which the balance of power returned concerned the issue of British 
intervention on the side of Spain, to support the independence of nations and the balance 
of power against the continental allies and France. In short, supporting Spain and national 
independence implied an intervention in the name of the balance of power. Supporting 
France and the continental great powers implied an intervention in the name of the 
Congress equilibrium.   
 
Conclusions 
After Verona, complaints about the high-handed treatment of lesser states continued. 
Liberals and radicals reversed Metternich’s theories of revolution and counter-revolution, 
and saw the Concert as a conspiracy against the peoples of Europe, whereas more 
nationalist arguments considered the Congress as an obstacle to the revision of territorial 
boundaries.72 Metternich refused to acknowledge any conflict between the Congress on 
the one hand, and state equality and independence on the other – Europe was an organism 
and Metternich was the physician tasked with curing its ills and preventing ‘le germe 
révolutionnaire’ from invading the body.73 The organic metaphor would linger, but with a 
focus on state individuality. Eventually, this individuation of states carried over into the 
balance of power seen as a buffer cushion between national passions. 
The debates investigated here, concretely shows the increasing shift in episteme – the 
balance of power was now less about the protection of a republican-inspired public 
interest against structures of dominance, and more about a liberal protection of the 
independence of relatively isolated states against interference from those seen to represent 
the public interest – the ‘equilibrium’. 
Throughout these debates, the rhetorical connexions between the concept of the balance 
of power and national independence grew stronger. Europe was atomised, and states 
individuated. The rhetorical work undertaken here involved separating the previously 
linked state interest and the public interest. Increasingly, now the main political 
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contenders were less a part of a common European élite, or a transnational court 
aristocracy of centrally placed actors, and became more ‘foreigners’ to each other. Instead 
of a European, natural community of which the balance of power was one product, or 
precondition, there were many natural, national communities, and the balance of power 
mediated between them.  
However, against Canning’s assertion that every nation was sufficient unto itself, some 
soon emphasised the increasing bonds of commerce, finance and industry, and that 
Britain’s splendid isolation could no longer be a viable policy.74 As Canning 
disassociated Britain from the Congress equilibrium, and reasserted the balance of power, 
British naval power was also reasserting itself across the Atlantic. Developments in Latin 
America, and the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in the USA, favoured Britain’s 
interest. This led some to question why issues of commerce and trade were not 
incorporated into the balance of power. Why, Richard Cobden would ask, were Latin 
America and the United States of America not included in balance-of-power calculations, 
while less civilised countries like Turkey were?  
The liberal individuation of states would later be linked to class, against the Congress 
politicians as an expression of the old system of court aristocracy. Eventually, a new type 
of argument would take hold. In the next chapter, I will show how the conflict between 
revolution and reaction increasingly became less important than power politics, national 
positions, and external relations. This was the argument of Ranke who also 
retrospectively presented the Congress as really having been all about the balance of 
power.75  
The meandering trajectory of the balance of power concept, and the rhetorical positions 
that it was used to defend, moved from being a positive promise for the European public 
interest. In a twist of plot, the concept was now used to condemn the Congress of Vienna. 
When the Congress failed, actors rhetorically mobilised the balance of power in its 
classical sense to argue against interventions. In turn, and as the next chapter will show, 
radical, liberal critics again denounced the concept. Thus we see that this winding road 
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leads to an increasingly familiar place, where the balance of power come to entail 
national position, and national positions entail the balance of power.  
Contrary to conventional presentations of the Congress system, in this section I have 
shown that the balance of power was used to oppose the Congress and argue against 
interventions, and not as a central legitimating principle of the Congress. The rhetorical 
tables had been turned: the Congress system was associated with order based on 
European sociabilities and traditions, and plans for peace. By contrast, the balance of 
power was increasingly used for national purposes by more radical, liberal critics of the 
Congress. Paradoxically, Congress politicians used the concept of equilibrium, reflecting 
monarchical legitimacy, to argue for the protection of the public interest of Europe, 
traditionally the concern of the balance of power – whereas the balance of power was 
used only when their liberal opponents attacked the hierarchical and interventionist 
practices of the Congress, defending national independence.  
The fight between intervention and independence also concerned an opposition between 
the old system of monarchical great powers in Europe, and the more individualist and 
liberal-oriented emphasis on the independence of all states, regardless of size or 
nationality. The Congress of Europe favoured the former, and has therefore been called 
‘conservative’. For the Concert system, ‘international tutelage of individual states’ had to 
be a principle, especially after the anti-revolutionary turn. Interventions were therefore 
not a violation of the order: they were in fact seen as a prerequisite for the new order.76
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CHAPTER 8 
Power in the Balance:  
Nationalisation of the Balance of Power 
 
This section – Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 – follows the trajectory of balance-of- power 
rhetoric from Britain to Germany and to the emergence of the IR discipline in the USA. 
The balance of power became almost anti-European, in the sense of rejecting any abstract 
European public interest, and seeing state practice as an expression of the interaction 
between variously capable nation-states and national positions. This is the second 
inflection point in the 19th century, and a continuation of the episteme shift, as the whole 
notion of a European public interest itself became questioned. 
The British-sponsored Göttingen University, presented in Chapter 4, laid the foundation 
for the later Prussian and German theories of the balance of power to be  examined in this 
chapter. I chart how actors ‘nationalised’ the balance-of-power concept. The main 
development in this was how the impersonal state replaced the balance of power as a 
first principle of international politics. The state became the a priori. When a self-aware 
middle class emerged, the state took precedent – a precondition for 19th century changes 
in balance-of-power rhetoric. Seeing the state as the first principle led to a focus on 
national positions in balance-of-power rhetoric, not on protecting the public interest. The 
nation-state came before the balance of power, as a natural unit that could be known on 
both the transcendental and practical levels, thank not least to the use of modern statistics 
and measurements to predict trajectories.  
Hegel used the balance of power to sharpen the contrast between the state as idea, and the 
practical realm of politics. The balance of power was political, as opposed to the ‘natural’ 
idea of the state. The state comes before and above the balance of power. In Prussia, 
when  this was combined with state-centrism and nationalism, the adoption of the balance 
of power as practical maxim by the middle classes  ‘turned the relatively flexible 
postulate that the self-interest of a state is the last and decisive reference for action in 
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international relations into a “categorical imperative”’.1 This state-centrism implied that 
the balance of power was not a first principle of international politics, but a management 
principle in the context of the progressive self-consciousness of nation-states. 
What would be the result of the interaction between such independent, nation-states – 
what Hegel called the ‘severalty’?2 This problem, which only a few decades later would 
be presented as the ‘anarchy problem’,3 emerged from liberal arguments concerning free 
competition between private interests – between individualised states.  
Morgenthau later talked of an ‘aristocratic international’ as his main subject, as opposed 
to the liberal middle classes. The middle classes occur in clusters, whereas the aristocracy 
covers the whole system. Despite the surging middle classes, the aristocracy prevailed in 
many respects in Great Britain and Germany; and ‘the middle classes ended up adopting 
the maxims of the previous ruling groups […] in this way the diplomatic culture 
reproduced not only itself, but also the international realm to which it supposedly was a 
practical answer’.4 Thus, the ‘aristocratic’ balance-of-power concept resonated in both 
Britain and Prussia, seen as prudent practice – ‘the special knowledge of this 
“Aristocratic International” […] was explicitly not reflexive or theoretical’.5  
The special aristocratic knowledge of politics as a practice was emphasised, and 
embodied in the balance of power. The balance of power came to rely on national 
positions and define the international-political. It became political and engaged – stripped 
of theoretical content. 
That vacuum would later be filled by political scientists and IR scholars focusing on the 
state.6 German theories were to become an important influence on International Relations 
(IR) in the USA. In Chapter 9, a central point will be how the balance of power was 
conserved as a diplomatic, engaged practical knowledge, first among practitioners in 
European foreign ministries, and then among IR scholars. This is the story of the 
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genealogical developments from debates at a British university in Hanover, how these 
became the point of departure for a Prussian and German-inspired balance of power 
concept, which in turn, grounded on the German university model, became the basis for 
US balance-of-power theory.  
The first part of the present chapter addresses the emergence of national bourgeoisies, or 
radical, liberal middle classes, in general terms. The important division, it was argued, 
was no longer between states, but between peoples and classes.7 General calls for 
independence turned into nationalist aspirations; in response, the major European powers 
had to seek new sources for political legitimacy and new ways of administering the state. 
With the emergence of the middle classes, and less pressed by incessant wars, many 
European polities now developed fully funded civil services, based on university 
education and ‘careers open to talent’ rather than based on inherited privilege.8 As a 
result, a completely new discussion on the nature of the state opened up. The emerging 
bourgeoisie fought over the nature of the state, conditioned by new, interrelated 
distinctions emerging between governments and individual freedoms, politics and society, 
the public and the private, war and peace – and the balance of power versus international 
law. The new configuration that emerged had the public and political associated with war 
and conflict on the one hand, and the private and societal associated with peace on the 
other. What the two had in common was a focus on the state – seen principally either as 
government or as civil society, respectively.  
Middle-class liberalism increasingly emphasised private interest, and how it could lead to 
peace, as opposed to the aristocratic balance of power. However, what started out as a 
trans-national project of bourgeois solidarity against princes and aristocracy would itself 
emerge as numerous bourgeois national projects. Particularly in Prussia, these national 
middle-class projects were hijacked by the aristocracy, and transmuted into a new, hybrid 
élite 
The second part of this chapter deals with developments in Prussia. In Prussia, there were 
two strands of middle-class politics: one idealistic-liberal, and one conservative-
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nationalistic. Both of these strands aimed for German unification, but only the latter 
achieved it, and then not by peaceful means. Particularly after 1871, then, the German 
middle classes adjusted to and adopted the military state. The German bourgeoisie 
adopted the ways of the court aristocracy, their military focus not least.9 The German 
middle classes turned away from the universalist and idealist peace movement, and 
embraced the realism of the ‘power state’ and the balance of power. A nationalist rhetoric 
that placed the country and the nation above all else replaced the more abstract focus on 
peoples and independence in general.10 This rhetoric was linked to a nationalised version 
of the balance of power, part of a German conceptual array that rested on the assumption 
that societies and rulers would always act on the ‘hard realities’ of international political 
competition.11 These factors combined to make a new kind of state-focused and military-
oriented composite middle class, who soon developed their own, nationalised balance-of-
power theories. In Prussia, middle-class liberalism was put to the service of power 
politics of the nation-state. The influence of the aristocracy led to the balance of power 
being defined as political practice.  
In the third part, I show how the institutionalisation of statistics, now in its more modern 
meaning, further helped to establish the predominance of national positions and the 
balance of power as an exclusively political-applied concept. Statistics made nations more 
concrete and tangible. The widespread use of numerical measurement transformed what 
was seen as the reality of politics – national positions could be assessed by means of 
measurable state capacities. Relative power as capacities became a prevalent measure – 
and once something can be measured, also the trajectories of other states can be predicted. 
Furthermore, once you can predict, you can prevent. Measurable national positions 
strengthened arguments for the primordial task of the balance of power being the state’s 
self-defence. This emphasis on measurable national positions coheres with how engaged, 
practical politics became separated from other kinds of knowledge.  
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The emergence of the bourgeoisie and the centrality of private interests 
When we hear the word ‘Biedermeier’, stuffed chairs and fitted carpets come to mind, but 
this style of design can also denote the entire period in German history of which it was 
characteristic, ca. 1815–1848, which saw the assertion of a growing bourgeoisie or 
middle class. Biedermeier represents a general emphasis on domestic and private space as 
opposed to the public and political. Biedermeier interior design, architecture, and even 
(in-home) music aimed to display the newly-won economic and cultural capital of the 
middle classes in private settings. In classical liberal fashion, the private and the public 
had become separate activities, and one could move back and forth from one to the other.  
The key thing to note is how this increasingly separate bourgeois realm of the private and 
self-interest could affect the public – the private gained public importance.12 As de 
Tocqueville wrote in this period,  
The principle of interest rightly understood is not a lofty one, but it is clear and sure. It 
does not aim at mighty objects, but it attains without excessive exertion all those at which 
it aims […It] produces no great acts of self-sacrifice, but it suggests daily small acts of 
self-denial. By itself it cannot suffice to make a man virtuous, but it disciplines a number 
of citizens in habits or regularity, temperance, moderation, foresight, self-command.13  
And indeed, the ‘number of citizens’ that were the middle classes emerged from ‘private’ 
activities, and would eventually become the new power élite in Europe. When such a self-
aware middle class with a focus on private rather than public interests emerged, the state 
and national positions took precedence, effecting 19th-century changes in balance-of-
power rhetoric. 
Recall that in the first year of the 18th century, Charles Davenant had deplored the private 
interest of the ‘monied men’ and traders, who were concerned not about the balance of 
power but about their own, private interest, because they could ‘buy their own peace’.14 
Precisely these ‘private interests’ were to become the staple of the new and powerful 
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middle classes – Bolingbroke and his 18th-century Tories would have turned in their 
graves.  
As Albert O. Hirschman asked, ‘how did commercial, banking, and similar money-
making pursuits become honourable at some point in the modern age after having stood 
condemned or despised as greed, love of lucre, and avarice for centuries past’?15 The 
answer is the rise of the middle classes. In Bolingbroke’s time, the 18th century, one could 
talk of  ‘groups of interests’, be they public or private; but in the period prior to 1848, the 
year of revolution, the division between classes was emphasised, and the ‘middle classes’ 
had become an established political concept. The self-proclaimed middle classes were 
also ready to assert their leadership. As Richard Cobden wrote in 1846, the middle classes 
were the real governing group in a community.16  
Hirschman argues that the new arose out of the old: bourgeoisie liberalism was not an 
independent ideology that arose from scratch, but a ‘sequence of concatenated ideas and 
propositions’.17 It is important to consider how actors themselves came to talk about and 
construct this middle class or association.  
By ‘middle classes’, or ‘bourgeoisie’, I mean a group or network of people who self-
identify as such. One would be hard-pressed to find mention of ‘middle classes’ before or 
during the French Revolution, for example. Even if many held what today might be 
termed ‘middle-class values’, by 1789 there was probably not yet much of a self-aware 
class standing against the rulers, ‘representing the new realities of economic power, ready 
to take into its own hands the destinies of the state, eliminating the declining feudal 
aristocracy’.18 What is certain is that the Revolution was used to construct a separate 
‘middle class’, retrospectively.  
For instance, in 1824, the French historian François Mignet held that the Old Regime had 
been divided into rival classes, where the nobles stood against ‘the people’, who were ‘the 
middle class’.19 The balance-of-power writer and politician Lord Brougham also turned to 
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‘the middle ranks of society’ for support for his policy programmes. By 1831, Brougham 
could specify that ‘by the People, I mean the middle classes, the wealth and intelligence 
of the country, the glory of the British name’. Even the aristocratic Lord Grey, noted in 
the previous chapter, appealed to ‘the middle classes […] without whom the power of the 
gentry is nothing’.20 In 1839, the Göttingen-educated scholar Wilhelm Friedrich Volger 
declared that the new ideas of the revolution had affected ‘all the relations of the ranks of 
society (Stände) in human society, and ‘that the “bourgeois rank” (Bürgerstand) became 
every day more important, by virtue of the visibly growing mass of intellect and 
education (geistige Bildung) it represented’.21 
By the 1830s, there was an emerging stratum of the urban population ‘situated by status 
and income between the nobility above and the (manually) labouring classes below’.22 
Calling themselves the ‘middle rank’, ‘middle class’, or (Bildungs)bürgertum, they were 
now depicted as a new power in society, narrated as the result of the French Revolution, 
collectively having fought and destroyed the remnants of aristocratic society.  
This is important for the balance of power because middle-class liberalism increasingly 
emphasised private interest, and how it could lead to peace. 
 
Private interests, the economy, and world peace 
The middle-class focus on the private was a reaction to a repressive political environment, 
but was also closely linked with political-economic arguments. The revolutionary 
principle had held ‘the right of every individual to rise, by his own ability, to the highest 
position in civil society and state’. What this principle necessarily implied in post-
Congress ‘despotic’ societies of the day, the German scholar Lorenz von Stein held, was 
the right to accumulate property, as other forms of competition for public distinction were 
unavailable. France, ‘falling under the despotism of the Empire’, entered a period where 
‘wealth constitutes power for each individual’.23 These arguments hark back to the 18th-
century Physiocrats or économistes who maintained that obstacles would have to be 
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removed for the natural harmony of interests to come to full expression in the free, 
unimpeded interchange between states and peoples.24 This was a theory of ‘the economy’. 
The government should step back and laissez-nous faire – ‘let us be’. As Adam Smith 
asserted, economic progress was best served by an economy of private enterprise,25 and 
his Wealth of Nations established an economic justification for the pursuit of individual 
self-interests. The economic system is the basis for order – no more is needed. It takes 
care of itself.26 Economic progress, through the pursuit of private interest, became a goal 
of society. 
Thus, it is not the visible hand constructing the European public interest from above, but 
the hidden hand of private interests that produces the common good. Private interest 
equalled economic interest, which was an advantageous kind of passion. This free-trade 
movement based in the emerging middle classes laid the foundations for the liberal peace 
movements and societies that spread across Europe and the USA in the early 19th 
century.27 Economic theory was expanded to include a broad vision of society and 
peaceful interchange. Free movement, flows, competition, passions, private interest, were 
good things in general.  
Such peace movements were a product of class confidence, a triumphalism that inspired 
the middle classes to believe that war could be abolished,28 as well as being a product of 
the emphasis on free trade, eventually capitalism – on the benefits of ‘private interests’. 
These were combined in the argument that free trade led to peace. 
Commercial life in the private sphere was deemed harmless, as opposed to the aristocratic 
ideal of the balance of power as the expression of prudent state practice and the old 
‘public’ passions of princes. Formerly held to be vices, greed and self-interest now 
belonged to the new, capitalist world – whereas honour and power belonged to the 
aristocratic societies of the past. Pursuing self-interest and private interests in a free 
competition could restrain the passions of the old system. Many also constructed images 
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of traders as peaceful and inoffensive, as opposed to armies and looting soldiers.29 
Traders looked to their private interest, without embarking on passionate pursuits of 
glory, as did the aristocracy. In short, the public was more war-prone than the private.  
It followed that promoting the private interest rather than protecting the ‘old’ public 
interest is what could sustain international peace. And who would promote the private 
interest? The middle classes. In consequence, the specific attributes of a state, and what 
kind of people (or class) rule it, became more decisive as regards questions of war and 
peace, than any abstract theory about the system or, indeed, the balance of power.  
 
Richard Cobden attacks the balance of power 
Inspired by these theories exalting economic over political factors,30 it was Richard 
Cobden who in the 1840s linked the middle-class emphasis on free trade and liberalism to 
the issue of the balance of power, peace and war, and the international system.31 The 
initial effort here was Cobden’s Anti-Corn Law League, which sought to turn public 
opinion and influence the government, based on liberal middle-class arguments 
concerning free trade and poor relief. Cobden succeeded in his campaign, and the Corn 
Laws were repealed in 1846. The campaign depended upon class organisation for its 
efficiency, so Cobden can be considered a middle-class pioneer, as this campaign and the 
ensuing political victory were key elements in the establishment of a British self-aware 
middle class.32  
Basically, Cobden, in his radical bourgeois project to link the promotion of free trade to 
world peace, used the balance-of-power concept. He was the one to revive Johann 
Heinrich Gottlob Justi’s arguments against the balance of power, as presented in Chapter 
4, in an almost verbatim manner, and he employed the concept of the balance of power to 
distance himself and the middle class from the ‘old system’ of aristocratic Europe.  
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Cobden wrote the pamphlet titled ‘Russia’ 33 in the midst of generalised fears of a Russian 
invasion with a consequent strengthening of the British Navy. He warned against hysteria 
and russophobia based on ‘absurd ideas of Russian power’, as one subheading put it. The 
pamphlet is not exclusively about Russia: it is also about the necessity of revising the 
maxims of foreign policy to bring them into conformity with global changes.  
Cobden attacks what he calls the warlike aristocracy in government34 and their typical use 
and abuse of the balance of power. The balance of power was employed so extensively 
simply because statesmen, ‘instead of thinking themselves and using reason, were held 
hostages by tradition’.35 These arguments are a copy of Justi’s, but now, the context is 
different, and that makes a difference: after the episteme shift, the new, liberal problem of 
interference and interventions is added; The British have a ‘passion for meddling with the 
affairs of foreigners’ under the pretence of the balance of power.36  
Cobden’s concern is the discrepancies in the use of balance of power theory – ‘theory – 
for it has never yet been applied to practice’, as he specifies. One hundred years earlier, 
Justi had opposed the ‘abstract knowledge’ of the balance of power; and Cobden 
complements his argument by now directly dismissing ‘balance of power theory’, which 
is ‘less understood now than ever’ although many ‘intelligent and practical-minded 
politicians have thrown the question [of the balance of power] overboard’.37 He echoes 
Justi’s arguments: the balance of power, this long-standing tradition, the ‘burden of kings’ 
speeches […] is a chimera!’, and continues:  
It is not a fallacy, a mistake, an imposture – it is an undescribed, indescribable, 
incomprehensible nothing; mere words, conveying to the mind not ideas, but sounds like 
those equally barren syllables which our ancestors put together for the purpose of 
puzzling themselves about words, in the shape of Prester John or the philosopher’s 
stone!38 
For Cobden, the social relations between peoples, in their states, were far more important 
than any balance of power, which was the treacherous dealings of princes, or ‘between 
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governments’. Cobden’s version of liberalism was an internationalist one, based on the 
promotion of interrelations between nations through, above all, free trade, and defined by 
an opposition to the balance of power. For Cobden, it was no longer a question of 
independence only, as during the Congress, but also of the freedom of peoples. In this, the 
balance of power was dated.  
But even though Cobden’s arguments had internationalist implications, they were not 
universalist. Like Justi, but counter to Edmund Burke’s arguments, Cobden attacks the 
idea of a European commonwealth or sociability. There is said to be in Europe a union, 
constitution, or a disposition of things, that make Europe into a whole, but  
we should like to know at what period of history such a compact amongst the nations of 
the Continent was entered into? Was it previously to the peace of Utrecht? Was it 
antecedent to the Austrian war of succession? Was it prior to the seven years’ war, or to 
the American war? Or did it exist during the French revolutionary wars?39  
No, he concludes, there is no confederation of ‘European powers, obeying certain laws, 
and actuated in general by a common principle’. In lieu of such a system, the ‘theory of 
the balance of power’ had been used ‘parrot-like’ by those who desired to do as Britain 
had done, namely to ‘hold’ the balance of power based on the lust for aggrandisement and 
conquest.40  
Earlier in the century, the liberal critique of the Concert relied on the balance of power to 
argue the case for the independence of nations and anti-intervention. Cobden attacked the 
balance of power from the same liberal vantage-point, but now in the context of a new 
governing élite in Europe – a middle class who stood against the ‘old system’ of an 
aristocratic Europe. The old type of aristocratic states that emerged in the 18th century 
emphasised intervention, power-seeking, and mercantilism – which promoted war. The 
balance of power was a result of states being held hostage by the old, aristocratic class 
and their secret diplomacy. By contrast, the liberal goal was states run by the new middle 
classes. 
This critique relied on the same arguments concerning independence and anti-
intervention, but now opposed any notion of a sociability or community of common 
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interests. The agenda was peace though the free, commercial interaction and competition 
of atomistic, independent states. Such states would be less inclined to war. The argument 
was therefore that international politics was determined primarily by the character of 
states and what kind of people – which class – ruled it.41   
This is what the later nationalistic and militaristic arguments, and Realpolitik, have in 
common with liberal rhetoric: they reject the notion of a European unity or sociability that 
is larger than the sum of its individuals, or individual states. The answers may be 
different, but the question is the same: what is the result of this free interaction among 
what Hegel called the ‘severalty’42 – the various independent nation-states? This problem, 
which only a few decades later would be presented as the ‘anarchy problem’, emerged 
from liberal arguments concerning free competition between private interests – between 
individualised states.  
The focus was squarely on the state. And the existence of many such independent, smaller 
states was not seen as being due to the system of a balance of power, as liberal arguments 
during the Congress period would have it, but because of what Cobden called ‘natural 
limits’ like unities of language, laws, customs and traditions.43  
Parallel with middle-class liberalism there was a movement from patriotism to 
nationalism,44 and with it, a state-centric movement that took the liberal arguments on 
private interest one step further and nationalised them: National spirit is another kind of 
beneficial passion, in the competition between nation-states. This, however, was less 
germane to the peace movement. The demise of this peace movement was due to the 
contradiction between ‘on the one hand, British liberalism and the belief in peace through 
free trade and non-intervention and, on the other, European liberalism and its attachment 
to nationalism, republicanism, and, as a prior necessity for peace, wars of liberation’.45  
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Nationalisation of the balance of power: Prussia’s particularities 
Cobden’s universal, irenic middle-class project had rejected the balance of power. 
However, what started out as a trans-national project of bourgeois solidarity against 
princes and aristocracy would itself transmute into numerous bourgeois national projects. 
The liberal middle classes were themselves nationalised. The most visible development in 
this direction took place in Prussia and Germany, where the middle classes embraced 
rather than rejected the balance of power. The way this developed in Prussia was so 
remarkable that it has led some to ask whether there is something unique about 
Germany’s transition from aristocratic to middle-class dominance and processes of 
nation-building. Did Germany for idiosyncratic reasons follow a ‘special path’, a 
Sonderweg, as compared with other European countries?46  
Wolfgang Mommsen has argued that middle-class liberalism changed into a conservative 
movement in the 1880s.47 James Sheehan holds that the liberal movement became class-
based and gradually declined by the 1870s with the establishment of the German Empire, 
when liberals started supporting Bismarck’s foreign policy and political programmes.48 
David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley49 have challenged the idea of a German Sonderweg 
after 1848, showing that there was no abrupt break and that liberalism, despite the 1848 
defeat, continued to make an impact in Germany.50  
In any case, if timings are debatable, at some point in the middle to late 19th century, 
German liberalism lost its universalist, progressive character, and became connected to a 
nationalised bourgeoisie (Bürgertum), with the liberals squeezed between the 
conservative militaristic aristocracy and the emerging working class. Sometime in mid-
century there came a transition from early liberal arguments envisioning a peaceful 
society of citizens to a more clearly class-based and nationalised liberalism.51 Eventually, 
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in Bismarck’s Germany, the nationally oriented middle-class movement would ally with 
the military ‘court aristocracy’, adopting the practical maxims of the aristocratic ruling 
groups in society, reproducing the balance of power concept.52 
 
King or Country? From patriotism to nationalism  
The wars of liberation had been led by princes and monarchs, later reflected in the 
conservative equilibrium order at Vienna. However, in the case of Prussia, the wars had 
also involved various groups of volunteers who swore loyalty ‘not to the King of Prussia, 
but to the German fatherland’. Prussia was a fairly heterogeneous assembly of groups and 
peoples, and the hybrid nature of the fighters involved had triggered conflicts over how 
best to narrate the wars.53 A central Prussian controversy after the Congress of Vienna 
had concerned whether the Prussians had joined the Wars of Liberation out of enthusiasm 
for the liberal cause of freedom, or out of duty to their nation-state.  
The controversy had culminated in the Wartburg Festival in 1817, where radical students 
got together to commemorate not a War of Liberation fought by armies but a War of 
Liberty fought by the people and volunteers. The people, not the princes, had defeated 
Napoleon.54 The student movement, ‘the Gymnasts’, had spread after the Wartburg 
Festival. They did not represent the King, but the community of individual citizens, and 
they managed to incorporate the memory of the struggle against Napoleon into a broader 
German, more national memory and narrative. Importantly, this new narrative also 
allowed for a new kind of politics where the romanticism of Weimar classicism was 
translated into a quest for a new kind of bourgeois political community, based on a 
particular memory of the wars.55 The ‘popularisation’ of the wars was also an indication 
of a nascent nationalism. The romantic liberalism was itself to be nationalised: ‘Purged of 
its political ambiguities, the Prussian war against Napoleon would ultimately be 
refashioned – however incongruously – as a mythical war of German national 
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liberation’.56 With this radical movement, Prussian liberalism developed in an 
increasingly nationalist direction.  
 
Prussian state centrism 
Another factor was Prussian state-centrism. Even if it is difficult to identify a decisive 
moment where Germany embarked on a Sonderweg, one way in which Prussia was 
indeed distinct was its long tradition, from the Enlightenment onward, of convergence 
between civil society and the state.57 This state centrism was expressed also, as we have 
seen, in the administrative sciences of the state, or the ‘police’ sciences that also 
addressed broad aspects of society, as developed first at the University of Göttingen in 
parallel with balance-of-power theories. Prussia was a heterogeneous assembly of 
peoples, classes, and traditions – but ‘the one institution that all Prussians had in common 
was the state’; and in the early to mid-1800s, during the transition from liberal middle 
classes to German nationalism, by way of Prussian patriotism, there was ‘an 
unprecedented discursive escalation around the idea of the state’,58 with Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel as its origo.  
Hegel attempted to fuse universal reason and the importance of politics as a practical 
endeavour. In this, the middle classes were fundamental. For Hegel, the middle classes 
were an expression of the state, and helped make the state ‘conscious of itself’ and to 
secure stability and order.59 Hegel argued that the civil servants, the bureaucracy, are a 
particular class, whose aims are identical with those of the state.60 For Hegel, the state 
bureaucracy equalled the middle classes, and the middle classes were the very pillar of 
the state.  
This was Hegel’s solution to the problem of reconciling the divisions between what were 
increasingly seen as two separate spheres: civil and political life. Hegel united 
governments and civil society in his focus on the natural State which was ‘no longer just 
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the site of sovereignty and power, it was the engine that makes history, or even the 
embodiment of history itself’.61 The state is everything: For Hegel, ‘logic does not 
provide a proof of the state but the state provides a proof of logic’62 – the state is the 
subject-matter of logic. It is the state not only as it manifested itself in the world, but the 
state as intellectual principle.63 Hegel thus helped to establish the state as a privileged 
object also of enquiry and reflection.64 Still, Hegel’s owl of Minerva did indeed fly before 
dusk: in practice, Hegel provided support for the nationalist project, and state-centrism, 
where history’s Geist would transcend the Prussian state and lead to the unity of the 
German Volk.  
Most interesting here, however, is Hegel’s use of the balance of power to make his point. 
The state was an intellectual principle, and Hegel connects the balance of power to the 
state by arguing that the balance of power was a practical and therefore political issue.65  
He first employed the traditional rhetoric associated with the balance of power: it was an 
antidote to universal monarchy or Oriental despotism. The balance of power, as an 
expression of the public interest, had emerged from wars between the powers, according 
to Hegel. But what exactly was the alternative to a Universal Monarchy? It was not a 
European Commonwealth, but ‘separate states […] animated by free individuality’.66 The 
object, he argued, was not to create a ‘community of interest’, but a community that could 
maintain ‘severalty, – the preservation to the several States of their independence, – in 
fact the “balance of power”.’ 67  
Hegel used the balance of power to sharpen the contrast between the state as idea and the 
practical realm of politics. The balance of power was political, as opposed to the natural 
idea of the state. The state comes before and above the balance of power. This state-
centrism implies that the balance of power is not a first principle of international politics, 
but a management principle in the context of the progressive self-consciousness of nation-
states. 
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In Hegel’s influential arguments, and indeed in Prussian state-centrism in general, we see 
how the distinction between and duality of practical politics on the one hand, and 
disengaged, philosophical or scientific knowledge on the other, is a result of the 
unprecedented Prussian state-centrism. As I will show in Chapter 9, invoking the balance 
of power in this way as a practical tradition would become the basis for later German-
inspired IR theory in the USA.  
 
Prussian militarism 
Philosophising about the state was not the only typical Prussian activity. Heinrich 
Treitschke talked of the ‘Janus-headedness’ of the Prussian state, borrowing from 
Madame de Staël’s observation that ‘the image of Prussia offers a double face, like that of 
Janus, one of which is military, the other philosophical’.68  
Hegel had emphasised a professional civil service for a reason – administrative reform 
was a favoured Prussian preoccupation. Carl von Clausewitz joined the discussion and 
broadened it beyond a focus on administrative reform, arguing that military theory should 
express the organic and flexible qualities of an army, possessing its own ‘genius’.69 An 
army was not merely a war machine, but also and always a political instrument. Making 
war should not be considered a goal in itself. War was political, so what initially started 
as an administrative ‘rationalisation’ of the military ended up in a project that constructed 
the military as the foremost exponent of Prussian patriotism. The objective of reforms 
became, in Scharnhorst’s words, ‘to raise and inspire the spirit of the army, to bring the 
army and the nation into a more intimate union.’70 To middle-class values, nationalism, 
and state-centrism was added the military as the branch of state power exemplifying these 
new values. One characteristic of Prussian statistics, to which I turn below, was the 
weight given the military. In fact, Prussia considered the distinction between military and 
civilian as ‘a first principle of all labelling of citizens’.71  
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Whereas Clausewitz did see the balance of power as maintaining the status quo, he 
emphasised the military aspects of the balance of power. The military was an extension of 
politics, and therefore an integral part of the balance. Clausewitz extended the balance of 
power to include theories of war as well.72 Increasingly, therefore, the power in the 
balance of power came to mean military power.73 The focus was on war-fighting 
capabilities, while earlier notions of protection of the European public interest receded 
into the background.  
The weight given to the military was fuelled by the fact that Prussia, a minor power in 
Europe until mid-century, was now becoming a great power. How had this happened? For 
contemporaries, the answer was clearly the string of Prussian military victories over 
Austria, Denmark and France in the 1860s and 1870s. This unprecedented change, from a 
revered memory of a nationalist struggle against the great power of France, to Prussia 
itself becoming a great power, was seen as being based on military success and strength. 
It was Bismarck, not the liberals, who had finally achieved the goal of uniting Germany 
and making it a great power in Europe. To this was added the role accorded to the 
military, and to the state.74  
In Chapter 6, I argued that balance-of-power rhetoric was not used to support the 
Congress system but rather, eventually, to oppose it. However, the Congress was later and 
retrospectively constructed as having been all about the balance of power and, as briefly 
mentioned, Leopold von Ranke (fl. 1824–1886) was one of the first who can be said to 
have framed the Congress system in balance-of-power terms. Ranke did not consider the 
Congress as having been something unique or extraordinary: he saw it as having been yet 
another instance of the balance of power. In fact, most of the arguments from Prussia 
concerning the balance of power attacked what had been Metternich’s Concert 
Equilibrium. Such attacks were parallel to the British arguments noted in the previous 
chapter, emphasising the independence of states. However, whereas typical British 
arguments linked the balance to independence, Prussian arguments linked it to the state 
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and power politics – in the Prussian version, a return to the balance of power would mean 
a system better suited to the needs of Prussia and Germany as nation-states.75 
Ranke held that the internal tension in states between revolution and conservation – the 
main issue in Metternich’s view of Europe – was in fact subordinate to power politics 
between states and their external relations.76 Although far from being a Hegelian, Ranke 
was influenced by Hegel’s combination of the state and history. The state was the most 
important actor. Like Hegel, Ranke maintained that ‘the history of mankind appears in the 
nations themselves’.77 Whereas the British fell back on the traditional balance of power 
concept, in Germany, it was reinvented in their own state-centric, nationalist, and 
militarist tradition. 
In his Historisch-politische Zeitschrift Ranke set out to defend Prussia against 
‘democratic propaganda’. The preponderance of Napoleon, he argued, had been a 
consequence of the weakness and defeat of the Prussian state. The statesmen of the 
Congress period had ignored this problem, or failed to recognise it. Prussia should have 
been strengthened, to strengthen the balance of power.78  
Ranke did not see the balance as preserving a status quo, but as an engine of development 
in a system of unique and individualistic states.79 Again, we note how the balance was no 
longer a first principle, but was now premised upon the state. Still, even if Ranke’s 
system of states was composed of individualistic states, they were linked in a European 
international community. However, Ranke did not emphasise order and ‘equilibrium’ as 
in the Congress system, but historical progress through tensions.80 Within the community, 
there was a continual struggle between the states: ‘the true harmony will spring from 
separation and unadulterated development’.81  
The balance of power therefore implied war, and war was what drove history forward. 
The balance of power was linked to war and conflict between individualised states, not to 
the protection of the ‘public interest’. The balance of power regulated the tensions 
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between nation-states, like a cushion, sustaining both state individuality and a systemic 
unity in Europe.82  
Ranke linked the balance squarely to national ‘spirit’ or ‘consciousness’ in emphasising 
national positions and state individuality. His arguments did not concern the protection of 
state independence in general: they were state-centrism, emphasising the particularities of 
national positions. Ranke adapted the balance-of-power concept to liberalism and 
nationalism; and, together with his disciples, he retrospectively ‘turned it into the 
principal German tradition of thought about the Concert of Europe.’83 Ranke’s arguments 
received support from all camps opposed to the Congress system – from the Prussian 
national liberals as well as the Hegelians.  
Such Prussian balance-of-power arguments stemmed from the early days of the 
University of Göttingen, but were now combined with Prussian state-centrism and 
militarism. Consider two of the foremost Prussian liberal reformers: Baron vom Stein and 
Karl August Fürst von Hardenberg. Stein had attended the University of Göttingen, and 
was steeped in the British, aristocratic, Whig balance-of-power tradition that emphasised 
the nobility. Hardenberg, on his side, came from the autonomous German Enlightenment, 
and was more concerned with the concentration of power and authority within the state.84 
The combination of these two strands in a new, German version of the middle classes was 
what changed the role of the balance of power. What emerged in Prussia and Germany 
was a new kind of composite middle class, with liberal, nationalistic, and aristocratic-
militaristic elements, emphasising the military over the liberal and humanist values of 
Kultur that had traditionally been the core of the liberal middle classes. In a later paradox, 
English scholars in the 20th century were keen on distancing themselves from Ranke’s 
balance-of-power theories, without realising that these theories came from the Göttingen 
tradition, which itself was a direct result of links with England.85 British balance-of-
power arguments were hybridised, and German politicians and academics made their own 
in hybridised form. This would in turn influence developments in the USA through the 
impact of the German university model.  
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The German composite middle class 
No sooner had Ranke finished his magnum opus on Prussian history86 than a new tome 
was required of him, as an unprecedented wave of revolutions swept the continent. In 
1848, nationalist aspiration spread across Europe; and, like the liberals and radicals before 
them, the nationalists claimed to speak for ‘the people’ rather than the crown. The 
nationalist version of ‘the people’ was somewhat ‘more inclusive than liberalism, whose 
horizons were confined to a wealthy, educated and largely urban elite’,87 so with the 
events of 1848, more and more German liberal radicals became nationalists. The dual 
influences of liberalism and nationalism were what moved the balance of power closer to 
national positions. National governments increasingly recognised the force of nationalist 
arguments, and incorporated these into their own rhetoric. The new debates after 1848 
resulted in a fusion, where the post-revolutionary government wold have to take care of 
and respond to the interests of both ‘the more statist and moderate elements of liberalism 
and of the more innovative and entrepreneurial elements among the old conservative 
elites’ ̶ a new, composite élite came to control the middle ground of politics, 
marginalising both the radical left and right.88  
To this new élite was added the militarism of the aristocratic elements of society: ‘large 
parts of the middle class – those in fact who had been integrated into the 
satisfaktionsfähige Gesellschaft, or who sought to be accepted by it – adopted the upper-
class code of honour as their own’.89 The traditional, liberal-nationalistic middle class 
fused with the military models of the traditional court aristocracy. The conflict between 
the middle classes and the court aristocracy90 was resolved in favour of the latter, but took 
the shape of the former.   
In Prussia, the liberal middle class fused with the traditionalist, militaristic aristocracy to 
form a new configuration, based on German nationalism and militaristic values. Whereas 
the British rhetoric continued to link the balance of power to tradition and anti-
interventionism, a specifically Prussian rhetoric on the balance of power emerged. This 
powerful concept in European history was given a new content, emphasising national 
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positions and power politics to suit the needs of the Prussian – and eventually the German 
– state. The point here is not the demise of liberal-type arguments: elements of the various 
liberal arguments remained all along, but were combined with a focus that was nationalist 
as well as state-centric and militarist. The processes of contingently linking the balance of 
power concept to other concerns, so crucial for this project, led to a hybrid way of 
arguing, between liberal individuation of states in international competition and a focus 
on the power politics that drives history forward, in part by war and the military, as the 
expression of the nation.  
Here we see how the liberal middle class was nationalised, always geared towards the 
state. Worth noticing, in contrast to Britain, is the absence of arguments for the private 
interest and free trade; this focus on the private and individualised interest was in Prussia 
turned into patriotism and nationalism. Given this state centrism, it should come as no 
surprise that statistics increasingly became an integral part of administration in Prussia, 
and a central tool for nation-building and for concretising the territorial entity that would 
eventually become Germany.91 I now turn to this institutionalised statistics and how it 
would in turn contribute to linking the balance of power to a focus on national positions, 
self-defence, and the prediction of trajectories.  
 
Statistics, measurements, and prediction 
In his work on mid-19th-century nation-building, Eric Hobsbawm calls attention to a 
rarely recognised dilemma: the assumption of nation-state builders was not only that a 
nation-state must be national, but also that it must be capable and developing 
progressively, economically as well as militarily. In other words, there is a difference 
between ‘nationalism’ and the political projects of ‘nation-state building’.92 New nation-
states were not intended to be small states, but moderately large ones. The question was 
not only one of independence, as previously, but also of viable unification. This type of 
functioning unit, defined in part by its ‘capacities’, was the ‘natural unit of the 
development of the modern, liberal, progressive and de facto bourgeois society’.93 This 
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focus on progress and capacities helped to uphold the hierarchical patterns established 
during the past century – now in an even more measurable and definite way, with the 
focus on the ‘private interest’ also of states, embodied in the bureaucracy of the middle 
classes. A crucial aspect of making the nation-state visible as a concrete and self-
contained thing was the development and institutionalisation of statistics, the early 
beginnings of which were noted in Chapter 4.  
How to measure interest and power, and therefore how to calculate the balance, had long 
been a central question. During the Napoleonic Wars, one dictionary definition of the 
balance of power stated that the French Revolution and subsequent ‘overturnings and 
changes’ on the continent had ‘effectually destroyed all the principles upon which any 
calculation of that balance were made’.94 Cobden, as Justi in Chapter 4, had argued that 
the balance of power could not be objectively measured, and that even the selection of 
countries to be included in the definition of the balance of power was based on political 
opportunity, or was random at best. But the criticism against the balance of power, that it 
could not be quantified, was partially muted with the spread of statistics, measurements, 
and new forms of numerical classifications. Seeing the balance of power as tangible and 
measurable would overshadow Justi’s and Cobden’s critique. In the 19th century, statistics 
took off, becoming ‘the grammar of science’95 – at least in the applied, practical, or 
‘useful’ variety now expressed in the balance of power. 
The increasing statistical comparison of states, based on objective criteria, also indicates 
that states were considered more as equal – it would not make sense to compare them 
statistically if they did not have at their core a stable, common essence. Previously, states 
were not individual and atomistic: they were seen as members of a family of nations, or 
members of a European Commonwealth. States were too differentiated. Now, however, 
states were individuated, seen as different but also equal as functional entities.96  
The police sciences and early statistics emerging from Göttingen in the 18th century had 
focused on traditional histories of the various states, assessing their ‘natural’ or ‘political’ 
interests, based on geographical, constitutional, and legal characteristics. Little time was 
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spent on quantifying armies or economies. Early statistical assessments of states were 
thus ‘virtually useless as a way of determining their relative strength’.97 By the 19th 
century, however, linked with the emergence of a bourgeoisie public sphere, the interest 
in quantifying populations, territories, national economies, and military force, allowed 
measurement of ‘the distribution of capabilities, in order to place individual states within 
the international system’.98 
This rise in numerical measuring and statistics was also connected to the growth of the 
middle classes, based, as they were, on commercial society and professions: the 
physician, the engineer, the scientist, the lawyer – this was the bourgeoisie. 
With Cameralism and the police sciences in the 18th century, trade and the general 
economy were increasingly seen as new expressions of a government’s national power 
capabilities.99 As free trade and commerce grew in the 19th century, there came a need for 
standardised and universal measures, as such measures were considered a precondition 
for free trade, markets, and rational economic action – in short, for a liberal order.100  
Ian Hacking has charted this transformation from an enthusiasm for public, numerical 
data amongst the middle classes, to the incorporation of technologies for classifying and 
enumerating within the bureaucratic state apparatus.101 In Prussia, in particular, with its 
state-centric tradition, both the measurement of capacities and the capacities for 
measurement increased radically in the 19th century, and Hacking notes the contrast in 
how statistics were developed and used between Prussia and Western Europe, including 
Britain and France.102 Sir John Sinclair, in his Statistical Account of Scotland, observed 
how ‘in Germany they were engaged in a species of political inquiry to which they had 
given the name of Statistics. By statistical is meant in Germany an inquiry for the purpose 
of ascertaining the political strength of a country, or questions concerning matters of 
state’.103 Chapter 4 presented the developments in statistics and the police sciences at the 
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University of Göttingen. Indeed, although political arithmetic had developed in England 
in the 17th century, ‘it was German thinkers and statesmen who brought to full 
consciousness the idea that the nation-state is essentially characterised by its statistics, 
and therefore demands a statistical office in order to define itself and its powers’.104 
Professional statistical bureaus were founded in Prussia (1805), Bavaria (1808), 
Württemberg (1820) and Saxony (1831), also with the goal of releasing centralised 
information to the middle-class public.105  
And it was the head of Bavaria’s statistical office, Georg von Mayr (1841–1925), who in 
1871 was asked to give a speech on the occasion of the foundation of the German 
Empire.106 On the 19 January 1871, the day after Wilhelm I had been crowned German 
Emperor at the Palace of Versailles in France, von Mayr set about the task of describing 
to a popular audience what exactly it was that had come into being. What was this new 
nation-state called ‘Germany’? ‘The digit’, von Mayr started,  
has an exceptional meaning in the spiritual life of men. It is the main means for the 
precise recognition of conditions and events. In particular this is the case for all social 
phenomena, which can only be correctly identified through quantitative mass 
observations. He who approaches social phenomena without the sure measure of the digit 
is deceived by the random groupings that initially seem to him to be facts.107 
Finishing his speech, he quoted figures on the numbers of Germans within and outside the 
national boundaries: in the Netherlands, in Switzerland, in Austria-Hungary, and in 
Russia. This fact, he asserted, was a promise of great things for the German Reich. It was 
a promise because numbers are objective: they cannot tell us about the nature of religion, 
he said, but only about the number of religious people. And that is an advantage, because 
numbers speak for themselves. Numbers afford certainty, without touching on dubious 
interpretations of the ‘nature’ of phenomena.108   
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Georg von Mayr’s whole speech was a quantification of the new Reich, painting a 
pointillist portrait of the standing and position of the nation in all its details as it existed as 
of 19 January 1871. 
Such institutionalised statistics was what pushed the balance of power squarely into the 
domain of the practically discoverable, numerically certain, and politically manageable, 
facilitating political decisions about how to use the state’s resources.109 Justi’s and 
Cobden’s critical remarks were proven wrong, as the balance of power and the diverse 
nation-states of which it was composed could now be depicted as having tangible and 
measurable capabilities, suitable for instant comparison expressed in a common language 
understandable also for the public – von Mayr’s ‘digit’. One did not have to be a 
philosopher or lawyer (or state official for that matter) to understand what ‘1000 
Prussians’ or ‘10 dreadnoughts’ meant.110  
As noted in Chapter 1, my goal with this project is not to bridge a presumed gap between 
the perception and the reality of the balance of power, but to examine such exercises 
amongst historical actors themselves. Thus, I do not assume that the prevalence of such 
measurements and statistics made an actually existing balance of power more accessible, 
more clearly visible. Measures are not their own interpretation. Comparing the standing 
of polities and various ‘interests’ is not new – but something happens once this turns into 
a quantifiable, ‘certain’ measurement of the relative distribution of capabilities, placing 
individual nation-states within the international system relying on a balance of power 
seen as the expression of power competition, and even the very march of history and 
progress itself.111  
The hammer-and-nail saying applies here – the statistical tools at your disposal 
predispose both the problem and its solutions. When your neighbour is a number, and that 
number is in the process of surpassing your own, securing ‘the liberties of Europe’ is not 
the first thing that comes to mind. Thus, the practice of measuring capacities transformed 
that which was linked to the balance of power, which transformed what was the gist of 
the political. Statistics and measurement helped to associate the balance of power with 
national positions of a kind that had not existed in the same way before statistics and 
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categorisations became the pre-eminent practical art of what we now would call ‘policy-
relevant knowledge’.  
Increasingly, the nation itself could be made tangible, for example through maps and 
censuses, as could the resources (including the military capacities) of nations in a 
comparative perspective. Relative power as capacities became a prevalent measure. Once 
you can measure exactly, you can predict; and once you can predict, you can prevent.  
Making something appear as an objective assessment of a threat, the obsessions with 
threat itself, and with ‘treatments for changing the odds’, stems from these developments 
in statistics, quantifying capacities, numerical designations, categorisations, and the 
practical purposes which grounded these new categories, intimately connected to the state 
and the balance of power as an expression of power politics.112 In a world of atomistic 
nation-states, the balance of power became increasingly associated with ‘self-defence’.  
 
National positions, self-defence, and the prediction of trajectories 
This is what I mean by ‘national positions’. A state-focused balance of power came to 
define the international-political. The balance of power was no longer the antidote to 
universal monarchy and domination, as a way of defending the public interest of Europe. 
Rather, it expressed the violent interaction of atomistic nation-states, with their particular 
interests and measurable capabilities. A central advantage of this way of conceptualising 
order, based on a science of individuals and private interests, was predictability.113 By 
calculation and measurements, one could observe trends, rather than the mercantilist and 
static absolute ‘balances of trade’ associated with the old order. One started worrying 
about the future trajectory of states, the relative rates of population growth and industry, 
for example, and what this meant for one’s own security and capacity for self-defence. 
This focus on the state, initially mainly philosophical (Hegel), assumed a more 
exclusively engaged and practical dimension when the military tradition became linked to 
nationalism and state-centrism.  
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These developments in Prussia are crucial in explaining how the balance of power 
became increasingly nationalised. With the growth of Prussia and the unification of 
Germany, other states had to respond in kind. In both Britain and Germany, the 
aristocracy still prevailed while the middle classes were nationalised. This was above all a 
development in Prussia, then Germany, but also in Britain. By 1848, the middle classes 
had become nationalised and ‘the frank class terminology and analysis of the 1840s 
became attenuated, and “moderate” critics of society and politics were beginning to use 
terms like “interest” again’.114 In the 1840s, therefore, came a return to speaking about 
‘interests’ that were now ‘national’ ones.  
Take Palmerston’s new use of balance-of-power rhetoric when in 1854, against Cobden’s 
associate John Bright, he maintained that the balance of power concerned individual 
states. It was, he declared, ‘the doctrine of self-defence, with the simple qualification that 
it is combined with sagacity and forethought, and an endeavour to prevent imminent 
danger before it comes thundering at your doors’.115  
Furthermore, in the 1860s, with war brewing between Prussia and Denmark over the 
Schleswig-Holstein question, Mr. Alexander W. Kinglake, speaking in Parliament, argued 
that so much of the troubles this particular issue had occasioned had resulted from what 
he called ‘political foresight’, and ‘that he would entreat Her Majesty’s Government to be 
very careful how they drew us into anything like war or dangerous engagements, from a 
mere fear that the balance of power in Europe might be disturbed’. It would have been 
wiser, he said, ‘to have had less foresight’ in what concerns the balance of power, and to 
wait until ‘the danger had actually occurred’.116 
As noted in the introduction, a shift in episteme implied moving away from republican-
infused arguments concerning the ‘protection against dominance’ as a structural concern, 
and towards individual states’ freedom from interventions. In this respect, Kinglake’s 
argument was a precise verdict on the balance-of-power concept in the early years of 
Bismarck’s Germany. There was no more talk of the ‘liberties of Europe’ or a European 
‘republic’ or ‘commonwealth’ – ‘Europe’ for Bismarck was nothing but a notion 
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géographique. The balance of power had come to rely more on national positions than on 
protecting something like the ‘public interest’. This movement had to do with the growing 
concern with calculations and measurements. Once capacities can be calculated, the 
balance of power becomes tied to national positions and, importantly, the prediction of 
state behaviour and national trajectories. In turn, this objectification of national positions 
gives a hitherto unavailable illusion of certainty.  
In the analytical literature on international order, ‘Power Transition Theory’ is 
conceptualised as the opposite of balance-of-power theory, because an equal balance 
between major states is seen to trigger revisionist state action.117 Here, by contrast, we 
end up with a balance-of-power rhetoric used to legitimise preventive wars, ultimately 
helping to permit power transitions rather than being the opposite of it. In the case of 
Utrecht, in Chapter 3, we saw how the way in which the concept of the balance of power 
had become settled and accepted served to coerce Austria, leading to a new post-war 
order and conception of the ‘system’. The deployment of the balance-of-power concept 
was the fundamental element in the construction of a post-war international order. Now, 
by the same token, deployment of the concept facilitated a power transition, eventually 
leading to the First World War.  
During the latter part of the 19th century, the very assessment of power had changed.118 
With the prevalence of statistics and measurements of capabilities, and because of 
technological developments, population and infantry were not the only factors for 
counting, but an array of different capabilities and tactics (ships, submarines, trains). It 
was about calculation, not necessarily about the intentions of e.g. a French king ‘set on 
universal dominion’ or whatever. It concerned national positions, national capabilities, 
supposedly irrespective of precedents or ploys or plans, and about trajectories and 
foresight, the dream of the early interest-theoreticians, now made reality (literally 
speaking) with the advances in statistical sciences – the most ‘useful’ and publically 
understandable of knowledges. This is linked to the well-known arms race in the run-up 
to the First World War, and influenced what Steven van Evera called ‘the cult of the 
                                                          
117 Organski, A.F.K. 1958. World Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
118 See Buzan, Barry and George Lawson. 2015. The Global Transformation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
274 
 
offensive’:119 One could, it was felt, foresee dangers in a much more precise way and act 
preventively. This marked the culmination of the developments in the balance of power in 
the 19th century, now seen as a zero-sum struggle between national positions. When the 
balance of power relies on national positions, the idea of intervening preventively to stop 
the trajectory of other states can take the upper hand, which was what happened in the 
run-up to the First World War. The balance of power implied an assessment not in terms 
of system stability as such, but in terms of relative national positions. The balance of 
power did not stabilise the international system: it acted to make European politics more 
unstable. As Morgenthau notes, it was the calculations of the balance that made 
preventive war a possibility, and that triggered the First World War.120  
 
Conclusions 
If in the previous section, the inflection point was how the balance of power was linked to 
the public interest by opposition to the Congress equilibrium, and the protection of state 
independence, here the triumph of the state pushed the European public interest 
completely out of the way. There was now a debate between private interests, embodied 
in the exaltation of economic factors, on the one hand, and the balance of power on the 
other. The rise and development of the middle classes and their relationship to the 
aristocracy were central conditions of possibility for development of a new balance-of-
power rhetoric in Germany.  
The middle classes, focusing on the benefits of passions and private interests, had become 
nationalised. The strand of liberal rhetoric that won the day was the one that focused on 
the nation-state, and not on civil society. Further, the balance of power became linked to 
practical politics and war-making capabilities. Whereas the British fell back on the 
traditional balance of power concept, the Germans reinvented it in their own state-centric, 
nationalist and militarist tradition. 
Balance-of-power theory now assessed the national positions of the great powers. There 
was less focus on the European public interest. The balance of power was linked with 
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Hegelian state-centrism, liberal nationalism and Rankean philosophy of power politics, 
converted into politically engaged knowledge-practices, including statistics and the 
measurable capabilities of various national positions.121 From being a pro-European 
concept intended to protect the public interest of Europe, the balance of power was now 
turned against the idea of a European Commonwealth.  
As these developments came together in the course of the 19th century, the balance of 
power took on the more familiar ‘realist’ form, nationalised and used in defence of the 
‘national interest’ and survival. What was emerging in the period covered in this chapter 
is what Morgenthau called the ‘concept of interest defined in terms of power’.122 Within 
the balance-of-power concept, the focus was now more on (measurable) power and 
capacity than on the ‘balance’ part of the equation, more on the national interest than the 
protection of the public. This view of state interaction, or competition, is also what 
defines the international-political as a separate sphere, distinct from detached reflections 
on the same.123 This was Meinecke’s definition, too: a ‘reason of state’ that ‘consists in 
realizing itself and its environment and to derive from this understanding maxims for 
action’, not themes for abstract speculation. The balance of power then becomes the one 
and only rational course of policy for any actor seeking success. It is, again in 
Morgenthau’s words, ‘a universal instrument of foreign policy used in all times by all 
nations who wanted to preserve their independence’– that is, their survival through self-
defence,124 also against eminently calculable future threats.  
That balances emerge because each and every nation is bent on maximising its own 
potential was a fairly new element, especially in so far as this is considered a universal 
assumption, and not dependent on the particular properties or ‘natural interests’ of a 
certain polity. The problem of a (European) order was not empire, not the public interest 
of Europe, but managing a delimited number of states and their interaction. A multitude 
of states, competing with each other, without any hierarchical principle or leader, archon, 
where the balance of power is now not seen as a principle guiding and leading a 
hierarchical, European order, but as an expression of the tensions between states, at best a 
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cushion between national states – this situation, and what to do about it, is the anarchy 
problem. It does not emerge before the combination of liberalism (freely competing, 
atomistic states), nationalist militarism (a state’s self-defence is the goal), and the 
renewed Prussian balance of power tradition (the balance is what defines the 
international-political, in short, the theory of international politics). 
During the 19th century, therefore, the balance of power for many becomes associated 
with international anarchy, power politics, self-defence and survival, and war. This is also 
the condition of possibility for political science and International Relations to include the 
balance as a core principle based on political practice and maxims. The balance-of-power 
concept thus links developments in the latter part of the 19th century to the emergence of 
the IR discipline, which I address in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Conserving the Balance of Power in Practice and Theory 
 
 
In this chapter, I trace how the concept of the balance of power, as developed in the 19th 
century, was deployed in the 20th, where it was linked to a crucial new development: the 
establishment of academic disciplines. The distinction between abstraction and reality, 
already present in international-political debates, gained an increasing prominence with 
the emergence of academic disciplines, as they sought to establish their own jurisdiction 
and define authoritative knowledge.  
Abstractions are crucial to professionalization.1 Academic disciplines needed to specify 
and define abstract concepts further, and in this, they reacted to and interacted with their 
constitutive outside: other disciplines, and international politics. Professional actors now 
sought to ‘academicize’ knowledge2 by establishing relative autonomy and distance from 
political practice. I show how the balance of power has been a central tool in this for 
International Relations as a US social science.3 First international lawyers, later political 
scientists and IR scholars, claimed the authority to define what the central concept of the 
balance of power really was, and what it was not. International law and International 
Relations were the scientific fields that produced knowledge on the balance of power, a 
part of the practical world of ‘politics’. Both claimed authoritative knowledge of the 
world – one by excluding, the other by including the balance of power and international 
anarchy. 
The history of the 20th-century in this chapter therefore follows the narrative concerning 
the distinction between abstractions and reality from the 18th century, and the episteme 
shift from about the 19th. The abstraction/reality distinction, in view of German state-
centrism, is the leitmotif in the arguments of both politicians and academics over the 
balance of power that I examine in the following – traceable from Justi’s rejection of the 
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balance as an abstract ‘chimera’, to the episteme shift away from a common public 
interest, and towards a liberal focus on the free interaction of individuated nation states 
and national positions, now to be called ‘international anarchy’. The developments 
addressed in the previous chapters had a tangible and crucial impact on the concept of the 
balance of power in the IR discipline, although the historical tensions were not resolved 
in any way. By linking the concept as we know it from International Relations (IR) to 
previous developments, in Germany in particular, this chapter therefore places the 
balance of power as a key concept of IR on empirical ground by directing attention to its 
history in and effects on the constitution of the discipline, which has not been fully 
appreciated.4  
Classical maxims and concepts like the balance of power has remained in IR, but have 
been devoid of the practical component, and turned into structural imperatives5  – ‘what 
once moved is enclosed and eternalized […] like an insect in amber’.6 This makes it more 
difficult to study the histories and problems linked with the concept, than to study those 
who claim to have already provided answers to them.7 Still, as I have done in the previous 
chapters, I attempt to do precisely this by tracing the deployment of the balance of power. 
Once again, the balance of power should be understood relative to context – in this case, 
including academic disciplines seeking relative autonomy and distance from political 
practice. For me, the uses of the balance-of-power concept in IR theory, in debates within 
the field, are not on a different analytical level than the uses of the concept in, say, 
diplomatic negotiations between Britain and Austria in the early 18th century. It makes 
little sense to treat IR theories as distinct from the many other forms of knowledge or 
political arguments that historical actors have engaged in and that I have taken as my 
object of investigation. The IR discipline is a historical site like any other I have 
examined, in which the uses and consequences of balance of power rhetoric can be 
investigated.  
Further, what enabled such disciplines to prevail, were their links to the practical and 
social organisation of universities. Disciplines concern the establishment and organisation 
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of authoritative knowledge, but also the organisation of scholars themselves in 
universities and associations.8 The German university model, specifying the relationship 
between the state, politics, and research, was also a central influence. This in turn means 
that academic disciplines are not self-contained spaces, and academia and politics, 
‘theory’ and ‘practice’, do not constitute different worlds. Therefore, I also address how 
the debates within academic disciplines, concerning the central distinction between 
abstraction and practice now in a world of ‘international anarchy’, parallels policy 
debates in the USA and Europe. In fact, the intimate links between communities of 
practical politicians and communities of academic scholars are reflected in how the IR 
discipline appropriated the concept of the balance of power to define its (porous) borders.  
The balance-of-power concept, however, does not respect the boundaries of the IR 
discipline. The fact that the balance of power became a central concept of IR actually 
precludes drawing any a priori analytical boundaries between the inside and outside of 
the discipline. The participants invoked the concept itself in the negotiating of such 
boundaries, so an analytical distinction between the inside and outside of IR cannot hold. 
The concept of the balance of power simultaneously influenced the discipline and the 
world it was meant to represent and explain.9  
In Chapter 1, I emphasised the methodological importance of conceptualising the 
relations between the historical communities under investigation on the one hand, and a 
contemporary community of researchers or scientists on the other. This, however, is also 
a substantive point: the distinctions between such communities emerge at certain points in 
time, and how knowledge claims and theories are assessed and used within different 
communities makes a difference regarding the balance of power, as actors respond not 
only to events or ‘practical politics’, but also to the theories used to describe or explain 
it.10  One historiographer of the discipline, Brian Schmidt, makes the valid point that the 
tendency to view an analytical tradition as an actual historical one is problematic. 
Scholars should not reify an analytical construct.11 However, what if the practitioners in 
question are the ones who ‘confuse’ an analytical tradition with a historical one? Further, 
what if, empirically speaking, parts of the analytical tradition are indeed constructed upon 
                                                          
8 Abott, Andrew. 2001. Chaos of Disciplines. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
9 Bell, Duncan. 2009. ‘Writing the World: Disciplinary History and Beyond’, International Affairs 85(1): 3-
22, p. 16. 
10 Hampsher-Monk, ‘Political Languages’ pp. 104–106. 
11 Schmidt, Brian. 1997. The Political Discourse of Anarchy. New York: SUNY Press. 
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a purported historical tradition as well? What happens when the cards are mixed – not by 
me or by us, but by them? That is what I investigate.  
The history and subject matter in this chapter is already well known in and beyond the 
discipline, so it will be shorter on realia than previous chapters. For instance, several 
recent texts dealing with the history of IR and political science overlap with the topic and 
account in this chapter – in particular the work of Brian Schmidt, Stefano Guzzini and 
Nicolas Guilhot.12 This is fortunate, as they make it unnecessary for me to explore many 
issues related to the history of IR. The level of detail is relative to the task at hand, which 
is to show the reversal whereby the balance of power has been appropriated in IR to 
account for the practices that are grouped together to form the concept itself.13  
This makes for the following procedure: To connect the developments seen in the 
previous chapter to the role of academic disciplines, which are important in this chapter, I 
will start by tracing the use of the concept of the balance of power in international law on 
the eve of the 20th century. To define their own authoritative knowledge, international 
lawyers rejected the balance of power concept, framing it as being too close to engaged 
politics. In the burgeoning academic discipline of international law, what was to be 
resisted was international anarchy. However, international anarchy would in turn be 
appropriated by scholars focussing on the state, as realistic description of the condition 
and system in which nation states found themselves. Political science adopted the concept 
as an expression of political practice.  
The opposition to and defence of the balance now played out in the context of academic 
disciplines, but also in international politics throughout the two World Wars. I go on to 
chart the use of the balance of power amongst state leaders and diplomats of the period. 
Whilst political leaders repudiated the balance, it was conserved amongst diplomatic 
practitioners in European foreign ministries. Following both wars, perhaps more than at 
any time before, the balance of power was up in the air, because many considered the 
international political scene as being a fundamentally new one. The First World War 
                                                          
12 Schmidt, The Political Discourse; Guzzini, Stefano, ‘The Enduring Dilemmas’; id. 2013. ‘The Ends of 
International Relations Theory: Stages of Reflexivity and Modes of Theorizing’, European Journal of 
International Relations 19(3): 521–541; Guilhot, Nicolas. 2010. ‘American Katechon: When Political 
Theology Became International Relations Theory’, Constellations 17(2):224-253; id. 2011. The Invention of 
International Relations Theory. Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
13 Culler, Jonathan.1997. Literary Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 5. 
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inaugurated a new decade of criticism against the balance of power. Just as international 
lawyers did, US President Woodrow Wilson rejected the old balance of power to promote 
his ‘new diplomacy’. On the other hand, the concept was defended and conserved by 
traditionalist diplomatic practitioners – what Hans Morgenthau called the ‘aristocratic 
international’ – who would serve as Morgenthau’s ultimate ‘reality check’14 and whose 
practice was precisely the basis for IR theorising. After the First World War, practitioners 
of the ‘old school’ of diplomacy conserved the balance, which was facing rejection by 
liberal political leaders.  
After the Second World War, and as the Cold War set on, the concept of the balance of 
power became more widely accepted, also in the USA. The nuclear arms race, the ‘cold 
war rationality’ and its associated calculations, was the apogee of the statistical 
arguments, the emphasis on measurements and pre-emption that emerged in the 19th 
century. However, this Cold War scientific rationality was opposed by early IR scholars, 
focusing on the traditional practical maxims of European international politics, such as 
the balance of power. Early IR theorists sought to establish their own jurisdiction by 
rejecting both behaviourism and liberal internationalism, rather focusing on traditional 
state practice in educating US policymakers. After the Second World War, then, IR 
scholars defended and conserved the balance of power as a concept. Paradoxically, it was 
now these scholars of international politics who would refer to a practical tradition, 
eventually converting it into a theory of international relations and feeding it back to 
policymakers. The political figures known for using the concept most frequently were 
also those most firmly enmeshed in the scholarly world of IR: George F. Kennan and 
Henry Kissinger are cases in point.   
Therefore, lastly, I turn to the development of the IR discipline in the USA, which, 
contrary to the discipline of international law, defined their authoritative knowledge by 
appropriating precisely political practice. As seen, making the state the a priori, and 
rejecting the public interest of Europe, was elements in the Prussian and German views of 
the balance of power, and this was a central influence on the gradual establishment of the 
academic discipline of IR, particularly the development of a theory of international 
politics in the 1950s and 60s. Echoing Justi’s arguments, the early realists’ opposition to 
liberalism was an opposition to abstractions to the detriment of politics as practice. For 
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IR scholars, ‘theory’ had a practical value – it was a praxeology that could guide policy 
and define the purposes of political leadership.15  
As noted in the introduction, a traditional goal of the discipline of international relations 
(IR) has been to approximate the concepts in use by academics and practitioners, in order 
to conserve established categories of political maxims and diplomatic practice. The 
balance of power was the bridge between traditional European state practice and the new 
hegemonic role of the USA, and between the notions of ‘practice’ and ‘theory’. In the 
formative years of the discipline, this aimed to help new policy elites to understand and 
manage international politics efficiently – particularly in the ‘new’ great power, the 
USA.16 However, as IR became an academic discipline, the need for some sort of 
objective detachment and scientific authority to theorise international politics became 
apparent (also this particularly in the USA).17 Abstractions had to be included if IR were 
to become a legitimate science. Most pronounced in the works of Morgenthau and Waltz, 
such practical knowledge and traditional concepts gradually became more attuned to a 
‘scientific’ approach. The balance of power became a principal theory of international 
relations – not because the balance of power was particularly efficient as an explanatory 
tool in analyses, but because it could be presented as simultaneously being both practice 
and theory. The traditional state practice of the balance of power became its own theory. 
The balance of power was a way of debating and formalising the scope of tolerable 
international anarchy, thereby carving out a disciplinary space for IR between the 
formalism of behaviourist political science and legal internationalism. 
This chapter therefore in important respects concerns the effects of the developments in 
Germany/Prussia I investigated in the previous chapter. The concept changed hands, in a 
manner of speaking: whilst politicians occasionally referred to it, the disputes, 
contentions, and debates involving the balance of power moved into the emergent 
academic field of IR, which sustained and reproduced the concept. The balance of power 
concept, imported from Germany, made the discipline of IR a possibility in the first place, 
as it was conceptualised as a pure form of political ‘practice’. This also made things 
difficult for a ‘Weberian moment’ in IR that would have accorded priority to disengaged 
                                                          
15 Guilhot, The Invention, pp. 21–23. 
16 Guzzini, ‘The Enduring Dilemmas’ p. 547. 
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science; the central move to constitute the IR discipline was to blur the distinction 
between politics and academic analysis by means of the balance of power concept.  
 
Law and anarchy 
As in Chapter 4, it is important to keep in mind that ‘politics’ and ‘science’ are not 
exclusive domains – but that the construction of such borders is consequential. Creating 
and maintaining an academic discipline requires policing its boundaries to other 
disciplines, and it is therefore appropriate to start with a short section on how a 
‘competing’ discipline invoked the balance of power concept – that of international law. 
This will illustrate both how the distinction between abstraction and reality, and the noted 
episteme shift, affected also academic disciplines in the transition to the 20th century.  
As the discipline of international law gained an increasing professional self-awareness in 
the 1860s and 1870s,18 the balance of power concept was excluded from it.19 International 
lawyers increasingly argued that the balance of power was not a source of international 
law, and that it belonged to Staats-Klugheit (‘state wisdom’), or the like. As a legal 
principle, the balance was dismissed, now viewed instead as a ‘principle of general 
policy’, and termed the ‘political balance of power’, ‘practical politics’, or a ‘political 
norm’.20 It was a political maxim, not a legal concept. The criticism is familiar – what is 
new is that the balance of power is clearly distinguished from the science of law, as being 
useful solely for politics.  
The definition of the ‘political’ and practical versus the abstract is used in attempts at 
defining authoritative knowledge. Both in international law and in International Relations, 
the character of the interrelations between an academic community and its surroundings, 
including the state, conditioned what kind of knowledge was considered suitably abstract, 
and therefore relevant.21   
                                                          
18 Kosenniemi, Martti. 2004. The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–
1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 3. 
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20 Ibid., p. 14. 
21 See Fourcade, Economists and Societies.  
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Before the noted episteme shift, the 18th-century concept of the balance of power 
emphasising the public good had worked well in combination with international law, but 
when the balance of power became linked with the state and national power politics, 
international lawyers increasingly presupposed a distance from political practice as a way 
of defining authoritative knowledge.22 As Martti Kosenniemi has shown, International 
lawyers aimed to defend their position by making other positions seem political or 
subjective - International Law attempted to remove the political from international 
relations, in turn inadvertently redefining what the political was all about:23  
The way in which international lawyers rejected the balance of power was also a reaction 
to the national state: After the episteme shift identified, this practical-political balance of 
power was no longer about a European public interest, but a multitude of independent, 
atomistic, national states competing, as in a market, in power-political struggles. Many 
international lawyers linked this view of international politics with the balance of power, 
thus defining their own sphere of authoritative knowledge by maintaining a relative 
distance to political practice. This view of international politics was also linked to what 
these international lawyers increasingly started calling ‘international anarchy’. 
From about the 1860s onwards, European international lawyers were increasingly 
invoking international anarchy to dismiss the balance of power. The balance of power in 
anarchy could now specify the precarious situation of independent nation-states with no 
central authority. In 1867, the British Lawyer Lord Vere Henry Hobart wrote a piece on 
Richard Cobden in Macmillan’s Magazine.24 Like Cobden in the previous chapter, he 
argued for the ‘intercourse between nations’, and dismissed any view of ‘patriotism’ that 
would imply a defence of the balance of power. Such views ‘tolerate and approve the 
anarchy of nations’; further, ‘the natural and necessary result of international anarchy is 
war, just as the natural and necessary result of national anarchy is personal violence. But 
war is not, because international anarchy is not, an inevitable condition of human 
affairs’.25 The lawyer Frederic Seebohm maintained that ‘the overruling cause why most 
nations entered the self-subsistent stage of national life may be said to have been, the 
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23 Ibid. 
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186. 
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prevalence of international anarchy’;26 and Thomas Joseph Lawrence in his Handbook of 
Public International Law mentioned ‘the great danger of international anarchy’.27 James 
Lorimer, one of the founders of the Institut de Droit International, linked the balance 
explicitly to international anarchy, by dismissing the role of the balance as protecting 
order. In the 1880s, he argued that the balance of power could not be a ‘guarantee against 
international anarchy’.28 Quite the contrary, Lorimer maintained, ‘the doctrine of the 
balance of power from first to last has been a mere proclamation of international 
anarchy.’29 Similar references to international anarchy recur throughout the 1880s and 
1890s, also in French and German publications, and the British scholar G. Lowes 
Dickinson’s widely read 1916 book The European Anarchy came to define much of the 
subsequent discussion about the role of the balance of power in the ‘new world’ that was 
at hand after the First World War.30  
 
Wilson’s ‘New Diplomacy’ and the League of Nations  
Dickinson’s book implied that the German Kaiser and the Russian Czar were not to carry 
all blame for the war: there was something about the system of international relations that 
had gone awry. International lawyers had rejected the balance of power and ‘international 
anarchy’, and in a like manner, Dickinson maintained that this system of anarchy and the 
traditional practices of European diplomacy had led to the Great War, and the new great 
power, the USA, would now have to ensure a transition from anarchy and the balance of 
power to precisely law.31  
This argument resonated well in the USA, where the balance of power was traditionally 
an object for many to despise. After President James Monroe had proclaimed his doctrine 
in 1823, establishing the American continent as the exclusive domain of US foreign 
policy and urging US withdrawal from European affairs, the country had defined its 
                                                          
26 Seebohm, Frederic. 1871. On International Reform. London: Longmans, Green and Co., p. 19, emphasis 
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moral purpose in opposition to the balance of power. Richard Cobden had considered the 
USA an ideal in this respect: ‘America, with infinite wisdom, refuses to be a party to the 
“balance of power”’.32  
The USA had been confident in its isolation, as the British had been in centuries past. In 
1838 Abraham Lincoln had said that ‘all the armies of Europe, Asia, and Africa combined 
[…] could not by force take a drink from the Ohio [River…] At what point, then, is the 
approach of danger to be expected? I answer. If it ever reach us it must spring up amongst 
us; it cannot come from abroad.’33 
Therefore, in the First World War, when the USA had involved itself in European power 
politics, it was not to mend the balance of power, but to get rid of it altogether. After the 
war, US opposition to the balance grew even stronger, and the US political scientist and 
president Woodrow Wilson hotly disputed the moral value and practical viability of the 
balance of power, associating it with the destructive power politics of the ‘old world’, in 
opposition to which the whole existence of the USA was an example. In 1917, Wilson 
argued that the balance of power must be replaced by a ‘community of power’ – a league 
of nations.34 The following year, in a speech in London, he stated:  
the center and characteristic of the old order was that unstable thing which we used to call 
the ‘balance of power’ – a thing in which the balance was determined by the sword which 
was thrown in the one side or the other; a balance which was determined by the unstable 
equilibrium of competitive interests; a balance which was maintained by jealous 
watchfulness and an antagonism of interests which, though it was generally latent, was 
always deep-seated.35 
The balance of power had no place in Wilson’s ‘new diplomacy’, as it was considered to 
have had a part in bringing about the War. Rather, what was now needed, Wilson argued, 
were ‘open covenants of peace, openly arrived at’.36 
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Still, the First World War did not kill the balance-of-power concept, as some would 
argue.37 Even in the USA, there had been dissident voices. In 1913, one US diplomat, 
Lewis Einstein, had argued that the European balance of power, protected by Britain, was 
a central concern for the USA.38 However, the balance had almost become too 
conventional: ‘The European balance of power’, he opens his essay, ‘has been such a 
permanent factor since the birth of the republic that Americans have never realised how 
its absence would have affected their political status.’ Britain’s defence of the balance of 
power had ‘contributed toward American development’.  
Furthermore, US scholars had established political science as a ‘realistic’ alternative to 
the prevailing internationalism of international law, and the ‘idealism’ associated with 
President Wilson. As opposed to international lawyers defining their own professional 
jurisdiction in opposition to the ‘political’ balance of power, political scientists, for the 
same purposes, increasingly held that the closeness to practical politics was precisely 
what made the concept useful: a science of politics should be based on the practical 
lessons of history, not on abstractions. For instance, the Prussian scholar Francis Lieber 
had introduced the distinction between the ‘abstract’ and ‘the historical and practical’ 
study of the state in the US context.39 Lieber had favoured the latter. He had thus 
established the state and its practical politics, not abstract transnational and normative law 
structures, as the central object of investigation. Also international anarchy, first 
negatively defined by international lawyers as something to be fought and avoided, soon 
became appropriated by those concerned with such engaged, political knowledge. For 
them, international anarchy emerged as the perhaps ideally unwanted, but unavoidably 
realistic, condition of international politics. Heinrich von Treitschke, the central exponent 
of Realpolitik, had written: ‘all theory must be founded on practice; only then does an 
understanding become genuinely reciprocal. That is a true balance of the Powers.’40 
Realpolitik, including the ‘practical’ balance of power, came to stand for the specifically 
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Prussian way of politics – a ‘science of self-interest’ as the English The Fortnightly 
Review called it.41  
In 1914, Raymond Garfield Gettel used such German state-centric arguments to defend 
the balance of power in the USA.42 Like Kenneth Waltz later, he distinguished between 
three levels: the individual, the state, and the ‘collection of states that comprise the world 
as a whole’. The state was the perfection of national life; echoing Hegel, he argued that 
the state must become ‘conscious of its own existence’. In this, the balance of power, at 
the ‘third level’, was central for safeguarding states’ independence. In the same vein, 
Westel W. Willoughby’s juristic theory held that states led ‘an independent and isolated 
existence’, like individuals in a state of nature;43 and Walter Lippmann maintained that 
the balance of power was not to blame for the First World War. In an argument with 
historical precedents, Lippmann stated that the problem was that economic private 
interests had been turned into the national interests. What was needed was some sort of 
international organisation, based on the public interest.44  
Still, it was above all European foreign ministries that conserved the balance of power. 
Even if a succession of British political leaders bought into Wilson’s vision and critique, 
there was staunch opposition in Europe, in particular within the traditionalist echelons of 
diplomacy. President Wilson’s new moral framework for the conduct of international 
affairs was not only against the balance of power – it contradicted the stated policy 
objectives of all the belligerents. As such, Wilson’s idealist and interventionist policy also 
‘challenged the conceptual foundations of traditional European power politics’.45  
In Britain, under the leadership of Sir Robert Vansittart, ‘a staunch proponent of “old 
diplomacy” and the epitome of the generation of Foreign Office mandarins who 
apprenticed in the art of diplomacy in the immediate years before 1914’,46 Foreign Office 
officials continued to argue for the practical importance of the balance of power: Britain 
had no choice but to follow the traditional, practical recipe of the balance of power, as 
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international politics had once again demonstrated the prevalence of the kind of 
Machtpolitik seen as characteristic of the late 19th century.47 
Also in France, Wilson’s proclamations were met with opposition. The practical logic at 
play amongst French diplomats and state leaders was one that looked back to the power-
political tradition in the era of French predominance. From the late 19th century, teaching 
staff of the École libre des sciences politiques, which held a near-monopoly on training 
diplomats, were conservative liberals, including practicing diplomats, with an ‘impatience 
with abstract principles’.48 They considered the balance of power the most practical of 
tools, and it was a well-established concept within the French foreign ministry.49 
Clemenceau refused to accept Wilson’s stance on the balance of power, declaring: ‘there 
is an old system of alliances called the Balance of Power – this system of alliances, which 
I do not renounce, will be my guiding thought at the [Paris] Peace Conference’,50 the 
conference which set the terms of peace following the First World War. Clemenceau’s 
speech was met with cheers in France, but was widely criticised on the other side of the 
Atlantic. The USA will isolate itself, US media argued, unless British and French leaders 
can succeed in establishing a League of Nations.51  
The controversy involving the abstraction or reality of the balance thus continued in the 
20th century. Wilson attacked the balance, and promoted the League of Nations as an 
alternative to it. All the same, balance-of-power rhetoric was conserved within the 
aristocratic, diplomatic tradition, and seen as the ‘real’ prudent practice of international 
affairs against the liberal dreams of political leaders. This is crucial, because international 
law, by upholding a distance to the balance of power, also had helped redefined what 
politics was: it was the practice of the balance of power – and that practice now rested 
squarely with diplomats and European foreign ministries, the ‘aristocratic international’ 
covering the system, not only single states. And it was precisely this echelon of society, 
this ‘aristocratic international’, expressing the real and traditional, prudent political 
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practice, that would be the basis for IR to theorise about international relations, 
converting precisely this practice into its own theory.   
 
From the Second World War to the Cold War 
As in the 1870s and 1920s, a ‘balance of power anxiety’ unfolded as the Cold War set in: 
Who would be the new guarantor of world order? Who would secure a new balance of 
power?52 In the USA, numerous analysts and politicians asked what the ‘new’ world 
would look like. Moreover, ‘will it be our kind of world? What is our kind of world?’53 
However, after the Second World War, US arguments on the balance had changed. The 
USA, one argument went, had ‘converted’ to the balance of power.54  
In 1947 DeWitt Clinton Poole, a centrally placed US diplomat and presidential envoy, 
could credibly argue that the balance of power was an American idea. Freedom is to be 
had only in ‘a world in which power is widely distributed and balanced; a world of 
complex balance of power’. Furthermore, a complex balance of power was for Poole a 
requirement for a working UN. The new invention, the atomic bomb, had not changed 
this, he maintained. A balance was needed also in the nuclear age.55 Some agreed – even 
more disagreed.  
Shortly after the first test of a nuclear weapon, the military strategist Bernard Brodie – 
‘American Clausewitz’ and to-be RAND employee – had published The Absolute 
Weapon. 56  He argued that it was not the use itself, but the threat of use of this new 
weapon that could lead to peace and stability. This seemed to promise a revision of the 
workings of the international system. In the 1950s, therefore, some started arguing that 
the balance of power was irrelevant because of nuclear weapons technology.57  
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With the onset of the nuclear age, there was a sense of ‘unprecedented urgency’.58 For 
some, ‘analysis took precedence over synthesis’;59 ‘the traditional forms of practical 
reason and statecraft, which emphasized prudence, experience, deliberation, and 
consultation, seemed inadequate to the challenge, as outmoded as conventional weapons 
in comparison with nuclear arsenals’.60 Civilian scientists challenged the authority of the 
military establishment, arguing that the military’s traditional ways of understanding war 
and conflict were irrelevant for the tabula rasa nuclear wars of the future – they were 
neither scientific nor based on rationality. The prospect of a completely new world, with 
nuclear weapons, and potentially without any balance of power at all, led many to focus 
on decisions and rationality, in tension with historical practice and tradition. The nuclear 
arms race, the ‘balance of terror’, the offense/defence duel, and how these scientists and 
policymakers treated it was in many respects the apogee of the intense debates about 
statistics, measurements and bean counting, calculations, and prediction of trajectories we 
saw emerge in the 1800s.61  
However, now, those defending the balance of power increasingly argued that the new 
scientific rationality had gone too far. Whereas some held that the balance had become 
irrelevant because of nuclear weapons, others defended the old, practical lessons from 
European diplomacy, and the concept of the balance of power. In 1951, Herbert 
Butterfield, in a Chatham House address, defended the balance of power also in a nuclear 
age.62 So did Robert Ingrim, arguing that the balance of power was still relevant, and that 
the concept could not be blamed for the world wars. The USA is not the holder of the 
balance, but a defender of it.63 Glenn H. Snyder, in 1965, claimed that the ‘balance of 
terror’ was merely a sub-category of the most general theory of equilibrium, the balance 
of power. The presence of nuclear arsenals would only modify the balance.64 Morgenthau 
argued that nuclear policy was not a foreign policy tool, but a means of ensuring that the 
national interest can be supported by traditional means. Nuclear policy is a background 
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condition which must be managed though cooperation, where peace and stability are the 
ultimate goal. Thus, the balance of power is not obsolete, he maintained: it operates, day 
to day, in the shadow of nuclear policy – which is a different matter entirely.65  
As a reaction to the prominence of the ‘Cold War rationality’, more conservative IR 
scholars deployed the balance-of-power concept against attempts at a formal, quantitative, 
and depoliticised rationalisation of science, seeking to establish their own academic 
discipline. However, they had to cater to ‘science’ themselves to gain legitimacy for IR as 
a discipline.  
 
International Relations, the practice of theory, and theory as practice 
International lawyers used the balance of power to establish a contrast between their own 
disciplinary knowledge and the outside, defined by engaged political practice. The exact 
opposite happened in IR – the new discipline incorporated the balance of power as part of 
its professional identity. IR thus came to serve as a new position from which to argue 
about the balance of power. Here my point is not to present innovative ‘important 
thinkers’ or texts, but that balance-of-power rhetoric now featured also within the context 
of the academic discipline of IR. This was a new space where the work of IR scholars 
‘would not only find a consistent and dedicated readership but appear as intellectual 
pillars of a new discipline and be read within a self-contained space of reflection’.66  
After the First World War, the idea of coordinating human affairs and of world 
unification ‘passed rapidly from the sphere of the literary idealist into that of the 
methodical, practical man’, H.G. Wells had maintained.67 That was indeed a common 
argument. Already in 1922, William Dunning, President of the APSA, had held that 
theories of political science and the practice of international relations were ‘hopelessly at 
variance’. Dunning favoured political practice, which theory failed to reflect.68 In IR, 
practice became its own theory.  
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Many of the early IR scholars in the USA were émigrés from Germany, inspired by 
Prussian and German theories of the state and the balance of power. Such German 
perspectives on power politics and the centrality of national positions were crucial to the 
formation of IR as a discipline.69 As Kenneth Thompson said of Morgenthau, he had 
‘translated certain European ideas to fit the American experience’ ̶ these émigré scholars 
criticised the prevailing US intellectual scene by continuing a conversation based on 
Weimarian premises.70 
Once again, after the Second World War, a ‘balance of power anxiety’ prevailed. What if, 
in some unprecedented way, there was no balance, order, or structure to international 
politics at all? Did the Cold War world imply ‘the end of an era and the descent into 
political anomie?’71 The initial concerns of many IR scholars went parallel to these 
discussions: Who would be the new guarantor of world order, and how? Was there a 
balance of power? or who could secure a new one? The new discipline of International 
Relations aimed to contribute to resolving these questions by reintroducing the balance-
of-power concept as central to the practice of statecraft, as opposed to abstractions and 
theoretical knowledge, including the detached Cold-War rationality.72 For the émigré 
scholars in the USA, however, there was a problem: some kind of scientific legitimacy, 
some kind of theory, was required. They also had to cater to an audience of policymakers 
by emphasising the possibility of establishing some ‘general laws’ or regularities in 
historical experiences, even if politics could not be contained within the limits of strict 
reason.73  
Of central importance to these debates and discussions in the field during the Cold War 
was the 1954 ‘Conference on International Politics’ organised by the Rockefeller 
Association.74 This conference, convened to discuss ‘the possibility, nature and limits of 
theory in international relations’, was according to Nicolas Guilhot, the first meeting that 
explicitly aimed to carve out a disciplinary jurisdiction for IR by ‘grounding it in an 
underlying theory’ to establish its definite autonomy from other fields of social inquiry, 
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like international law, but also political science.75 The purpose of a theory of international 
relations was to isolate the study of power in international politics from purely scientific 
rationality and behaviourism. Realist IR scholars favoured reason over rationality: they 
opposed rationalism by invoking the importance of politics and decisions – the contingent 
and at times irrational processes of international politics. The early realists aimed to distil 
an academic field of international relations from the German debates (presented in the 
previous chapter), emphasising political maxims, but adapted to a US context. To this 
end, they fashioned a theory distinct from both rational behaviourism and international 
law. 
If the emerging IR discipline is a context for the balance of power rhetoric, so are the 
particularities of the USA. As noted, disciplines could prevail in part due to their 
institutionalisation in universities. The same scholars who faced the dilemma of historical 
practice and academic theory had championed the German university model in the USA, 
which in many respects was at the roots of the dilemma itself: it concerned the 
relationship between science and politics, as Max Weber had discussed in the 
Prussian/German context.76  
The legitimacy of science is based on distinguishing it from non-scientific interests. As 
seen, international lawyers did this by constructing a separation between their own 
knowledge, and the world of subjective, engaged politics, seen to be embodied in the 
balance of power. However, the legitimacy of science also builds on demonstrating 
compatibility between science and the public interest. This came into the spotlight in the 
USA in the 1950s and 1960s, when a cycle of social protests questioned the traditional 
duality between science and politics. This triggered ‘new ways to maintain credibility 
simultaneously as objective scientists and as political actors serving the public good’.77 
For example, various public-interest science organisations were formed in the USA, 
representing ‘pure’ science but with the responsibility to serve the public good.78  
Scholars sought to demonstrate ‘their commitment to serving the public without 
undermining the sources of their real political utility: the claim that scientific evidence is 
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untainted by political interests’.79 This is the important boundary work that goes into the 
establishment of a scientific disciplinary jurisdiction,80 which is not dependent on internal 
factors only – not even as regards ‘purely scientific’ contents. These dynamics were 
evident in the USA in general, but assumed particular urgency with the establishment of 
International Relations.  
 
Speaking truth to power  
One reason why early IR scholars insisted on a scientific justification for practical ends 
was the new situation of the USA after the world wars, having to cope with the 
‘necessity’ of exercising global hegemony.81 IR scholars set out to educate the USA about 
the real practice of world politics – as opposed to the abstractions of internationalism and 
international law, with Wilson’s anti-balance of power stance and illusive moral 
‘crusades’ being the prime example.82 Morgenthau’s A New Foreign Policy for the United 
States even offered an instructional to-do list of seven points for US foreign policy as its 
conclusion.83 Arnold Toynbee warned that the USA was ‘unprepared to assume its new 
hegemonic responsibilities’ after the transfer of power that had taken place following two 
world wars. He urged the Rockefeller Foundation to prepare the USA for this.84 The 
Foundation organised the 1954 Conference, intended to provide the necessary intellectual 
groundwork to educate US foreign policy practitioners. The central theme was the tension 
between the requirements of scholarly knowledge production on the one hand, while 
being relevant to international political practice and foreign policy on the other. From the 
start, the scholarly discipline of IR was linked to engaged political practice.85 
Unlike the field of international law, which used the balance of power to construct and 
uphold a distance to political practice, IR scholars deliberately construed their view as 
being the purely ‘practical’ aspects of politics. Many pioneers in the field subscribed to 
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some kind of Weberian or Nietzschean view of the human condition as clashing wills to 
power, between national positions, often resting on historical foundations. Early IR 
scholars were therefore troubled with the effects of the historical arguments addressed in 
previous chapters of this project, with a marked difference between practical-political and 
abstract-theoretical knowledge. Scientific reason and political action were not necessarily 
commensurable – but this gap now had to be bridged, or at least clarified. As Reinhold 
Niebuhr noted, all contributions to the Conference on International Politics dealt with ‘the 
relationship of theory to practice’.86 
The ‘reality check’ of early realist IR theories, then, ultimately referred to the world of 
political practice, not to scholarly knowledge.87 However, realism also needed a scientific 
justification, not least because of the import of German university ideals to the USA. The 
problem is, if the balance of power is based on practical, engaged knowledge, acting as 
one is ‘thrown’ into the world as Heidegger put it, and this is the benchmark for 
assessment, why would realism need a theoretical justification at all? It needs one, 
because if ‘tradition’ is all there is, that would undermine the realist claim to ‘realness’, as 
opposed to idealism or normative liberalism.88  
 
The balance of power in IR 
Precisely because they were relatively isolated as scientists, scholars could legitimately 
give advice to policymakers. Confronted with an all-pervasive web of rationalisation, not 
only in academia but also throughout society, a scientific defence was needed – to 
establish IR as a discipline, and to be able to serve the public interest and be relevant to 
policymakers in the new ‘American century’. Therefore, in order to communicate 
effectively with policymakers and boost their own scientific credibility, IR theory would 
have to be connected to the dominant and broadly accepted ‘Cold War rationality’89 that 
emphasised science as consisting of laws and regularities.  
                                                          
86 ‘Minutes from the Conference on International Politics. May 7–8, 1954’, in Guilhot, The Invention, p. 
240. 
87 Guzzini, ‘The Enduring Dilemmas’, p. 546. 
88 Ibid., p. 548. 
89 See Erickson et al., How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind. 
297 
 
 
 
The answer to practical problems like the above is often, as sociologists of science have 
shown, to make ‘specific kinds of rhetorical claims and by organizing around objects as 
subjects of legitimate action’.90 Abstractions are needed to legitimate a separate 
professional jurisdiction,91 and in IR, given the dilemma between historical practical 
tradition and theory, the balance-of-power concept was well suited to cater for all these 
needs, as a foundation for authoritative knowledge about international politics.  
The problem was that, because a scientific justification was needed, the distinction 
between theory and practice became less clear-cut. To have legitimacy, a theory of 
International Relations had to be constructed in the language of science – but how to add 
a theoretical justification onto the more ‘practical wisdom’ advocated by these scholars? 
As shown in the previous chapter, some Prussian and German authors had maintained that 
theory was unnecessary for theoreticians and practitioners alike, since practical 
knowledge was superior in any case. Now, however, needing a theoretical justification, 
the new rhetoric in IR was that ‘the maxims of practical knowledge are a scientific 
theory’ – practice was already a theory, so there was no need for a new one, or for any 
abstract models.92 What IR scholars meant by ‘theory’, then, ‘had a highly practical 
value’.93 It was a praxeology for guiding policy and defining the purpose of political 
leadership.94 The rhetorical strategy employed was to make practice its own theory. The 
historical practice of the balance of power became its own theory, as a conservative 
defence of the historical reservoir of practical human knowledge on how to conduct 
prudent and situation-aware foreign policy and international politics. In turn, this 
‘solution’ to the distinction between theory and practice – that practice is its own theory –
predisposed any theory of International Relations to be a theory of the status quo, 
privileging tradition.95 
That being said, making the balance of power the principal theoretical element of IR was 
not only the result of a strategic decision to become more relevant to policymakers 
through establishing scientific authority – it was also what was genuinely seen to be 
closest to a theory when one searched for historical, empirical regularities. Morgenthau, 
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for example, wrote that it was ‘this repetitive character of international politics, that is, 
the configurations of the balance of power, that lends itself to theoretical 
systematization’.96 The practice of the balance was introduced into a new context: that of 
a legitimating move for a new disciplinary jurisdiction based on science, formalised as a 
practical ‘maxim’ – and, for precisely that reason, deemed as close to a theory of 
international relations as was possible.  
If the balance of power is considered the defining practice of international relations and if 
a theory is needed to establish IR as a scientific discipline, then the balance of power 
concept is what allowed the IR discipline to exist and turn out the way it did. In this 
sense, then, IR is yet another effect of balance-of-power rhetoric.  
 
Weber, Morgenthau, and the balance of power 
Realists like Morgenthau were above all concerned with politics. Many feared that 
politics itself would succumb to the abstract reasoning and scientism of behavioural, 
experimental ‘situations’, with a right or wrong answer to the question of how to act 
within given parameters.97 Politics defied science and reason by its very nature. However, 
if one were to understand politics scientifically, this should be done by distilling 
prudential maxims for action, not abstract scientific principles.98  
Morgenthau wrote that ‘politics must be understood through reason, yet it is not in reason 
that it finds its model’ – that was rather in the acute awareness of the specificities of a 
given historical situation, and with reference to tradition. History was background 
knowledge of experiences, a laboratory of prudent policy from which to draw practical 
maxims.99 Thus, for Morgenthau, concepts like the balance of power always referred to a 
specific political situation: they were not the legal abstractions of international law.  
His criticism of liberalism concerned exactly this: liberal concepts were ‘abstract 
generalities which may be applied to any political situation but which are not peculiar to 
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any particular one’.100 These lines from the poet Robert Bridges offer a concise summary 
of Morgenthau’s position: ‘Our stability is but balance; and wisdom lies / in masterful 
administration of the unforeseen’.101 
Many publications have discussed Morgenthau and his work.102 Most note the tensions in 
Morgenthau’s writing: between an international society and Realpolitik,103 between 
tradition and science,104 between the normative and the descriptive,105 and between the 
religious and ‘worldly’.106 In my view, all these tensions, which these authors have 
correctly identified, are instances of the negotiation between abstraction and reality, 
theory and practice. As Morgenthau’s core concept is the balance of power, he is 
therefore part of a centuries-long debate over the reality of the concept.  
Richard Little107 argues that the main tension in Morgenthau’s work is that between an 
associational view of the balance, seeing it as part of an international society, and an 
adversarial use of the balance, whose emergence I traced historically in the previous 
chapter. I hold that the tension in Morgenthau’s treatment of the balance lies rather in his 
mixing of the balance of power as empirical and analytical claim. Morgenthau, 
throughout Politics Among Nations, for example, writes about the balance of power – ‘it’ 
– as doing things. But the book is also full of quotes from diplomats and political 
practitioners, ‘thrown’ into and facing the world at various different historical junctures, 
and using balance-of-power rhetoric. Morgenthau talks about the balance being used also 
as a pretext to cover for other interests. In turn, Morgenthau the scholar uses all quotes to 
support his project of establishing an analytic of international politics, based on the 
balance of power.  
Not only did Morgenthau and IR reject the abstractions of international law. As opposed 
to the calculations and predictions associated with the nuclear arms race and the ‘balance 
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of terror’, Morgenthau rejects the possibility of measuring and calculating the balance 
with any precision – ‘the uncertainty of power calculations’, he writes, ‘is inherent in the 
nature of national power itself’.108 Despite being ‘uncertain, unreal, and inadequate’,109 
the balance of power still remains the basis for a general theory of international politics. 
Morgenthau rejects the basis for a behaviourist theory, instead embracing historical 
regularities as its own theory, built into the world, so to speak. Since the balance cannot 
be calculated, it cannot be applied, and it is therefore ‘unreal’, he writes. However, this 
only means that a ‘nation must try to have at least a margin of safety which will allow it 
to make erroneous calculations and still maintain the balance of power’.110 The balance is 
both unreal and real: it is ‘precise’ because of its vagueness. Every state must aim for 
superiority, and not explicitly for a balance of power. However, the balance is still a result 
of this struggle for power. Here we have it, clear as day: the tension I started out with in 
the introduction and Chapter 1, in the balance being both analytical device and practical 
politics. 
What is it, then – ‘practice’, or ‘theory’? According to Morgenthau, the balance of power 
was at some point discovered. The balance had been operating for thousands of years; it 
was then discovered in the 16th century, and thereafter increasingly made into an object 
for theoretical reflection. Still, it is the same balance all along, defined as a stable, 
historical practice. What Morgenthau does not address is the reflection upon reflections, 
which is what he himself is doing. Morgenthau’s own work remains unclearly positioned 
between practice and theory, with elements of both thrown into the mix. This is a result of 
the aim of making practice its own theory – of integrating a concern with practical 
maxims, with the requirements of a science of IR for public usefulness. 
The scholarly distinction between theoretical and empirical claims concerning the balance 
of power, and between analysis and practice, became confounded as the scholarly field of 
IR was being formed. Although Morgenthau was influenced by Max Weber’s substantive 
writings on power politics, because of his own opposition to ‘liberal abstractions’, he 
could not take the full Weberian route – the only sort of theory that was allowed 
concerned the historical regularities of the practice of state élites, which in turn is how 
things really are. There is theory, but it is limited by the real-world practices of state elites 
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and their theorisation. Morgenthau’s methodology did not allow for the introduction of 
new theoretical concepts that were not rooted in practice. He was ‘stuck’ with the balance 
– a concept seen as being the reality of prudent and traditional diplomatic practice.111   
In this, there is no space for the analyst, no space for a Weberian reflective distance to the 
world. Realists did not prioritise science, other than deferring to the scientific orthodoxy 
of the day because of concerns for legitimacy. The Weberian prioritisation of science or 
political judgement, as in sociology, was not possible because the emphasis on traditional 
practices, automatically limiting what the world really is. The scientific legitimation of 
the realist was the very limited one of making practice its own theory.112 
Practice became its own theory when the early ‘realists’ in the USA intended to distil 
maxims from the 18th century into social scientific theory. Other rules of validity would 
then apply.113 In contrast to the more positive sciences, like sociology or indeed 
international law, the IR discipline experienced no ‘Weberian moment’ in its early history 
emphasising social science, because of the conservative bias of relying on traditional 
practice as its own theory. There was no space for reflecting upon and making the 
constitutive differences between scholarly knowledge and that of practitioners into a 
foundation for scientific theory. This is reflected in the fact that much IR theory still 
operates with the ideal that scholarly language should imitate the language of 
practitioners, a suggestion not observed in practice, nor logically required on any level.114  
 
Conclusions 
As seen, the emphasis on the ‘public interest’ of Europe, or a European international 
society, had disappeared. The state was a first principle of international politics, and the 
balance of power implied national positions. To fashion their own professional 
jurisdiction, international law rejected the balance, also rejecting what international 
lawyers themselves started calling ‘international anarchy’ in the last three decades of the 
19th century, as a way of describing the operation of what they considered the politically 
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engaged balance of power, as opposed to the scientific search for principles of 
government.  
The 19th and 20th century disputes, contentions, and debates involving the balance of 
power moved into the emergent academic field of IR, which sustained and reproduced the 
concept, creating a disciplinary jurisdiction for IR. The balance of power concept, 
imported from Germany, was appropriated in IR to account for the practices that were 
grouped together to form the concept itself.115 IR scholars appropriated the concept of the 
balance of power to provide a theory of real, practical politics, as opposed to the 
abstractions of lawyers and liberal political leaders alike.  
Not only was the balance of power imported to America from the German tradition. Also 
the view of education and the separation between politics and academia came from 
Germany. Thus, the balance of power concept came to America with the need for a 
theory to justify its existence as something separate from politics, something with a value 
of its own, which could consequently be applied to politics. A balance of power theory 
was also needed to construct the emerging discipline of IR.  
The balance of power became a solution to the tension between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ 
because of its vagueness. It is worth noting that at the 1954 Conference on International 
Politics, the details of the balance of power were not discussed at length. Nor in much of 
the most prominent work on the balance by early realists is there much detailed 
discussion of what the balance of power as theoretical concept really entails and means, 
except for references to historical cases as ‘prototypes’, and highly general formulations. 
And this, exactly, was the advantage: in its vagueness lies its specificity, as contingent 
political practice.  
Practice was its own theory, and there was no attempt to turn practice into the basis for a 
social science. Building on Prussian and German influences, IR experienced no later 
‘Weberian moment’ whereby a reflective distance to practical politics could be upheld. 
Without any reflexive distance, the result is a tautology – the analytical concept of the 
balance of power is justified because it reflects the practitioner’s concept of a balance of 
power.  
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Conclusions 
 
More goes into a concept than what can be formalised and made explicit in a definition: 
that has been one of my starting assumptions. Strictly bounded and formalised concepts 
will leave too much out of the account.1 Still, there can be precision in vagueness, which 
does not prevent using words in a manner perfectly suited for their purposes – as Keynes 
said, ‘you can think accurately and effectively long before you can, so to speak, 
photograph your thoughts’.2 The concept of the balance of power is vague and 
indeterminate in this way, also because it emerged from a practical tradition of use and 
from practical maxims, and was only gradually imported into what came to be academia 
and science. This has resulted in the dilemma between the balance of power as a category 
of analysis, where its use is judged according to pre-established standards of what we call 
‘scientific research’, and as a category of practice, where its use is judged according to 
whatever historical, contextual and intersubjective understandings and purposes might 
have been present at a particular time and place. 
This study has traced the genealogy of the balance-of-power concept empirically and 
concretely – from its emergence in England in the mid-17th century based on a domestic 
republican tradition, to its elaboration at the British-founded University of Göttingen in 
Hanover, on to Prussia and Germany, before finally ending up in the USA with the 
emergence of the discipline of International Relations (IR). I have shown how the 
development of the balance of power is closely linked to the conceptions of polities and 
their relations. Therefore, the stability or instability of the international system or the 
international order has less to do with the balance of power ‘itself’, than with the 
deployment of that concept in practice.  
As opposed to treating the concept as a ‘law’ or timeless principle of international 
politics, I identified four inflection points in the trajectory of the balance of power, and 
one episteme shift. The balance of power was not a stock-in trade ‘realist’ concept from 
the beginning: the episteme shift concerns how the balance of power shifted, from being a 
concept built on republican argumentation of protecting the common and public interest 
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of Europe from threats of dominance and ‘Universal Monarchy’, and came to draw more 
on liberal arguments – not protecting anything, but concerned with atomistic nation-states 
in competition and with national positions.  
I have examined how actors have used and invoked the concept in public settings. Here 
one paradox is that as IR appropriated the concept of the balance of power as a key 
theoretical term, the use of the concept seems to have waned amongst practising 
politicians and diplomats. I have not been able to identify many controversies that 
centrally involved the balance of power since the 1954 Rockefeller ‘Conference on 
International Politics’. Indeed, science and academia, by heeding traditions of statecraft 
and practice, and incorporating these into structural theories, have been ‘conservative’ in 
the most literal sense – conserving and retaining a practical concept from the past in 
analytical garb. 
That being said, however, today we may be witnessing a new foregrounding of the 
balance of power as a concept in the international politics of the early 21st century.  
The Obama administration has recently argued for an ‘East Asia-Pacific Rebalance’, 
‘positioning the United States to better promote its interests as the center of global 
politics’.3 China has reacted to the US balancing rhetoric, pointing out in a party/state-
approved spring 2013 Defence White Paper that ‘some country [the United States] has 
strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the 
region, and frequently makes the situation there tenser’.4 According to Vice Minister in 
the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, He Yafei, the ‘rebalance’ worries China ‘in so far as 
it has many negative connotations.’5 
In summing up the negative connotations, and countering the US balance rhetoric, China 
has invoked the supposed ‘ancient roots’ of the balance-of-power concept, arguing that 
the USA and China, ‘the incumbent superpower and the biggest rising developing nation’, 
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‘face the dilemma of falling into the “Thucydides Trap”’6 – referring to the Melian 
Dialogue, where Thucydides stated that ‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer 
what they must’ – taken to be an expression of the balance-of-power idea. However, 
China ‘does not subscribe to the outdated logic that a country will inevitably seek 
hegemony when it grows strong […] China will never follow the path of big powers 
which seek hegemony once they grow strong.’7 
In 2002, one year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Bush’s Assistant for National 
Security Affairs, Condoleezza Rice, delivered a lecture entitled ‘A Balance of Power that 
Favors Freedom’.8 President Bush’s National Security strategy, she explained, ‘calls on 
America to use our position of unparalleled strength and influence to create a balance of 
power that favors freedom’ against ‘tyrants’ and ‘terrorists’. 
Further, ‘today’s threats come less from massing armies than from small, shadowy bands 
of terrorists’, and just as the 19th century politicians at the Congress of Vienna had argued 
concerning the ‘equilibrium’ of Europe, Rice held that threats come ‘less from strong 
states than from weak or failed states’. Further, as was the case during the Congress and 
beyond, the balance of power can justify preventive attacks: ‘our Nation is properly 
focused as never before on preventing attacks against us before they happen […] as a 
matter of common sense, the United States must be prepared to take action when 
necessary, before threats have fully materialized’. 
The influence of liberal arguments is evident in a statement that almost echoes Woodrow 
Wilson’s ‘new diplomacy’ that aimed to replace the old practices of secret diplomacy and 
balance of power, but now linked to a new balance of power: ‘We have an historic 
opportunity to break the destructive pattern of great power rivalry that has bedeviled the 
world since the rise of the nation state in the 17th century’.9  
                                                          
6 Ibid. 
7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2014. ‘Xi Jinping Delivers Important 
Speech in Germany, Stressing China Will Unswervingly Adhere to the Path of Peaceful Development’, 
Available at: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpzxcxdsjhaqhfbfwhlfgdgblshlhgjkezzzbomzb_666590/
t1143914.shtml [28.12.2015]. 
8 Rice, Condoleezza. 2002. A Balance of Power that Favors Freedom. Wriston Lecture, 01 October 2002. 
New York: Manhattan Institute. Available at: https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/2002-wriston-
lecture-balance-power-favors-freedom-5566.html  [28.12.2015]. 
9 Ibid. 
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The possibilities of arguing for and against the balance of power in today’s debates are 
conditioned by the historical arguments concerning the concept from 19th-century 
Germany, and how these were later introduced in a US context. The development from 
republicanist protection of the public interest to the individuation of states reached its full 
fruition in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when the state became the first principle 
of international politics, and the balance was firmly associated with the practices of 
nation-states, emphasising the interaction of national positions in an ‘international 
anarchy’. This had allowed Bismarck to dismiss Europe as a ‘geographical notion’. And it 
was that Prussian/German state-centric conception of the balance that came to bear on the 
discipline of IR in the USA.  
To understand how the conception of states as we know them in IR has emerged, it is 
crucial to realize how, earlier in the 19th century, the balance of power had been re-
appropriated by liberally inclined politicians, and used to argue for the independence of 
all states and against the public interest, then embedded in the ‘equilibrium’ promoted by 
the interventionist great powers in the Congress of Vienna.  
The way in which the public interest was conceptualised led to changes in the uses of the 
balance of power. Those who challenged the Congress of Vienna creatively re-invented 
the balance of power as the principal means of protecting state independence. The debate 
over the nature of the public interest thus stood between independent states versus the 
Congress diplomats’ focus on intervening in the domestic affairs of smaller states in order 
to protect the social ‘equilibrium’.  
Those who challenged the Concert of Europe argued that the international order and 
national independence are clearly separated, and the latter cannot be sacrificed for the 
former. In these arguments the balance-of-power concept made a surprising return. One 
had to return to the ‘classical’ balance of power, but now against the Concert equilibrium 
as an expression of the public interest, against the great-power hegemony, or the 
‘collective Universal Monarchy’, which was the Concert of Europe in the early decades 
of the 19th century.   
Seen in retrospect, the rhetoric surrounding the Congress of Vienna is one source of 
international anarchy as a problem, because the Congress marks the first step on the way 
to individuating ‘power states’ and national positions. From Vienna on, the central 
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problem of international order increasingly turns on how to overcome anarchy between a 
certain number of measureable units with definable national positions – which originates 
in liberal styles of argumentation, against the republican focus on the orderly public 
interest as protection against arbitrary rule and dominance.  
It was from here on that the balance of power increasingly emphasised national positions. 
The problem of a (European) order was not empire, not the public interest of Europe, but 
managing a delimited number of states and their interactions. 
This, in turn, is indicative of an episteme shift: developments in the 19th century, after the 
Napoleonic Wars, reveal a major difference from the previous century. The rhetorical 
core of the concept of the balance of power shifts. The balance of power moves away 
from a general concern for the protection of the European public interest, and begins to 
centre on liberal freedoms and responsibility in the interplay between private interests, 
and concretely measurable and individuated states, which are to be protected from 
interference. 
Whereas after the episteme shift, the ‘liberty’ to be protected was now more attuned to 
Hobbes’ individualised definition of freedom as the ‘absence of interference’, it had 
previously been concerned with the systemic ‘absence of arbitrary power’. The main 
concern in the 18th century had been to secure a communal liberty from systemic 
dominance and oppression – a republican defence of the public interest, or the 
commonwealth of Europe.  
Those who reintroduced the balance in the 19th century harked back to this earlier period, 
citing the historical examples of the Ochakov controversy – where Prime Minister Pitt 
had been unsuccessful in using balance-of-power rhetoric to counter Russia’s occupation 
– and the divisions of Poland in the name of a ‘false’ balance of power, to show what 
could happen if one neglected the balance of power, or used it in the wrong way. In the 
Ochakov controversy, interventions had emerged as a problem sui generis, based on 
precisely this distinction between the balance of power as useless abstraction, and the real 
interest of Britain. The episteme shift, and the decline and then the return of the balance 
in the 19th century, drew on late 18th-century debates concerning the status of the balance 
as abstraction or reality. 
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Also present-day balancing rhetoric concerns this central issue, the interaction between 
scholars and policymakers, and the distinction between abstractions and reality. 
Concerning China, Obama’s National Security Adviser Tom Donilon argued against ‘the 
premise put forward by some historians and theorists that a rising power and an 
established power are somehow destined for conflict. There is nothing preordained about 
such an outcome. It is not a law of physics, but a series of choices by leaders that lead to 
great power confrontation.’10  
One commentator noted: ‘trained in historical fatalism and the realist theory of 
international politics, American analysts are inclined to think that a rising China will 
inevitably challenge U.S. interests and a collision between Beijing and Washington is all 
but certain’.11 If the U.S. believes it must prepare for this, it could have dangerous policy 
consequences. ‘However, mindful of this narrative, China offered to construct a new 
model of relations with the U.S. If successful, this attempt can help both sides to avert 
“the tragedy of great-power politics”, avoid the “Thucydides’ trap” and prove historical 
fatalism wrong’.  
In her speech, Condoleezza Rice favoured the practical-political reality over the 
abstractions of theory. She argued explicitly against the abstract debate between realists 
and idealists in International Relations, holding that they only ‘obscure reality’, whereas, 
in ‘real life, power and values are married completely’. Thus, ‘to build a balance of power 
that favors freedom, we must also extend the peace by extending the benefits of liberty 
and prosperity as broadly as possible’. 
The paradox between theory and practice, abstraction and reality, became particularly 
evident with the emergence of IR as an academic discipline, with all the associated 
sociological dynamics inherent to academia and professional fields, and the explicit 
commitment to the (social) sciences. The ‘conservative’ function of academia comes into 
effect once such maxims and practical experiences cease to be commonsensical and taken 
                                                          
10 In Lampton, ‘A New Type’. 
11 N.a. 2015. ‘Thinking Beyond Conflict’, China–U.S. Focus, June 01, 2015, Available at: 
http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/managing-differences-key-to-new-model-of-china-us-
relations/#sthash.Y3NEbL5d.dpuf [28.12.2015]. 
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for granted, but – as Stefano Guzzini notes – still must gain authority by recourse to 
arguments based on ‘how things really are’.12 
In arguing this, Guzzini points to the IR theory of realism. Because of this dilemma 
between the focus on traditional practices of diplomats on the one hand, and the need to 
legitimate this through theory, he argues, realism has failed to translate such maxims into 
scientific laws. The dilemma consists in that scholars must either concentrate on 
improving practical knowledge, or on ‘logical persuasiveness’ – but the one would 
undermine and discredit the other.13 
However, I have shown that this is a variant of the more general dilemma which emerged 
with Justi and others in the mid-1700s, as seen in Chapter 4, between reliance on tradition 
and objective, detached explanations of why this is relevant for our times, on the basis of 
efficiency and utility, and also on some universal principle – be it ‘truth’, ‘natural law’, 
‘natural philosophy’, religion, or modern-day social science. Ultimately, it is a dilemma 
between abstract, universalist categories (however justified) and categories of ‘real’ 
practice (however defined). The universalist impulse must point to an unshakeable reality 
that cannot be overcome. To be relevant, the practical must counter such constructs. 
When these two come together, various forms of the same dilemma occur – between 
conservatism opposing abstract, ideal constructs, and the radical and critical, opposing the 
apparent. The conservative is oriented towards the status quo, whilst the radical questions 
the traditional and aims to look behind the scenes to question that same status quo.14 This 
played out in the debates initiated by Justi in the mid-1700s, against the traditionalist 
defence of English, republican-inspired balance-of-power arguments. The distinction 
between abstraction and reality was triggered by debates at the British university in 
Hanover, Göttingen University, where the balance of power had become linked to 
international law, and the distinction made there between abstraction and reality.  
The balance-of-power principle itself had come to be opposed by using this distinction 
between useless and abstract knowledge on the one hand, and the real, practical and 
useful on the other. Individual state interests had become increasingly separate from the 
‘public interest’ of the system, through links to international law.  
                                                          
12 Guzzini, Stefano. 2004. ‘The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations’, European 
Journal of International Relations 10(4): 533–568, p. 535. 
13 Ibid., p. 546. 
14 Ibid., p. 553. 
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What was at stake at Göttingen was the balance-of-power concept as it had emerged in 
the context of the Dutch Wars of the late 17th century, used to oppose France. The balance 
of power had been employed against threats of hegemonic dominance – Universal 
Monarchy – to protect the public interest of Europe. The monarchs of Europe had 
represented their own polities, but they had to represent the public interest as well, which 
had been the common interest of Europe. It was here that the balance of power became 
stabilised as a concept, first linked to a European system, synchronising the domestic and 
the international according to English republican principles. 
After the balance of power had become a counter-concept to Universal Monarchy, 
hegemony was rejected in theory, so other orders than a European empire or res publica 
christiana had to be devised. The problem was in many ways one of imperial 
reconstitution. It addressed European order and governance in the positive sense as the 
promotion of a European public interest or ‘commonwealth’ (literally the ‘common 
wealth’, meaning ‘public welfare, general good’) and negatively as the opposition to 
universal monarchy (see Chapter 2). ‘Order’ did not then imply anarchy, as is so often 
assumed when discussing the balance of power. Rather, when studying the balance-of-
power rhetoric empirically, I find that it first appears as a means through which to 
establish hierarchies by means of authoritative justification. This hierarchy is visible 
already in the Utrecht Treaties; Austria tried to appeal to the dynastic order – but failed, 
as the balance of power was increasingly seen as a system to prevent any power from 
growing too big, and some polities gained a stronger claim to represent the ‘public 
interest’ than others (see Chapter 3). If the Congress of Vienna was largely a hierarchical 
affair, the Congress system of 1815–1822 had its origins in the systemic and hierarchical 
understanding of the balance of power, which picked up pace already from Utrecht on. 
We can now return to the Figure 1 from the introduction, which is a summary of what has 
been demonstrated in terms of the episteme shift: 
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Time 
Style of 
argumentation 
Interest 
Abstract-
theoretical 
knowledge 
Practical-applied 
knowledge 
18th century Republican 
Public 
(common good) 
 
European order and commonwealth; 
opposition to Universal Monarchy, 
dominance, and arbitrary rule. 
19th century Liberal 
Private 
(freedom and 
passions) 
Autonomy, 
independence, 
anti-intervention 
Statistics, 
measuring 
dispositions, 
capacity, 
influence, 
trajectories 
 
In light of this, in the relatively few present-day debates involving the balance of power, 
the same mechanism applies: the balance of power is contingently linked to other 
concerns, serving as a rhetorical resource or script that policymakers seize onto.  
The balance of power is being linked to a new, broad array of developments. For instance, 
in the Obama administration’s ‘East Asia-Pacific Rebalance’, the argument is that ‘efforts 
and investments should be rebalanced towards Asia to develop and strengthen ties […] 
support effective regional institutions […] increase trade and investment […] promote 
democratic development […] addressing health and environmental problems […] expand 
people-to-people ties’, in addition to ensure that ‘our military presence in the region 
effectively supports the full range of our engagement’.15 The rebalance involves 
‘positioning the United States to better promote its interests’, but also to ‘support peace 
and prosperity’. And as noted, the Bush administration linked the balance of power to 
universalist liberal freedoms, and to the fight against terrorism, as well as to protecting 
US preponderance in collaboration with ‘all nations that favour freedom’.16 In a hybrid 
way, the USA is linking the balance to values like peace and prosperity, as well as to 
                                                          
15 U.S. Department of State, The Rebalance. 
16 Rice, A Balance of Power. 
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classical arguments concerning preponderance and hegemony, whereas China is warning 
against balance-of-power rhetoric and its implications. 
Albeit still sparsely used, this is a new potential inflection point: after the state-centrism 
of the 20th century, new links are made between the balance-of-power concept and an 
array of new concerns beyond the state (terrorism being a case in point) – but also 
expanding the sphere of validity for invoking the balance of power to include the 
promotion and protection of liberal values in domestic societies to defend a particular 
version of international order, or the ‘public interest’. In some respects, the use of the 
concept seems to have moved away from the 20th-century preoccupation with 
individuated states, and once again back to a preoccupation with the public interest, but 
now in a different way: it is not used to protect the preponderance of the USA as a 
‘balancer’ (as with Britain historically), but to protect the US-led liberal world order 
itself, and the values associated with it. We might be witnessing a return to something not 
unlike the earlier, republican-inspired episteme.  
That would, however, not be the functionalist argument of the English School that the 
balance of power is an institution of international society – but rather that political actors 
today are contingently seizing on the rhetorical resource represented by the balance-of-
power concept, to use this ingrained concept for new purposes, in turn being contested by 
China, amongst others. Once again, what the public interest is and is not is being 
contested by means of the concept of the balance of power.  
And once again, the importance of the balance of power lies in its value as a 
consequential rhetorical tool rather than as a mechanism that exists ‘out there’ or 
something that can be actually achieved. This does not mean that it is not real, that it is 
some kind of ‘chimera’ – only that it cannot be reduced to an idea, or to an objective 
account of ‘material interests’. This applies also to present-day international politics, 
including the community of IR researchers. Any conflict between China and the USA, for 
instance, would then not necessarily be a result of any objective shift in the balance of 
power. Rather, ‘shifts’ in the balance of power have been and are governed more by how 
the concept itself is deployed, domestically as well as across borders, than by any material 
or territorial assessment of power capabilities, or any refinement of ideas or concepts. 
Here Lebow and Valentino offer an appropriate assessment of today’s debates: 
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Should war come between the United States and China in the future it will not be a result 
of a power transition. The greater risk is that conflict will result from the misperception 
that such a transition is imminent […] Security discourses in China and elsewhere in Asia 
– much more than in Europe – tend to take its fundamental propositions as verities. It 
would be ironic if US-China relations deteriorated because each power based its 
expectations on how the other will behave on theories that lack empirical validation. 17 
 
Reflexions 
I started this project with a section on methodologies, ontologies and genealogies. 
Clarifying methodological differences has been important for what I do in this project, but 
also empirically, as a crucial point concerns how differences in what claims can 
legitimately be made depend on different communities and their standards of evaluation – 
which is also a historical phenomenon with consequences.  
Being able to capture both these aspects, the agency of both myself as scholar and of 
those I study, is one benefit of my methodology. Focusing on the participants in historical 
phenomena, and on their accounts, is not sufficient in itself. Methodology inevitably 
comes into play, and a genealogy is explicit about the inevitability of a view from the 
present. As argued in Chapter 1, the researcher’s ‘stances’ are the foundation for 
methodologies and, ultimately, for research itself. As Hanna Pitkin aptly put it,  
a ‘purely observational’ social science independent of our existing conceptual system in 
the realm of action might or might not be possible, might or might not be interesting or 
useful; but it could not tell us the things we now want to know about society and politics. 
It could not answer the questions we now can formulate, for they are formulated in the 
concepts we have.18  
My focus on the balance of power as a ‘category of practice’ on the one hand implies that 
my genealogy of the balance of power as a concept, emphasising contingency and 
controversies, rejects any moral definition of or value judgement about what kind of a 
‘balance of power’ is politically desirable. On the other hand, and more importantly, what 
                                                          
17 Lebow, Richard Ned and Benjamin Valentino (2009) ‘Lost in Transition: A Critical Analysis of Power 
Transition Theory’, International Relations 23(3): 389–410, p. 408.  
18 In Coates, The Claims, p. 107. 
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is consequently not rejected is the practical competence of political action and political 
judgement. This genealogy is therefore ‘value-free’ in the sense that it has empirically 
assessed all such normative value-claims as facts – but it is certainly value-laden, because 
it appraises ‘the activity of politics as a way of life’.19 
Both ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ are political in this sense, and the common denominator for 
the conflict between the assumed ‘practice’ and ‘theory’ distinction is precisely the lack 
of a ‘reflective distance to its own construction’.20 In this study, I have sought not to 
commit similar errors.  
The balance of power, I have argued, is most often used as an analytical and theoretical 
term, specified and confined by scholars within today’s social science disciplines, but 
divorced from the very reason why the concept is relevant and interesting for us in the 
first place.21 At the same time, many IR scholars are practically involved in two different, 
broad communities with different rules, procedures, methodological demands, and 
standards for evaluating knowledge: there is the research community, and there is the 
(past and present) community of diplomats and practitioners of politics. That as such is 
not a problem. The problem is that some approaches in IR seek to establish and maintain 
an affinity between the concepts used in both communities: the balance of power as a 
concept used in scholarship, and as used amongst those involved in political processes, is 
ultimately treated as one and the same thing.  
I started this project and constructed my research puzzle by separating the balance of 
power as ‘category of analysis’ from the balance as ‘category of practice’ in order to get 
at a different way of investigating the balance of power. The IR discipline has treated the 
balance of power almost exclusively as a category of analysis. That is still true. However, 
in the course of this project, I have come to realise that this, my research problem, is itself 
a result of the historical uses of the balance of power – from the debate between 
abstractions and reality at Göttingen, to the conservation of the concept as category of 
analysis in the IR discipline, paradoxically as practice became its own theory. In 
investigating the balance of power empirically, I have also explained how that research 
                                                          
19 Palonen, Kari. 2002. ‘The History of Concepts as Style of Political Theorizing’, European Journal of 
Political Theory 1(1): 91–106, p. 103. 
20 Guzzini, Stefano. 2013. ‘The Ends of International Relations Theory: Stages of Reflexivity and Modes of 
Theorizing’, European Journal of International Relations 19(3): 521–541, p. 530. 
21 Guzzini, Stefano. 2013. ‘In the Beginning was Conceptualisation’, pp. 3–14 in Fredrik Bynander and 
Stefano Guzzini (eds), Rethinking Foreign Policy. Abingdon: Routledge, p. 6. 
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question became possible in the first place and how the problematic situation I identify at 
the root of the puzzle – how the balance of power as an empirical phenomenon has been 
exempt from investigation – itself is a result of that empirical history. I have now come 
full circle.  
The point is not that this invalidates my puzzle or the points made in the introduction. 
Quite to the contrary: one result of this project is also an explanation of how I can pose 
the initial question. The empirical investigation has come to the point where it offers an 
explanation also of the conditions of possibility for my own initial question or puzzle. 
The investigation of the practical effects of the balance of power as a concept now 
includes this effect as well: the balance of power made IR as we know it possible – it is 
one of the foundational analytical concepts for the IR discipline, of which I am a part.   
If ‘great debates’ and the various ‘-isms’ are no longer the focus of IR theory, analysis of 
concepts should be, because that is what we have in common, and what connects 
communities across time and space. Scholars need to cast the net wider and deeper into 
the past in studying key concepts in practice and in theory. By taking up this challenge, 
scholars of IR will also rewrite their own history.22 
It should by now be clear that this project, within the discipline of International Relations, 
is yet another effect of the long and winding trajectory of the balance-of-power concept. 
To be sure, I have had to climb my own methodological hill, as that is the only way to get 
an overview of and describe the landscape. However, that same hill is not isolated from 
the geography – even though it can be hard to look down at your feet when an 
exhilarating panorama is unfolding all around you.   
 
 
                                                          
22 See Guzzini, ‘The Ends’. 
